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SUMMARY 
 
Decentralisation policies have been adopted by most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
expectation of improved service provision.  The benefits expected are two-fold:  a) 
decentralisation will lead to better coordination and collaboration between different parts 
of the state at the local level and b) decentralisation will lead to increased consultation and 
responsiveness of local governments to their citizens.  In this thesis I seek to explain why 
these benefits are realised in some contexts and not others.  In most parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the predominant form of decentralisation is a combination of devolution and 
deconcentration. Often these two policies are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory.  
What are the processes through which such mixed systems work?    
 
This thesis attempts to understand how mixed systems of devolution and deconcentration 
work in practice through a comparative study of Five Municipal Health Directorates in 
Ghana.  The study explores the three sets of relationships that are critical for 
decentralisation to work well in such mixed systems a) between the Health Directorate and 
the District Assembly administration, b) between the Health Directorate and the elected 
members of the District Assembly and c) between the Health Directorate and selected civil 
society organisations working on health.   The work is based on detailed qualitative 
interviews in the five municipalities. 
 
The main finding is that informal ties between the Health Directorate and the three sets of 
actors mentioned above are helpful in explaining why coordination and consultation seem 
better in some municipalities than others.  Four kinds of ties are found to be important:  
ethnic/tribal links, family/kinship/neighbourhood relations, political party affiliations, and 
old-school networks. These ties between Municipal Health Directorates and senior officers 
of the Municipal Assemblies were found to facilitate Municipal Health Directorates‟ access 
to District Assemblies‟ Common Fund, which was controlled by the Municipal Assemblies. 
The existence of these ties between Municipal Health Directorates and elected Assembly 
members of Municipal Assemblies were found to enhance the quality of Municipal Health 
Directorates‟ policies and helped to gain public support. Finally, such ties between 
Municipal Health Directorates and leaders of selected Civil Society Organisations that 
iii 
 
 
 
mobilised around HIV and AIDS programmes were found to facilitate implementation of 
Municipal Health Directorates‟ policies around HIV and AIDS. 
 
The thesis‟ contribution is that it shows that informal linkages between different local 
bodies and between local government and civil society organisations seem important for 
improved coordination and collaboration among various actors, and better consultation with 
elected representatives of citizens and leaders of CSOs for effective service delivery at the 
local level. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 My inspiration for this research 
 
The inspiration for this research came from my experience as Assistant Development 
Planning Officer of the Ga District Assembly, Amasaman in the Greater Accra Region of 
Ghana over a decade ago.
1
 I performed a wide range of duties including preparing 
development plans, recording minutes during general Assembly meetings, and writing 
speeches for the District Chief Executive.
2
 I also had responsibility for the transport office 
when the transport officer travelled.  
 
I was intrigued by the difference between the official and unofficial rules for allocation of 
transport. The release of the Assembly‟s vehicles to heads of decentralised departments 
such as education, agriculture, and health was governed by the Local Government Act (Act 
462 of 1993). Normal practice was for department heads to write a letter requesting a 
vehicle to the District Chief Executive, copied to the Transport Officer. The Chief 
Executive‟s approval for the release of vehicle was based on the Transport Officer‟s 
determination. In most cases, the Chief Executive would approve on condition that the 
requesting officer would fuel the vehicle, and „smile‟ the driver.3 
 
I noticed that the Director of Health Services had easy access to the Assembly‟s vehicles. In 
addition, health issues considered at general Assembly meetings readily received the 
approval of the Presiding Member, the Chief Executive, District Coordinating Director, and 
                                                 
1
 The Ga District was one of the 3 administrative districts that constituted the Greater Accra Region at the 
time. The national capital, Accra, is located in the Greater Accra Region. Throughout this study I will use the 
phrase „District Assembly‟ and „the Assembly‟ interchangeably. The District Assembly is made up of two 
major groups. The first group comprises Executive Officers (the District Chief Executive, District 
Coordinating Director, District Planning Officer, District Budget Officer and the supporting staff). The 
second group is made up of Elected and Government Appointed Assembly members. 
2
 The District Chief Executive is the head of the Assembly appointed by the President of Ghana. He is the 
Mayor of the District. 
3
 A term used within the Assembly to mean that a senior officer will tip a junior officer or buy lunch for him 
or her. 
2 
 
 
 
most Assembly members.
4
 During this period the Director of Agriculture did not enjoy the 
same level of support from the Assembly or transport department and I wondered why.  
 
Discussions I had with senior staff revealed that the Chief Executive and the Health 
Director were good friends and were members of the same political party (the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC)), while the head of Agriculture Department was not a friend 
and belonged to the opposition party (the New Patriotic Party (NPP)). The existence of 
informal ties appeared to influence the allocation of resources and this sparked my interest 
in how they could facilitate or undermine improved service delivery within the 
decentralised system in Ghana. 
 
I saw the way in which strong informal relationships such as ethnic or tribal links, family, 
kinship or neighbourhood relations, political party ties and old-school networks could 
facilitate the work of public officers in a variety of public organisations as they collaborated 
in their efforts to deliver effective and responsive services to the poor. I also observed that 
informal ties at the local level had the power to undermine the efficient and effective use of 
resources even where formal legal and institutional arrangements existed for the 
coordination and effective delivery of services by different state institutions.
5
 
  
This thesis attempts to understand how informal relationships operate in mixed systems of 
devolution and deconcentration through a comparative study of Five Municipal Health 
Directorates in Ghana.  The study explores the three sets of relationships that are critical for 
decentralisation to work well in such mixed systems a) between the Health Directorate and 
the District Assembly administration, b) between the Health Directorate and the elected 
members of the District Assembly and c) between the Health Directorate and civil society 
organisations working on health.   The work is based on detailed qualitative interviews in 
the five municipalities.  The main finding is that four kinds of informal ties between the 
Health Directorate and the three sets of actors mentioned above are helpful in explaining 
                                                 
4
 The Presiding Member is the Speaker of the General Assembly. 
5
 In this study, the „local level‟ is the „Municipal level‟. This is important as the term “local” level can mean 
different things to different people in various countries (Appiah 2005: 17). 
3 
 
 
 
why coordination and consultation seem better in some municipalities than others. These 
are ethnic/tribal links, family/kinship/neighbourhood relations, political party affiliations, 
and old-school networks. 
 
This is how I organise this chapter. Following my inspiration for this research, I will 
describe decentralisation in Ghana with a focus on expectations of the decentralisation 
reforms. This discussion covers the devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health 
Directorates. I then point out conflicts in the decentralisation system with specific reference 
to the two major legal frameworks under which decentralisation reforms have been 
implemented, these are the Local Government Act 462 of 1993, and the Ghana Health 
Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 525 of 1996. The conflicts in the legal arrangements 
manifest in challenges of collaboration and coordination between the Assemblies and the 
Health Directorates. I therefore discuss problems of compliance with central government 
directives for the utilisation of the District Assemblies‟ Common Fund which is one area 
where there are problems with coordination and collaboration, and therefore the focus of 
this study. After this, I present an overview of existing studies on the District Assemblies 
and the Health Directorates and point out gaps in these studies. I then present my research 
questions, the approach I adopt for this study and the key arguments of the thesis.   
 
1.2 Decentralisation in Ghana: Devolution and Deconcentration 
 
The Ghanaian decentralisation reforms were made in the expectation that decentralisation 
would a) promote collaboration and coordination between decentralised institutions (World 
Bank 2004; Oxhorn 2004; Saito 2003; Oyugi 2000; Republic of Ghana 1993b; 1996a), and 
b) encourage consultation with citizens, whose lives are affected by policy decisions, to 
participate in shaping the outcomes of policy (Olowu 2006; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; 
World Bank 2004; Rondinelli 1981; 1983a; 1983b; 1990a; 1990b; Smith 1985; Maddick 
1963). 
 
The two areas subject to reform were local government and healthcare although they were 
decentralised in different ways „devolution‟ for local government and „deconcentration‟ for 
4 
 
 
 
healthcare. These terms are explained in more detail in chapter 2.In Ghana there are two 
separate pieces of legislations under which healthcare decentralisation has been 
implemented (Ayee 2008b; Sakyi 2007). The Local Government Act 462 of 1993 devolves 
healthcare delivery to District Assemblies by virtue of the fact that they are the main 
political authority at the local level. The second law, the Ghana Health Service and 
Teaching Hospitals Act 525 of 1996, deconcentrates healthcare delivery to Health 
Directorates at the local level. 
 
1.2.1 Devolution and Local Government in Ghana 
Local government systems had been in existence in Ghana throughout the colonial period 
and post-independence era (Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004). In 1989 the Provisional National 
Defence Council regime, under the populist government of Jerry Rawlings, gave a new face 
to decentralisation and local government in a way that attracted a lot of interest of 
Ghanaians who began to actively participate in the governance process of the country 
(Singleton 2006).  
 
At the time of conducting this research there were 10 administrative regions in the country.
6
 
For each administrative region a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) forms the highest 
political authority (see Figure 1). Each administrative region is further divided into districts 
for which the RCCs have responsibility for monitoring, coordinating and evaluating the 
overall performance of the districts. 
 
At the district level the District Assembly is the main political authority (Republic of 
Ghana 1992; 1993b) and depending on the population, it may be termed a District 
(population of 75,000), Municipality (population of 95,000), or Metropolitan Assembly 
(population of 250,000 and more) (see Figure 1).
7
 The Assemblies are the planning 
authorities which have overall responsibility for the development of areas under their 
                                                 
6
 There are debates to split a number of large regions for the purposes of administrative ease. 
7
 Municipal Areas are further divided into a number of Zonal Councils which are also divided into several 
sub-District structures (Unit Committees). For the District Assemblies, they are divided into 
Urban/Town/Area Councils with the Unit Committees at the bottom (refer to Figure 1). The Unit Committees 
serve as rallying points of local support for the development objectives of the Assemblies. 
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jurisdiction (Republic of Ghana 1993b). They are responsible for the general economic and 
social development of the district. They are also in charge of the development of basic 
infrastructure and provide municipal works and services.  
Figure 1: Local government structure and healthcare decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Republic of Ghana (1993b); and PPMED (Ghana Health Service), April 2009 
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In accordance with the local government system, in principle, the Assembly should have 
power over all decentralised departments which would include Health Directorates (see 
First Schedule, Section 38 of Act 462) (Republic of Ghana 1993b). Section 10 (1) of Act 
462 provides that a District Assembly shall exercise political and administrative authority 
in the district; provide guidance; give direction to, and supervise all other administrative 
authorities in the district. This implies that the Health Director should be under the 
authority of the Chief Executive. In practice however this does not seem to be the case as is 
explained in the following sections. 
 
1.2.2 Deconcentration of Healthcare delivery in Ghana  
Till the 1980‟s healthcare delivery in Ghana was fairly centralised.  To understand the 
rationale and implications of deconcentration of healthcare in Ghana a brief history of the 
role of public health in the country would be useful. 
 
Healthcare delivery during the colonial period focussed more on curative than preventive 
healthcare (Senah 2001). When Ghana gained independence in the late 1950s, the  existing 
healthcare system had seven important features: (i) the principle of cost-sharing, (ii) largely 
curative and urban oriented, (iii) central government as the largest provider of health 
service, (iv) subordination of indigenous healing systems to Western medicine, (v) a 
disadvantaged north in the provision of health infrastructural services, (vi) health outcome 
of life expectancy of 48 years, and (vii) infectious and parasitic diseases took a heavy toll 
on the life of children and adults (Senah 2001: 84). These characteristics of the health 
system left by the colonial administration have not changed much since then (Oppong and 
Hodgson 2010; Witter et al. 2007; Buor 2003; Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998; Asenso-Okyere 
1995).  
 
Currently healthcare in Ghana is provided by both public and private hospitals, clinics and 
health centres. About 92 per cent of urban residents have access to healthcare and in the 
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case of rural dwellers it is 45 per cent.
8
 Over 60 per cent of the population depends on 
public healthcare which has until recently focused on curative health. 
 
Comparatively, public health facilities are poorly equipped in terms of human capacity and 
modern medical technology. Salaries are low and the incentive to work is not attractive 
enough for health workers so many health professionals choose to work in the private 
health sector or migrate outside the country (Agyepong et al. 2004; Agyepong 1999; 
Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998). 
 
Private providers of health services are made up of four sub-groups:  Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) with a focus on public health services such as family planning and 
HIV and AIDS education awareness (Kyerekoh et al. 2002), missions or religious groups, 
for instance the Roman Catholic Church, the Islamic or Ahmadiya Mission, and the 
Presbyterian Church, these provide both preventive health and curative services. The third 
sub-group is the private for profit providers which mainly provide curative care. The last 
sub-group comprises traditional medical practitioners who also provide mainly curative 
care. Generally, the private health facilities provide better quality service as they are better 
equipped, they also pay better salaries and incentives such as better housing for their staff; 
consequently they are able to attract skilled staff. 
 
The problems experienced by Ghana‟s healthcare system range from underfunding9 to 
institutional inadequacies (Sakyi 2007; Larbi 1998; Asenso-Okyere 1995; Cassels and 
Janovsky 1992). The effect of inadequate funding as a consequence of the economic crises 
that hit the country in the late 1970s, coupled with inefficient use of available resources has 
been the delivery of poor health services. The response of the government in the early 
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 Accessibility is defined as living within one hour travel time by any means from health facility (Republic of 
Ghana 2002c). 
9
 The government has had difficulty in funding the health sector and therefore relies heavily on donor support. 
Waddington (1992) has shown that the level of donor funding has risen from about £3m in 1984 to over £11m 
in 1990. This constitutes an average of 45 per cent of total government health budget. Additionally the Ghana 
Health Service (2005a) shows that the proportion of national health budget earmarked from donor sources is 
over 60 per cent in 2001; 50 per cent in 2003; and 45 per cent in 2004. All these flows are not adequate to 
sustain health care for the entire population. 
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1980s which was driven by World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions 
was to reform the health sector as part of general public sector reform under a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Akonor 2006; Singleton 2006; Amponsah 2001; Oppong 
2001; Boafo-Arthur 1999). A number of reforms were therefore implemented from the mid 
1980s through to the 1990s.  Major changes were a shift of emphasis from curative to 
preventive health care;
10
 a shift from user fees to health insurance in healthcare financing;
11
 
and decentralisation of health care delivery (Republic of Ghana 2006c). 
 
Healthcare delivery has been administratively decentralised within Ghana‟s local 
government system
12
 since the mid 1980s. It involved a transfer of administrative authority 
for health service delivery from the central Ministry of Health (MoH) to Regional, 
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Health Directorates (refer to Figure 1) with the 
intention to make health services more responsive to local health needs (Republic of Ghana 
1993a). In tune with the New Public Management (NPM) approach, a Ghana Health 
Service was established by Act 525 of 1996 as an autonomous executive agency charged 
with responsibility for implementing national health policies under the direction of the 
Minister of Health. The responsibilities range from preventive, curative, restorative, and 
promotional care at the regional, district, sub-district, and community levels. The Ghana 
Health Service as a public service body receives public funds but its public sector 
employees are not part of the civil service. The Municipal Health Directors do not follow 
civil service directives, rules and procedures as they deliver health care at the decentralised 
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 The approach to healthcare now emphasises preventive care where communities take steps to reduce and 
prevent the occurrence of common diseases (Republic of Ghana 2001a; 2004c). In order to minimise the 
occurrence of diseases, a major component of the preventive health policy is devoted to the implementation of 
a programme of Community-Based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) across the country (Nyonator et al. 
2003) The CHPS programme seeks to bring health workers and local people close together to work to prevent 
diseases (Ghana Health Service 2005c). 
11
 A National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has been introduced with the passage of the National Health 
Insurance Regulations (L.I. 1809) in 2004 to replace the user fee policy. This shift is to address the problem 
of limited access to healthcare as most poor people could not afford to pay under the user fee which is 
popularly known by Ghanaians as „cash-and-carry‟ which was introduced in mid 1980s (Republic of Ghana 
2003b; 2004b; Abbey 2003; Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). At the time of the introduction of the NHIS in 2004 
about 80 per cent of the people resident in Ghana could not afford to pay out-of-pocket at the point of service 
use (Witter and Garshong 2009; Witter et al. 2007; Republic of Ghana 2004a; Waddington and Enyimayew 
1989). 
12
 This comprises the District, Municipal, and Metropolitan Assemblies (refer to Figure 1). 
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levels. According to the Ghana Health Service (2008), this autonomy is aimed at providing 
healthcare managers a greater degree of managerial flexibility to work at the lower levels in 
the districts.
13
 This flexibility could not be achieved if the Health Service worked within the 
civil service rules. 
 
In line with the decentralisation programme, there are 10 Regional Health Administrations 
(regional level) and 170 District Health Administrations (district level) and several Sub-
district health offices. This means that District, Municipal and Metropolitan Health 
Directorates exist at the same levels as District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies 
(Republic of Ghana 2006b) (refer to Figure 1). The District Director of health is formally 
responsible for the implementation of the policies and decisions of the Ghana Health 
Service Council. He is answerable to the Director-General through the Regional Director of 
Health Services in respect of health matters and to the District Chief Executive on matters 
relating to administration (Republic of Ghana 1996a). 
 
1.3 Conflict within the decentralised system 
 
A basic structural conflict was created by Act 462 and Act 525, neither of which defines 
how the Assemblies and the Health Directorates should work together.   Act 462 makes the 
Chief Executive the overall head of the Assembly but Act 525 does not address how the 
Health Director should report to the Chief Executive. This is due to a lack of clear 
distinction between the terms “health matters” and “matters relating to health 
administration” as stated in Act 525 (Republic of Ghana 1996a: 13). As a result most 
District Directors of Health tend to hold strong allegiances to their Regional Directors 
particularly as the Ministry of Health is their main source of funding.  
 
The enactment of the Local Government Service Act (Act 656) of 2003 does not appear to 
have made the attempt to effectively address these structural and legal contradictions 
between Acts 462 and 525. The Act 656 focuses more on how the Regional Coordinating 
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 http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/aboutus.php?inf=Background (accessed on 06.08.08) 
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Councils (RCCs) and District Assemblies (DAs) work with relatively weak reference to the 
Health Directorates or Act 525 in that sense, this is evidenced from the ways in which 
various sections of Act 656 make reference to the Health Directorates or provisions in Act 
525 (see Republic of Ghana 2003c); these are: 
 Section 4(e) which states that the Local Government Service Council shall “assist 
the Regional Coordinating Councils and the District Assemblies in the performance 
of their functions under the Local Government Act, 1993, (Act 462), the National 
Development Planning (Systems) Act, 1994, (Act 480) and under any other 
enactment; 
 Section 5(c), the “governing body of the Service is the Local Government Service 
Council. The Ghana Health Service shall be represented on the Council by one 
person”; 
 Section 6(j), “The Council shall have general management and control of the 
Service and shall work in consultation and close co-operation with other services of 
the public service; 
 Section 15(6)(c), “Establish, with the approval of the Council, systems for effective 
interservice and sectoral collaboration and co-operation between the Service, the 
Education Service, the Health Service, the Forestry Service and any other Services, 
to harmonise local government programmes and avoid duplication; and 
 Section 23(1) which states that “the departments of a District Assembly, shall be 
headed by heads of department of the District Assembly who shall be responsible 
for the efficient and effective performance of the functions and responsibilities 
assigned to the departments”, and (2) which also provides that “the heads of 
departments are answerable to the District Chief Executive through the District Co-
ordinating Director.” 
 
The various provisions fail to harmonise the conflicts in Acts 462 and 525. In fact, apart 
from the provisions in Section 15(6)(c), which seeks to set the basis for collaboration 
between the Health Directorate and the District Assembly, Section 23(1) and (2) appear to 
perpetuate the existing contradictions as it is unclear as to how the autonomy granted the 
11 
 
 
 
heads of the decentralised departments of the District Assembly under Section 23(1) is to 
be exercised with respect to the chain of authority, command and reporting system under 
Section 23(2), given that the Health Directorate remains strongly aligned to the Ghana 
Health Service through the Regional Director of Health under Act 525. 
 
Consequently, and in spite of the fact that healthcare delivery has been devolved to the 
Assemblies, in practice the Health Directorates wield a lot of influence mainly as they 
appear to be independent from the Assemblies‟ budget controls (Crawford 2010; Bossert 
and Joel 2002).  
 
Another potential reason for conflict between the Health Directorates and the Assemblies is 
that of all the decentralised departments, the Health Directorates appear to maintain a 
strong allegiance to their ministry. In addition, the Health Directorates control a part of the 
health budget beyond the control of the District Assemblies (Crawford 2010; 2009; Cassels 
and Janovsky 1992). 
 
The nature of Ghana‟s local government system and decentralised healthcare implies that a 
mixture of devolution and deconcentration should operate simultaneously under two 
conflicting legal and institutional provisions (Ayee 2008a; 2008b; Sakyi 2007; Mayhew 
2003). This combination of devolution and deconcentration with conflicting institutional 
and legal arrangements characterised by unclear definition of roles among the key actors is 
not uncommon in Africa (Chikulo 2004; Jeppsson et al. 2003; Oyugi 2000; Mutizwa-
Mangiza and Conyers 1996). 
  
1.4 The District Assemblies’ Common Fund 
 
An example which illustrates the difficulty involved in implementing directives is the 
District Assemblies‟ Common Fund (DACF). The DACF was provided for under Section 
252 of the 1992 Constitution. “The section requires Parliament to make provision annually 
for the allocation of not less than five per cent of the total revenues of Ghana to the District 
Assemblies for development and the amount paid into the District Assemblies Common 
12 
 
 
 
Fund” (Ayee 1995: 297). The law instructs the Assemblies to collaborate with the Health 
Departments and allocate part of the DACF to the Health Directorates for HIV and AIDS 
programmes.
14
 
 
Section 9 of the District Assemblies‟ Common Fund Act (Act 455) of 1993 empowers the 
Minister of Finance, in consultation with the Minister for Local Government and Rural 
Development, to specify how the Assemblies expend the Fund (Republic of Ghana 1993c). 
In line with the implementation of the directive, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Local Government and Rural Development directed all Assemblies to focus their share of 
the Fund in two areas: health and education (Ayee 1995). This was implemented in 1994. 
But as noted by Ayee (1995: 301): 
The history of Ghana is replete with measures which were meant to be temporary but become 
permanent. The directives to the Assemblies certainly seem likely to become a permanent 
feature of the District Assemblies‟ Common Fund, especially since the Act establishing the 
District Assemblies‟ Common Fund stipulates that no expenditure from the fund may be made 
without the consent of the Minister of Finance acting in consultation with the Minister of 
Local Government. 
 
The directive has become permanent as Ayee (1995) predicted. Under the directives in 
force at the time of conducting this research, one per cent of the fund is to be devoted to 
HIV and AIDS programmes. Many Assemblies however have had difficulty complying 
with these directives and enforcement by central government appears to be ineffective.
15
 
 
It would seem logical that the conflicts in the legislation would prevent effective 
collaboration between the District Assembly responsible for funding the programmes and 
the Health Directorates responsible for managing the programmes. However, this has not 
always been the case and, just as I observed personally, there has been some cooperation 
between the two organisations leading to successes with HIV and AIDS programmes. 
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 The DACF and the fund will be used interchangeably in this study. 
15
 Apart from problems with collaboration and coordination between the Municipal Assembly and the Health 
Directorate around the DACF, other routine administrative coordination activities between them seem to have 
broken down. For example, the District Health Management Teams which are supposed to be one of the 
formal platforms for the two institutions to collaborate appeared to be weak. Many of the DHMTs did not 
have representatives from the Assemblies and Civil Society Organisations and were therefore only constituted 
by health officials. 
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Given the lack of clear direction within the formal provisions of the legislation the reasons 
for this success require further exploration. 
 
1.5 Overview of studies on District Assemblies and Health Directorates. 
 
In an effort to understand why the relationship between the two organisations would 
sometimes work in spite of the weaknesses in the formal systems I turned to the literature 
pertaining to the District Assemblies and also decentralisation in general. 
 
None of the Ghanaian studies investigated the way in which devolved Assemblies 
collaborated and coordinated service delivery efforts with other deconcentrated 
stakeholders. Much of the work on decentralisation in Ghana by scholars such as Abbey et 
al. (2010)
16
, Awortwi (2010a; 2010b); 2010c; Crawford (2008); Inanga and Osei-Wusu 
(2004); Ayee (1986; 1995); Crook and Manor (1998); and Crook (1994) focused on other 
aspects of  District Assemblies and their performance. For example the work by Crook 
(1994) analyses the relationship between decentralisation, democratisation, and 
performance of District Assemblies. He shows that Assemblies were not responsive enough 
to the needs of most people, and argues that the factors that might explain poor 
performance are a) excessive control over staff and finances by central government; b) 
clash between national policies of retrenchment and power of central government agents; 
and c) the non-partisan nature of Assemblies. All these “weaken their legitimacy to assert 
their authority over tax collection mainly due to unresolved contradictions between notions 
of community based self-help, voluntarism, and representative district authority” (Crook 
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 Abbey et al. (2010) focus on the processes of empowering civil society to play a role in promoting 
accountability around the utilisation of the fund. They argue that in spite of the fact that civil society had a 
role to play in the formulation of budgets, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public expenditure; 
the impact of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in these areas is not yet felt in Ghana. Their argument was 
informed by what they refer to as weaknesses in the administration of the fund to include: delays in allocation 
and disbursement to District Assemblies; lack of transparency in selecting projects/contract awards; central 
government interference in the use of the fund; weaknesses in the formula for the allocation of the fund; and 
non-consultation of community members in the selection of DACF projects. They make a case for CSOs to 
“trace the flow of resources from origin (the Consolidated Fund) to destination (i.e. to the District 
Assemblies) and determine the location, scale, and anomalies (if any) of disbursed funds” (Abbey et al. 2010: 
76). 
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1994: 339). He does not address the issue of cooperation with other decentralised 
departments. 
 
Scholars who did focus on the Assembly appeared to assume that Assemblies would 
perform well if issues of finance and central government interference were resolved (see for 
example Crawford 2009; Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004; Ayee 1986; 1995; Crook and Manor 
1998; and Crook 1994). However, having funds available to the Assemblies does not 
necessarily mean that they will reach the target population as intended. For example, Abbey 
et al. (2010) do not track the distribution of DACF by the District Assembly to other 
destinations such as health services in any depth and overall the disbursement of funds at 
the local level has not received adequate attention. This is one area of research which could 
improve our understanding of collaboration and coordination between the devolved 
Assemblies and deconcentrated Health Directorates. 
 
In terms of research into the decentralisation of healthcare, much of the work has 
concentrated on analysis of issues of health financing, and how the capacity of Health 
Directorates at the local level affects healthcare delivery (Witter and Garshong 2009; Sakyi 
2007; Agyepong 1999; Larbi 1998; Coleman 1997; Asenso-Okyere 1995; Cassels and 
Janovsky 1992; Waddington and Enyimayew 1989).
17
 Whilst these scholarly works provide 
insight into when Assemblies are able to effectively deliver basic services and highlight 
some of the conditions that may explain when Health Directorates can also do so they do 
not tackle the issue of collaboration between departments.  
 
1.6 Key Research Questions  
  
Decentralisation has been promoted widely as a way to improve resource allocation, 
encourage the participation of citizens in the decision making process, enhance governance 
and improve service delivery. Yet there is evidence to suggest that the impact of 
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 The focus has been on the implementation of user charges and associated challenges, and debating the 
experiences of implementation of the health insurance scheme as a means to increase access to health care. 
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decentralisation on services is mixed (Oyugi 2008a; 2008b; Conyers 2007; Grindle 2007a; 
2007b; Awortwi 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Awortwi et al. 2010). In certain contexts, 
decentralisation has had a positive impact (Ayee 1997; Crook and Manor 1998; UN-
HABITAT 2002; Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004; Faguet 2006) but 
there are instances where it has led to elite capture and inequities in service provision (Shah 
and Thompson 2004; Ahamad et al. 2005; Robinson 2007a; 2007b; Awortwi 2010a; 2010b; 
2010c; Awortwi et al. 2010).  
 
As countries throughout the developing world adopt decentralisation policies, there is an 
increasingly urgent need to understand the conditions under which decentralisation leads to 
improved service delivery and one of the areas which has received insufficient attention is 
the way in which informal ties may prompt cooperation between departments. 
 
This research explores the question what is the role of informal ties in promoting 
collaboration and coordination between devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health 
Directorates, and consultation with civil society groups that mobilise around HIV and 
AIDS campaigns by Health Directorates? To explore this question, I sought answers to 
three interrelated questions around informal ties between different parts of the state 
apparatus and the embeddedness of the state institutions with civil society. I focus on 
informal ties and embeddedness because these are factors that are largely neglected by the 
literature in explaining how devolution and deconcentration work together. Informal ties 
can facilitate collaboration, coordination and consultation but alone are not sufficient to do 
so since they can also lead to collusion and corruption. 
 
The first question is how have informal ties between officers at the Health Directorates and 
Executive Officers of the Municipal Assemblies enhanced or constrained these two 
decentralised authorities in collaborating and coordinating their programmes around 
healthcare delivery? This is an important issue for a number of reasons. Service delivery in 
mixed systems of devolution and deconcentration requires different state entities to be 
responsible for various stages in the processes involved so formal processes of coordination 
will need to be effective for devolution and deconcentration to work together.  The process 
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is critical and can have significant impact on service delivery outcomes. Effective 
collaboration and coordination becomes imperative for the process to lead to the expected 
outcomes; however, this may not happen in Ghana as there are conflicts between Act 462 
and Act 525. Although the directives for the utilisation of the DACF assume that the 
Assemblies who control the funds and are responsible for the provision of health service 
infrastructure will collaborate and coordinate efforts with the Health Departments charged 
with health service administration this may not occur as the Health Directorates are 
strongly aligned to the Ministry of Health and the Ghana Health Service and the 
Assemblies lack control over Health Directorates budgets. I investigate the circumstances 
under which the Assembly may be willing to collaborate with the Health Directorate and 
allocate additional funds to the Health Director particularly when Health Directorates are 
perceived as being financially strong. 
 
The second question is closely related to the first. In which ways have informal ties 
between health officers and elected Assembly members facilitated the consultation with 
Assembly members by health staff in order to win public support for health programmes? 
This question is important because Assembly members are the representatives of the local 
community and express the voice of citizens but again the structural problems between the 
Assembly and the Health Directorate can limit the ability of elected Assembly members to 
participate and influence healthcare decisions. So we need to know what efforts are made 
by health staff to overcome the structural problems and seek the views of citizens, I ask 
what motivates them to take such steps and what would encourage elected Assembly 
members to support health staff. In exploring this question I seek to increase our 
understanding of whether citizens at the local level are able to influence decisions and what 
challenges exist. The question can further increase our understanding of the commitment of 
health staff to involve citizens at the local level. 
 
The third question is: how has the embeddedness of health officers with leaders of groups 
within civil society who were known to work on HIV and AIDS programmes (religious 
groups, traditional authorities; non-governmental organisations) promoted increased 
17 
 
 
 
consultation with leaders of these civil society actors by health staff in order to implement 
health programmes? This question is important because, in spite of statements by public 
officials, national and local politicians that CSOs play a role in healthcare delivery, there is 
no formal institutional mechanism for leaders of CSOs and health staff to collaborate. 
Neither Act 462 nor Act 525 has clear provisions on how health staff should involve CSOs. 
We know that CSOs can be vehicles for citizens to influence policy even though they are 
not democratic representatives of citizens. Given the lack of clear institutional arrangement 
to involve CSOs, I investigate the circumstances in which health staff and leaders of the 
selected CSOs work together and ask why health staff would seek to establish and maintain 
strong ties with leaders of such CSOs also looking at the incentives for leaders of the 
selected groups within civil society to maintain strong links in the Health Directorate. As 
we see in chapters 3 and 7, the groups within civil society that were interviewed are those 
that were known to the Health Directorates and the Municipal Assemblies to be working on 
HIV and AIDS programmes similar to those being implemented by both the Health 
Directorates and the Assemblies; they can therefore not be said to be representative of the 
entire civil society groups in the various municipalities. However, exploring the third sub-
question might contribute to promote our understanding of state and society relations and 
how both the state and society can work together to deliver effective services to the poor. 
 
1.7 Developing the research approach 
 
Much of the literature regarding decentralisation has tended to look comparatively at 
countries, attributing failure or success of decentralisation reforms to a number of factors at 
the national level such as the political commitment of national leaders and adequate 
devolution of resources (see, for example, the works of Crook and Manor 1998; Crook and 
Sverrisson 2003; Bossert and Joel 2002; Bloom and Standing 2001; Bloom et al. 2000; 
Conyers 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). There is relatively little comparative work 
which examines the performance of decentralised bodies within a uniformly decentralised 
system with constant factors such as political commitment, devolution of power and 
resources.  
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In addition, many studies of health service delivery performance adopt outcome or output 
indicators, particularly when baseline data is available.
18
 Indicators such as infant mortality 
rates, hospital admission rates or the number of HIV and AIDS patients treated can be 
useful in assessing performance but are likely to be affected by a range of factors such as 
the time it takes to get to health facility to receive treatment, efficiency in diagnosis, 
availability of drugs, and the right usage of medication. Outcome indicators do not allow us 
to adequately capture the dynamics of the processes involved in collaboration and 
coordination between devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health Directorates and 
improvements in levels of consultation may not be captured by outcome indicators.
19
 
 
To understand how informal relationships can affect the performance of decentralised 
institutions, I chose to look at the Municipal level Health Directorates and District 
Assemblies. Each district has the same decentralised system so these factors are constant, 
this will enable identification of the factors influencing cooperation and highlight the 
dynamics of the relationships thus contributing to fill the gaps in current research. To 
further focus the research I have selected the management of HIV and AIDs between 2000 
and 2008 and the distribution of the DACF during this period as this is one area in which 
cooperation is required and these distributions are measurable. 
 
The implementation of central government directives to Municipal Assemblies for the 
utilisation of the HIV and AIDS component of the DACF is reviewed to explore (i) 
collaboration and coordination between the Assemblies and Health Directorates, and (ii) 
increased consultation of citizens by the Health Directorates in order to win their support 
for health programmes.
20
 Some further information about devolved Assemblies and 
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 See for example, the study of Uganda‟s success in fighting HIV and AIDS by Asingwire and Kyomuhendo 
(2006), and the study on the performance of District Assemblies in immunisation programmes in Ghana by 
Ibrahim et al. (2004). 
19
 Consultation of citizens is essential to achieve responsiveness which has been the focus of studies by high 
profile institutions that seek to measure the performance of local government in Ghana. For example, in a 
study by AFROBAROMETER (2008b: 6) which sought popular opinions of Ghanaians on the performance 
of local government in Ghana, local government representatives were seen to be responsive to local people 
when they “listen to what ordinary people” need and address those needs (see also Crook 1994). 
20
 It is worth noting that coordination of healthcare delivery, and achieving more acceptable and responsive 
health services through active participation of health care users heavily drive much of the healthcare reforms 
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deconcentrated Health Directorates will assist the understanding of the relationship between 
the Assemblies and Health Directorates and the subsequent discussion of the impact of 
informal ties and the ways in which departments collaborate and coordinate efforts. 
 
The combination of devolution and deconcentration is the main feature of Ghana‟s 
healthcare system. This parallel system has significantly impacted healthcare delivery, and 
how the Assemblies and Health Directorates collaborate and coordinate efforts, 
particularly, around the use of resources such as the DACF. It has also affected how the two 
institutions coordinate programmes. Evidence shows that performance in terms of 
coordination between the two institutions varies across the Municipalities following 
decentralisation even though all the Health Directorates operate within the weaknesses in 
Act 462 and Act 525. For example, Ibrahim et al. (2004) show that collaboration and 
coordination between the Ga District Assembly and its Health Directorate have been 
described as “best practice” in Ghana that other Assemblies are encouraged to emulate. 
They note that: 
  
Right from the inception of the National Immunisation Days in 1996, the Ga District 
Assembly provided more funds for the programme than any other district in the country. The 
performance of the district was sufficiently significant to be cited as a best practice in the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Best Practices Report … The outcome was a very high 
performance in the programme compared to other districts. The district scored 100% coverage 
and remained at the top of the scale for several years of the programme (Ibrahim et al. 2004: 
65). 
 
Although there is no systematic research into this topic, there is a widely held view in 
Ghana that most Assemblies are uncooperative with their Health Directorates as far as the 
Assembly‟s support in terms of issues around the use of the fund are concerned (Ghana 
News Agency 2009b). How can we explain such variations in collaboration between these 
two institutions across the country? 
 
This research will examine the relative performance of health services in five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana: Ho Municipal Health Directorate (located in the Volta 
                                                                                                                                                    
of most countries even though evidence suggests that it is difficult to achieve this in most parts of sub-
Saharan Africa (Golooba-Mutebi 2005; Akin et al. 2005). 
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Region); Obuasi Municipal Health Directorate (in the Ashanti Region); Sunyani Municipal 
Health Directorate (in the Brong Ahafo Region); Techiman Municipal Health Directorate 
(in the Brong Ahafo Region); and New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate (in the Eastern 
Region).  Examining the comparative performance of five Municipal Health Directorates 
within the decentralised healthcare system in Ghana enables us to obtain a nuanced 
understanding of the link between decentralisation and improved services.  
 
To address the research questions, I undertook extensive and in-depth interviews with 
officers of the Assembly, Health Directorate, and selected leaders of groups within civil 
society who are sympathetic to Health Directorate HIV and AIDS programmes in these five 
municipalities. The discussion centred on how ethnic ties, neighbourhood relations, 
political party affiliations, and old-school networks between them influence how they 
interact on day-to-day basis in the management of HIV and AIDS between 2000 and 2008.  
 
The method selected focuses mainly on the processes involved in collaboration, 
coordination, and consultation which I use to measure the performance of the Health 
Directorates.
21
 I focus on the process because of the use of the DACF by the Assemblies 
and the Health Directorates.  
 
Although I emphasise the measurement of the Health Directorates‟ performance in process 
terms, in some instances I extend the discussion and the analysis to cover relevant themes 
that emerged around selected health service outputs or outcomes. Consequently in Chapter 
7, I have assessed performance very fully in terms of the outcomes of HIV and AIDS 
campaigns geared towards exploring whether the campaigns succeeded in changing local 
attitudes to the disease. This strategy allows for a more robust discussion of the process 
variables. 
 
                                                 
21
 I use collaboration and coordination together to indicate performance. They may be used interchangeably 
in parts of the thesis. 
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The analysis is rooted in the literature on social capital (Putnam 1993), and embeddedness 
as developed by Evans (1995; 1996a; 1996b) as these explore informal relationships which 
are largely ignored by the literature and discussion of decentralisation.  
 
1.8 Arguments of the thesis 
 
I argue that informal ties might matter for collaboration and coordination to occur between 
devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health Directorates; further embeddedness of 
Health Directorates with groups within civil society that mobilise around HIV and AIDS 
campaigns work to achieve increased consultation with such groups who could influence 
healthcare decisions on behalf of local people even though they might not represent local 
people directly. Informal relations seem particularly important when more routine 
administrative coordination activities such as the constitution and function of the District 
Health Mangement Teams (DHMTs) which are supposed to be formal platform for 
coordination between devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health Directorates do not 
seem to work.  In Ghana, where formal institutional arrangements for the implementation 
of decentralisation reforms raise both structural and non-structural problems that constrain 
collaboration and coordination between different parts of the state, and between the state 
and society, informal relations and embeddedness might help to overcome the problem. 
However, informal ties and embeddedness might also facilitate collusion, corruption, and 
cronyism which can ultimately undermine service delivery efforts. Although the data for 
this study are drawn from Ghana, the results might help us understand decentralisation 
reform implementation in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the combination of 
devolution and deconcentration is common in the region, and informal ties form a core part 
of social organisation. I do not however attempt to generalise the findings as this research is 
a study of only five cases within a single country (Thomas 2011; Gerring 2007), and the 
paths of decentralisation adopted by most countries are varied (Awortwi 2010a; 2010b; 
2010c). Three related arguments that inform the thesis‟ main argument are the following: 
 
The first argument is that the structural and non-structural problems that exist as a result of 
inadequate clarity in the legal and institutional arrangements for collaboration and 
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coordination can be overcome when good informal relations exist between officers at the 
Health Directorates and executive officers of the Assemblies. The structural issues include 
relative autonomy of the Health Directorates and issues about who has the capacity and 
mandate to perform which task at the local level.  There is also a major non-structural 
challenge which is the widely held notion in Ghana that the Health Directorates are 
financially strong. Whilst the relative autonomy of the Health Department and the notion 
that the Health Department has enough resources appear to make it difficult for most 
Assemblies to allocate HIV and AIDS component of the DACF to the Health Department, 
misunderstandings about capacity and mandate further limit collaboration and coordination 
between the two institutions. Overall, these structural and non-structural problems seem to 
undermine the constitution and functioning of the District Health Management Teams 
(DHMT) as representatives who are supposed to come from the Assembly never show up 
making the DHMT to only exist in name on paper. Though the non-functioning DHMTs 
appear to significantly undermine how the Health Directorates work with the Assemblies, 
this study revealed that Health Directors who had informal ties with executive officers of 
the Assemblies were relatively more successful in obtaining the District Assemblies‟ 
Common Fund from the Assemblies even though some of the practices involved in the 
release of the fund for health programmes could be considered to be corruption or 
nepotism.
22
 Where informal ties were weak, collaboration and coordination were found to 
be significantly impeded. Good informal ties might therefore be needed in addition to 
factors such as adequate financial resources; autonomy of local government bodies; and 
effective legal framework which are suggested as requirements for decentralisation to lead 
to improving service delivery.  
  
The second argument is that informal ties with elected Assembly members have the 
potential to facilitate increased consultation with Assembly members. This may weaken the 
negative effects of central government interferences in the affairs of local governments and 
replace the influence of personal political ambitions with productivity aimed towards public 
                                                 
22
 The DACF is controlled by the Assemblies. By law, the Assemblies are mandated to release part of the 
fund to the Health Directorates for HIV and AIDS related programmes in the districts. I use this to measure 
collaboration and coordination. 
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benefit. The work of the Assemblies is heavily politicised because the appointment of the 
Chief Executive plus one-third of Assembly members is by the president of the country. 
The situation is further worsened by the effects of personal political struggles among both 
executive and elected members of the Assemblies. All these affect how citizens influence 
healthcare decisions through their Assembly members as Assembly members are diverted 
from pursuing the aspirations of their electorates. In taking steps to keep their positions, 
Assembly members become vulnerable to corrupt practices. Therefore to obtain their 
support for programmes that might not directly help promote their political agenda can be 
challenging even when such programmes are beneficial to the majority of local people. The 
ability of the Health Directorates to expand their informal ties with Assembly members was 
found to increase the chances that they would support such programmes even when they 
find themselves in highly politicised Assembly. 
 
The third argument is that despite the lack of clear mechanisms of engagement between the 
Health Directorate and Civil Society in the current legal and institutional arrangements 
(particulary given that most of the DHMTs seem to be non-functional), the embeddedness 
of the Health Directorates by creating good informal relationships between Health 
Directorates and Civil Society actors can facilitate consultation with CSOs by the Health 
Directorates. This can help them work together to remove cultural practices, social norms 
and religious beliefs that may be considered barriers to implementation of HIV and AIDS 
policy. Those Health Directorates that were adequately embedded within Civil Society 
were able to remove these barriers. First, they obtained the support of the church to 
promote debates around condoms; second, they were able to reduce stigmatisation and 
discrimination against people infected with AIDS, and third, they minimised the dominance 
of the views of males in matters around sex and health. This argument is based on empirical 
evidence obtained from the analysis of in-depth narratives by the relevant public officers 
and Civil Society actors who were involved at various stages in the implementation of HIV 
and AIDS programmes at the Municipal level. 
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1.9 The structure of the thesis 
 
Whilst working for local government I observed firsthand the ways in which informal ties 
sometimes affected the ways in which departments worked together. On the surface, 
bypassing formal bureaucratic arrangements to make vehicles available to the Health 
Department could have been deemed a method to facilitate the work of the Health 
Department. At the same time as health programmes were supported by Assembly 
members meant the Health Department was not constrained by the acrimony that 
characterises debates over approval of other projects in the Assembly. However, ignoring 
formal arrangements for the benefit of only the Health Director could have suggested the 
existence of nepotism or cronyism against other heads of department. 
 
My interest in how to facilitate better coordination between departments led me to review 
the legislation where I identified ways in which conflicts within the decentralisation 
legislation appear to hinder the process of collaboration although for some reason, possibly 
due to the existence of informal ties, some departments seem to work well together.  
 
A review of the literature relating to both decentralisation in general and the district 
assemblies in particular revealed a gap in the research as the effect of informal ties on the 
cooperation between government departments had not been adequately investigated. This 
has prompted my research which will contribute to the field of study.  
 
I have structured the thesis in eight chapters. Following this chapter, I discuss the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 2 with a view to providing an understanding of the 
decentralisation concept and its potential to improve governance outcomes. I highlight the 
areas in which the literature does not adequately help to explain how devolution and 
deconcentration work together in practice.  Since this thesis questions some of the claims in 
the neo-patrimonial literature that informal relations always undermine government 
performance, I explore this literature and discuss the evidence against this claim. I discuss 
the idea of informal ties within the state which is followed by a review of the literature on 
social capital (Putnam 1993), which may take the forms of informal relations I discuss to 
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exist within the state in Ghana and might help explain how devolution and deconcentration 
can work together. I point to the fact that despite the strength of the idea of social capital 
and its focus on ties within society, it is not sufficient to explain the relationships between 
state institutions and civil society actors. The chapter investigates the nature of 
embeddedness of state institutions, in the theory developed by Peter Evans (1995; 1996a; 
1996b) to explain the gap. The idea of embeddedness focuses on the relationships between 
the state and society but fails to adequately explain relationships between different parts of 
the state; this is the contribution that I will make with this study by analysing relationships 
across different state institutions. 
 
In Chapter 3, I present the research approach and methods I used in this study. I explain the 
research design, the rationale for my choice of healthcare and HIV and AIDS in particular, 
and why I focus the study at the municipal level. I also explain why I employ the 
comparative cases approach and how I selected the five cases. I then describe how I 
operationalise the research variables; the sources of data; data collection techniques, and 
the respondents interviewed (senior officers in the two decentralised institutions including 
elected Assembly members and leaders of CSOs). The chapter shows that the data collected 
are mainly stories in the form of qualitative in-depth narratives. 
  
Chapter 4 is the first of the four empirical chapters, essentially it presents the empirical 
material. For each of the five cases I describe a) the nature of informal networks between 
the Health Directorates and their Municipal Assemblies, b) embeddedness of the Health 
Directorates with Civil Society groups, and c) the performance of the Health Directorates in 
terms of (i) collaboration and coordination (access to the DACF), and (ii) consultation with 
citizens. The objective is to present a synopsis of the strength of informal ties, 
embeddedness and performance as the detailed analysis of causal relationships are 
examined in chapters: 5, 6, and 7. 
 
Chapter 5 explores how informal ties between the Health Directorates and the Municipal 
Assemblies facilitated collaboration and coordination between these two different state 
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institutions. Using the release of the fund from the Assemblies to the Health Directorates as 
a measure of collaboration and coordination, the discussion will focus on whether or not the 
Chief Executive released the fund to the Health Department and why. As far as 
collaboration and coordination between the Assemblies and the Health Directorates are 
concerned, the chapter shows that both structural and non-structural issues need to be 
considered since either may significantly undermine how the two institutions work 
together. These issues are the relative autonomy of the Health Directorate, the perception 
that the Health Directorates are financially strong, and issues around capacity and doubts 
about mandate. The chapter goes on to present evidence based on the comparison of New 
Juaben and Techiman to show that the presence of strong ethnic links, neighbourhood 
relations, political party affiliations, and old-school ties can be used to overcome these 
structural and non-structural problems.  
 
Chapter 6 addresses the second question. In what ways have informal ties between health 
officers and elected Assembly members facilitated the consultation with Assembly members 
by health staff in order to win public support for health programmes? The significant 
highlight of this chapter is that for consultation to be effective, informal ties must have 
wider coverage to influence most of the key actors. Wide reaching informal networks have 
the potential to increase the level of transparency and promote the spirit of collective 
interests among the actors around healthcare issues. I compare New Juaben and Sunyani in 
this chapter to show that in addition to networks with executive officers, ties with Assembly 
members can enhance collaboration between the Assembly and the Health Directorate. 
 
In chapter 7 I address the third question which is: how has the Health Directorates‟ 
embeddedness with leaders of groups within civil society that mobilise around HIV and 
AIDS campaigns facilitated increased consultation with leaders of these civil society 
groups (religious leaders, traditional rulers, and NGO leaders) by the Health Directorates to 
win their support for HIV and AIDS programmes? The chapter compares Sunyani with 
Techiman to show how the differences in embeddedness of the Health Directorates might 
help explain their ability to remove social norms and faith-based or religious practices that 
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are perceived to be stumbling blocks against the implementation of HIV and AIDS 
programmes. Altogether socio-cultural norms and religious doctrines present three issues or 
themes that have the potential to undermine HIV and AIDS policy. These are: the church‟s 
position against condoms; stigmatisation and discrimination against people who have HIV 
or AIDS; and the notion of male dominance over females in issues of sexual and 
reproductive health. The chapter shows that when health staff are embedded within society 
and build trust with citizens, it can facilitate the process of dealing with these issues. 
 
The conclusion of the thesis, Chapter 8, contains a summary of key findings from the study 
and conclusions based on the findings. The chapter revisits the various questions and links 
them with the findings and the propositions that drive the study. The theoretical 
significance of the findings in terms of when devolution and deconcentration work 
together, and the study‟s contribution to the literature on neo-patrimonialims are discussed. 
In doing this the chapter highlights the potential of the ideas of informal ties and 
embeddedness as factors that matter in explaining when devolution and deconcentration 
work together to produce better governance outcomes. I conclude the chapter by stating that 
ethnic/tribal relations, family/kinship/neighbourhood links, old-school ties, and political 
party affiliations might not always produce corruption, cronyism, nepotism, patronage and 
clientelism. They can be a solution to a) enhance collaboration and coordination between 
different parts of the state at sub-national level; and b) facilitate increased consultation with 
citizens in the implementation of health policy. Finally the chapter draws attention to policy 
implications of the findings, and suggests areas of further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Informal ties and Embeddedness as the ‘bridge’ between Devolution and 
Deconcentration: a review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Many decentralisation efforts in poor countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
combine devolution and deconcentration.  However, the current literature does not look 
explicitly at such combined systems. In this chapter I examine the literature on 
decentralisation paying attention to the factors that explain when and why devolution or 
deconcentration can lead to better service delivery. I draw on the body of work on social 
capital, embedded autonomy, and informal relations to develop an approach to 
understanding the hitherto largely neglected issues of how informal ties can provide insight 
into when such mixed systems work at the local level. 
  
Much of the early literature explains the successes and failures of implementation of 
decentralisation reforms in poor countries in terms of factors such as inadequate financial 
resources and poor human resources (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Smith 1985; Maddick 1963). 
More recent literature highlights socio-political factors to explain the impact of 
decentralisation. These include political commitment from central governments, issues of 
elite capture of the reform process, and the legal and institutional framework within which 
local government bodies operate (Crook 2003; Boone 2003; Robinson 2007a; 2007b). 
However, even attempts to look at socio-political factors fail to look critically at social and 
cultural issues such as social capital, embeddedness of decentralised institutions within the 
societies where they operate, and informal networks across decentralised institutions that 
operate at sub-national level as having the potential to shape both the process and outcome 
of decentralisation reforms. 
 
Two of the central claims in the literature are that devolution and deconcentration can 
enhance coordination of different parts of the local state and increased consultation with 
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local citizens can occur.  Together greater coordination and increased consultation are said 
to lead to responsiveness of decentralisation and contribute to better public services. 
However these expectations are not being realised so perhaps the ideas of social capital, 
embeddedness, and informal ties help increase our understanding of when devolution and 
deconcentration can work together.  
 
To explore the issues I first look at the concept of decentralisation, what the reforms entail, 
investigate why politicians and governments might choose to devolve and disperse power 
and functions from the centre to lower levels of government hierarchy and explore the 
performance of past reforms. Among the issues that seem to explain the performance of 
decentralisation in the African context are the local cultural, social, economic, and political 
forces and how they interact and affect day-to-day working of public officers and how 
public officers interact with public service users. Often the relationships between public 
officers and citizens in this context are neo-patrimonial in the sense that public officers 
mostly tend to use their access to the state and control of public resources to benefit 
sections of society with which they have political, social, and cultural connections. Such 
actions largely exclude other sections of society and deprive many poor people from 
benefiting from state resources. This might ultimately undermine performance of 
decentralised institutions at the local level. Therefore the issue of neo-patrimonialism seems 
important in explaining the performance of decentralisation. On this basis, I discuss the 
literature on neo-patrimonialism as this literature helps to explain how and why 
decentralisation works and show that the study questions some of the claims in this 
literature. I then introduce the idea of informal ties and discuss the extent to which they can 
help explain how different parts of the state function at the local level. On the basis of this, 
I review the debates surrounding informal relations rooting the discussion in the idea of 
social capital (Robert Putnam 1993). The social capital discussion highlights a gap, in spite 
of the strength of the literature on social capital; it tends to focus more on ties within 
society than ties between society and the state. I then examine the concept of embeddedness 
(Evans 1995) which promises a good explanation of state-society relations. The concern I 
raise about this concept is that it does not appear to provide us with the nuances of the 
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influences of informal ties within the state. I conclude the chapter by indicating that the 
idea of embeddedness (narrowly defined) and informal relations form the basis of the 
discussion in the rest of the thesis. 
 
2.2 Decentralisation and its forms: devolution and deconcentration 
 
Decentralisation has been defined in many ways.
23
 According to Crawford (2010: 94), 
“decentralisation entails the transfer of power, responsibilities and finance from central 
government to sub-national levels of government at provincial and or local levels.” A 
common factor of the various definitions is that “decentralisation involves sharing, and 
sometimes even ceding, of power and authority to lower-level units to act on behalf of the 
centre” (Oyugi 2008a: iii). 
 
Decentralisation can take many forms, two of which are the focus of this study. The first is 
devolution which has also been referred to as political decentralisation. The second is 
deconcentration also referred to as administrative decentralisation
24
 (Crawford 2010; Scott 
2009; Robinson 2007a; 2007b; Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Cohen 1999). The basic 
theoretical differences between devolution and deconcentration are presented in Table 1. In 
this study, I will address these two forms of decentralisation as they are the reforms 
implemented in Ghana, these comprise the transfer of political and administrative authority 
from central government respectively to (i) elected local government bodies (Municipal 
Assemblies); and (ii) non-elected administrative departments of central government 
ministry (Municipal Health Directorates) at the local level.  
                                                 
23
 For example Smith (1985: 1) defines decentralisation to mean “both reversing and concentration of 
administration at a single centre and conferring powers of local government…[it] involves the delegation of 
power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one government within a state or 
offices within a large-scale organisation.” A number of scholars and development organisations seem to agree 
that decentralisation is the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility by the central government to local 
government bodies, quasi-independent government institutions, and private organisations for them to deliver 
services to citizens (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Rondinelli 1990a; 1990b; DFID 2008; Devas 2008; 
Rondinelli et al. 1989). The Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) in Ghana also defines 
decentralisation as the process of transferring power and resources from central government to the lower 
levels of government, such as the regions, municipalities and districts in the Ghanaian context (CDD 2005). 
24
 It should be noted that a number of scholars make a distinction between devolution and political decentralisation, and 
also between deconcentration and administrative decentralisation. 
31 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Why leaders adopt devolution: examining the claims 
 
Crook and Manor (1998: 6) define devolution as “when central government cedes power, 
authority, control, and resources to elected local government institutions.” Political or 
democratic decentralisation also known as „devolution‟ is about creating a domain of 
autonomy involving the transfer of power and resources to lower level elected authorities, 
which are largely independent of high levels of government (Crawford 2008: 237; CDD 
2005:i). One fundamental feature of devolution is that powers and responsibilities are 
transferred to elected local governments (see Table 1). This is also referred to as political 
decentralisation (Scott 2009; Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Wanyande 2004; Blair 2000; Turner 
and Hulme 1997). Under devolution formally constituted local authorities controlled by 
elected local councils have the power to pass ordinances having a local application within 
limits specified by the central government, and they can vary centrally decided policy in 
applying it locally (Oxhorn 2004; Rondinelli 1990a; 1990b; Rondinelli et al. 1989; Cheema 
and Rondinelli 1983; Maddick 1963).  
 
Table 1: Basic theoretical features of deconcentration and devolution
25
 
Degree of 
decentralisation 
Political features Fiscal features Administrative features 
Deconcentration -No elected local government 
-Local leadership vested in local 
officials, such as a governor or mayor, 
but appointed by and accountable to the 
centre 
-Voice relationships are remote and 
possibly weak 
-Local government is a service 
delivery arm of the centre and 
has little or no discretion over 
how or where services are 
provided 
-Funds come from the centre 
through individual ministry or 
department budgets  
-No independent revenue 
sources 
-Provider staff working at local 
level are employees of centre, 
and accountable to centre, 
usually through their 
ministries; weak local capacity 
is compensated for by central 
employees 
-Accountability remains 
distant: the short route of 
accountability may be weak 
and citizens may have to rely 
on a weak long route stretching 
to politicians at the centre; a 
strong compact between 
policymakers and providers can 
compensate to some extent 
Devolution -Local government is led by locally 
elected politicians expected to be 
accountable to the local electorate 
-Voice relationships can be very strong, 
but also subject to capture by elites, 
social polarisation, uninformed voting, 
-Subject to meeting nationally 
set minimum standards, local 
government can set spending 
priorities and determine how 
best to meet service obligations 
-Funding can come from local 
-Providers are employees of 
local government 
-Local government has full 
discretion over salary levels, 
staffing numbers and 
allocations, and authority to 
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 These are ideal types as many systems have elements of both systems operating in parallel, and many of the 
arguments for devolution can also apply to deconcentration and vice versa. 
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and clientelism revenues and revenue-sharing 
arrangements and transfers 
from centre 
-A hard budget constraint is 
imperative for creating 
incentives for accountable 
service delivery 
hire and fire 
-Standards and procedures for 
hiring and managing staff may 
still be established within an 
overarching civil service 
framework covering local 
governments generally 
-Potentially strongest long and 
shortest routes of 
accountability, but now also 
more influenced by local social 
norms and vulnerable to local 
capacity constraints and 
politics 
Source: Evans (2004: 22) 
 
 
The first claim that the literature makes is that devolution can lead to responsive 
governance outcomes. Local government is said to have the potential to deliver services in 
line with the demands of local people because development can be effectively tailored to 
suit local demands (Ayee 2008a; Mitullah 2004; World Bank 2004; Ngware and Ngware 
2004; Crook 2003; Blair 2000; World Bank 2000a; Tendler 1997). Chikulo (2004: 133-
134) also shows that political decentralisation in South Africa is aimed at enhancing 
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. The argument that devolution can lead to 
responsiveness is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that local politicians 
are close to the people so they are in a better position to use local knowledge to deliver 
appropriate needs. Ultimately, the process can lead to efficiency in service delivery (Smith 
1985: 24; Agyeman-Duah 2005: 12). The second assumption is that democratic 
decentralisation can enable citizens at the local level to hold public officers accountable for 
their actions as they can vote out councillors that they find to be corrupt or inefficient. The 
pressure of electoral politics can therefore motivate rational public officers to be more 
responsive to citizens (Blair 2000: 23; Rondinelli 1981: 598). 
 
Advocates of decentralisation are also cautioned by Smith (1985) about the expectation that 
responsiveness can be achieved from such reforms as there is a danger that needs at the 
local level may be misrepresented. Local people whose knowledge influences policy 
outcomes can be erroneously seen as a “unified mass with common interest” (Smith 1985: 
29). If we view society as one unit, we might overlook the fact that the political process is 
heavily influenced by conflicting class interests and some groups are more capable of 
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advancing and projecting their interests than others. Responsiveness depends on the 
individual‟s point of view based on his needs.  
 
This criticism by Smith (1985) does not expand on the kind of services that societies might 
need. This might be important as the provision of certain basic services such as health is 
capable of overcoming class conflict. Healthcare is an essential service that everybody will 
need in most societies. In the delivery of health services, it may be possible to view society 
as having a common interest so if local government authorities employ effective 
mechanisms of participation to arrive at a consensus, healthcare delivery can receive 
support from many interest groups. Defining what constitutes common interest might be 
possible depending on the context and the kind of service. 
 
The second claim is that devolution can produce strong democracy and civic awareness, 
and that the development of citizens‟ political capacity has increased the appeal for 
devolution in many countries. Political decentralisation allows citizens to engage with state 
institutions and learn to debate issues to arrive at mutually acceptable consensus. This 
process can lead to increasing the level of civic consciousness and political development of 
citizens at the local level. It can also provide a platform for political training of citizens 
who might rise to engage in politics at the national level and take charge of national public 
office (Grindle 2007a; Rondinelli 1990b; Slater 1990; Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; 
Maddick 1963). 
 
However, the argument for the claim of the potential benefits of devolution is contested. 
Smith (1985: 22-23) contends that to propose that the process of devolution will enable 
citizens to be politically educated is paternalistic. He argues that voting, standing for 
elections, and participation in local government business might not be the only source of 
political education for citizens because the wider social environment affects people‟s 
political enlightenment; therefore assuming that local political organisation would be the 
source of political education will be unrealistic. Smith (1985: 23) explains that it will be 
problematic to isolate all other factors that contribute to the training of politicians, and it 
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can be complicated to determine whether councillors who have local experience do better 
than their counterparts who do not have that experience. Also, given that politics at the 
national level and the functioning of the national legislative assembly are very different 
from what prevails at the local level, it might be logical to be cautious about the level of 
expectation from local governments as political training grounds. 
 
In spite of the fact that the contention Smith (1985) makes has some support, his position 
has difficulties. He does not shed much light on how political environments in different 
countries can play a role in providing political enlightenment to citizens. There is evidence 
to suggest that local governments have been important spaces to increase political 
education of ordinary people. Across most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the development of 
citizens‟ interest in national politics (in addition to a host of factors such as the history of 
the struggle for independence) could also be explained by the implementation of local 
government reforms and governments becoming closer to the people. A number of national 
political figures have had training at local government level. A good example is politicians 
who became leaders of newly independent states in Africa. They were the elites who were 
elected to local councils during the colonial administration.  
 
The third claim is that the process of political decentralisation enables citizens to participate 
in the decision making process (Crawford 2008; Crook 2003). Grindle (2007a: 6-8) asserts 
that advocates, political activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and human 
rights groups have argued that political decentralisation can open up spaces for citizens to 
participate in decisions that affect their lives. Overall, democracy can be strengthened 
through active participation of citizens which is one indication of good governance 
(Katsiaouni 2005; Omiya 2000; Smith 1985). 
 
Nevertheless, scholars such as Golooba-Mutebi (2005); Boone (2003); and Smith (1985) 
criticise the perception that political decentralisation can promote participation by citizens 
to influence governance outcomes. For example, Smith (1985: 25) argues that politics at the 
local levels, as at the national level, is prone to the practical challenges of politics in which 
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power is always ill-distributed given that “class-based power” exists at the local level as 
well. It is also true that “privilege and exploitation can be maintained and strengthened 
through local politics” (see also Friedman and Kihato 2004). 
 
This argument by Smith (1985) is true for devolution efforts in many countries across the 
developing world. Even though a number of governments in developing countries claim to 
have devolved power to local governments, such efforts cannot be termed as devolution in 
the real sense as most of them continue to appoint a substantial number of party faithful to 
occupy key positions at local government level. As these appointed people are more likely 
to promote the agenda of the party rather than championing the cause of local people, the 
practice can undermine devolution and the expectation that the process will promote 
participation of citizens to shape policy to suit their benefits. 
 
2.4 When can devolution lead to improved service delivery?  
 
The literature raises a number of factors as requirements for devolution to work but the two 
that are most relevant to this study are the autonomy of local government bodies, and 
adequate financial resources. Ayee (2004a; 2004b) has argued that the interference of 
central government in local government affairs constrains effective performance of Ghana‟s 
local authorities. Kiyaga-Nsubuga (2004) describes a similar case in the Ugandan situation 
where the president appoints resident district commissioners who report to the president‟s 
office. Tension sometimes ensues between the district commissioners who would like to 
push the agenda of the president who appointed them, and elected local government 
members who might also want to promote the needs of their electorates. As a result of 
central government interference via the appointment of the district commissioners, local 
authorities could not maintain sufficient independence to pursue their main agenda 
appropriate to the needs of their people. Adequate political commitment to grant autonomy 
to local authorities has therefore been argued as an important ingredient to the success of 
devolution (Smoke 2004; Olowu and Wunsch 2004). 
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Additionally the weak financial base of local authorities has attracted a lot of interest as it 
could provide another explanation for poor performance of local government authorities 
(Crawford 2010: 115; Crook 1994). For example, Chikulo‟s (2004) study of local 
governments in South Africa found that inadequate financial resources limited the ability of 
local authorities to provide basic services. Similarly UN-HABITAT (2002: 9) argues that:  
 
There must be a link between local financial and fiscal authority to the service provision 
responsibilities and function of the local government, so that local politicians can deliver on 
their promises and bear the costs of their decisions. 
 
What seems to have compounded the situation of weak revenue resources is that many local 
authorities are weak in terms of mobilisation of local revenue by themselves.  
 
In the next section, I discuss why national politicians and central government bureaucrats 
will transfer administrative powers and functions to institutions at the local level, and the 
conditions under which deconcentration produces the expected benefits. I highlight the fact 
that claims of efficiency, coordination of programmes and communication between central 
government and local citizens are among the incentives for adopting deconcentration. In 
addition, adequate human capacity and the willingness of national officers to support the 
process can explain when deconcentration can achieve the intended objectives. 
 
2.5 Perceived benefits of deconcentration of powers and functions 
 
Deconcentration is the administrative decentralisation of functions performed by central 
government and the transfer of those powers to geographically distinct administrative units 
(Scott 2009; Crawford 2008; Oxhorn 2004; Rondinelli et al. 1989). For Crook and Manor 
(1998), deconcentration is one of the ways through which administrative power can be 
transferred away from a central authority to lower levels of government in a territorial 
hierarchy. Under this arrangement, central government expands its influence by shifting 
some of its agencies that were originally controlled at the centre to lower levels in the 
political system but this arrangement enhances the centre‟s hold on power (Wanyande 
2004; Crook and Manor 1998). Under deconcentration a central government transfers tasks 
to lower level civil servants to execute central government policies. The civil servants in 
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the administrative offices remain accountable only to persons higher up in the hierarchy 
(refer to Table 1). 
 
These definitions suggest that with deconcentration, national government transfers part of 
its functions and power to non-political administrative units at lower levels. Citizens at that 
level would have limited influence over such administrative units since central government 
continues to have strong influence in decisions taken by such administrative authorities.  
 
One of the claims in the literature is that, from the public administrative and management 
perspective, deconcentration can promote inter-governmental coordination at the local level 
(Turner and Hulme 1997: 156-157). The provision of a service such as health requires a 
mix of other services including sanitation, water, and roads, so several other government 
and non-government agencies, and international development organisations play different 
roles. These other stakeholders operate under different mandates with varied comparative 
advantages in terms of resources. However, it is claimed that deconcentration of 
administrative functions facilitates the ways in which these varied actors work together 
(Wekwete 2007:244). The coordination of programmes offered by deconcentration has 
been described as “cooperative behaviour” of sub-national governments (Azfar and 
Kähkönen et. al 2004: 20). Deconcentration can facilitate coordination particularly when 
donors and development agencies bypass central governments to support development 
initiatives through CSOs and private independent organisations (Rondinelli 2007: 38-39). 
 
The second argument for deconcentration is premised on efficiency claims that it would 
promote efficiency on the part of national offices, ministries, departments, and agencies of 
the state. Part of the hope in achieving efficiency in decision making is that coordination of 
programmes by state agencies can be more effective as noted by Rondinelli that  
deconcentration would provide: 
  
… a means by which the diverse central ministries and agencies involved in development 
could coordinate with each other; and with local government officials and private 
organisations within specific jurisdictions. Regions, or provinces, provide a convenient 
geographical base for coordinating specialised programmes and projects that many developing 
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countries are undertaking in rural areas in integrated and coordinated manner (Rondinelli 
1981: 598). 
 
The reason is that the process can allow national officers to concentrate on key functions of 
policy formulation, supervision, and facilitation of implementation from national 
headquarters so that those day-to-day functions of policy implementation that could be 
better performed by field officers or local staff do not burden top management. This would 
allow top management enough time to plan and monitor the implementation of policy in an 
efficient manner (Blunt and Turner 2007; Jeppsson et al. 2003; Rondinelli 1990a; Cheema 
and Rondinelli 1983). Efficiency can be achieved because deconcentration, as a 
management tool, can be employed to reduce or minimise bureaucratic tendencies in 
decision-making processes which can be common with centralised systems of decision 
making (Fiske 1996). As governments become closer to citizens they will save time and 
costs that may be required if citizens visit the national headquarters of government 
ministries to conduct business (Rondinelli et al. 1989). 
 
The third reason for deconcentration is that it can serve as a communication channel 
between central government and local people at the grassroots. Rondinelli (1981) points out 
that deconcentration can provide channels to effectively communicate national policies to 
remote areas of a country that would otherwise not be aware of government policy due to 
their location. It can therefore be employed to overcome the dangers of undermining 
national policy by local elites in areas where central government has a weak support base. 
The process can provide a face-to-face platform for both service delivery agencies and 
service users. This has been the rationale behind restructuring and deconcentration 
programmes across most countries in Africa (Jeppsson et al. 2003). 
 
It is important to note that although deconcentration has the potential to enable central 
government officers to concentrate on policy making; shorten decision-making processes; 
and ultimately enhance the performance of both central government staff and staff at the 
local government level, the strategy could have significant weaknesses. Officers in 
deconcentrated institutions cannot be held accountable for their actions by citizens at the 
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local level as they tend to hold strong allegiance to central government. Secondly, the claim 
that the process can promote coordination appears exaggerated because there is evidence to 
show that deconcentrated institutions mostly behave like their parent ministries who have a 
lot of difficulty coordinating their programmes at the national level. In the same way, 
deconcentrated agencies find it difficult to coordinate with similar agencies and, most 
importantly, coordinating their programmes with devolved authority at the local level. 
Given these weaknesses and because of the unique feature of deconcentration, the question 
that emerges is when can deconcentration work? 
 
2.6 What will make deconcentration work? 
 
Evidence from a number of countries suggests that capacity in terms of personnel and 
expertise is the most critical condition affecting the success or failure of administrative 
deconcentration in improving  service delivery in poor countries (Scott 2009; Ahmad et al 
2005; Mukwena 2004; Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Conyers 2003; Jeppsson et al. 2003). In 
a study exploring the performance of administrative offices of central government 
ministries under decentralisation programmes in Namibia, Mukwena (2004) finds that 
limited institutional capacity of regional and local administrative authorities served to 
impede the ability of deconcentrated offices to function effectively. He explained that 
deconcentrated authorities lacked qualified staff in key areas of finance and accounting and 
human resource management. Similarly, poorly trained and unmotivated staff, and in other 
cases overstaffing in junior management positions were found to be the main challenges for 
administrative decentralisation programmes in countries such as South Africa (Wittenberg 
2006). 
 
Another factor is that central government officers resist efforts to transfer power and 
functions to lower level institutions (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Mathur 1983). This was 
Uganda‟s experience when senior officers at the Ministry of Health initially resisted plans 
to reform the administrative set up by transferring part of their functions to field officers 
(Jeppsson et al. 2003). The weak commitment of central government officers to support the 
transfer of power and functions to district offices can be a stumbling block to the success of 
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deconcentration. National politicians can be reluctant to transfer key decision making 
powers to government agencies at lower levels because they might feel threatened that such 
efforts can weaken their control over affairs at the local level. 
 
The literature on decentralisation suggests that devolution will promote democracy and the 
participation of citizens. The necessary conditions required for these benefits to be realised 
include non-interference by central government in local government affairs and adequate 
financial resources. Deconcentration, the literature suggests, contributes to making public 
officers at national and local levels more efficient and effective so they serve as channels of 
communication between central government and local people.   For deconcentration to 
produce these outcomes, there must be strong institutional capacity of deconcentrated 
authorities at the local level and national officers should be willing to transfer power to 
lower level staff.   
 
There are a number of problems however, with the claims of decentralisation, I discuss 
three of these. First, there is a trend to promote decentralisation although for each of the 
arguments for decentralisation, there is a counter argument against it. Existing records show 
decentralisation‟s performance is poor making it difficult for scholars, governments, and 
political leaders to adequately make good judgement about decentralisation reforms as a 
development strategy. 
 
The second issue is that in spite of there being little evidence to support the merits of 
devolution (at least in terms of service delivery) (Robinson 2007a; 2007b; Turner and 
Hulme 1997), much effort is made to promote complete devolution rather than 
deconcentration as the ideal model appropriate for African countries (see Crawford 2008; 
UN-HABITAT 2002). Scott (2009) has shown that the model of decentralisation promoted 
in developing countries over the last two decades is political decentralisation or devolution. 
What this emphasis on devolution seems to overlook is that a mixture of devolution and 
deconcentration is a common practice in most parts of Africa (Olowu 2006: 231). An 
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exploration of how these two forms of decentralisation work in parallel might help us to 
advance both theoretical and empirical understanding of decentralisation in the region. 
 
The third issue is that whilst much of current literature focuses on „across country 
comparison‟ studies,26  it explains successes and failures of decentralisation to improve 
service delivery mainly in terms of weaknesses in the system of decentralisation rather than 
external factors. Much of the literature has focused on factors such as the extent to which 
reforms are fully implemented; parallel systems of devolution and deconcentration, access 
to financial resources, the quality of local government staff, and the extent of local 
government autonomy (see Crawford 2008; 2010; Wunsch 2001). For example, with 
autonomy of local government bodies, the literature seems to suggest that once 
decentralised authorities are adequately autonomous from central government controls, 
reform implementation will work (Mukwena 2004; Mutizwa-Mangiza and Conyers 1996). 
It has been argued that adequate legal and institutional provisions are needed for 
decentralisation reforms to be effective (UN-HABITAT 2002; Freedman et al. 2005; 
Appiah 2005; Avoka 2005a; 2005b). So if we take autonomy of local governments to mean 
the legal and institutional provisions within which they perform their functions, how can 
we explain variations in the performance of different decentralised authorities of state 
within a country where central government controls, in terms of laws and legal framework, 
can be said to be uniform? 
  
The importance of local cultural, social, economic, and political factors are increasingly 
recognised by the literature as critical in the performance of decentralised institutions 
(Booth 2011; Crook and Booth 2011; Blundo et al., 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). In Africa, 
the debate around these issues seems to be largely rooted in the literature on neo-
                                                 
26
 Comparison of the following countries: Uganda, Kenya, Botswana, Tanzania, and Ethiopia (UN-HABITAT 
2002), Ghana, Cote D‟Ivoire, Bangladesh, and India (Crook and Manor 1998), Chad, Botswana, Uganda, 
South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya (Olowu and Wunsch 2004), Bolivia, Brazil, South Africa, Uganda, 
China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006), India, Thailand, Nepal, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka (Rondinelli 1983b). There are however few works that focus 
on comparative work examining the performance of decentralised bodies within a uniform decentralised 
system thus keeping constant factors such as political commitment, devolution of power and resources etc. 
Examples include Grindle (2007a); Tendler (1997); and Putnam (1993). 
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patrimonialism. A dominant view is that neo-patrimonialism largely explains the poor 
performance of governments in Africa and by extension why decentralisation reforms have 
fallen short of expectations. This study however questions some of these claims. Therefore 
in the next section, I explore the concept of neo-patrimonialism. I present empirical 
evidence to show that neo-patrimonial relations can undermine government performance. I 
will discuss claims that neo-patrimonialism might also produce positive outcomes under 
certain conditions. The point of departure of this study is partly rooted in the claims that 
neo-patrimonial relations might promote government performance.   
 
2.7 Neo-patrimonialism and governance in Africa: questioning the claims 
 
The findings of this study question claims of the literature on neo-patrimonialism in Africa 
which argues that informal relations mostly undermine government performance (see 
Blundo et al., 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006a; Alou 2006; Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997).
27
 Recent work on politics and governance in Africa has argued for a 
“developmental neo-patrimonialism”; by using empirical evidence they show how neo-
patrimonialism is not necessarily incompatible with developmental outcomes (Booth 2011; 
Crook and Booth 2011; Cammack and Kelsall 2011).  The question posed is „under what 
conditions do informal relations, which form the core of social organisation in most 
countries in Africa and therefore shape behaviour patterns, enable or undermine 
government performance?‟  The inspiration for this study arose from my experience with 
the Ga District Assembly where I witnessed the ways in which informal relations could 
                                                 
27
 In Africa, informal relations such as ethnic ties and family affinity constitute very important factors in the 
recruitment process for the public service (Grindle 2007c; Evans 1995:49; Grindle and Thomas 1991), and are 
characterised by corruption (Blundo et al. 2006). These social ties heavily shape the everyday life of 
government bureaucrats. The ways in which both bureaucrats and citizens mutually accept informal relations 
makes it difficult to make clear distinction between acts that might be termed to be corruption and those that 
are not.  Sometimes both citizens and bureaucrats feel that what they do is morally justified though such 
practices may not have official backing from the state (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006a). For example, in 
the analysis of everyday functioning of the Beninese legal system, Bierschenk (2008: 131) has shown that, 
due in part to the state‟s inability to pay decent salary to officers in the legal system, citizens pay legal officers 
“directly” through what might be termed „corrupt practices‟. As many of those practices are historically 
embedded in everyday culture such as gift-giving, citizens feel they are socially acceptable. Thus, the nature 
of informal relations in African societies and bureaucracies makes corruption endemic and systemic in the 
everyday functioning of African bureaucracies (Bierschenk 2008; Olivier de Sardan 2008; Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan 2006a).  
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promote government performance, which I described in chapter 1, and the empirical 
evidence from a more recent work by a group of scholars in the Africa Power and Politics 
Programme (APPP).
28
 Following this recent literature, and whilst acknowledging that neo-
patrimonialism can undermine government performance, I argue that important forms of 
informal relations in Africa such as ethnic relations, neighbourhood ties, political party 
affiliations, and old-school networks can, in some circumstances, promote the public 
good.
29
  
 
In this study, three conditions appear to be important. First, when government bureaucrats 
share strong informal ties, they are likely to develop shared interests which go beyond 
individual interests. The more widespread these ties, the greater the possibility of them 
contributing to improved coordination.  Second, when such ties exist across a large number 
of bureaucrats and citizens shared interests can develop which can marshal resources from 
both citizens groups and the state to provide public goods.  Third, conferring moral 
standing by praising individuals who seek to champion the interest of the collective 
motivates public office holders and individuals to work in the interest of wider society 
rather than pursuing individual or personal interests. 
 
To make these arguments, it is useful to quickly revisit the concept of neo-patrimonialism 
and how it has been used to explain polities in Africa.  According to Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997), neo-patrimonialism emerged from Max Weber‟s term “patrimonial 
authority” which is present when (i) individuals govern with their own power and prestige, 
(ii) power is personalised, (iii) ordinary people are treated as an extension of the powerful 
man‟s household, (iv) ordinary people have no rights or privileges unless conferred  by the 
                                                 
28
 The APPP is a DFID funded research consortium based at the Overseas Development Institute, London that 
is conducting research on politics and governance in Africa with partner organisations in Ghana, Niger, 
Uganda, the UK, France and the USA. The chief aim of the APPP is to explore alternative governance 
solutions that may be effective in dealing with service provision and poverty reduction efforts in Africa 
(Booth 2011: 2). 
29
 This argument is based on the fact that informal relations in Africa are dominated by ethnic and family ties. 
In contrast to the literature on informal relations in organisation theory and public management in which 
public officers and bureaucrats get selected or recruited from prestigious and elite educational institutions 
including high profile universities, their informal relations are largely based on their elitist and professional 
ties (see for example Grindle 2007c: 112-113; Tendler 1997: 137; Grindle and Thomas 1991). 
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ruler, and (v) rights, benefits and other privileges are extended to selected “loyal clients” of 
the patron. In their work on democratic experiments in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997) define neo-patrimonialism as the coexistence of patrimonialism within rational-legal 
institutions, this is the chief characteristic of political systems in many countries in Africa. 
Its characteristics are (i) loyalty through informal networks is well knitted into the formal 
administrative system, (ii) corruption, rent seeking, political patronage and clientelist 
practices thrive, (iii) parallel and unofficial structures may well hold more power and 
authority than the formal administration, and (iv) personal relationships … constitute the 
foundation and superstructure of political institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62). 
Similarly, Kelsall (2011: 77) has defined neo-patrimonialism as a system of rule 
characterised by personal distribution and consumption of public resources among and 
between a ruler (patron) and his staff (clients) as though they were the private property of 
the ruler and his staff when public officers and political leaders (patrons) use state resources 
to the benefit of those who are not in a position to access those resources (clients) in return 
for political support. In most cases, neo-patrimonialism may take the form of patronage and 
clientelism (Leonard 2009; Leonard and Pitso 2009; Leonard and Owuor et al., 2009; van 
de Walle 2007; Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62).  
 
The characteristics of neo-patrimonialism show that it exists in a symbiotic relationship 
with established formal and legally accepted institutional arrangements in many African 
states. The formal institutional structures take their strength from neo-patrimonial practices 
whilst such practices are sustained by the formal legal rational structures. It is in these 
processes that rents are created. 
 
The central argument in neo-patrimonial literature suggests that personal ties or informal 
relations, which form the core of neo-patrimonial relations, undermine governance 
performance and the production of public goods for the poor (Kelsall 2011; Leonard 2009; 
Leonard and Pitso 2009; Bierschenk 2008; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006a; Blundo 
and Olivier de Sardan 2006b; Alou 2006). Blundo and Olivier de Sardan et. Al., (2006) in 
their work “Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa”, 
45 
 
 
 
give extensive exposition on the nature, form, and characteristics of how corruption, which 
seems to be largely practiced and embedded within neo-patrimonial relations, might 
undermine state performance in delivering services to citizens. They note that irrespective 
of the diversity in the evolution of the post-colonial states in the three countries they 
studied (Niger, Benin, and Senegal) they found the same or similar forms and 
characteristics of corruption which are largely related to the informal nature of how the 
state functions. This suggests that the informal functioning of public institutions, and 
ultimately the state, in terms of not operating according to formal or official legal and 
administrative procedures and guidelines which they found to be widespread may be 
similar across Africa.  
 
Other scholars have also claimed that “neo-patrimonialism allows African politicians to 
supplement their incomes” through corruption (Kelsall 2011: 77; Olivier de Sardan 1999; 
Bierschenk 2008).
30
 Public sector salaries are low partly due to the unproductive nature of 
public servants, massive underemployment, and poor performance of the economy (Olivier 
de Sardan 1999).
31
 There is therefore a high temptation for public officers to use illegal 
means to acquire wealth, and this is when informal ties appear to be useful tools. 
 
                                                 
30
 Part of the reason is that public sector salaries are low. For example, Bierschenk (2008:111) has noted that 
in Benin‟s legal system, “a young judge – who can be responsible for cases involving hundreds of millions of 
CFA francs earned a basic salary of approximately CFA Fr 80,000 including his basic salary and different 
supplementary benefits, this is approximately € 122 per month. It was obvious that his income did not enable 
him to maintain an adequate lifestyle. Due to the introduction of structural adaptation measures, these salaries 
were lower in 2001 in real terms than they were in 1985.” 
31
 According to Olivier de Sardan (1999:32) three factors explain the prevalence of corruption in African 
states. First, the crisis of the African state (the massive employment of unproductive civil servants, followed 
by the bankruptcy of the employer-state, the irresponsibility and cupidity of the ruling elite) have all 
contributed to the exposure in broad daylight of corruption in high places, and the incapacity of the state to 
control “petty corruption” Second, the “under-employment” of civil servants, whether in comparison to their 
northern counterparts (with whom, owing to “globalisation”, they increasingly share the same training and 
aspirations to a similar style of life), or in the light of the economic crisis (indebtedness, devaluation and 
structural adjustment), has obliged them to look elsewhere for the resources which are no longer provided by 
their salaries. Third, development aid has played a somewhat similar role to that of the incomes of the drug 
and diamond economy, by inducing an inflow of assistantship and clientelism favourable to corruption. The 
“project system” and the multiplication of NGOs, which have attempted to correct this bias by a greater 
control of the use of these resources and by partly short-circuiting the state, have amounted to the creation of 
parastatal enclaves, which secrete in turn their own particular form of corruption. The enormous gap between 
the salaries paid by development projects and those paid by the state also incites government civil servants to 
seek complementary resources by illegal means.  
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Another argument is that since markets are not adequately developed in Africa, the system 
makes it possible for corrupt African politicians to “use the power of the state to gain a 
foothold in business.” This works as “the majority of ill-informed voters find it easier to 
evaluate a concrete donation in the form of a private good, such as job or a club good...” 
(Kelsall 2011: 77; Cammack and Kelsall 2011). Informal ties might therefore be employed 
to advance personal interests so may be used to undermine development (Leonard 2009; 
Leonard and Pitso 2009; Fagernäs 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006a
32
; Alou 
2006
33
; Grodeland 2005; Smith 2003; Taylor 2003; Hellman and Ndumbaro 2002).  
 
Ethnic mobilisation, which is chief among informal relations in Africa, enables politicians 
and bureaucrats to be selective in distributing state resources to members of some ethnic 
groups and impose costs on other groups (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2004; Turton 1997; Leonard 
2009; Gantzel 1997; Lewis 1997; Rösel 1997) and there is evidence to support this 
assertion. An example is the case cited in the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo) where  only President Mobutu‟s kinsmen occupied important positions and had 
access to state resources (Evans 1995). Most governments have similarly been criticised as 
being ethnocentric in the allocation of public resources. This is generally perceived in the 
development and governance literature as corruption which is commonly agreed to be the 
“exercise of official powers against public interest or the abuse of public office for private 
gains” (Shah 2006: 2; Smith 2001; 2003; Kpundeh 1994; Tignor 1993), or in most public 
offices, corruption might take the form of a “bribe given to a civil servant in return for 
some favour, the abusive use of public funds to a personal end, or simply dipping into the 
public purse” (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 27).  
 
Olivier de Sardan (1999: 28) has noted that corruption is a characteristic of neo-
patrimonialism and that it “has become, in almost all African countries, a common and 
                                                 
32
 Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006a) list informal relations as family ties, neighbourhood relations, old-
school ties, and note that they easily result in favouritism and other forms of preferential treatments that 
systematically exclude others from accessing public resources. 
33
 The exploitation of informal relations with judges to influence adjudication of justice in the legal system in 
Niger as described by Alou (2006) adds to the mounting evidence of how neo-patriomialism is said to 
undermine government performance.  
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routine element of the functioning of the administrative and para-administrative apparatus, 
from top to bottom...” In describing the extent to which corruption has become endemic in 
African states, largely explained by neo-patrimonial practices in public administration in 
Niger, Benin, and Senegal, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006a) note that there is a wide 
gap between the actual functioning of the state and the way in which the state is supposed 
to  function, based on organisational arrangements, legal framework, and the several policy 
and political declarations in these countries and that the functioning of the state is largely 
informal.  
 
There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that neo-patrimonialism undermines 
governance and this seems to inhibit many scholars, donors, and governments from 
extending the intellectual and policy debate to consider the possibility that neo-
patrimonialism, and by extension informal relations, could promote government 
performance in many African countries because of the ways in which their societies are 
structured and function. Increasing our understanding of Africa‟s socio-political systems 
may therefore be helpful in developing non-conventional ways to promote the performance 
of governments on the continent (Booth 2011). 
 
In recent times however, an improved understanding of Africa‟s socio-political systems has 
raised questions about the conventional thinking in the neo-patrimonial literature.
34
 For 
example, a body of evidence provided by scholars in the APPP supports this assertion; as 
noted by Kelsall (2011), “...emerging body of research has begun to question whether 
clientelism, corruption and rent-seeking are as detrimental to development as once 
believed...” (Kelsall 2011: 76).  
 
Under certain conditions patron-client relations and rent-seeking may not undermine 
government performance which is the APPP‟s claim as stated by Booth (2011: 3), “when 
                                                 
34
 This is particularly important as in many parts of Africa the borderline between corruption and everyday 
practices is quite thin, and in some cases the actors themselves do not see such practices as corruption as is 
common with gift-giving, and logics of solidarity networks which are characterised by a general obligation of 
mutual assistance (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 38-40; Bierschenk 2008).  
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thinking about pathways towards development, it is worth distinguishing among the 
different forms that neo-patrimonial rule can take. We should at least consider the 
possibility that there are forms of the neo-patrimonial state that combine patronage politics 
with quite a high degree of developmental effectiveness.”35 In their comparative work on 
governance systems characterised by neo-patrimonial relations across Malawi, Niger, Côte 
d‟Ivoire, and Ghana, Crook and Booth and other APPP scholars suggest that neo-
patrimonialism, and by extension informal relations, might not always undermine 
governance and that recognising and working with the socio-cultural and political realities 
in Africa would mean neo-patrimonialism is harnessed for “developmental ends” (Kelsall 
2011: 76). As noted by Crook and Booth (2011: 99) “greater recognition is needed that 
“what works” may be rooted in very localised and complex ways of doing things which 
coexist within forms of governance which, out of necessity, are informalised and penetrated 
by local arrangements and pay-offs, deals and political clientelism.” This is particularly so 
as informal structures, values, norms and practices on the one hand, and formal functioning 
of the state on the other hand are interwoven and knitted together over a long period of time 
and it is likely to remain so for long time to come (Blundo et al., 2006).  
 
As indicated earlier, this study‟s grounds for questioning the claims in neo-patrimonial 
literature is that due to the ways in which informal relations work within the African 
context neo-patrimonial relations might promote government performance. Government 
institutions in Africa are characterised by informal behaviours in their functions. This is 
largely explained by ways in which social and cultural practices of most African societies 
have become part of formal institutional behaviour and practices (Blundo et al. 2006). In 
some cases, the functioning of the state incorporates certain local values and norms that 
encourage public officers to seek to promote the interest of the many poor people rather 
                                                 
35
 For example, in the Malawi case, Cammack and Kelsall (2011) explain that the conditions under which 
neo-patrimonialism promotes developmental outcomes include the following: a) centralised structure which 
made it possible for individuals or group of persons at top management position and government bureaucrats 
to define which forms of rent can be created, and also they did the distribution of the rent created at their own 
volition; b) top bureaucrats were inspired by long term vision not only to create rent but also to ensure that 
there was discipline to check rent-seeking so that long term expansion of economic growth is achieved; and c) 
relationship between politicians in government and economic technocrats or senior officers who were 
adequately equipped to provide technical advice were shaped by effective norms. 
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than being self-centred and corrupt. Therefore the central argument being advanced in this 
study is that a better understanding of how African societies work may explain how neo-
patromonial relations are capable of promoting the performance of governments. 
 
This study‟s argument supports the suggestion by APPP scholars that attempts to address 
Africa‟s governance problems need to be informed by the general experience that 
institutions perform well when they are adequately rooted in the social, economic, and 
political context in which they are located and incorporate local values, norms, and 
initiatives (Cammack 2011; Olivier de Sardan 2011). This assertion is further supported by 
Booth (2011: 7) who has noted that “the institutions that work best for public goods 
provision and development in Africa context are ones that, by design or otherwise, have a 
local problem-solving character and build on relevant components of the available cultural 
repertoires, whether in the form of extant beliefs or values or in the form of widely 
recognised behavioural templates.”  
 
Apart from the recent evidence from APPP scholars that neo-patrimonialism can promote 
governance performance, other scholars have found similar evidence elsewhere, that 
informal ties between public officers in different state institutions can facilitate their 
collaboration and coordination of efforts to work and deliver effective services to the poor. 
Ties between public officers of different institutions and between public officers and 
citizens can lead to the development of shared interests and aspirations, and contribute to 
promote accountability of public officers to citizens (Tsai 2007; Granovetter 1983). The 
work by Tsai (2007) on the activities of solidary groups in rural China is a classical 
example which shows that informal ties can benefit the wider society. According to Tsai, 
members of solidary groups are bound by informal ties that are based on shared moral 
obligations as well as shared interests. A very significant character of solidary groups is 
that they confer moral standing on public officials in recognition or acknowledgement and 
appreciation of the good behaviour of public officers when their actions promote the 
interest of everybody in the community. Moral standing prompts honour and respect for 
public officials. Tsai argues that “even when formal governmental accountability is weak, 
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local officials may still have a strong incentive to provide public goods when citizens award 
them moral standing for doing so” (Tsai 2007: 356).  
 
APPP scholars focus on countries and national level bureaucrats so potentially the 
conditions under which neo-patrimonialism may produce positive outcomes, such as those 
described by Cammack and Kelsall (2011) in the Malawian case, might not be applicable to 
this study which focuses on local level public officers and leaders of a section of civil 
society actors in the same country. However, the body of work by these scholars provides 
useful insights to this study as they indicate that neo-partimonialism could be useful to 
development efforts under certain conditions. Before reviewing a number of conditions that 
are likely to make neo-patrimonial relations useful in the context of this study, it might be 
helpful to discuss how the approach I adopt in conceptualising informal relations and neo-
patrimonialism and their effects speaks to the ideas of scholars in the APPP and the concept 
of neo-patrimonialism.  
 
There are two levels of analysis in this study at which the issue of neo-patrimonialism is 
important. The first level is the relationship between the Health Directorate and the 
Municipal Assembly including health officers and executive officers of the Assembly. The 
Health Directorate and the Assembly are two “parallel” decentralised authorities with 
“equal” powers as per Act 525 and Act 462 respectively. It may not be clear that neo-
patrimonial relations exist across the two institutions particularly as the District Health 
Management Teams (DHMTs) are supposed to provide an equal platform for the two 
institutions to collaborate. However, with regard to issues around the “control and 
disbursement” and the “receipt” of financial and other resources, we might view the 
relationship between the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) and the Municipal Health 
Director (MHD) as a “patron” (MCE) and “client” (MHD) relationship which is likely to be 
influenced by political party, ethnicity and the other informal ties; in this case neo-
patrimonial relations exist. This might be so as the MCE is likely to allocate resources to 
those MHDs who will reward them politically at some point.  
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The second level of relations providing a good example of neo-patrimonial relations 
developing is in the relationship between health staff and leaders of selected civil society 
groups. Health officers, particularly Health Directors, are likely to behave like “patrons” by 
using the various resources that leaders of the CSOs (clients) need to obtain political 
support for themselves or their connections such as the MCEs. In these relationships, ethnic 
ties, political party networks, old-school relations and neighbourhood ties are likely to be 
influential. 
 
Having described the circumstances in which we may refer to the varied relationships 
addressed in this study as neo-patrimonial relations I now review the conditions under 
which neo-patrimonial relations and by extension informal ties, may positively influence 
government performance. 
 
First is the existence of a dense network connecting health and Assembly staff including 
both executive and elected members and also between health staff and leaders of the 
selected civil society groups. All these actors must be connected by as many of the ties as 
possible. Under such conditions, and since it is likely that each of the ties will have its 
unique interests, the  network is likely to shape and harmonise the various interests to 
produce shared ones for many actors rather than satisfying the interests of a few. Second, 
when networks have wider coverage, the greater the chances are that shared interests that 
are developed would have emerged from a more transparent process. Third, when citizens 
acknowledge and reward behaviours that seek to advance the interest of the collective, by 
conferring moral standing as described by Tsai (2007) and Tendler (1997), neo-
patrimonialism and therefore informal relations may contribute to achieving developmental 
outcomes.  
 
2.8 Coordination in mixed decentralised systems: the role of informal ties 
  
My approach in this thesis is to draw on the body of work on social capital, embedded 
autonomy, and informal ties. The importance of social capital is increasingly recognised in 
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other aspects of governance, but very little attention is given to how it can contribute to our 
understanding of decentralisation. The notion of social capital can help shed light on the 
forms of social organisation in most countries in Sub-Saharan African. Societies in these 
countries are highly organised around informal networks: friendship ties, family and 
kinship relations, ethnic and hometown networks, and religious affiliations. These 
relationships constitute strong forces that shape the life and behaviour patterns of most 
people. The ways in which societies are organised can support exchange and reciprocal 
support systems that operate along these informal networks (Crook and Hosu-Porbley 
2008; Slater 1990; World Bank 2001). This form of social organisation perpetuates the 
control of power by public officers who distribute public resources to favour their 
constituencies. Mungiu-Pippidi (2006: 87) has referred to this kind of control of power and 
distribution of resources as “particularism” which has been characteristic of societies in 
most developing countries for many centuries. Social organisation of this type can shape 
the behaviour of public officers in the performance of formal functions which in turn can 
shape the way in which formal decentralisation processes operate and how decentralisation 
process leads to producing the expected outcomes (Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Hyden 2007; 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Mayhew 2000; Boone 2003; 1998).  
 
This is particularly important in Ghana where devolution and deconcentration operate in 
parallel and alliances between officers of Municipal Assemblies (devolved authorities) and 
those of the Health Directorates (deconcentrated authorities) may make them vulnerable to 
cronyism, nepotism, and corruption.  For example, Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) notes that one of 
the root causes of corruption in poor countries can be attributed to forms of social 
organisation in terms of how people relate and the consequent exchange of reciprocal 
support along informal networks which can affect the distribution of resources. Failure to 
understand and target the ways in which informal relations shape the behaviour of people 
accounts for the failure of efforts to fight corruption in poor countries (Hyden 2007). This 
proposition is further supported by Jeppsson et al. (2003) who shed light on how personal 
relationships can affect policy implementation. They studied the efforts to deconcentrate 
health service delivery in Uganda by restructuring the Ministry of Health to delink policy 
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formulation and facilitation of implementation from actual implementation.  Jeppsson et al. 
(2003) noted that the restructuring exercise could not lead to collaboration between staff of 
the Ministry of Health and their counterparts in the district offices as expected because the 
process cut off interaction which is needed for collaboration to occur between centre and 
the periphery.   
 
Although Jeppsson et al. (2003) refer to relationships between the central and the local 
levels, their argument is relevant to the current study because they draw our attention to the 
issue of personal relationships as an important factor that can affect how policy is 
implemented. I suggest that whether decentralisation reforms produce the expected 
outcomes or not might depend on the extent to which the design and implementation of 
such reforms incorporate issues of informal relations in the wider social context within 
which the reforms operate.  
 
Informal relations that exist within the bureaucracy in Africa might take various forms. 
Their importance and situational flexibility are likely to vary but what seems to be a 
consensus in the literature is that they play significant role in explaining the performance of 
state institutions in Africa (Crook and Booth 2011; Blundo et al. 2006). In Ghana, informal 
relations that appear to be common among public officers include ethnic relations; political 
party affiliations; family or neighbourhood ties; and old-school networks. I explore these 
informal ties in the next section. 
 
2.9 Bringing informal ties back in 
 
Informal ties are relationships between people at a personal level (Coleman 1991). They 
may include a complex combination of “weak ties (relationship with acquaintances and 
friends of friends) and strong ties (relationship with friends, relatives, and neighbours)” 
(Granovetter 1983: 207). Grodeland (2005: 5) has noted that an informal network is an 
“informal circle of people able to and willing to help each other.” Generally what seems to 
be common to these definitions of informal ties is that they can be grouped into two broad 
categories. The first is what I will call the non-voluntary category. In this group, an 
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individual will have no choice over a decision to be part of such ties. These may include 
tribal; ethnic; hometown; and family ties.
36
 The second category comprises the voluntary 
group. Voluntary ties are those that people choose to establish. These may include 
friendship ties, old-school networks, neighbourhood ties, political party affiliations, and 
religious affiliations. Informal ties remain very important in most parts of Africa as noted 
by Kimenyi and Mbaku (2004: 113) that “while many changes have taken place in Africa 
over the last 40 years … little has changed in regard to the attachment and loyalty that 
individuals have towards members of their ethnic group.” As members of an informal 
network share benefits that accrue to that network, they hold an obligation to it; any failure 
to promote the interest of the members could result in exclusion from the group. This is 
what Coleman (1991) suggests when he notes that:  
Social relations are self-sustaining in the sense that incentives to both parties to continue the 
relation are intrinsic to the relation. The incentives are generated by the relation itself and 
continuation of the relation depends on it generating sufficient incentives for both parties 
(Coleman 1991: 2) 
 
The informal ties on which I focus in this study are ethnic ties; family, kinship, 
neighbourhood or abusua ties; old-school networks, and political party connections. An 
important feature of informal ties is that the benefits that come with membership imply that 
informal ties are largely personal which I will discuss in more detail in the next section. In 
reality, the various forms of informal ties overlap in a very complex web of networks. For 
instance it may be common to find people from different ethnic backgrounds that share the 
same old-school or political party ties. 
 
2.9.1 Ethnicity and ethnic identities in Africa 
 
Ethnicity or ethnic identities are one of the key social ties in many parts of Africa. Our 
understanding of the usefulness of such identities and their adaptation in terms of 
situational or contextual demands and circumstances especially in contemporary Ghana 
may be enhanced by a bit of exploration of the concept. 
 
                                                 
36
 Family ties can fit into both non-voluntary and voluntary categories as in the case of abusua in Ghana 
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There appears to be no consensus on the definition of ethnicity as the concept itself is 
dynamic and evolving in significant ways particularly in recent times in response to 
contextual and situational challenges (Young 2004; 1983; Phinney 1990). The definition 
considered most appropriate to this study is the one put forward by Young (2004). In his 
work on “Revisiting Nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa” in which he examines the 
evolving forms and uses of nationalism and ethnicity in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, Young (2004: 7) suggested that:  
 
“ethnicity might be conceptualised in terms of three defining elements. Firstly, ethnicity rests 
upon a variable list of shared cultural attributes. Language is primarily, although not 
invariably present as a marker; ... Other defining common properties include ancestry and 
kinship ideologies, cultural practices, symbolic repertoires, or modes of religious observation. 
Secondly, ethnicity is defined by an active consciousness of collective selfhood. The group is 
invariably named and its members hold a self-awareness of their collective affiliation; ... 
Thirdly, ethnicity is defined by boundaries ... whom one is depends upon whom one is not.”  
 
Young (2004; 1986) has suggested that the nature of evolution of ethnicity in Africa shows 
that ethnicity has been socially constructed through a number of ways. These include (a) 
the partition of Africa into colonies, (b) the ways that colonial powers constituted Africans 
as ethnic subjects based on tribal lines, (c) the activities of different groups of missionaries 
in an effort to effectively reach the subject populations using different standards by 
establishing other forms of ethnic identities largely based on linguistics and dialects in their 
catchment areas, and (d) the role played by Africans themselves in the construction of 
ethnicity and ethnic identity.  
 
How Africans organised politics, power and authority during the pre-colonial period 
explains many of the contemporary ethnic identities. For example, in Ghana, the history of 
the Asante Empire gives contemporary Ashantis a sense of unique identity separate from 
the other Akans (McCaskie 1983; Wilks 1961). 
 
Ethnicity is a complex phenomenon and its expression and effect can shape and be shaped 
by a host of contextual factors, its expression in a particular setting depends upon a wide 
array of historical, social, economic, cultural, and psychological factors (Young 1983). This 
is evident from situational flexibility in understanding of the concept and significance of 
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ethnicity particularly in the period before colonisation, during colonisation (independence 
struggles), and in the period following independence. Although there was ethnic 
consciousness among Africans, its mental and geographical boundaries were different from 
its latter forms following the works of the colonial powers to reconstruct and reclassify 
ethnicity even though it did not fit this new classification in reality. Pre-colonial forms of 
ethnicity did not have a clear expression in political terms and to a large extent, it did not 
have a relationship with the evolution and disintegration of states (Young 1986). 
 
Because ethnic identities are complex, it might be sociologically difficult to make 
generalisations and conclusions about uses and significance of ethnic identities (Phinney 
1990). Notwithstanding this, it appears that there are a number of ways in which the uses of 
ethnic identities stand out in the African context showing their situational flexibility as 
noted by Young (2004). For example during the struggle for independence, ethnicity 
assumed a different significance when viewed from the perspective of instrumentalists. For 
the instrumentalists, ethnicity was mainly “a weapon in the pursuit of collective advantage, 
they stress the situational and circumstantial nature of ethnic solidarity, and focus upon 
competition and interaction” (Young 1983: 660). The instrumentalists‟ position is 
supported by evidence of how in some instances, nationalists‟ struggles employed the 
concept to mobilise the people to fight for independence. It must however be noted that this 
was not the general phenomenon across Africa. In some cases as in Ghana, nationalists 
such as Kwame Nkrumah tried to discourage ethnic segregation in order to pursue a 
common national identity (Owusu 2006). 
  
In another situation ethnicity played quite a different role. When electoral politics and 
competition emerged on the continent in the period following independence, ethnic 
identities and ethnicity provided the foundation and framework for the construction of 
many political parties. This became possible because leaders of local communities had 
appealed to ethnic solidarities to establish representative institutions in response to some of 
the strategies of the colonial administration such as divide and rule and indirect rule.  It is in 
this process that some of the constituencies that local leaders mobilised provided the basis 
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for establishing political parties to access the state and control public resources. This 
phenomenon appears to be prevalent in most parts of Africa in recent times. For example, 
Eifert, Miguel and Posner‟s (2010) findings from over 35,000 respondents in 22 public 
opinion surveys in 10 countries revealed a strong relationship between heightened levels of 
ethnicity and political competition and that ethnic identities can be useful tools with which 
to compete for and possibly win political power in Africa (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010). 
This partly explains why ethnic identities are predominant in the architecture of politics in 
Africa (Leonard 2009; Newbury 1992). 
 
Development of ethnic identities in Africa can also be explained by the desire to control 
trade (Cohen 1966). This is evident in the history of the period of colonisation and post-
colonisation.  For example, Cohen‟s (1966) study of the formation of Hausa communities 
in Yorubaland (Nigeria) suggests that Hausas mobilised ethnic solidarity to control trade in 
kola from forest areas to savannah regions of the country. Competition and the quest for 
monopoly and control over the kola trade resulted in them mobilising politically against 
other ethnic groups to coordinate and protect Hausas engaged in various stages of the trade. 
The process led to the growth of ethnic and tribal communities of Hausas. 
 
In recent times ethnic solidarity has been expressed in other forms such as hometown 
associations. Such associations will comprise people from the same town or village who 
live abroad. The associations are organised with the view to influence socio-economic 
activities and politics back home (Crook and Hosu-Porbley 2008; Afede-XIV 2005; Steve 
2007).
37
 Ethnic, clan, tribal and hometown ties have become popular not to control power 
and public resources but to influence development in villages and cities from which 
members of these groups hail. For example, the mobilisation of Ghanaians in Germany 
shows that such groups have strong networks back in Ghana and their influence in the 
country includes the adoption and support of deprived communities (Steve 2007). They 
also provide support in healthcare such as the supply of hospital beds, medical equipment, 
                                                 
37
 Steve (2007: 12) lists the most common village/hometown associations such as the Ashanti Akim Kuo, Obo 
Citizens Union, Oguaa Kuo. He also lists ethnic/tribal associations including Ashanti/Asanteman Union, 
Brong-Ahafo Union, Ga Union, Fanti Union, Kwahu Union, Akwapim Union. 
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medicines and training gadgets to health institutions. Crook and Hosu-Porbley (2008) note 
that in Ghana, hometown associations have a long history dating back to the twentieth 
century, and since the 1970s and 1980s hometown associations have extended beyond the 
borders of Ghana as they form overseas branches. The connection between overseas and 
home branches further enhances their influence back home. In Peki, for example, the Peki 
Union influenced policy in the District through their support for education, health, and 
agriculture (Crook and Hosu-Porbley 2008). In Mohan‟s (2006) view incentives which 
influence ties and networks associated with hometowns include Ghanaians abroad being 
able to mobilise and promote development in their hometowns so as to make life 
comfortable for their immediate and extended relatives. Another reason might be to raise 
the image of their hometown so that they would not be embarrassed in the event of funerals 
which are occasions for their friends or colleagues and neighbours to visit their 
hometowns.
38
  
 
The significant concept of ethnicity most relevant to this study is the construction of 
ethnicity by people who reside and work in urban areas away from rural areas where their 
extended families might live. Young (2004: 14) has noted that “in the emergent urban 
centres, migrants of common cultural affinity form organisations for mutual support in 
overcoming the multiple challenges of town life: jobs, housing, coping with misfortune.” 
Ethnic affinity has therefore become quite significant in most urban areas in Africa (Young 
1983).  
 
Ethnicity is probably a growing factor in structuring social solidarities and collective 
images of political competition (Young 1983: 659). It is worth noting that given the nature 
of situational flexibility and the varied significance of ethnicity, there might be fluctuations 
in its usefulness in countries that have competitive elections and this might vary in line with 
election cycles (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010); this might occur in Ghana. At one level, 
                                                 
38
 Funeral celebrations can be very important to Ghanaians and these funerals are mostly held in villages and 
hometowns where people have strong kinship attachments. To avoid embarrassment to urban residents and 
those  abroad who might have gained high social status where they now live, they are obliged to fix the 
situation back home. This may explain why old and dilapidated family houses are quickly renovated and 
painted in preparation for funerals (see Witte 2003; Clark 1999). 
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ethnic identities could become important in urban settings. This is when affinity to 
hometown associations and districts might become an important mobilisation factor to 
Ghanaians. At another level, political affinity might matter more. In election periods, even 
though hometown connections might matter (with respect to strongholds of political parties 
such as NDC – Volta region, and NPP – Ashanti region), it is likely that ethnicity would 
assume a different significance.  
 
In most areas of the public services across Africa, the people sharing ethnic and hometown 
connections seem to treat each other in a special way when it comes to official or formal 
dealings. It is very common to find that people get connected to opportunities such as jobs, 
contracts, or other resources and support systems as a result of the ties they have with those 
who have access to those opportunities (see Ghana News Agency 2010a; 2010b). 
 
2.9.2 Family, kinship and neighbourhood networks 
The family in most parts of Africa is likely to extend beyond the father, mother and 
children boundaries or nuclear family. It might include the extended family and neighbours 
as well.
39
 In an urban context in Ghana, it is sometimes difficult to locate the boundary of 
the family with the emergence of the new family or the abusua in this study.
40
 On this basis, 
I put family, kinship and neighbourhood ties or the abusua into one category because of the 
blurred boundaries which have developed across these ties in contemporary urban 
communities in most countries across Africa Hanson (2004). The „abusua‟ in Ghana is an 
Akan word for family (African family), and I have adopted this concept for use in this study 
as culturally understood metaphor for friendship and support amongst workers in most 
urban areas in Ghana. To help in our understanding of its use in this study it might be worth 
of additional elaboration. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 A neighbour in this study is taken to mean colleagues at work and the people with whom we live in the 
same neighbourhood in the city. These are people who also live and work away from their kinsmen and 
families. 
40
 I will use abusua extensively in this thesis. 
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The concept of abusua 
The abusua is a part of the culture of the Akans in Ghana. In this study I adopt the 
definition of culture from Swidler (1986: 273) that “culture consists of such symbolic 
vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well 
as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life.” In 
the strictest sense and in the culture of the Akans, the abusua is about the matrilineal 
family. Members of an abusua have a common blood line through female ancestors. 
Members of an abusua have rights, privileges, responsibilities and obligations. Among the 
rights are inheritance to property such as land and other forms of wealth (Berry 1997:9; 
1992.). There would be several privileges in the form of support in times of bereavement, 
marriage, and child outdooring. Enjoying these rights and privileges come with obligations 
and responsibilities to extend similar support to others in the abusua. However, one does 
not have to be a beneficiary of the support system before extending support to others, and 
nephews would expect to inherit from their uncles (brothers of their mothers).  
 
As noted by Swidler (1986: 273), “culture influences action ... by shaping a repertoire or 
tool kit of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct strategies of action.” Most 
people who reside and work in urban areas away from their immediate families invoke the 
idea of abusua and take the friends they make in the cities and colleagues at work as their 
abusua (the new family). This is because the abusua (this new circle of friends and 
neighbours) play most of the role of actual families in terms of the support system they 
provide.  
 
Faced with challenges or new situations, individuals, groups or societies would develop 
coping mechanisms to meet the demands or challenges of the time, and strategies adopted 
are likely to be effective when they are drawn from enduring ways of life or their culture or 
the “tool kit” as Swidler (1986: 279) puts it. The abusua therefore offers most workers in 
urban areas in Ghana the means of solving diverse kinds of problems which confront them 
in everyday life in the city away from their real families. In her analysis of cultural theory, 
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Swidler (1986) used “strategies” to mean ways in which action is organised which makes it 
possible for the one who takes such actions to obtain numerous life objectives.  
 
I use this idea of abusua in the study as a strategy which has the potential to bind 
government bureaucrats between different parts of the state at the local level, and between 
public officers and leaders of the selected civil society groups in the study. As a cultural 
practice, abusua could have enduring effects on its members and shape their actions 
(Swidler 1986). 
 
The difference between abusua as used in this study and the traditional sense of abusua as 
with the Akans is blood lineage and therefore inheritance rights. Members of an abusua in 
this study are not related by blood and cannot inherit property of their abusua. The common 
characteristic of the abusua, as used here, and the traditional abusua is the availability of 
reciprocal support systems.  
  
In recent times, abusua ties have become very important in Ghana because of the benefits 
that come with them. These include receiving favours and support in various forms from 
other members of the abusua. They also come with obligations that enjoin members of the 
abusua who have access to opportunities to extend them to other members (Alesina and 
Giulian 2007; Crook and Hosu-Porbley 2008; Clark 1999; Aldous 1962). As Clark noted, 
in Africa, besides the support that one would receive from key social institutions such as 
marriage, child naming ceremonies, and bereavement, one‟s connections with siblings, 
cousins, and uncles provide routes to access a wide range of resources and opportunities 
(Clark 1999). Findings from studies such as that of Palumbo (1992) on marriage, land, and 
kinship in Nzema (Ghana) contribute to the well established literature on land tenure in 
Africa that family and kinship ties give access to land.  
 
The benefits of family or abusua ties might even extend beyond life; in fact it could also be 
extended to the dead in terms of providing a decent and befitting burial to the dead (Witte 
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2003)
41
 particularly when that person is considered to have made a tremendous contribution 
to advance the cause of the abusua. Public officers can invoke these obligations and 
benefits systems to obtain cooperation from other officers they work with. These reciprocal 
exchanges suggest that family, neighbourhood or abusua ties within the state can shape 
how public officers collaborate to perform statutory functions. 
 
2.9.3 Old-student networks 
The primary and secondary schools, and universities or training institutions that people 
attend can be good roots for the establishment of informal ties. Unlike the family (in 
African sense) or the abusua (in Ghana), old-school networks might not be peculiar to 
Africa but occur in other parts of the world. The benefits that come with membership of an 
association of a particular educational institution are so huge that it is common in Ghana to 
hear people say that if you do not have school-mates then you are unlucky. Old-school ties  
can extend beyond classmates to any person who attended that school so it is the name of 
the school which provides the connection not a personal connection with members in the 
network from whom support or assistance may be required. Old-school ties between public 
officers in different institutions can be employed to access opportunities in important 
contexts. Vidich (1997: 213) has called such ties “institutional cliques.” He notes that: 
Each individual within an organisational (bureaucratic) hierarchy possesses informal and 
formal connections and ties with others in other organisational institutions. The informal 
connections have their origins in extra-institutional relationships based on such consideration 
as … old-school ties based on graduation from the same educational institutions or graduating 
class (Vidich 1997: 213). 
 
These ties can enhance exchanges of reciprocal and mutual support because members might 
have strong loyalty towards the group. A kind of loyalty rooted in common or shared 
interest around projecting the image of their former educational institution. In such 
networks there are members who have access to and control public resources, jobs, and 
other opportunities that can be extended to other members in the network so that overall the 
image of their school is promoted (Hanson 2004; Vidich 1997).  
 
                                                 
41
 The work by Marleen de Witte (2003) on funeral celebrations in Ghana shows how most people can take 
pride in the fact that they will be given befitting burial because of their abusua connections. 
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An example of how old-school ties can work is described by Crook and Hosu-Porbley 
(2008) in their work on the Peki Union in Ghana. Their account of Peki Union‟s efforts to 
campaign for a district suggests that the success of the  Peki Union and the people of Peki 
to establish a new district might have been aided by a web of old-school connections with 
key public officers.
42
 They show that the then member for Parliament for the Peki area and 
the then Minister of Local Government and Rural Development are old-boys of Prempeh 
College (in Kumasi, Ghana) which the former President John Agyekum Kufuor also 
attended. Additionally a former teacher of President John Agyekum Kufuor was from Peki. 
The old-school ties enabled the petitioners to gain access to the President which may have 
contributed to the campaign to establish a district.  The old-school factor seems important 
as the campaign for the district started in the late 1970s but they obtained district status 
during the Kufuor government between 2000 and 2008. In this case, it was even not 
university but a secondary school which they attended many years ago that bound them 
with the president. 
 
2.9.4 Political party ties 
Political party affiliations are also likely to strengthen these other ties particularly ethnic 
relations. For example, in most parts of Africa, there are ethnic groups that are known to 
have strong allegiance to certain political parties. But this is no surprise as most of the 
political parties in Africa are rooted in ethnic solidarities (Morrison 2004; Tignor 1993). 
We find similar examples in countries such as Rwanda where the Mouvement Social 
Muhutu (MSM) which later become the Le Parti du Mouvement de L‟émancipation Hutu 
(PARMEHUTU) is Hutu-dominated and champions the interest of Hutu ethnic group, 
while the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNR) and Ressemblement Démocratique Rwandais 
(RADER) champion the interests of Tutsi (Newbury 1992). The strong relationship 
between ethnicity and politics implies that they tend to strengthen one another and 
strengthen other ties such as religion and old-school networks. 
 
                                                 
42
 This is one example where hometown association employed old-school ties to advance a cause, an 
indication of the interconnectedness and overlap between the various forms of informal ties. 
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The history of Ghana‟s political development strongly supports this assertion. Chazan 
(1982) has noted that:  
Ethnic politics, despite severe vacillations in regime types and ideological predictions, have 
come to play increasingly prominent role in Ghanaian politics since independence in 1957… 
Control of state power has moved from southern Akan groups during the Nkrumah years; 
through a Ga-Ewe coalition under the National Liberation Council (NLC); the central Akan 
(Asante-Brong) alliance of Busia; the ethnically more balanced National Redemption Council 
(NRC) – Supreme Military Council (SMC) constellation; a minority agglomeration with 
disproportionate northern representation in the administration of the Third Republic; and 
finally to heavily Ewe-based ruling clique in the Provisional National [Defence] Council 
(Chazan 1982: 461). 
 
In recent times in Ghana, the Volta and a large part of the Northern regions are perceived to 
be the strongholds of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), while the Ashanti and 
Eastern regions are also perceived to be strongholds of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
(Chazan 1982). 
 
There is an overlap between ethnicity, religion and political party affiliations. It is widely 
claimed in Ghana that most people in the northern regions of the country are Muslims 
whilst large part of the southern areas are Christians. On this basis, one is more likely to 
find Ghanaians from the northern regions who are Muslims and are members of the NDC 
than it is to find Muslims in the southern regions who are members of the NPP. But there 
are instances of conflicts. This is when a person from Ashanti region (in the south) is a 
Muslim and NDC member. It is very common to find tension between such people (often in 
the minority) and others because it sounds odd for an Ashanti to be a Muslim and belong to 
the NDC.  
 
A very important product which is likely to result from the informal relations I have 
described is the issue of trust between members who share these bonds. I will define trust 
in this study as the situation in which an individual in the network is confident to deal with 
all others who are members of the network in a transparent and honest ways without 
suspicion or doubt and he or she is convinced that the others deal with him or her in the 
same way.  Trust is needed to sustain informal networks and facilitate the exchange of 
reciprocal support system within informal relations. The existence of trust might engender 
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collaboration and development of concerted efforts and shared interest between public 
officers and service users and among citizens. The body of work that might help us to 
understand the relationship between trust and informal ties is around the ideas of social 
capital which I turn to in the next section.  
 
2.10 Exploring the usefulness of social capital 
 
In this section, I explore the idea of social capital which promises an understanding of 
informal relations within society. The focus on informal relations in social capital is what I 
adopt in my analytical approach. This is because the forms in which social capital manifest 
in Ghana which are the focus in this study are family ties, ethnic/tribal relations, political 
affiliations, and old-school networks. These social relations can facilitate or undermine 
collaboration and coordination between institutions and affect service delivery. 
  
It appears that there is no consensus among scholars as to who first used the term „social 
capital‟ (see Farr 2004; Harriss 2001; Fine 2001). However, one of the key proponents of 
the concept of social capital is Coleman (1988) who explains that: 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different 
entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, 
and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the 
structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Like physical capital 
and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain 
activity. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain action may be 
useless or even harmful for others. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the 
structure of relations between actors and among actors (Coleman 1988: S98). 
 
In his theorisation of social capital, Robert Putnam‟s notion is that the concept “refers to 
features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993: 167). It has also 
been defined as a set of norms, social networks, rules, procedures, values, attitudes, and 
beliefs and precedents and organisations. All these enable people to gain access to power 
and resources that are instrumental in enabling decision-making and policy formulation 
(Pargal et al. 2002; Serageldin and Grootaert 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Krishna 
and Uphoff 2002). Social relations can function as other types of capital: land; labour; 
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funds; and machinery that are needed in the production of goods and services (Fafchamps 
and Minten 2002). 
 
Robert Putnam (1993)‟s examination of institutional performance of all twenty regional 
governments in Italy over a period of two decades, finds that regions in the northern part of 
the country became more successful than those in the southern areas in terms of economic 
and political development. He argues that the civic nature of citizens in the northern regions 
with their inherent social capital is the most powerful force that accounts for advancement 
in governance performance in those parts of Italy as compared with the southern parts. In 
the southern areas, which he refers to as “less civic” regions, they are characterised by 
vertical and hierarchical relationships of authority and dependency (Ibid: 88-89). They are 
plagued with individualism, distrust, suspicion, patronage, clientelism, and civic 
associations that were less actively involved in community affairs. All these undermined 
cooperation among people for the mutual benefit of everybody. The outcome is poor 
governance performance and disadvantaged south when compared with the north (Putnam 
1993). 
He notes that: 
Citizenship in the civic community entails equal rights and obligations for all. Such a 
community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by 
vertical relations of authority and dependency. Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and 
clients or as governors and petitioners (Putnam 1993: 88). 
 
Communities with social capital work towards the common good of everybody. Trust 
prevails which enables people to be tolerant of other‟s choices and opinions. They have 
strong associations that cut across all sections of the community which serve as structures 
of collaboration. These structures embody robust norms and values that sustain reciprocal 
exchanges. 
 
Social capital is something owned by citizens or communities so Putnam‟s (1993) idea 
provides useful insight into how informal relations can affect peoples‟ behaviour towards 
others. In both the civic and less civic communities in Putnam‟s study, the channels of 
social capital are informal ties such as friendship or good neighbourliness. It is from such 
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relations that trust, cooperation, and norms of reciprocity are established and sustained. 
Whether social capital, expressed in informal relations, translates into the mutual benefit of 
everybody largely depends on whether the norms upheld by citizens or communities 
support or frown on individualism, distrust, suspicion, patronage, and clientelism. 
  
In spite of the strength of the idea of social capital, a number of criticisms are levelled 
against it. One of such critics is Collier (2002) who argues that as it is possible to use other 
factors of production (physical capital such as land, labour, machinery etc.) in a negative 
way which implies that the same thing could be true of social capital. The activities of 
Mafia groups and rebellious activities associated with civil wars fall in this category 
because they require the basic components of social capital to function and produce 
benefits for their members.  
 
Harriss (2001) and Fine (2001) also noted that the potential of social capital to promote 
development is exaggerated as it seems to de-emphasise the role of the state, and the 
importance of political bargains and negotiations in development decision making. They 
argue that the idea of social capital is a modern tool which helps to perpetuate the 
hegemony of capitalists. They explain that emphasising social capital would mean that the 
poor and disadvantaged majority are called upon to help themselves; a way to escape 
criticisms against public expenditure cuts.  
 
The concept of social capital therefore provides fertile grounds for World Bank 
programmes that seek to bypass the state and accentuate the role of NGOs as key 
institutions in programme delivery. The World Bank views NGOs as vehicles capable of 
channelling development funds to poor people rather than using local government 
authorities. Yet these NGOs and local associations “are not democratically representative 
organisations, [and] not democratically accountable. They might be attractive because they 
appear to offer the possibility of a kind of democracy, through popular participation, but 
without the inconveniences of contestation politics and the conflicts of values and ideas 
which are a necessary part of democratic politics” (Harriss 2001: 9). 
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In spite of the criticism by scholars such as Harriss (2001) there are claims, in both the 
development and governance literature, in the two decades following the work of Putnam 
(1993) that social capital is a useful concept and that there is a positive relationship 
between social capital and good governance outcomes (Colletta and Cullen 2002; Dasgupta 
2000; Narayan and Pritchett 2000). For example, one of the major conclusions that Isham 
and Kähkönen (2002) make from their study of water management in Java is that donors 
are unlikely to achieve positive results if they invest in water projects in communities that 
have low social capital. In fact, much of the literature on poverty reduction approaches 
suggests to donor agencies that social capital will continue to be one of the very important 
ingredients whose neglect could undermine efforts to alleviate poverty (Narayan and 
Pritchett 2000).  
 
Following the work of Putnam (1993), the very first work that explores the impact of social 
capital is an edited book by Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002). They provide empirical 
findings to show that poverty alleviation and rural development programmes have been 
facilitated by social capital. In this book, Krishna and Uphoff (2002) measure social capital 
and explore its impact on development. They studied sixty-four communities in the State of 
Rajasthan (India) in which they interviewed over 2000 respondents made up of all 
categories of local people. Even though they found other factors to be important, they claim 
that social capital emerged strongly as the most important explanation to better water 
resources management and cooperation among farmers. Similarly Fafchamps and Minten 
(2002) find greater impact in economic terms, on agricultural trading in Madagascar where 
traders who have good personal connections with both their suppliers and consumers can 
increase their return on investments. Additionally, Pargal et al. (2002) found that social 
capital enabled communities to collectively and voluntarily mobilise for garbage disposal in 
municipalities in Dhaka (Bangladesh) when municipal authorities failed to provide that 
service effectively. Narayan and Pritchett (2000) also found a strong relationship between 
social capital and the adoption of improved farming practices; increased incomes to 
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farming households; and improved management of public water supply system and rural 
roads in villages in Tanzania. 
 
In a study by Widner and Mundt (1998) on „Researching Social Capital in Africa‟, they 
attempted to apply the theory of social capital to analyse local government performance in 
Botswana and Uganda. Among their findings was that the norms of social capital that were 
correlated in Putnam‟s Italian case did not cohere in their two African cases. In addition, 
they found no causal relationship between social capital and government effectiveness in 
the two countries. They also found that measures of trust were lower in Botswana than in 
Uganda, although Botswana‟s economic and democratic performance are better than 
Uganda. What we learn from these findings is that social capital explanations of Africa‟s 
predicaments rely on inadequate assessments of African norms and fail the test of 
accounting for intra-African variations in performance. 
 
In this thesis I embrace the idea of social capital to understand informal relations within 
civil society.  The concept of social capital expands our understanding of how Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) work and the potential contribution CSOs can make to improving 
governance outcomes in terms of better service delivery. I focus on the form of social 
capital that can exist amongst leaders of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
Traditional authority (TA), and religious groups (RGs). I depict this in Figure 2 below.  
 
As the literature on social capital focuses more on ties within society, the work of Putnam 
(1993) and other scholars does not seem to provide adequate insight into the dynamics of 
state-society relations. This gap is however addressed by scholars such as Evans (1995; 
1996a; 1996b) and Tsai (2007) with the concept of embeddedness which explains networks 
between state institutions and society (see Figure 2). The idea of embeddedenss therefore 
offers the basis for understanding of ties between decentralised authorities and society. This 
is the subject of the next section. 
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Figure 2: The theoretical framework: social capital, embeddeness and informal ties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.11 Exploring state-society relations: the concept of embeddedness 
 
I will now turn to the concept of embeddedness. The vertical relationship between state 
institutions and society has been conceptualised as embeddedness. The embedded 
relationship is defined as “a concrete set of connections that link the state … to particular 
social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of transformation” (Evans 1995: 
59). It is the building of relations of trust and networks of collaboration (Evans 1996a; 
1996b).  According to Evans “people working in public agencies are closely embedded in 
the communities they work with; creating social capital that spans the public private 
divide” (Evans 1996b: 1130). So embeddedness is a type of network that develops between 
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public officials and private actors in society so that both groups develop shared aspirations 
and interests (refer to Figure 2). 
 
Tsai (2007) also notes that embeddedness occurs when ties that cross the public-private 
divide develop among citizens and public officials. The ties can be that public officials are 
members of solidary groups; born in the local area; live in the area; and engage in activities 
that local people engage in. In such circumstances citizens and public officials are likely to 
develop shared interests that can shape their behaviour.  
 
The term embeddedness as used in this study is drawn from Peter Evan‟s notion of 
embedded autonomy. In his work on the role of states in newly industrialised countries in 
promoting information technology, Peter Evans argues that the state‟s role is important in 
economic transformation in the production of collective goods such as sewage system, 
roads, education, and health (Evans 1995).
43
 The state‟s ability to effectively facilitate the 
delivery of these services to its citizens can partly be explained by the extent to which the 
state embeds itself within society. When a state becomes embedded without asserting its 
independence, it may be vulnerable to capture by powerful businesses and elite groups. 
Conversely, when the state is highly independent without connecting well with businesses, 
it may not have access to useful information or access to private actors in policy 
implementation (Evans 1995; 1996a; 1996b; Schneider 1998). 
 
Evans (1995; 1996a; 1996b) shows that embeddedness plays a significant role in successful 
cases of development programmes in developmental states such as Korea, China, and 
Taiwan. Local ties which bind local level public officials with business entrepreneurs on 
joint projects of rural industrialisation explain the high performance of rural 
industrialisation (Evans 1996a). According to Evans (1996b) “the central role of ties that 
cross public-private boundaries in China‟s transition success story echoes the pivotal role of 
embeddedness in ... the transformation of the economies of East Asia” (Evans 1996b: 
1123). 
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 Brazil, India, and Korea 
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The extent to which state-society relations can contribute to the production of public goods 
is also supported by Tsai (2007) in a study of solidary groups in China. Tsai has argued that 
when public officials are embedded within society it is likely that officials and citizens will 
“share a common set of ethical and moral obligations. Members of clans, churches, 
fraternal organisations ... have strong obligations to the collective” (Tsai 2007; 356). 
Embeddedness therefore has the potential to provide good incentives to public officers to 
be responsive to members of their communities. This is more likely to occur when solidary 
groups (clans, churches, fraternal organisations etc) offer rewards to public officers in terms 
of “high moral standing for providing public goods, and impose sanctions on those public 
officers who fail to do so” (Ibid: 356). 
 
Similarly, embeddedness might be what Tendler (1997) shows to have contributed to the 
success of preventive health programme in Ceára state (Brazil). According to Tendler, 
preventive health agents embedded themselves in the community by offering “assistance to 
mothers with mundane tasks not directly related to health” (Ibid: 37). In addition to the fact 
that health agents are drawn from regions in which they work, they developed good 
personal relations with mothers by assisting them with cooking, cleaning, and child care. 
Over time, mothers came to see them as friends they could trust and share personal 
problems with. These relationships facilitated the work of the health agents (Tendler 1997). 
 
My study focuses on the embeddedness of staff at the District Health Directorate with local 
leaders of religious groups, NGOs, and traditional councils (Figure 2). It is worth stating 
that in the area of state-society relations, the principal focus of this thesis is on a narrow 
form of embeddedness between public officials and selected social actors. These selected 
groups within civil society may appear to champion the cause of local citizens as I seek to 
explore in the third sub-question, however, this research is not about citizenship and my 
definition of embeddedness does not cover the entire universe of state-civil society 
relations. For these reasons, the extensive literature on „citizen voice‟ and „state-society 
relations‟ in public service provision has not been used. Whilst the broader literature on 
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citizen participation, power and accountability provided a backdrop to my study, for 
example works such as that of Leach and Scoones (2006); Leach, Scoones and Wynne 
(2005); Goetz and Jenkins (2005); Kabeer (2005; 1994); Cornwall (2004); Gaventa (2004); 
Licha 2004; Narayan et al. (2000), this study is about a more narrow set of state-society 
relations.  
 
Embeddedness might not always lead to the production of public goods. As noted by Evans 
(1995; 1996a; 1996b), states vary based on their internal structures and how those 
structures relate to society. States vary in their capacity to function based on what their 
internal structures enable them to do so embeddedness could lead to corruption and the 
deprivation of citizens as is common with predatory states. Characteristically, predatory 
states lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals. 
Personal ties are the only source of cohesion, and individual maximisation takes precedence 
over the pursuit of collective goals. Ties to society are ties to individual incumbents, not 
connections between constituencies and the state as an organisation. When ties between 
individuals and bureaucrats are not institutionalised they become undependable and they 
are more likely to produce spontaneous outcomes (Evans 1995)
44
. 
 
The concept of embeddedness does not adequately explain the relationship between public 
officers in different state institutions and how their interaction can affect the ways in which 
devolution and deconcentration work together. In addition, Evans (1995) does not 
sufficiently research the processes of decision making by businesses and state officials as a 
result of the ties between them. He does not explain the actions of public officers when 
business owners fail to comply with reciprocal terms of the ties (Schneider 1998). Another 
weakness of Evans‟ idea of embeddedness is the proposition that state institutions will 
require social organisations to embed with for such a relationship to yield good outcomes; 
Tendler‟s (1997) case in Ceara shows that embeddedness can produce positive outcomes 
when public officers establish ties with social actors on the individual level. 
                                                 
44
 It is in recognition of the weaknesses of embeddedness that Evans (1995) proposes the idea of „embedded 
autonomy,‟ so that whilst the state seeks to embed itself within society, it should be able to maintain adequate 
autonomy to minimise the risk of capture. 
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In spite of the weaknesses of the body of work relating to embeddedness, I adopt the idea as 
it assists our understanding of state-society relations. Evan‟s (1995) concept of 
embeddedness is that the state embeds itself in society through ties between ministries and 
private industries or business groups and the process of negotiations and cooperation 
between the ministries and private businesses is institutionalised. In this study, I use 
embeddedness in a very narrow sense. I focus on ties between decentralised departments 
and leaders of groups within civil society who were known to the Health Directorates and 
Municipal Assemblies to be working on HIV and AIDS programmes at the local level. In 
addition, in the concept of embeddedness as used in this study, the channels of interaction 
and negotiations are not institutionalised unlike what Evans (1995: 12) notes in his 
developmental state where what binds the state to society are concrete set of ties which 
“provide institutionalised channels for continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and 
policies.” Even though the way I use Evan‟s (1995) idea of embeddedness is in a much 
narrow sense and cannot be said to be adequate reflection of state and society relations, to a 
certain extent, it provides us with an idea about how the decentralised departments of the 
state at the local level might relate with a section of society. In Ghana, embeddedness of 
decentralised authorities with society will take the form of family ties, ethnic or tribal 
relations, and old-school networks between public officers and citizens. Embeddedness has 
the potential to contribute to the performance of decentralised institutions and by extension, 
devolved authorities and deconcentrated institutions of state can collaborate and coordinate 
development programmes at the local level if they establish strong relations with societal 
actors. This is more likely to occur when norms of high moral standing prevail. As noted by 
Tsai (2007; Tendler 1997), the existence of opportunities for public officers to be accorded 
respect and appreciation for acting in the interest of the larger community can contribute to 
minimise corruption. 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature on decentralisation. I explored when and how 
devolution and deconcentration can work at sub-national level. I also explored the concept 
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of neo-patrimonialism, and indicated that my findings in this study question some of the 
claims in the literature on neo-patrimonialism. I discussed the kinds of informal ties that 
might develop within the state which have the potential to shape how public officers relate 
to each other and also how public officers and leader of CSOs relate. I examined the ideas 
of social capital to understand ties within society, and the idea of embeddedness for insights 
into state-society relations. 
 
The chapter has shown that current literature on decentralisation, social capital, and 
embeddedness might not be enough for us to understand how and why a mixture of 
devolution and deconcentration work better in some regions of Ghana than in others. The 
literature on decentralisation focuses more on relations between central government (the 
centre) and local government authorities (the periphery) and assumes that decentralisation 
will work once we get the centre-periphery relations right. Most importantly, this 
assumption is based on comparisons across countries. With respect to the literature on 
social capital, it focuses on ties within society; scholars of social capital seem to view social 
capital from a normative perspective suggesting that social capital cannot be created in 
societies that lack it. The idea of embeddedness relates to state-society relations but 
scholars of embeddedness (like the first group of scholars who focus on conditions required 
for decentralisation to work) also assume that when the relations between state institutions 
and civil society actors are right the state can work better. However, the idea of informal 
ties suggests that ethnic and tribal ties; political party ties, old-school relations and family, 
kinship or abusua ties can help explain the inadequacies of the literature on 
decentralisation, social capital, and embeddedness and show how and when dual systems of 
devolution and deconcentration can work. 
 
We also see in this chapter that the concept of neo-patrimonialism can play important role 
in explaining how mixed systems of decentralisation work. What this suggests is that 
corruption, cronyism, and clientelism might be common in mixed systems of 
decentralisation where informal relations heavily shape day-to-day functioning of 
decentralised authorities. Based on empirical evidence from other scholars such as those in 
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the APPP, we also see that informal relations might not always undermine the performance 
of governments and that they are capable of producing positive governance outcomes. 
 
In spite of the weaknesses of the literature on decentralisation; social capital; and 
embeddedness, there are important aspects of each that cannot be overlooked. All 
decentralised state institutions at the local level need well qualified and highly motivated 
personnel to function. They also need adequate resources and logistics to enable them to 
deliver basic services to their citizens. Since central government has an important role to 
play in ensuring that these factors are available to all local governments, the centre-
periphery relationship needs to be right for decentralisation to work. When these vary 
across the Municipal Health Directorates (MHDs), they can explain how MHDs perform. 
The nature of relations between MHDs and civil society (embeddedness) will shed light on 
coordination and collaboration between the MHDs and CSOs in the design and 
implementation of health policy. Additionally, the level of associational life and political 
enlightenment of civil society can help us understand how accountable and responsive 
health officers will be to citizens. Neo-patrimonial relations may not always undermine 
development. The literature on decentralisation, neo-patrimonialism, social capital and 
embeddedness therefore offers useful insights to understand how devolution and 
deconcentration work simultaneously. In the next chapter I present the way in which I 
conducted this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Exploring Informal ties and Embeddedness: A Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I describe the research design and the methods employed to explore why 
and how devolved and deconcentrated institutions are able to work together to deliver 
better health services in Ghana. The specific questions I explore with the research design 
are: a) how did informal ties between officers at the Health Directorates and executive 
officers of the Assemblies enhance or constrain how these two decentralised authorities 
collaborate and coordinate efforts to implement HIV and AIDS programmes? b) in which 
ways did informal ties between officers in the Health Directorates and Assembly members 
(particularly elected members) facilitate the consultation with Assembly members in order 
to win public support for HIV and AIDS programmes? and c) how has the embeddedness of 
Health Directorate with civil society organisations (CSOs) (religious groups, traditional 
authorities, and non-governmental organisations) promoted increased consultation with 
leaders of CSOs by the Health Directorates in order to implement HIV and AIDS 
programmes that are more acceptable to citizens? I employed a comparative case study 
approach to examine variations in the ways in which five Municipal Health Directorates 
(MHDs) worked with their Assemblies over a period of eight years (2000 to 2008) to 
implement HIV and AIDS programmes; this is the main focus of this thesis. The data I 
present in this thesis are mainly in the form of narratives or stories told by the various 
actors who are central to health care delivery at the municipal level. They are officers of the 
MHD; executive officers and elected Assembly members of the Municipal Assembly; and 
leaders of Civil Society groups. I will focus on their informal relations, their views on the 
influence of their relations on the management of HIV and AIDS, the impact of their 
relations on the allocation of the HIV and AIDS component of the DACF, and the 
participation (through consultation) of citizens in the planning and delivery of HIV and 
AIDS programmes. 
 
78 
 
 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: in the next section I explain the rationale for my 
choice of health care, why I chose to focus on HIV and AIDS in particular and reasons why 
I focus on the municipal level. I then explain why I employed the comparative cases 
approach and how I selected my cases. I will follow this with a description of how I 
operationalised the research variables, the sources of data, data collection techniques, and 
the respondents interviewed. The conclusion of the chapter is in the final section.  
 
3.2 The health sector and HIV and AIDS 
 
Decentralised departments such as education and agriculture both present equally good 
cases to improve our understanding of whether informal relations can contribute to better 
local level service delivery. I chose health and a specific focus on HIV and AIDS because, 
as noted by the World Bank (2004:1), it is a service “which impacts directly on the 
wellbeing of people especially poor people” and is crucial for the achievement of the other 
development outcomes, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Republic of 
Ghana 2007c; World Bank 1993; 1994b). It might be in recognition of this that three out of 
the eight MDGs are health related (Wilson et al. 2005; Haynes 2007).
45
 Additionally, the 
right to good healthcare is one of the rights given in chapter 6 of the “Directive Principles 
of State Policy” (Republic of Ghana 1992: 31). 
 
The first reason for selecting HIV and AIDS is that the disease receives unique treatment in 
Ghana because: (i) HIV and AIDS is one of the diseases, apart from malaria, which has 
been given specific allocations by the directives of the Administrator of the District 
Assemblies‟ Common Fund (DACF) to the District Assemblies for its utilisation.  It 
therefore requires cooperation between devolved and deconcentrated institutions; and,  (ii) 
HIV and AIDS is the health issue which is on top of the list of priorities for controlling 
communicable diseases in Ghana (Ghana Health Service 2004a; 2005d; Ministry of Health 
2008a; 2009a). The government, as a consequence of these characteristics, directs all 
                                                 
45
 Haynes (2007: 150) has listed these three as (1) reduce child mortality by two-thirds, especially among 
children under five years, the worst affected group, (2) „improve maternal health‟, and (3) „combat HIV and 
AIDS … and other diseases.‟  
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stakeholders to collaborate and coordinate their actions to fight the disease (Republic of 
Ghana 2004e). It therefore requires negotiation between health care providers and care and 
support givers on the one hand, and the general public and people living with AIDS 
(PLWAs) on the other hand, even though the role of stakeholders such as religious groups 
in combating the disease can be very controversial (Haynes 2007).  
 
I also chose to focus on HIV and AIDS because of the challenge the disease poses to 
development. According to UN-HABITAT (2002), 70 percent of all HIV and AIDS cases 
in the world occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. About 25 million Africans were estimated to be 
living with AIDS in 2003 and 2.2 million died from the disease in the same year (Sachs 
2005). Currently, approximately three-quarters of the world‟s annual HIV and AIDS deaths 
occur in Africa, with women now disproportionately affected (Howe 2000; IIkkaracan and 
Jolly 2007). The disease is considered to have contributed to reducing the life expectancy 
of people in Sub-Saharan Africa from 54 to 47 years. It has the potential to affect human 
capacity and reduce productivity in Africa, particularly in agriculture which employs 
between 65 and 70 percent of the workforce. This disease can thus affect Africa‟s food 
security and export earnings (UN-HABITAT 2002). The burden of the disease on families 
can be tremendous as Wilson et al. (2005: 110) indicated that “in the highest prevalence 
countries, the unprecedented number of orphans is threatening to overwhelm the capacity 
of extended families and countries to provide adequate care”. This is because out of the 15 
million children orphaned by HIV and AIDS, 12.3 million or more than 80 percent are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Another reason for choosing HIV and AIDS is the many misconceptions and superstitions 
about the disease that may be propagated by some churches (Charismatic, Pentecostal and 
the Catholic churches) in Ghana. Common misconceptions such as those preached by my 
own pastor consistently over a period of years, are that HIV and AIDS are a punishment 
from God meted out to promiscuous people or sinners; and condoms cannot contribute to 
reducing the spread of the disease.  I have been disturbed about these misconceptions for a 
long time because these „religious‟ teachings are flawed. Scientific evidence is clear about 
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the ways through which HIV can be transmitted.
46
 I hope to shed light in this study on how 
we can get societies to change their attitudes in a positive way to help promote programmes 
around HIV and AIDS.  
 
3.2.1 Why focus on the Municipal level? 
The research is focused on „municipalities,‟ an administrative unit between the larger 
metropolitan areas and smaller and rural district units in size.  The populations of the 
municipalities are growing fast due to an influx of people from rural areas looking for jobs. 
The rise in population has come with concerns about the spread of HIV and AIDS, and 
local politicians use awareness campaigns in the municipal areas to win electoral support. 
There are also a number of civil society groups (churches, mosques, and NGOs) in the 
municipal areas that mobilise around health (Kyerekoh et al. 2002). I chose not to focus on 
metropolitan areas because they are centres of large business corporations, major health 
facilities, and large populations. As a result, issues in the metropolitan areas are highly 
politicised and the focus of national politics. Choosing the metropolitan areas might have 
meant that a mixture of national politics and several other issues could have blurred our 
understanding of decentralised local health care delivery. I did not focus at the district level 
because most of the District Assemblies are rural and are losing their populations to urban 
areas so there is little mobilisation around health by civil society groups at the district level. 
Mobilisation by CSOs is central to the study‟s attempt to understand the role of civil 
society in health care delivery.  
 
Because of the complex dynamics of governance issues that HIV and AIDS raise, there is a 
tendency among scholars to study cases where efforts at addressing the disease have been 
successful or failed.
47
 This approach can be helpful when the focus is on outcome or output 
indicators and baseline data is available for before-and-after design strategy. I have not 
adopted this approach in the current study since my focus is on the processes involved in 
                                                 
46
 A number of scholars have shown that heterosexual intercourse is the predominant mode of transmission of 
HIV in most countries (Chamratrithirong et al. 1999; Camara 2000; Abreu et al. 2003; Kist 2007). 
47
 An example is the work on Uganda by Asingwire and Kyomuhendo (2006). 
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policy implementation rather than on these indicators. Additionally, I have compared five 
cases rather than a single example.  
  
3.2.2 Comparative case study design 
I have adopted a comparative case study approach that can expose and illuminate the 
strength of informal ties as a factor which could explain why and how devolution and 
deconcentration work in parallel within a uniform decentralisation system. This study is a 
comparative case study of five deconcentrated Health Directorates and their devolved 
Municipal Assemblies specifically considering HIV and AIDS programmes between 2000 
and 2008. I conducted a comparative case study for the following reasons. Firstly, there are 
five cases that have consistent health data and stable geographical boundaries during the 
period under investigation. At the time of my fieldwork, there were 30 MHDs, and 19 of 
these had been upgraded from „District‟ to „Municipal‟ status in 2007; there were a further 
6 newly created MHDs which were created in 2007 by altering the boundaries of some of 
the existing districts. The changes in boundary and population mean that information on 
health services and social relations from such municipal areas might not be consistent and 
reliable over the 8 year period being studied. I therefore selected 5 „old‟ municipalities 
whose boundaries had not altered.  These are the Ho, Obuasi, Sunyani, New Juaben and 
Techiman municipal areas (see Figure 3).  
 
Secondly, in terms of health care delivery, the 5 share a number of characteristics because 
of their location and associated activities.
48
 They are tourist destinations and big 
commercial centres and all have HIV and AIDS management high on the health care 
agenda. For example, the New Juaben Municipal area recorded an average prevalence rate 
of 7 percent between 2000 and 2007, which is double the national average (Ghana News 
Agency 2009a). The disease accounted for an average of 4.2 percent of deaths annually 
                                                 
48
 This fits the “most similar systems design (MSSD)” approach (Landman 2000: 27). The objective of the 
MSSD is to compare cases that have common characteristics and try to neutralise what might differ across 
them and at the same time highlight the important differences that might explain political outcomes across 
them (Landman 2000). 
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between 2000 and 2008.
49
 In the case of Obuasi, it accounted for an average of 2.5 percent 
of deaths annually during the same period (OMA 2006a; OMHD 2008).
50
 Figures in the 
other cases were also high. Sunyani recorded 2.0 percent, with 2.8 percent in Ho and 3.1 
percent for Techiman.
51
 These figures suggest that there would be a big incentive for the 
Health Directorates, Municipal Assemblies, and Civil Society groups to collaborate and 
coordinate their efforts to manage the disease, with the potential for collaboration and 
coordination, the dependent variable, to vary across the cases.
52
  
 
                                                 
49
 Interviews with New Juaben Municipal Health Director on 20
th
 October 2008; Director of Faith and Hope 
in Koforidua on 22
nd
 October 2008; Director of 4-Ghana, in Koforidua on 22
nd
 October 2008; Director of 
Mathew 25 House in Koforidua on 21
st
 October 2008. 
50
 Interviews with Director of Social Support Foundation, in Obuasi on 17
th
 June 2009; and Director of 
PACA, in Obuasi on 19
th
 June 2009. 
51
 Interviews with Sunyani Municipal Health Director on 12
th
 May 2009; Deputy Director of Virgin Club, in 
Sunyani on 18
th
 May 2009; Chief of Sunyani Traditional area, in Sunyani on 7
th
 May 2009; and HIV and 
AIDS Focal person (Sunyani Municipal Assembly), on 14
th
 May 2009.  
52
 Choosing these municipalities therefore agrees with what is suggested by Johnson and Reynolds (2005: 87) 
that “cases are chosen for the presence or absence of factors that a political theory has indicated to be 
important” (see also Gerring 2007). Similarly, Burnham et al. (2004: 62) add that “exploiting the logic of 
comparison means choosing cases that isolate one or a small number of factors that appear relevant in 
producing a particular political outcome.” 
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Figure 3: Map of Ghana showing study areas 
 
Based on the criteria that were employed, cases were only selected if their boundaries had 
not been altered during the period under investigation. I concentrated on municipal areas 
characterised by high populations in transit because they are major transport hubs, tourist 
destinations and two of them are located close to Ghana‟s borders with neighbouring 
countries.
53
  
                                                 
53
 There is a general perception in Ghana that such towns were at a relatively higher risk in terms of their 
potential to record high HIV and AIDS prevalence rate (Ghana News Agency 2003c). The Director General 
of Ghana AIDS Commission (GAC) has expressed concern about the vulnerability of municipalities and 
towns located close to the borders in terms of the spread of the disease. She noted that the country's 
neighbours, such as Cote d'Ivoire; Togo and Nigeria had high HIV and AIDS prevalence rates of between 6.0 
Key 
Ho  
Sunyani   
Techiman  
Obuasi  
New Juaben  
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However, this approach to the selection of my cases may contain some bias. Since the 
selected cases have HIV and AIDS as the top health issue and personal relationships 
between the various actors vary due to the length of time each of the actors have known 
each other, it may appear that the cases favour my argument that informal ties and 
embeddedness matter for collaboration and coordination to occur in the implementation of 
HIV and AIDS programmes. To overcome any possible bias, I have limited inferences to 
data obtained from the in-depth interviews and relevant documents from the various 
Municipal Assemblies, Health Directorates, NGOs, and national data on health. I have also 
made an effort to identify, discuss and address any potentially competing explanations for 
causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
In the analysis of these cases, I have paired two cases for each research question. For the 
first question, which explores the relationship between informal ties and collaboration and 
coordination, I have compared New Juaben and Techiman because they show extreme 
values on the performance scale I have used (Gerring 2007: 89). Out of the five cases, New 
Juaben stands out as the best case in which the presence of good informal relations across 
the Assembly and the Health Directorate contributed, to a large extent, in facilitating 
coordination between the two institutions. On this basis therefore, the case in Techiman 
becomes the appropriate candidate to compare with New Juaben which stands out as the 
worst case. Weak informal networks between the Techiman Municipal Assembly (MA) and 
the Health Directorate significantly undermined how the two institutions worked together.  
 
To address the second research question, relating to the politics of participation of citizens 
through consultation with elected Assembly members, I compared New Juaben and 
Sunyani. Out of the five Chief Executives, the reluctance of the Chief Executive of the 
New Juaben MA to undermine elected Assembly members appears unusual. It is very 
common to hear of Chief Executives frustrating elected Assembly members who are 
considered „problematic‟ because they want to be firm and objective in the Assembly. The 
                                                                                                                                                    
and 11.0 per cent (Ghana News Agency 2003c; Ghana News Agency 2009a). The implication of the 
director‟s views is that there is the high possibility of this spilling over into municipalities close to the 
borders. 
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Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) in New Juaben did not undermine Assembly members 
which enabled them to influence policy; involving them was helpful to the MHD. I selected 
New Juaben on this basis as the situation challenges widely held perceptions about MCEs 
in Ghana. The Chief Executive of Sunyani‟s behaviour can be considered the direct 
opposite of that of New Juaben (out of the four remaining cases), so Sunyani was identified 
as the appropriate case to compare with New Juaben. The strategies employed by the Chief 
Executive of the Sunyani MA to weaken the voice of elected Assembly members compare 
well with New Juaben, where elected Assembly members were supported and able to 
influence policy. 
To address the third question, which is the consultation of civil society in order to break 
down traditional and religious barriers in the fight against the HIV and AIDS pandemic, I 
compared Sunyani and Techiman. These two municipalities are just 60 km apart or about 1 
hour‟s travel by road, so are effectively next-door neighbours; they are both dominated by 
the Brong/Bono ethnic group. In spite of this closeness, there are huge differences between 
how CSOs mobilise to influence health policy. Comparing them gives a better appreciation 
of the influences of well organised civil society. 
 
The other two cases, not selected for comparison, are Obuasi and Ho. In terms of 
coordination of programmes, Obuasi appears to be fairly similar to New Juaben. In the case 
of the role of the Health Directorate‟s embeddedness in overcoming norms and practices 
that undermine HIV and AIDS programmes, the Techiman case fairly represents what I 
found in Ho. Even though Ho and Obuasi were not selected, I drew on them in the 
discussion in relevant sections of the thesis. 
 
3.3 Operationalisation of the research variables 
 
(a) The dependent variable 
The decentralisation programme is expected to promote collaboration and coordination at 
the local level so the analysis of negotiations and interactions between the Health 
Directorate and the District Assembly with regard to the utilisation of the DACF can 
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provide a good understanding of how devolution and deconcentration work in Ghana. 
Consequently the dependent variable in the current study is the differential performance of 
the Health Directorates in two dimensions; collaboration and coordination, and consultation 
(see Figure 4 below). The first dimension is the collaboration and coordination between the 
MA and the Health Directorate. In general terms, collaboration can mean “two or more 
parties actively and voluntarily working together to achieve common objective” (Webb 
1991: 229; Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Vigoda 2002). Coordination can also mean 
“working together more closely and effectively” (Webb 1991: 229). I have used 
collaboration and coordination together in this study to mean all the activities that enable 
the various actors at the local level to pursue a unified and harmonised agenda for HIV and 
AIDS.  
 
I measured collaboration and coordination in terms of the accessibility of the District 
Assemblies‟ Common Fund (DACF) by the Health Director (see Figure 4). Access to the 
DACF looks more attractive as a good proxy for collaboration and coordination because the 
District Assemblies are legally bound to release part of the fund to the Health Directorate 
for HIV and AIDS programmes. The directive for the utilisation of the fund specifies that 1 
percent of the value released to each Assembly should be allocated to HIV and AIDS 
programmes (implemented by the Health Directorate).  
 
Although I focus mainly on the DACF, I have attempted to do some amount of exploration 
into more routine administrative work which would require that the health officers and 
Municipal Assembly officials will collaborate to work. This is to strengthen the analysis 
and discussion of the more formal means of collaboration around the DACF. 
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Figure 4: Operationalisation of the theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the objectives of decentralisation is to make governments more responsive to the 
needs of citizens; therefore the second component of the dependent variable is the extent to 
which health staff consult with elected representatives of citizens and selected groups 
within civil society in order to obtain their views for the design and implementation of HIV 
and AIDS programmes. Even though consultation does not mean responsiveness, it is the 
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first step towards responsiveness.
54
  Consultation with local people by the Ghana Health 
Service is the rationale behind the implementation of the Community Health Planning and 
Services (CHPS) programme; and it is the main strategy outlined in the HIV and AIDS 
policy to manage the disease (Republic of Ghana 2003a; 2004e; 2006b; Ghana Health 
Service 2005c).  
 
Consultation has been defined as involving citizens for the purpose of consensus building 
in the decision-making process (Freeman 1996; Cuthill 2001). I use consultation in this 
study to mean seeking the views of citizens‟ on the design and implementation of HIV and 
AIDS programmes. I have looked at consultation at two levels. The first is the consultation 
with elected Assembly members by health staff. Although I use elected representatives of 
citizens (Assembly members), I acknowledge that these Assembly members may not 
necessarily represent citizens as the process of getting elected into the Assembly is fraught 
with numerous issues, and the risk of Assembly members pursuing personal agendas could 
distract them from advancing the cause of their electorates. The second is consultation with 
leaders of selected civil society groups by health staff (refer to Figure 4 above). Just like the 
elected Assembly members interviewed, leaders of the selected groups within civil society 
who were interviewed are not necessarily representatives of all civil society groups in the 
various municipalities as they were the ones who were known to the Assemblies and Health 
Directorates to be the groups that worked on HIV and AIDS related activities. They may 
not therefore represent citizens in that sense. 
 
It might be worth stating that although I do not focus on investigating citizen needs 
directly; my research examines the responsiveness of Health Directorates to citizen needs 
indirectly. An underlying assumption in this research is that both Assembly members and 
selected groups within civil society are representative of citizens and articulate their 
interests.  Two factors led to this indirect examination of responsiveness.  First, capturing 
citizen needs would have required developing a methodology, probably surveys which 
                                                 
54
 The Health Directorates can therefore achieve responsiveness to local peoples‟ health needs mainly through 
consultation with local people whose lives are affected by the decisions of the Health Directorates (Republic 
of Ghana 1993a; 1993b; 1999a; 2000a; 2006a; 2006b; Ghana Health Service 2003c).   
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limited time and resources did not allow. Second, because of the focus on HIV and AIDs 
campaigns, local priorities might not have been consistent with public health concerns.   In 
fact, HIV and AIDS campaigns were geared towards challenging and changing local social 
attitudes, behaviours, norms, and practices towards the disease, and thus would be in 
conflict with local beliefs and behaviours. 
 
(b) The independent variables 
The independent variables I have used to explain the Health Directorates differential 
performance are: (i) the informal ties Health Directorate officers have with executive 
officers of the Assembly or elected Assembly members and (ii) the extent of Health 
Directorate officers‟ embeddedness with leaders of civil society groups (see Figure 4). 
 
3.3.1 Establishing informal ties and embeddedness 
The relationships I refer to as informal ties in this study are based on one or a combination 
of the following: ethnic or tribal relations, family, kinship, neighbourhood or abusua ties, 
old-school networks and political party affiliations. When these relationships exist between 
officers in the Health Directorate and those in the MA, I refer to them as informal ties but 
when they exist between officers in the Health Directorate and leaders of civil society 
organisations, I refer to them as embeddedness (see Chapter 2, and Figure 4). I considered 
these ties in the analysis only when they prompted interviewees to interact both in private 
and official levels in the performance of their statutory duties.   
 
To establish the existence of these ties, I asked interviewees about their ethnic and tribal 
background, family history, educational history and history of residence in the 
municipality. I also asked them to indicate the political party they belonged to.
55
 I then 
asked if they were connected through any of the ties they mentioned to the other 
interviewees (see questionnaire in Appendix B). To verify the relationships cited, I 
                                                 
55
 With respect to officers who had not been at a post in the Assembly and the Health Directorate from 2000, I 
used several sources to obtain data on the ties they had with all other respondents. 
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conducted interviews with the people referred to. For example, when I asked one of the 
Health Directors about the ties he had with officers in the Assembly, he related that: 
The person I am likely to contact in the event of issues or problems concerning my work or 
even outside my job are my abusua, these are the MCE, MCD, and Planning Officer. I 
would say the top people at the Assembly. I have sought their support for them to 
accompany me to funerals on a number of occasions, and when they came on such 
occasions they supported me with funds. In the same way I have also attended funerals with 
them and supported them with funds. It is like you scratch my back and I also scratch your 
back [Health Director, 20
th
 October 2009]. 
 
I then validated the Health Director‟s abusua ties to the MCE, Municipal Coordinating 
Director (MCD), and Municipal Planning Officer (MPO) by interviewing each of them. 
The MPO confirmed his ties with the Health Director stating: 
It is true that we have formed a kind of family here because of our job. The Health Director 
has attended funerals with all of us here, and we have also done the same thing to him. That 
is how it is. You establish a new family wherever you are transferred to work because the 
people you work with are the first point of call when you need any support. I have done that 
for the 25 years of my professional life [MPO, 20th October 2009]. 
 
I infer from these statements that informal ties exist between these people. I refer to this 
kind of relationship as neighbourhood or abusua ties.  
 
3.3.2 Determining the strength of informal ties and embeddedness 
To determine the strength of informal ties and embeddedness in the analysis, I calculate the 
number of existing ties as a percentage of all possible ties that one could have with other 
interviewees. I interpreted the strength of informal ties and embeddedness using the 
following scale: strong (≥ 70%); medium (40%-69.5%); and weak (≤ 39.5%). The four 
types of informal ties I used in the analysis are (i) ethnic relations; (ii) neighbourhood or 
abusua ties; (iii) old-school networks and (iv) political party ties. 
To calculate the strength of informal ties between Health Directorate and executive officers 
of the MA I used the following procedure: 
- Ethnic ties are represented by „E‟ 
- Neighbourhood relations are represented by „N’ 
- Old-school ties are represented by „O’ 
- Political pary ties are represented by „P’ 
- Number of officers from the Health Directorate is 3 
- Number of officers from the Assembly is 4 
- Number of informal ties each officer can have is (4 ties x 4) = 15 ties 
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- This means the number of ties each case could obtain would be (16 ties x 3) = 
48 ties 
- Therefore, number of all existing (Y56) ties as a percentage of all possible ties 
(48 ties). This shows the strength of ties (see Table 2). 
 
I used the same procedure to calculate the strength of informal ties between officers of the 
Health Directorate and elected Assembly members (see Table 6 in Chapter 6), the Health 
Directorate‟s embeddedness with CSOs (Tables 7 and 8 for ties with NGOs and other 
CSOs respectively in Chapter 7). 
Table 2: Strength of informal ties: Health Directorate and executive officers of Municipal 
Assembly 
 
Health Department 
Municipal Assembly  
 
% 
MCE MCD MPO HIV/ FP 
 
 
Ho 
Health Director - E, N N,P -  
(15/48) = 
31.25% 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
E 
 
E 
 
N,P 
 
E 
Disease Control Officer P E,P E E,P 
 
 
Obuasi 
 
Health Director 
E, N, 
O,P 
 
N,P 
 
N,P 
 
N,P 
 
(24/48) = 
50.00% Deputy Director of Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
N 
 
N 
 
E, N 
 
E, N 
Disease Control Officer N,P N,P E,P E,P 
 
 
Sunyani 
Health Director N N N N,P  
(23/48) = 
47.91% 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
E, N,P 
E, 
N,P 
 
N,P 
 
N 
Disease Control Officer  
E, N,P 
E, 
N,P 
 
N,P 
 
N 
 
 
Techiman 
 
Health Director 
- E, 
N,P 
- -  
 
(9/48) = 
18.75% 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
- E, 
N,P 
- - 
 
Disease Control Officer 
- E, 
N,P 
- - 
 
 
New 
Juaben 
Health Director  
E, N,P 
E, 
N,P 
N, 
O,P 
 
E, N,P 
 
 
(35/48) = 
72.91% 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
E, N,P 
E, 
N,P 
 
N,P 
 
E, N,P 
Disease Control Officer  
E, N,P 
E, 
N,P 
E, 
N,P 
 
E, N,P 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
 
 
                                                 
56
 The existing ties are the ties that each officer would say he/she has with other officers. 
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3.3.3 Determining collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
Collaboration and coordination between the Health Directorate and MA is measured by the 
level of access to the DACF.  The Chief Executive of the Municipal Assembly controls the 
fund.
57
 Given that the funds were released to the MCEs
58
, I asked the Health Directors 
whether the Chief Executives released the funds to them or not each year between 2000 and 
2008. I sought a „Yes‟ or „No‟ answer. I then used percentages (the number of years that 
MCE released the fund to the Health Director as a percentage of the 8 years under 
investigation). I have used the following scale to interpret access level: high (≥ 70%); 
medium (40%-69.5%); and low (≤ 39.5%) (see Table 10 in Appendix H). 
 
3.3.4 Determining the extent of consultation with citizens 
To measure consultation, I used the involvement of citizens (elected Assembly members) 
and civil society actors (leaders of NGOs, religious leaders, and traditional rulers) in the 
design and implementation of the Health Directorate‟s HIV and AIDS programmes. I 
established the level of consultation using a three-stage procedure. In the first stage I 
compiled HIV and AIDS activities designed to manage the disease between 2000 and 2008 
(see Table 11 in Appendix I). The sources of these measures include High Impact Rapid 
Delivery (HIRD) plans; interviews with Health Directors, Disease Control Officers, Public 
Health Nurses, Deputy Directors of Nursing Services, HIV and AIDS focal persons, elected 
Assembly members, and leaders of civil society groups. The other source of information 
was the MAs‟ Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs). 
 
In the second stage, using HIV and AIDS activities I had identified, I asked elected 
Assembly members whether they were consulted by the Health Directorate during the 
                                                 
57
 Elected Assembly members are supposed to be part of the allocation process but this is largely determined 
by the MCE.  
58
 The release of the funds to the MCEs was critical to the analysis of access, because one factor that might 
have affected whether the Chief Executives would have been able to release the fund to the Health Directors 
was the issue of delays in the release of the funds from the central government (the Common Fund 
Administrator) to the Chief Executives. The Common Fund is released by the fund administrator quarterly, 
but it is very common for releases to be delayed. When this happens, the Chief Executives would not be in a 
position to allocate any funds to the Health Director for HIV and AIDS programmes even if they had good 
relations. 
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preparation and implementation of those activities. I obtained answers to this question at 
two levels. Level one was a „Yes‟ or „No‟ answer to obtain the proportion of elected 
Assembly members who were consulted. Based on the responses, I calculated the 
percentage of Assembly members who were consulted out of the total number of elected 
Assembly members interviewed (see Table 12 in Appendix J for proportions of elected 
Assembly members consulted). 
 
Similar to the elected Assembly members, I asked leaders of civil society groups who were 
known to be working on HIV and AIDS programmes whether officers at the Health 
Directorate consulted with them about the HIV and AIDS programmes. I sought a „Yes‟ or 
„No‟ answer.  I then had a discussion of the responses to understand (i) what role they 
played if they were consulted, and (ii) why they were not consulted if the response was 
„No‟. I determined the level of consultation using the percentage of the number of leaders 
of CSOs that were consulted out of the total number of leaders of CSOs interviewed (see 
Table 13 in Appendix K). The general pattern of informal ties, embeddedness and 
performance across the cases is shown in Table 4 (Chapter 4). In Table 3 I present a 
composite table showing details of how I arrived at the general pattern of informal ties, 
embeddedness and performance across the cases. 
 
This table (Table 3), shows how the summary Table 4 (in Chapter 4) was obtained. In Table 
3, for each of the cases, for example Ho, the overall strength of the independent variable 
(informal ties) is obtained by taking the average after summing up the strength of ties with 
executive officers and that of the elected Assembly members. This same process is used to 
obtain the strength of embeddedness; and the level of performance in terms of consultation. 
It is only the level of collaboration and coordination that this method of averaging the sums 
does not apply to. Data in the cells for collaboration and coordination have been brought 
from Table 5 (Chapter 5). 
 
These data show the nature of ties existing between the various officers. For example, in 
Ho, the overall score for informal ties is 28.95% suggesting that officers do not have many 
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of the ties in common, thus they have weak ties. In New Juaben for example, the overall 
score of 69.78% (strong) suggests that most of the officers have many of the ties in 
common which is likely to facilitate how they collaborate and coordinate programmes as 
argued in this thesis.  
 
  Table 3: Details of performance across the cases 
 
 
Hypotheses 
Cases 
 
Ho 
 
Obuasi 
 
Sunyani 
 
Techiman 
New 
Juaben 
 
INFORMAL TIES 
 
   Executive Officers 
(31.25%) 
weak 
(50.00%) 
medium 
(47.91%) 
medium 
(18.75%)  
weak 
(72.91%) 
strong 
 
   Elected Assembly members 
(26.66%) 
weak 
(26.66%) 
weak 
(36.66%) 
weak 
(10.00%) 
 weak 
(66.66%) 
medium 
 
Informal ties - overall 
average is 
28.95% 
weak 
average is 
38.33% 
weak 
average is 
42.28% 
medium 
average is 
14.37% 
weak 
average is 
69.78% 
strong 
 
EMBEDDEDENSS 
 
   NGOs 
(33.33%) 
weak 
(40.74%) 
medium 
(44.44%) 
medium 
(15.55%) 
weak 
(52.77%) 
medium 
 
   Chiefs and religious leaders 
(50.00%) 
medium 
(44.44%) 
medium 
(50.00%) 
medium 
(11.11%)  
weak 
(55.55%) 
medium 
 
Embeddedness - overall 
average is 
41.66% 
medium 
average is 
42.59% 
medium 
average is 
47.22% 
medium 
average is 
13.33% 
weak 
average is 
54.16% 
medium 
 
PERFORMANCE 
a. Collaboration/ 
coordination (access to 
DACF) 
 
low 
(33.33%) 
 
medium 
(66.66%) 
 
high 
(77.77%) 
 
low 
(33.33%) 
 
high 
(88.88%) 
      
Consultation (Elected Assembly 
members) 
(30.00%)  
low 
(60.00%) 
medium 
(30.00%)  
low 
(30.00%)  
low 
(60.00%) 
medium 
Consultation (NGOs/Traditional 
authority/religious groups) 
(50.00%) 
medium 
(66.66%) 
medium 
(57.14%) 
medium 
(29.28%)  
low 
(85.71%) 
high 
b. Consultation - overall 
average is 
40.00% 
medium 
average is 
63.33% 
medium 
average is 
43.57% 
medium 
average is 
29.64% 
low 
average is 
72.85% 
high 
Note: The percentages for the hypotheses and the performance indicators are interpreted as follows: (A) Informal 
ties/embeddedness is strong if (≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and weak (≤ 39.5%). (B) Access to DACF is high (≥ 
70%), medium (40%-69.5%) and low (≤ 39.5%). (C) Consultation is high ( ≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and low (≤ 
39.5%). 
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3.4 Sources of data 
 
In my fieldwork I used ethnographic tools for data collection. I conducted fieldwork in two 
phases.
59
 Phase one was between October 2008 and December 2008, and the second phase 
was between April 2009 and December 2009.
60
 I used a number of tools including 
questionnaires and a voice recorder. Recording the interviews was necessary since the 
responses were narratives so I could not capture everything through note taking (Kelly 
(2006a). 
 
I used different semi-structured questionnaires for each of the respondents (see Appendix B 
for the questionnaire).
61
 I started the interviews by first identifying and interviewing a 
number of key informants
62
, which provided me with a lead to information about 
discussions around the use of HIV and AIDS funds by the Assembly and Health 
Directorate, stories behind the formation of some of the NGOs, and the relationships 
between some NGO leaders and key officers in both the Assembly and the Health 
Directorates. 
 
I located my key informants at business centres in each of the municipalities.
63
  I asked the 
operators of the business centres about where to find influential people who had lived in the 
municipalities for 15 years or more, particularly retired civil servants, chiefs, and other 
                                                 
59
 Ethnography here is adopted as defined by Berg (1995: 88) “to involve extensive fieldwork of various types 
including participant observation, formal and informal interviewing, and document collecting…” 
60
 The first phase enabled me to test my research instruments to see how appropriate they would be in 
obtaining the relevant data. I also used this period to establish the necessary networks with key informants 
and officers in the Health Directorates and in the Assemblies. 
61
 See also Appendix Q for the list of the main interviewees and dates I interviewed them. 
62
 The key informants include retired civil servants and Commissioners of Oath who served as licensed letter 
writers. The Commissioners of Oaths are persons who have the authority of the Supreme Court to certify 
documents for citizens. They also advise and assist people in the preparation of legal documents.  
63
 These are small shops/kiosks that operate secretarial services such as photocopying of materials, scanning, 
and typesetting and printing of documents. In addition to these services, they offer telephone facilities for 
people to make and receive calls. These centres attract people from all backgrounds in terms of education, 
qualification, ethnicity, religion and politics. All kinds of issues are discussed in such areas particularly when 
there are a lot of people waiting for their turn or especially when there is a power cut and customers will have 
to wait until there is power for them to be served. 
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opinion leaders.
64
 These other interviewees helped me to gather information about the 
MAs, the MHDs, and CSOs. They directed me to Assembly members who have lost their 
seats. All the key informants confirmed that HIV and AIDS was a significant health issue in 
the municipalities. The key informants provided valuable information about the activities of 
the MAs, MHDs, and Civil Society organisations regarding the disease. 
 
To gain the trust and cooperation of the Health Directors, I went to the Ghana Health 
Service head office in Accra to inform the office of the Director-General of the Service 
about the research, and to seek his consent to go to the districts and interview the Health 
Directors. I was given the approval and a letter was sent through the respective Regional 
Directors to the District Directors informing them of the research and requesting them to 
grant me access to the data I needed and also grant me interviews (see Appendix A for a 
copy of the letter). I needed this „key‟ to access the Health Directors for two reasons. First, 
the Health Directors might not have cooperated with me given that I sought to ask 
questions around how they used informal ties to negotiate for collaboration and 
coordination in the districts. They could have been hesitant because they might have 
thought that such information might expose what can be considered clientelistic and 
patronage issues. The second issue is about the type of data I needed. Information around 
the use of financial resources is considered confidential by most public officers in Ghana 
and such data could equally expose corruption and inefficiency of public officers. Thus 
such information could not be released to me without the consent of superior officers at the 
headquarters of the Ministry of Health in Accra. 
 
At the MHDs, the respondents interviewed were the Director, Deputy Director of Nursing 
Services (DDNS), Public Health Nurse (PHN), and Disease Control Officer (DCO); all of 
whom are located in the same building. Although I interviewed several other officers from 
the Health Directorates, my analysis focused on the Director, DDNS, PHN, and DCOs 
because they are the top officers involved in the day-to-day administration of the Health 
Directorate. Consequently, they were responsible for making the key decisions concerning 
                                                 
64
 Out of the 14 people I interviewed in each municipality, three were Commissioners for Oaths and Licensed 
Letter writers. Five were retired Assembly members who had lost their seats, and six were Chiefs. 
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mobilisation of financial resources and coordination, and collaboration with other 
stakeholders in health care decision-making at the municipal level.  The Director was in 
charge of the management and day-to-day administration of the municipality. I interviewed 
the DDNS or PHN because all the other unit heads reported to her. The DCO was also 
included because of her regular interaction with NGOs that mobilised around HIV and 
AIDS. The responsibilities of the DCO also include developing HIV and AIDS 
programmes and coordinating outreach activities undertaken by NGOs, in addition to her 
role as coordinator of NGOs. The head of clinical services division is one of the highest 
ranking officers; however as I did not seek to collect clinical data she was not a relevant 
respondent so I did not interview her. 
 
In the Assemblies, I made an effort to interview the MCEs but they were not available.
65
 I 
interviewed the Coordinating Director, Planning Officer, and focal person for HIV and 
AIDS. The MCEs are important because, as the political heads and representatives of the 
President of the Republic of Ghana, they initiate and endorse the release of funds to the 
other decentralised departments including health. Similarly, the Municipal Coordinating 
Director is the chief civil servant at the municipal level who advises the MCE on matters of 
civil service administration. As the chief administrator, the coordination of the activities 
and programmes of all the decentralised departments is his responsibility. The Municipal 
Development Planning Officer is in charge of the preparation of the Medium-Term 
Development Plans, and head of the Municipal Planning and Coordinating Unit. 
Coordinating the activities of the HIV and AIDS programmes of the Assembly is the 
responsibility of the HIV and AIDS Focal Person. He is therefore responsible for issues 
related to NGO activities around HIV and AIDS, and collaboration between the Assembly 
and the Health Directorate.  
 
                                                 
65
 Even though the Municipal Chief Executives were not available for interview, I used other sources to 
obtain data about their informal relations with officers at the Health Directorate. The MCEs who were in 
office between 2000 and 2008 had handed over when their party (the New Patriotic Party – NPP) lost the 
2008 general elections to the National Democratic Congress (NDC). I was informed that most of these MCEs 
had either left the country or their whereabouts were not known. Their telephone numbers did not work even 
though I made efforts to contact them. 
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To investigate how citizens participated in HIV and AIDS management decisions, I also 
interviewed 10 of the elected Assembly members (out of the total number of Assembly 
members which range between 46 and 52 for the various Assemblies), and 5 of the 
government appointed members of each of the Municipal Assemblies.  Assembly members 
are representatives of citizens so their views can help us to understand the influence citizens 
have on the HIV and AIDS programmes implemented by the Health Directorate and the 
Assembly. 
 
Finally, with regard to civil society involvement I interviewed leaders of selected Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) who were known by the Assemblies and Health Directorates 
to be working on HIV and AIDS programmes. In Ghana, CSOs range from professional 
associations to NGOs and religious organisations (Amankwah 1996; Tackie 1996; Drah 
1996a; 1996b).  In this study, the three civil society groups that are most relevant are 
religious groups, NGOs, and traditional authorities. I included CSOs because evidence 
suggests that they play a significant role in the fight against HIV and AIDS (ActionAid 
2007). Most NGOs provide educational campaigns and care and support for PLWAs and 
they are able to penetrate the hinterlands, to which government officials are unable to go, to 
reach PLWAs. The importance of CSOs is recognised by influential NGOs such as 
ActionAid, whose findings from studies into ways to address HIV and AIDS in Ghana 
support the idea that CSOs should be key stakeholders (see Table 9 in Appendix C) 
(ActionAid 2007: 93). 
 
The main religious groups comprise Christians, Muslims, and members of African 
traditional religions. The Christians are particularly vibrant and vocal which is evident from 
the numerous Charismatic and Pentecostal churches in all the municipalities. These are 
mainly offshoots from the orthodox churches (Presbyterian, Catholic, and Methodist 
churches). They are popular with the middle-aged segment of the population (aged from 
19-49), who are more sexually active and therefore the group to whom HIV and AIDS 
campaigns might be relevant. I have therefore focused primarily on Charismatic and 
Pentecostal churches because they mostly preach against condoms; I deliberately selected 
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the religious leaders.
66
 In places I deem successful municipal areas, I selected those 
religious leaders who were known to have changed their views from opposing condom 
awareness programmes to supporting such programmes. In the not so successful areas, the 
religious leaders who still opposed condoms were selected for interview. Religious leaders 
were selected because they can be very influential in promoting sexual and reproductive 
health programmes or acting as barriers to such programmes. 
 
For the NGOs, I obtained their details and contact telephone numbers from the HIV and 
AIDS Focal persons at the MA, Health Directorates, and my key informants. I used this 
information to compile a composite list of all the NGOs from which I removed those who 
could not be contacted. I then randomly selected approximately 50 per cent of the 
remaining NGOs for interview; on average, this led to 4 NGOs being interviewed in each 
municipality.  
 
Traditional rulers or Chiefs are the custodians of cultural practices and social norms in 
Ghana and can be very influential in implementing sexual and reproductive health 
programmes. Identifying the chiefs for interviews was straightforward as usually in Ghana 
there is only one paramount chief in a municipality and he is the head of the traditional 
council. One chief made headlines in the Ghanaian media when he publicly condemned the 
use of condoms and advocated abstinence as the best way to combat the spread of HIV and 
AIDS (Ghanaian Chronicle 2004). This chief claimed that HIV and AIDS advertisements 
were misleading people and that their real goal was profits for businesses and companies 
that manufacture and supply condoms. As chiefs are highly respected, his comments 
attracted huge criticism from senior politicians and leaders of NGOs as undermining efforts 
to stop the spread of HIV. 
 
                                                 
66
 The numbers I selected for each of the cases are: 1 (Ho); 2 (Obuasi); 1 (Sunyani); 1 (Techiman); and 2 
(New Juaben). 
100 
 
 
 
In addition to in-depth interviews with these interviewees, I attended General Assembly 
meetings of New Juaben, Ho, and Obuasi.
67
 My main goal was to understand how 
Assembly members discuss issues and make policies. Before I attended each of the 
Assembly meetings, I spent time with various people in order to capture issues around HIV 
and AIDS. I wanted to understand citizens‟ perceptions about how the disease should be 
managed and how public officers respond to local people‟s views (Payne 1999). I employed 
direct observation techniques (non-participant overt-observation) to obtain the data I 
needed.  This technique helped preserve the principle of informed consent (Bailey 2007; 
1996; Payne 1999; Punch 1994).  
 
Attending the General Assembly meeting was very helpful because it enabled me to a) 
understand how political and partisan the District Assembly and Local Government system 
is, even though the law provides that it should be non-partisan and b) ask the Assembly 
members about the behaviour of the MCDs, MCEs, and the Presiding Members (PMs)
68
 
and how they felt about the PMs‟ handling of the meetings. After each of the meetings, I 
followed up with in-depth interviews of Assembly members as they fall within what Payne 
(1999: 32) describes as a “captive community” within “institution and work-based 
communities”. I obtained their contact telephone numbers from the Assemblies‟ registry 
and randomly selected at least half of those who have been in office for 2 or 3 terms.
69
 
 
I also collected secondary data from the MTDPs of the Assemblies, Minutes of General 
Assembly meetings, and a number of national documents relating to health. However, using 
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 The meetings were held on the following dates: New Juaben (8
th
 July 2009 at the Assembly hall at 
10.46am); Ho (27
th
 July 2009 at the Assembly hall at 10.20am); and Obuasi (5
th
 August 2009 at the Assembly 
hall at 10.40am) (Plates 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix D show the researcher at the Assembly meetings). Before I 
attended the meetings, I first introduced myself to the Presiding Members, Coordinating Directors and Chief 
Executives. In all the meetings I attended, the Presiding Members first informed the Assembly members about 
my presence as a researcher and an observer, and then I was invited to explain the research to them and my 
objectives for sitting in the meeting. I also explained that I would follow up with individual interviews with 
members.  Consequently I was able to openly record my observations. This could have introduced bias 
because the Assembly members might have behaved differently because they knew they were being observed 
(Bailey 2007; 1996; Payne 1999; Johnson and Reynolds 2005). 
68
 The PM is the Speaker of the General Assembly. His role is similar to the Speaker of Parliament 
69
 Elected Assembly members who had been in office for more than one term were more relevant because 
they were in a better position to provide information on the history of issues in the Assembly. They were 
therefore the best source to obtain information about the MCEs during the NPP administration. 
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secondary data can have weaknesses as it might not be appropriate in terms of timeliness or 
the purpose for which such information was organised or compiled (Silverman 2005). In 
addition, secondary data can be incomplete and biased because record keepers might only 
document data “that are not embarrassing to them, their friends, or their bosses; that might 
reveal illegal or immoral actions; or that disclose stupidity, greed, or other unappealing 
attributes” (Johnson and Reynolds 2005: 231; Creswell 1994).  This could explain why the 
HIV and AIDS Focal person at Techiman and Obuasi, and Municipal health accountants at 
Ho and Techiman were reluctant to give me the information on the list of NGOs that are 
funded by the Assembly. I needed to use my own personal ties
70
 to obtain information 
when necessary. In spite of these weaknesses, there are good reasons to use secondary 
sources, including the fact that this data is „cheap‟ since it has been already organised 
(Johnson and Reynolds 2005). 
 
Some limitations 
 
This study has a number of limitations. First, the analysis does not cover the specific value 
of the DACF that was transferred from the Assembly to the Health Directorates. An 
analysis of this data could enhance the determination of how successful the Health 
Directors were, because it can support the claim made by the Health Directors that the 
MCE released the funds to them. As is the case presently, it is possible that some Health 
Directors might not have received the funds, but they were able to cover up for their MCEs 
in order to maintain their relationships. I did not however focus on the actual value of the 
fund because most MCEs were uncooperative when it came to issues around the DACF so 
obtaining such data can be very difficult.  
 
                                                 
70
 I have good personal ties with all the Planning Officers of the Municipal Assemblies which I developed 
during Training and Workshop programmes organised by the Department of Planning (of which I am a 
member) at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, in Kumasi. These were held for 
Planning Officers and Budget Officers of the Assemblies. I also have good friendship ties with all the Deputy 
Planning Officers at the Assemblies as they were students I had taught in the university. I also have friendship 
ties with the Chief of Techiman, this network was established during my role in a team that assisted the 
Techiman Traditional Council to promote tourism. 
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Second, my research focused on HIV and AIDS, and it is possible that the dynamics of 
health care delivery with diseases such as malaria or programmes such as child 
immunisation will be different. It is not possible to judge if my findings would hold for 
other health areas. However, the findings may hold in the implementation of programmes 
such as CHPS, which requires good collaboration and coordination of efforts between the 
Assembly and the Health Directorate. The Assembly‟s responsibility is to construct the 
CHPS compounds whilst the Health Directorate sends health personnel and health 
equipment to the CHPS compounds. These have to be implemented within conflicts in 
existing institutional arrangements.  
 
Third, I focused on the relationships between officers in the MHD and those in the MA 
even though three of my cases (Ho, New Juaben, and Sunyani) have Members of 
Parliament (MPs) who are also ministers in the government, who might have played a role 
in sustaining such ties. I did not include the MPs in the analysis because MPs are unlikely 
to be part of the day-to-day decision-making between the MHD and the MA as they are ex-
officio members of the Assembly; there are also claims of tension between most of the MPs 
and their MCEs relating to the use of the DACF. Extending the analysis of ties to cover the 
MPs might blur our understanding of the effects of ties between the MA, MHD and CSOs 
on collaboration and coordination among these actors in health policy implementation. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
I conducted this study using a comparative cases approach. This approach enabled me to 
delve beneath the surface of people‟s informal relations to examine the ways in which 
informal relationships shape the interaction between devolved Assemblies, deconcentrated 
Health Directorates and Civil Society actors in their efforts to deliver health services. All of 
these would have been difficult to capture using surveys or other types of data. 
 
Having provided insights into the research and methodological approach to the study, I now 
turn to the analysis and findings in the subsequent four empirical chapters. In the following 
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chapter 4 I will present the field data which shows the general pattern of informal ties, 
embeddedness, and performance across the cases.  
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Chapter 4 
Informal ties, embeddedness, and performance of Health Directorates 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Two expected outcomes of decentralisation are the collaboration and coordination of 
programmes between devolved Assemblies and deconcentrated Health Directorates; and 
increased consultation with citizens by Health Directorates. However, conflicts in legal and 
institutional arrangements may constrain effective collaboration and coordination between 
different parts of the state, and between the state and civil society at sub-national level. In 
examining the performance of healthcare delivery in this study the existence and quality of 
informal ties and embeddedness help to determine how the expected outcomes may occur 
in various municipalities in Ghana. 
 
Having described how I conducted the study in Chapter 3, in this chapter, I present the data 
to show the pattern of informal ties, embeddedness, and performance across the five cases. 
My objective here is to show that the strength of informal ties and embeddedness varies 
across the cases. Additionally, I hope to show that performance of each of the Municipal 
Health Directorates also varies. In order to avoid monotony and duplication I do not go into 
detailed description of relationships between the nature of informal ties and embeddedness 
on the one hand, and the performance indicators on the other hand, as this is addressed in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 where I compare selected cases. In certain cases, however, especially 
those that were not selected for comparison, the discussion is a bit more detailed.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: after the introduction, I present each of the five cases 
in turn. For each of the cases, I present the pattern of (a) informal ties (between the Health 
Directorate and the Municipal Assembly), (b) embeddedness of the Health Directorate with 
groups within civil society working on HIV and AIDS, (c) coordination and collaboration 
between the Health Directorate and the Municipal Assembly (using the release of the 
DACF by the Municipal Chief Executive to the Health Director), and (d) the consultation 
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with (i) elected Assembly members; and (ii) leaders of the civil society groups working on 
HIV and AIDS by officers at the Health Directorate. 
 
Generally, of the five Municipal Health Directorates, New Juaben stands out as the best 
performing case (see Table 4)
71
. Informal ties and embeddedness are strong and medium 
respectively. This is based on the number of existing ties as a percentage of all the ties 
being considered. Collaboration and coordination are also high, and this is measured as the 
number of years that the MCE released the fund to the Health Director out of the 8 year 
period I investigated. In addition, the percentage of Assembly members and leaders of 
CSOs who were consulted with by health staff is high in New Juaben. Comparatively, the 
worst case is Techiman which is at the extreme end of informal ties and embeddedness 
scales (weak for both criteria) and records low collaboration and coordination, and low 
consultation with citizens (see Table 4). Obuasi and Sunyani performed well similar to New 
Juaben. Whilst Obuasi recorded medium collaboration and coordination, Sunyani recorded 
high. But both cases recorded medium consultation. The difference between Obuasi, 
Sunyani and New Juaben is that whilst all three had medium embeddedness with CSOs, 
New Juaben had strong informal ties with the Assembly, whilst ties with the Assembly 
were respectively medium and weak for Sunyani and Obuasi (see Table 4). Ho‟s case is 
similar to Techiman except that consultation with elected Assembly members and leaders 
of the selected civil society groups in Ho by the Health Directorate is better than Techiman; 
it is medium in Ho and low in Techiman (see Table 4). In the next section, I present the 
detailed data for each of the cases. The discussion will be preceded by a description of the 
profile of the cases to include the following characteristics: population, political party 
activities, traditional authority, and NGO activities around HIV and AIDS. 
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 This table is a summary of Table 3 so essentially, it presents the same data and implications as in Table 3 
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Table 4: Summary of performance across the cases 
 
 
 
Cases 
 
Ho 
 
Obuasi 
 
Sunyani 
 
Techiman 
New 
Juaben 
a. INFORMAL TIES - overall  
weak 
 
weak 
 
medium 
 
weak 
 
strong 
(ai) Executive Officers weak medium medium weak strong 
(aii) Elected Assembly members  
weak 
 
weak 
 
weak 
 
weak 
 
medium 
 
b. EMBEDDEDNESS - overall  
medium 
 
medium 
 
medium 
 
weak 
 
medium 
(bi) NGOs weak medium medium weak medium 
(bii) Chiefs and religious leaders  
medium 
 
medium 
 
medium 
 
weak 
 
medium 
 
PERFORMANCE 
 
a. Collaboration and Coordination (access to 
DACF) 
 
low 
 
medium 
 
high 
 
low 
 
high 
b. Consultation  
medium 
 
medium 
 
medium 
 
low 
 
high 
(bi) Consultation (elected Assembly members)  
low 
 
medium 
 
low 
 
low 
 
medium 
(bii) Consultation (CSOs)  
medium 
 
medium 
 
medium 
 
low 
 
high 
Note:  (A) Informal ties/embeddedness is strong if (≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and weak (≤ 39.5%). (B) Collaboration and 
Coordination - high if ( ≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%) and low (≤ 39.5%). (C) Consultation is high if (≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), 
and low (≤ 39.5%).  
 
4.2 New Juaben 
 
New Juaben, the main tourist destination in the Eastern region of Ghana is the best 
performing case among the five cases studied. It had a population of 136,768 in 2000 and 
with a growth rate of 2.6 percent, it is projected to be a little above 160,000 in 2007 
(Republic of Ghana 2005d). About 65 percent of the population is concentrated in 
Koforidua, the municipal capital. The municipality is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity 
and religion. The several ethnic groups include Akans (52 percent), Ga-Adangbe (21 
percent), Ewes (15 percent), and ethnic groups from the northern parts of the country 
constitute (12 percent). In terms of religion, the municipality is predominantly Christian 
(about 83 percent). Moslems constitute 6 percent and those of traditional faith constitute 11 
percent.  
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The municipality has been the stronghold of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which lost the 
2008 general elections. The NPP has retained the parliamentary seat for the New Juaben 
constituency in the 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and the 2008 elections. 
 
The New Juaben Traditional Council is headed by a Paramount Chief. Durbars and other 
gatherings organised by the Paramount Chief are effective platforms for the promotion of 
healthcare in the municipality by the Municipal Health Directorate, Civil Society 
Organisations, and the New Juaben Municipal Assembly. 
 
A number of private, not-for-profit voluntary and non-governmental organisations 
complement the efforts of the Assembly and Health Department in a number of ways. 
Among them are Enowid Foundation; Human Development Foundation; Redemption 
Youth Relief Association; Lamp of Peace Association; Mathew 25 House; 4-H Ghana; and 
Rural Watch. These NGOs are engaged in a wide range of activities including HIV and 
AIDS awareness campaigns, youth development, and community development schemes. 
 
4.2.1 Informal ties with Municipal Assembly 
The overall strength of informal networks between officers at the Health Directorate and 
the Municipal Assembly is strong (69.78 percent). In terms of ties with executive officers of 
the Assembly, it is strong (72.91 percent) (refer to Tables 2 and 3 in chapater 3, Table 4 in 
this chapter and see Figure 5 below.  
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Figure 5: Informal ties and embeddedness in New Juaben 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though ethnic ties are relevant, neighbourhood bonds or the abusua are predominant 
in the municipality. Each of the three officers from the Health Directorate has abusua ties 
with all the four executive officers from the Assembly, and all of them have ethnic ties with 
three of the officers of the Assembly apart from the Planning Officer. However, the 
Planning officer and the Health Director were school mates in the former Soviet Union in 
the 1980s. Each of these officers indicated that abusua ties are important to them and they 
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are keen on maintaining those ties. On the average abusua relations have been in existence 
among these officers for a period of 6 years. For example, one of the officers from the 
Health Directorate explained how long he has had abusua relations with officers of the 
Assembly and why he would do everything possible to maintain those relationships. 
I have been working here for the past 10 years away from my immediate family so I have 
established a new abusua with the people I work with here. As far as my job is concerned I 
work with a lot of institutions but the first on the list in terms of my frequency of contacts and 
interaction is the Municipal Assembly. Therefore the top officers are the people who have 
become important part of my new abusua. I know they also see me in the same light. So I 
receive most of the support that my immediate family would give me from them and I also do 
the same to them [Staff of the Health Directorate, New Juaben, 27
th
 October, 2008]. 
 
The officers at the Assembly made similar statements about the abusua ties they have with 
their counterparts from the Health Directorate. According to one of them: 
Those whom we work with have become our special friends and everything. We see ourselves 
more as abusua than work colleagues. Having worked here for 5 years I have become close to 
people such as the Health Director and his staff and we all look up to each other in times of 
social needs. We have supported one another in many ways that I cannot even remember and 
list to you. You will not tell me you can remember all the good things you have done to the 
people who are close to you and what they have done to you. But I will say one of the ways is 
support during funerals or church programmes for fund raising etc. [An Executive Officer, 
New Juaben Municipal Assembly, 6
th
 November, 2008]. 
 
The fact that these officers work in the city away from their immediate and extended 
families would mean that they lack support in times of need so it sounds logical that those 
people that they work with and interact with on daily basis would become their abusua 
from whom they would expect support and to whom they would also offer their support. 
 
The data on informal ties with elected Assembly members suggest that the ties are medium 
(66.66 percent) (refer to Figure 5 and see Table 6 in Chapter 6). According to the officers 
from the Health Directorate, Assembly members constitute one important group of 
stakeholders whose roles matter a lot in what the Health Directorate does towards 
delivering better health services to the people. As one of them stated: 
The fact is that you cannot bypass the Assembly members and think that you will be able to 
do anything meaningful in the communities. Some of them are very influential and most are 
highly respected in their electoral areas. Most people develop a sense of belonging and 
ownership when they find that you are working with their Assembly member. So we do 
everything to maintain good relationships with the Assembly members. We attend all kinds of 
functions when they invite us and they attend ours especially Christmas and New Year parties 
[A staff, New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate,   28
th
 October, 2008]. 
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The recognition of the Assembly member as a stakeholder with a critical role to play in the 
implementation of health policy would suggest that fostering the relationship between 
officers of the Health Directorate and the Assembly members becomes a significant issue to 
the Health Directorate staff who have the statutory mandate and are responsible for health 
service administration. As one of the officers said, many Assembly members are highly 
respected by the people in their electoral areas. Therefore once the Health Directorate get 
the Assembly members to support their programmes it would be easy to get the people as 
well. As I show later in Chapter 6, the Health Directorate employed these ties with the 
Assembly to access additional funding for most of its top priority projects geared towards 
promoting responsiveness to citizens. 
 
Apart from ethnic, abusua, and old-school ties that exist across the Health Directorate and 
the Municipal Assembly, over 80 percent of officers in these two institutions are bound by 
strong political party ties.
72
 They belong to the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP). The 
strong party affiliation further strengthens the other ties. As I show in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 
the existence of a complex overlap of party ties with ethnic, and old-school networks seems 
to have contributed in significant ways to promote and also undermined how the devolved 
Assemblies and the deconcentrated Health Directorates implement HIV and AIDS 
programmes. 
 
4.2.2 Embeddedness of the Health Directorate with CSOs working on HIV and AIDS 
New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate is one of the four cases that recorded medium 
embeddedness with civil society (refer to Figure 5 and Table 4 in this chapter). In a 
discussion with leaders of NGOs, Directors of three of the four NGOs indicated that they 
have two of the three types of ties with the Health Directorate.
73
 The ties are ethnic (they 
                                                 
72
 It must be noted that most of the interviewees were not prepared to disclose their political party affiliation (especially 
the Health Directors, Coordinating Directors and some Assembly members). Those who were willing to disclose their 
party affiliation were those who said they were members of the NPP. It was more difficult for those who belong to the 
NDC to disclose it. This might be due to the fact that the NPP was in power at the time I conducted the interviews. It was 
easier for most of the interviewees to say they belonged to the NPP than say they were NDC members. This may be 
necessary for protection of jobs and positions. I used other sources to obtain these data. To make the analysis stronger, I 
have decided to include the information in the thesis. For ethical reasons and to preserve the confidentiality of my 
informants, the names and party affiliations will not be included in portions of the thesis that will be published in future. 
73
 Mathew 25 House, 4-H Ghana, and Faith and Hope Foundation. 
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are all Akans from Juaben) and abusua networks. The leader of one of the NGOs even has 
old-school ties with two officers at the Health Directorate (see Table 7 in Chapter 7). She 
explained that:  
The Deputy Director of Nursing Services (DDNS) and I have been friends and neighbours for 
over 10 years. We were in the nursing training school and we have been working together 
after school. I have also worked with Mr. Boateng for over 5 years. All of the officers at the 
Health Directorate are brains behind the establishment of this NGO. In fact, the DDNS 
inspired me to do this when we worked in the hospital and we found a lot of people with the 
disease and there seemed to be no help for them. Because of this, officers at the Health 
Directorate have always made me part of what they do towards fighting HIV and AIDS [A 
leader of NGO, New Juaben, 16
th
 Sept., 2009]. 
 
The leader of another NGO also added that:  
 
The Health Director and I come from the same village. We attend the same church. In 
addition to these relations, we have worked together for over 6 years. I was a key advisor to 
the Municipal HIV and AIDS Committee for over 5 years since 1998 until I left to set up this 
NGO. The Health Directorate has relied on us to implement HIV and AIDS programmes, and 
currently we do Tuberculosis (TB) as well because the Health Director said HIV, AIDS and 
TB go together. Even though we don‟t have funds for TB, I do it [A leader of NGO, New 
Juaben, 16
th
 Sept., 2009]  
 
Health staffs also have medium ties with traditional authority (see details of data in Table 8 
Chapter 7). In addition to the abusua ties that officers at the Health Directorate have with 
members of the Traditional Council, one of them was the focal person for the Health 
Directorate‟s HIV and AIDS awareness programme which started in 2005 targeting market 
women in the areas of prevention of mother to child transmission (PMCT). According to a 
member of the Traditional council:  
The first people I look up to in times of bereavement include Mr. Boateng and his staff. The 
next group include the Municipal Chief Executive and other key officers of the Assembly. In 
the same way I am also invited by these people when the need arises. Mr. Boateng is my 
personal friend and you can ask him. I go to him anytime. I have personally championed the 
cause of women concerning HIV and AIDS. I mobilise the market women for talks by the 
Disease Control Officer. They leave their wares and come because of me. As you know 
women are more vulnerable and also issues about transmitting to children by pregnant women 
have become important. Because I am a Queenmother, the Health Directorate uses me to get 
health matters discussed with the paramount chief who is also keen on reducing HIV and 
AIDS in New Juaben [Member, New Juaben Traditional Council, 21st Sept., 2009].  
 
The study revealed that ties between staff at the Health Directorate and women who are 
members of the traditional authority have been in existence for over 10 years. My  
impression is that these ties are very important to the health officers as they enable them to 
reach women with programmes that seek to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
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and AIDS. Their relationships also enable them to receive good support from the 
paramount chief. 
 
With regard to political party ties, officers in the Health Directorate are strongly connected 
with most of the leaders of NGOs. Most of them are NPP members. In addition, leaders of 
the religious groups I interviewed are NPP. This further strengthens the Health 
Directorate‟s ties with the CSOs. It is only the paramount chief who is NDC member. 
Generally, party ties between officers in the Health Directorate and leaders of civil society 
organisations are strong. 
 
4.2.3 Collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
The New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate is one of the two cases in which there is a 
high level of collaboration and coordination between the two decentralised institutions 
(refer to Table 4 and see Table 5 in Chapter 5). The Health Director had good access to the 
fund. He received it consistently from 2000 to 2004, and between 2004 and 2008. It was 
only in 2005 and 2006 that he did not receive an allocation (see Table 5 in Chapter 5). 
Compared with the other cases New Juaben performed well given that there was no 
consistency in receipts of the fund by Health Directors in the other cases between 2000 and 
2004. It is only Sunyani which registered some consistency but it was only so for the period 
between 2000 and 2003. Why this might be so is discussed in Chapter 5 where I compare 
New Juaben with Techiman.  
 
4.2.4 Consultation with elected Assembly members and HIV and AIDS CSO leaders 
 I compiled a composite table of programmes aimed at managing HIV and AIDS (See 
Appendix H for details of the process and see Table 11, Appendix I showing the 
programmes) and I asked the elected Assembly members whether they were consulted by 
officers from the Health Directorate in the development and implementation of those 
programmes. Out of the 10 elected Assembly members I interviewed, 6 of them indicated 
that they were consulted (see Table 12 in Appendix J). This suggests that consultation with 
Assembly members is medium. Among these elected members is one whom I consider to 
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be the most active member during the General Assembly meeting. His views, which give 
good indication of the nature of consultation which the Health Director undertakes, are 
presented below: 
Mr. Boateng sees Assembly members as partners as far as dealings with HIV and AIDS in 
Koforidua are concerned. He always calls us to his office to discuss visits to our electoral 
area before the outreach team comes. I think he does that because he respects us and he 
knows that we can help him.  He even asked me if I could first explain the „know-your-
status‟ campaign to my people during my meetings with them.74 He has not undertaken any 
programme without letting us know about it. Take for example the issue about National 
Health Insurance registration. He used us a lot [Elected Assembly member, New Juaben, 
16
th
 Sept., 2009]. 
 
The views of one of the interviewees at the Health Directorate about this Assembly 
member‟s explanations of why elected Assembly members are consulted further show that 
consultation is acceptable in the municipality. According to this officer, the Health Director 
organised training on „community entry techniques‟ for the outreach team not only for the 
„know-your-status‟ and voluntary counselling and testing campaigns but also for 
immunisation and other public health campaigns that require that they visit the 
communities. She explained that: 
 
Our director has always insisted that we are cautious not to bypass the community leaders 
when we go for immunisation and other visits. He organised training for us to be able to know 
how to get to the people. We are able to do this easily because we use the Assembly members 
and the chiefs [Staff of Health Directorate, New Juaben, 18
th
 Sept., 2009]. 
 
The story of another elected Assembly member Hon. Alhaji Alhassan Mahama also echoed 
the acceptable level of consultation by the Health Directorate.
75
 His story gives further 
credence to the claims by other Assembly members and staff at the Health Directorate that 
elected Assembly members are very important to the Health Directorate. His story is 
presented below: 
The Director of Health and the manager of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
relied heavily on me to educate my people about the NHIS. I was able to do it so well that 
my electoral area recorded the highest registration for the scheme. I was therefore awarded 
two citations. This has never happened in this municipality and I am very proud about that. 
As a result of this recognition I am doing the same thing to create awareness about HIV and 
AIDS and propagate the message about the use of condoms in my electoral area. This is 
what the Health Director wants me to do. I do it every Friday at the mosques around the 
                                                 
74
 This is a national programme which encourages people to go for voluntary counselling and testing to know their HIV-
status. It is one of the major areas that the Health Directorates have focused their resources. 
75
 Hon. Alhaji Alhassan Mahama gave his consent for me to mention his name and publish his picture with his citations 
which is presented in Appendix N. 
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municipality [Hon. Alhaji Alhassan Mahama, Elected member for KNT community C and 
D electoral area 16
th
 Sept., 2009]. 
 
I discuss how this level of consultation with elected Assembly members seemed to have 
enabled the Health Director to obtain additional funds for health projects in Chapter 6. This, 
I hope, would enhance our understanding of how elected Assembly members influence 
decisions around HIV and AIDS management in the New Juaben municipality. 
 
With respect to consultation with leaders of civil society groups who worked on HIV and 
AIDS programmes, of the 5 NGOs I interviewed, 4 of them indicated that the Health 
Director consulted them around HIV and AIDS issues (see Table 13 in Appendix K). The 
Director of one of the NGOs claimed that he was one of the leaders who were requested by 
the Health Director to include tuberculosis in HIV and AIDS programmes. He indicated 
that:  
The Health Director always invites us for meetings to discuss HIV and AIDS especially how 
to provide care and support for people with the disease. He organises training workshop for 
our volunteers who work in the communities to be able to detect and identify HIV, AIDS and 
TB patients. He has been a key advisor to my NGO and I also consult him a lot [Head of an 
NGO, New Juaben, 16
th
 Sept., 2009].  
 
4.3 Sunyani 
 
Sunyani, the Brong Ahafo regional capital is becoming the centre for international 
conferences because of its reputation as the cleanest city in Ghana. The 2000 Population 
and Housing census shows that the population of the municipality is about 179,000 with a 
growth rate of 3.8 percent (Republic of Ghana 2005d). The population is fairly split 
between males and females (about 50 percent each). The population is however young with 
those in the 15-64 year group constituting about 57 percent. With respect to ethnicity, the 
Brongs/Bonos dominate (about 74 percent). There are however several other minority 
ethnic groups. In terms of religion, Christians constitute the majority (about 82 percent), 
followed by Moslems (12 percent). The rest comprises of those of traditional faith and 
atheists. 
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Results from the 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary elections suggest that Sunyani is a 
stronghold of the ruling NDC. In fact, when the first round of voting could not produce a 
clear winner between the NDC and the NPP, it was one of the constituencies in the Brong 
Ahafo region that gave the NDC a win following a run-off.  But there are also claims that 
Sunyani can swing to either NDC or NPP at anytime as some of the founding fathers of the 
NPP come from the Brong Ahafo region. 
 
The Sunyani Traditional Authority is the seat of the paramount chief of the traditional area. 
It is one of the influential traditional councils in the Brong Ahafo Region as the bulk of 
Ghana‟s cocoa is produced in the region. The traditional council‟s views on health matters 
are heavily shaped by its role as the custodian of culture, traditional norms and values. 
 
Over 80 percent of NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in the municipality 
were into HIV and AIDS programmes ranging from education campaigns to the provision 
of care and support and economic empowerment of people living with AIDS (PLWAs).  
 
4.3.1 Informal ties with Municipal Assembly 
The strength of informal ties between the Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate and the 
Assembly is medium, and ties with executive officers alone are also medium (refer to Table 
4 and see Figure 6 below). Unlike New Juaben where ethnic ties are common among the 
various actors, two officers from the Health Directorate relate with only two out of the four 
officers from the Assembly on ethnic lines (refer to Table 2 in Chapter 3). Just like New 
Juaben, abusua relations are very common. Reasons such as support during bereavement 
explained why most of them maintain those abusua ties. What is unique with informal 
relations between staff from the Health Directorate and those in the Assembly is that some 
of them employ it as a form of collateral security to acquire loans and property. For 
example one officer from the Health Directorate said: 
Because of my friendship ties with officers at the Assembly, I used three of them as 
guarantors to apply for a loan. I did this in 2004, 2006 and 2008 and each time I use the same 
people. The bank just needed someone who would vouch for me to say that I can be trusted.  I 
have also guaranteed loans for some of them. I know that other members of staff also do the 
same thing [Officer, Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate, 21
st
 October, 2008]. 
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This suggests that abusua ties are important and that most of the officers trust one another, 
and as indicated in the literature on informal ties, trust is one of the important ingredients 
that are required for the sustenance of personal relationships (Tsai 2007; Putnam 1993). For 
any of them to stand as guarantors for loans would mean that the persons involved took 
great risk because if the loans are not repaid the guarantors would be held liable. Also for 
the beneficiaries to honour and pay back the loans means they cherish their relationship 
with their guarantors and they would not conduct themselves in a way that would 
undermine that relationship. In addition to all the other forms of support that abusua ties 
provide the officers in Sunyani, its relevance when it comes to accessing personal loans 
from banks would mean that such ties would be sustained for a long time. 
 
Figure 6: Informal ties, embeddedness in Sunyani 
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In the case of ties with elected Assembly members, health officers have weak ties with 
them (refer to Figure 6 and Table 3 in Chatper 3, and Table 4 in this chapter). The two 
important bonds are around ethnic and abusua relations (see Table 6 in Chapter 6). None of 
the health staff have old-school bonds with them. But what is striking is that informal ties 
enable Assembly members to borrow and lend money. One of the Assembly members 
explained that: 
There are people at the Health Directorate who lend me money anytime I needed money 
urgently. I see them as the people I can trust who will not let anybody hear about this. There 
are other people who will not give you such support when you need it but they will go about 
telling others about how broke you were and that you came to them to borrow money. I will 
not go to anybody I do not trust that is why I know where to go if the need arises [Elected 
Assembly member, SMA, 16
th
 September, 2009]. 
 
Officers from the Health Directorate indicated that they would be willing to lend money to 
those with whom they had good abusua ties. 
 
In terms of political party affiliation in Sunyani, whilst the Health Director is a member of 
the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Chief Executive belongs to the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP).  The Municipal Coordinating Director is also a member of the NPP. 
In addition, about 80 percent of Assembly members are NPP members (refer to Table 2 in 
Chapter 3). This made it difficult for the Health Director to work with the MCE and the 
Assembly members. The data however show that political party ties across the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly is strong overall just like the case in New Juaben. This is 
because other officers at the Health Directorate are NPP members. This is a significant 
difference between Sunyani and New Juaben where all the officers in the Health 
Directorate are NPP sympathisers. The difference in political parties helps to explain the 
weak collaboration between the Health Director, responsible for decision making, and the 
Municipal Chief Executive (I explore this in detail in Chapter 6). It also helps to explain the 
inability of the Health Director to consult with and obtain the support of the 80 percent of 
Assembly members who are NPP members. 
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4.3.2 Embeddedness of the Health Directorate with CSOs working on HIV and AIDS 
Generally the strength of embeddedness of the Health Directorate within civil society is 
medium (refer to Figure 6), and Sunyani is one of the four cases that recorded medium 
embeddedness with CSOs (refer to Table 4). Regarding ties with NGOs alone leaders of 
three NGOs out of five have both ethnic and abusua ties with the two officers in the Health 
Directorate (see Table 7 in Chapter 7). They are from Brong which is the major ethnic 
group in the municipality. Apart from the abusua ties which four of the NGO leaders have 
with the Health Director, none of them has ethnic ties with the Health Director.  The Health 
Director is from Akwapim in the Eastern region. Essentially, their abusua bonds are around 
mutual and reciprocal social support systems similar to those found in New Juaben and the 
other cases.  It is interesting to note that the leader of one of the NGOs did not have abusua 
ties with the Health Director given that it seemed to be common with other NGOs.  She 
explained that she would not consider the Health Director as one of the persons from whom 
she would receive support in the event of funerals, church harvest, and weddings. However, 
this did not mean that she did not have good working relations with the Health Director. 
This is how she explained it: 
The Health Director and I work well and he has endorsed my proposals for funding to do HIV 
and AIDS programmes. We know each other very well for about 6 years except that we do not 
have that kind of personal relations. I won‟t say he is an abusua as you put it. But I won‟t say 
the same thing about the Public Health Nurse and the Disease Control Officers. These are 
people who invited me for their private functions and I also did the same in the past and we 
shall continue to do so. I will say these are part of my abusua. So I won‟t say that he endorses 
my proposals because we are friends. The Ghana AIDS Commission requires that our 
proposals are endorsed by him to show that we are recognised and credible NGO [A leader of 
NGO, Sunyani, 4
th
 May 2009]. 
 
For the leader of this NGO to indicate that she and the Public Health Nurse and the Disease 
Control Officer mutually support each other and that she did not have that informal 
arrangement with the Health Director means that first, abusua ties mean a lot to her, and 
second, there are boundaries that define the extent of neighbourliness in terms of who falls 
within one‟s abusua networks and who falls outside of that.  
 
In terms of embeddedness with other civil society actors (heads of traditional authority and 
religious leaders) Sunyani compares well with Ho, Obuasi, and New Juaben recording 
medium informal relations (see Table 8 in Chapter 7). There is equal strength of ethnic 
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relations and abusua ties between the Health Directorate and traditional authority and the 
church. The nature of embeddedness seemed to have played a major role in the 
implementation of HIV and AIDS policy in Sunyani. I explore this in Chapter 7 where I 
discuss how the Health Directorate uses its informal ties with civil society actors to remove 
social norms that can undermine the implementation of HIV and AIDS policy in the 
district.  
 
The Health Director in Sunyani has weak political party ties with leaders of civil society 
groups. Whilst he is NDC member, the paramount chief and leaders of religious 
organisations are NPP sympathisers. In addition, about 80 percent of all leaders of NGOs 
belong to the NPP. Unlike the Health Director, three other officers in the Health Directorate 
have NPP ties with leaders of CSOs. This might have compensated for the Health 
Director‟s weak ties with them because overall, there is increased consultation of CSOs 
around HIV and AIDS programmes by the Health Directorate. 
 
4.3.3 Collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
The Health Director in Sunyani also performed well. He is in the high access category 
(refer to Table 4 in this Chapter and Table 5 in Chapter 5). The Sunyani case is interesting 
because allocations to the Health Director were intermittent. He received the fund 
continuously for three years from 2000 with no receipts in 2004. He received allocation 
again in 2005 and 2006 with another break in 2007 and then allocation was made to him 
again in 2008 (see Table 5 in Chapter 5). Given that there were breaks in allocation for only 
two periods, the Health Director could perhaps have obtained his allocations during these 
periods if he had been more diligent. I base this observation on the assumption that the 
existence of a „sister-city relationship‟ with a local government authority (District of 
Nanaimo) in Canada may have highlighted the way in which the Chief Executive allocated 
funds.I explain this when I compare Sunyani with New Juaben in Chapter 7. 
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4.3.4 Consultation with elected Assembly members and HIV and AIDS CSO leaders 
Consultation with elected Assembly members by staff from the Sunyani Municipal Health 
Directorate is low (refer to Table 3 in Chapter 3 and Table 4 in this Chapter). Out of the 10 
elected Assembly members, only 3 of them indicated they have been involved by the 
Health Directorate in various ways with programmes to manage HIV and AIDS (see Table 
12 in Appendix J). There is inadequate evidence to show that the Health Director uses 
Assembly members to push his programmes through the Assembly. The evidence suggests 
that the option of using the Assembly members might not be attractive to staff at the Health 
Directorate due to heavy politicisation of the Assembly resulting in episodes of the Chief 
Executive frustrating the work of Assembly members.  
 
All three Assembly members consulted with by the Health Directorate indicated that they 
have been involved at the community level in the mobilisation of the people in their 
electoral areas for campaigns to promote condoms.  For example, one of them explained 
that: 
I led a team of leaders of NGOs and staff from the Health Directorate to undertake public 
campaigns in the main lorry station which is in my electoral area. Since my people like me, 
when they see me to be part of any activity then they will come around to listen so I have 
played a key role in this respect. In addition to the campaigns at the lorry stations, I have also 
helped the Health Directorate to promote condom related issues in my church [Elected 
Assembly member, Sunyani, 5
th
 May 2009]. 
 
Even though only few of the Assembly members claimed to have been actively involved or 
consulted by the Health Directorate, they seemed to have made a useful impact on the 
promotion of condoms in the Sunyani municipality. I present evidence of this when I 
compare Techiman and Sunyani (in Chapter 7). 
 
In spite of the low consultation with elected Assembly members, the strength of 
consultation with leaders of HIV and AIDS civil society groups is medium (refer to Table 4 
and see Table 13 in Appendix K). It seems that although staff at the Health Directorate 
could not effectively use Assembly members to influence health issues in the Assembly, 
civil society provided a viable alternative. This appears to have worked well as we see in 
Chapter 7. The health officers used leaders of civil society actors to help remove the 
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negative perception that most people have about HIV and AIDS as a disease; people 
infected by the disease; and condoms as one of the means to minimise the spread of the 
disease.  
 
4.4 Obuasi  
 
Ghana‟s major gold mining city is Obuasi. According to the 2000 Population and Housing 
census, the population of the municipality as at the end of 2005 is 195,000. It is estimated 
to have an annual growth rate of 4 percent mainly due to the influx of migrants into the 
municipality as a result of mining activities (Republic of Ghana 2005d). About 48 percent 
of the population falls in the dependent age cohort (0-14, and 65+). The potential labour 
force is a little over 50 percent. In terms of ethnicity, it can be referred to as cosmopolitan 
constituting many ethnic groups. It is an Akan dominated municipality, therefore cultural 
practices of the Akans predominate. 
 
The municipality has been a stronghold of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which has won a 
majority of parliamentary seats and also presidential votes for the NPP in the past three 
elections. Obuasi municipality is part of the Ashanti Kingdom but it has its own paramount 
Chief and a number of sub-chiefs as heads of the various communities and ethnic groups.  
 
Because of the mining activities and the high prevalence of HIV and AIDS in the 
municipality, there are a number of NGOs (about 6) and Community Based Organisations 
(about 15) that mobilise around the disease. Essentially they provide public education and 
awareness campaigns. A number of them also provide care and support facilities to people 
with the disease. 
 
4.4.1 Informal ties with Municipal Assembly 
Generally, there are weak ties between the Health Directorate and the Assembly. With 
respect to executive officers of the Assembly, the strength of ties in Obuasi is medium like 
Sunyani (see Figure 7 and refer to Table 3 in Chapter 3 and see Table 4 in this Chapter). 
Obuasi is similar to Sunyani in terms of ethnic ties. According to the data in Table 2 
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(Chapter 3), two officers from the Health Directorate have ethnic ties with two officers 
from the Assembly. One difference between Obuasi and Sunyani is that old-school is one 
of the ties that exist between the Chief Executive and the Health Director in Obuasi. This is 
the similarity between Obuasi and New Juaben. These are the two cases in which old-
school ties between the Health Directorate and the Assembly emerged in the analysis.  
 
Ties with elected Assembly members are weak in Obuasi (see Figure 7). Both Obuasi and 
Sunyani have medium ties with Executive Officers of the Assembly, and both have weak 
ties with elected Assembly members (refer to Table 4 and also see Table 6 in Chapter 6). 
This implies that there is wide difference between Obuasi and New Juaben where ties with 
Assembly members are medium. 
 
Figure 7: Informal ties and embeddedness in Obuasi 
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Political party ties in Obuasi are generally strong. Just like the case in Sunyani where the 
Health Director is a member of the opposition NDC, a high ranking officer at the Health 
Directorate (Deputy Director of Nursing Services - DDNS) in Obuasi belongs to the NDC. 
In spite of this, there is no evidence to suggest that the DDNS‟s membership of the NDC 
affected collaboration between the Health Directorate and the Municipal Assembly. 
Collaboration is strong partly because the Health Director who is the main decision-maker 
is NPP, which makes it easy for him to work with the Chief Executive and the large 
proportion of Assembly members who are NPP. 
 
4.4.2 Embeddedness of the Health Directorate with CSOs working on HIV and AIDS 
The nature of Health Directorate‟s embeddedness in Obuasi is medium, similar to the case 
in Sunyani and New Juaben (refer to Figure 7 and see Table 3 in Chapter 3 and Table 4 in 
this Chapter). In Obuasi, however, two out of three NGOs have both ethnic and abusua 
networks with two of the officers from the Health Directorate (see Table 7 in Chapter 7). 
The ethnic bond is Ashanti and in fact, the Ashantis constituted the largest proportion of the 
population in Obuasi at the time of this research. There was no evidence of ethnic relations 
between leaders of all the NGOs and the Public Health Nurse. Even though ethnic relations 
enhance abusua bonds, most officers in Obuasi have good abusua ties without ethnic ties. 
 
Informal ties between the Health Directorate on the one hand, and the church and 
traditional authority on the other hand are also medium. There are instances where there are 
ethnic bonds but no abusua ties. Conversely there are also instances where abusua ties exist 
yet they did not have ethnic relations (see Table 8 in Chapter 7). 
 
With respect to political party ties between the Health Director and leaders of CSOs, there 
is an equal split. Leaders of religious groups split equally for NPP and NDC. Apart from 
this, the paramount chief is NPP and about 70 percent of leaders of NGOs are NPP 
members. This gives the Health Director strong NPP ties with leaders of HIV and AIDS 
CSOs.  
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4.4.3 Collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
The Health Director in Obuasi also performed well even though there were inconsistencies 
in disbursements similar to Sunyani.  However, the Obuasi case suggests there is a 
relationship between when the funds are allocated and the election calendar in the country 
suggesting that the elections influence the Chief Executive‟s actions.76 According to Table 
5 (Chapter 5), the funds were released in 2000. There were no releases in 2001 and 2002, 
then there was a release in 2003 when preparations were underway ahead of the 2004 
elections. The Health Director received the funds again during the election year and the 
year after. The cycle started again with a break in 2006 and a release in 2007 ahead of the 
elections in 2008 with a further release in 2008 during the elections. 
 
4.4.4 Consultation with elected Assembly members and HIV and AIDS CSO leaders 
The picture in Obuasi in terms of the Health Director‟s consultation with citizens is similar 
to the level of consultation in Ho and Sunyani (medium) (refer to Table 4 in this chapter). 
However, there are striking differences between Obuasi and New Juaben. Six out of the 10 
elected Assembly members were consulted by the Health Directorate (Table 12 in 
Appendix J), although the Health Directorate has weak ties with elected Assembly 
members (refer to Table 6 in Chapter 6). The weak informal ties did not constrain the 
Health Directorate‟s efforts to make Assembly members participate in programmes to 
address HIV and AIDS in the municipality. Obuasi‟s case appears to be  unique which 
might be explained by the fact that the Obuasi Municipal Assembly is also actively 
involved in HIV and AIDS awareness creation in the municipality evidenced by the 
numerous sign boards spread all over the municipality (see Appendix N). Obuasi is the only 
case in which the Municipal Assembly has erected these sign boards to create HIV and 
AIDS awareness. The role of the Assembly might partly explain why most Assembly 
members are consulted by the Health Directorate. 
 
                                                 
76
 Elections were held as follows: 3rd Presidential and Parliamentary elections (2000); 4th Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections (2004); and 5th Presidential and Parliamentary elections (2008). 
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The consultation with those groups within civil society working on HIV and AIDS is 
medium (refer Table 4). All the three active NGOs and a very influential religious leader 
claimed that they participate in all the programmes initiated by the Health Directorate to 
manage HIV and AIDS.
77
 According to the leader of one of the NGOs: 
One of the key programmes to address HIV and AIDS is the development of HIV and AIDS 
Work Place Policy by the Municipal Assembly. The Health Directorate and NGOs actively 
pushed and lobbied the Assembly to do this in 2005. It was not like the Assembly would not 
do it but the issue was how soon? So we lobbied to facilitate it. Another example of the active 
role NGOs play was that we saved over 200 PLWAs in 2007. We had a hint that prayer camps 
were keeping these 200 or more PLWAs. You see, they had been indoctrinated to believe that 
HIV and AIDS were spiritual diseases and that the devil was responsible, and those pastors 
claimed that they could pray for them for healing. Someone secretly informed us that the 
PLWAs were being abused. They were being starved, beaten to confess their sins that they 
were promiscuous so their sins will be forgiven and so on. So together with the Health 
Directorate, we raided 3 prayer camps to release those PLWAs [Head of an NGO, Obuasi, 
17
th
 June 2009]. 
 
The Municipal Coordinating Director, Planning Officer, and the HIV and AIDS focal 
person at the Assembly all indicated their awareness of the joint lobbying of the Health 
Directorate and NGOs to get HIV and AIDS policy drafted by the Assembly. According to 
the Focal person for HIV and AIDS, coordination of efforts by the various actors, 
especially among NGOs, the Assembly, and Health Directorate, is important to the 
Assembly. This is because of the threat the disease poses to the municipality as a mining 
area which attracts all kinds of people from all over the world, particularly from 
neighbouring countries such as La Cote D‟Ivoire, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia, and 
Nigeria. 
 
4.5 Ho 
 
The location of Ho on the Ghana-Togo border makes the municipality a popular transit 
point in the Volta region. It has a population of 200,000 with a growth rate of about 1.3 
percent. The municipality‟s population is estimated to reach 217,000 by 2008 with about 37 
percent resident in urban areas whilst the rural population is estimated to be around 63 
percent (Republic of Ghana 2005d). 
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 According to my key informants, this pastor was „powerful‟ in terms of his religious capabilities. They claimed that he 
had a prayer camp which attracted all kinds of people from Ghana and outside of Ghana to seek solutions to their 
problems including finding cure for HIV and AIDS. 
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The Ho municipality is located in a region considered a stronghold of the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) because the founder of the NDC, former President Jerry 
Rawlings hails from that region. 
  
The Ho Traditional Council is very influential in the municipality partly because the office 
of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs is located in the municipality. Local chiefs therefore 
play a significant role in the fight against HIV and AIDS in the district. Their durbars are 
good platforms for NGOs to mount educational campaigns especially during festivals when 
all kinds of tourists arrive in the municipality.  
 
There are a number of NGOs in the municipality that mobilise around HIV and AIDS. One 
of such NGOs (FUGI – Future Generations International) is among 17 NGOs selected by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as partner in the fight 
against HIV and AIDS. In spite of the fact that NGOs are doing well in the Ho District, 
most of them are concentrated in the municipal capital thereby neglecting the remote 
communities. 
 
4.5.1 Informal ties with Municipal Assembly  
In Ho, ties between the Municipal Health Directorate and the Assembly are weak (28.95 
percent) overall (refer to Table 4, and see Figure 8 below). Ethnic ties are predominant but 
these did not promote good neighbourliness or abusua relations. Ho‟s case is interesting 
because Ho is in the Volta region of Ghana and there is a popular perception among most 
people in Ghana that the people from the Volta region see themselves as „brothers‟ and 
„sisters‟ or one big „family.‟ This long held perception arose because, compared with other 
parts of Ghana, the Volta Region appears to have fairly homogenous people with very 
blurred ethnic lines. It is common to find that different people from the Volta region easily 
relate to each other when they meet in other places such as Accra or Kumasi, and consider 
themselves „family‟ irrespective of which part of the region they come from. In most 
offices across the country, there is the common perception that those from the Volta region 
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treat their neighbours from the region with special kindness. On this basis, I expected to 
find informal ties to be strong or at least strong abusua ties which should be pushed by 
strong ethnic solidarity. 
 
Figure 8: Informal ties and embeddedness in Ho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding is equally surprising because according to the data in Table 6 (Chapter 6), 
informal ties with elected Assembly members were also weak (refer also to Table 4). 
Although over half of the Assembly members have ethnic relations with the staff at the 
Health Directorate this could not strengthen abusua ties. 
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Ho is similar to Techiman where political party ties across the Health Directorate and the 
Municipal Assembly are not as strong as New Juaben, Sunyani, and Obuasi (the three with 
strong NPP ties). In Ho, both the Health Director and the DDNS are affiliated to the NDC 
whilst key officers in the Assembly are NPP members (refer to Table 2 in Chapter 3). The 
weak political party ties may well explain why the other ties are weak. Overall, this may 
have contributed to poor collaboration between the Health Directorate and the Assembly 
given that 80 percent of the Assembly members belong to the NPP. 
 
4.5.2 Embeddedness of the Health Directorate with CSOs working on HIV and AIDS 
Ho is one of the four cases in which the Health Directorate had medium embeddedness 
with selected groups within civil society (refer to Figure 8 and Table 4). The staff at the 
Health Directorate have medium abusua ties with religious leaders and the chief. They also 
have strong political party ties with leaders of the church and the traditional ruler. However, 
their weak ties with leaders of NGOs eventually resulted in medium overall embeddedness 
(see Tables 7 in Chapter 7 showing ties with leaders of NGOs. A point of interest with Ho 
is that all the religious leaders and the paramount chief are NDC members. Most of the 
leaders of NGOs and officers at the Health Directorate were sympathisers of the opposition 
NDC.  
 
4.5.3 Collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
Coordination between the Health Directorate and the Assembly in Ho is low as evidenced 
by low access to the fund (refer to Table 4). The periods during which releases were made 
to the Health Director also coincided with the three periods of elections (see Table 5 in 
Chapter 5). The funds were released in 2000; 2004; and 2008. The conclusion I draw from 
Ho‟s case which staff from the Health Directorate, the Assembly and key informants 
alluded to is that the elections are the major incentives for the Chief Executive to release 
the fund to the Health Director. For example, one officer from the Health Directorate 
related the election calendar to the release of the fund as follows: 
We do not bank our hope on the fund because what we know is that we only receive it during 
election times. The Chief Executive will not tolerate any attempt to ask for the fund during 
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non-election times. The impression this creates is that the fund comes for us to be able to do a 
lot of things to make the people vote for whichever government that is in power. This applies 
to both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP). They all do 
the same thing. This is unfortunate because the Health Directorate is non-political and non-
partisan. We are supposed to deliver health services to everybody so if they tie the release of 
the fund to elections it makes me feel very uncomfortable [An officer from Health 
Department, Ho, 17
th
 October 2009]. 
 
4.5.4 Consultation with elected Assembly members and HIV and AIDS CSO leaders 
Ho is the third case in which there is low consultation with elected Assembly members by 
officers in the Health Directorate (refer to Table 3 in Chapter 3 and Table 4 in this 
Chapter). It appears that officers at the Health Directorate did not have the incentive to use 
elected Assembly members mainly due to the nature of the relationship between executive 
officers of the Assembly and the Health Directorate. I realised from my interviews with the 
Director of Health and the Public Health Nurse that there is a kind of tension between the 
Health Director and the Chief Executive.
78
 It looks like an issue of personality clash or 
clash of authority which might be due to attempts by each of them to assert their authority 
as provided by Act 462 and Act 525 respectively for the Chief Executive and the Health 
Director. This might be one reason why the Health Management Team only seemed to exist 
on paper in terms of membership and did not have all the members as provided by law, and 
as indicated by my key informants in the Health Directorate and the Assembly, it is the core 
staff of the Health Directorate that constitute the Health Management Team and perform 
the functions. Just like the case in Sunyani, officers at the Ho Municipal Health Directorate 
tend to connect more with civil society actors to promote health programmes. 
 
4.6 Techiman 
 
Ghana‟s major market centre for food crops is Techiman. The municipality is an important 
transit point for long distance heavy duty vehicle drivers from Mali, Niger, Chad, and 
Burkina Faso. The population of the Techiman municipal area for 2007 is estimated to be 
207,545 based on a projection from the 2000 Population and Housing census with a growth 
rate of about 3 percent (Republic of Ghana 2005d). About 55 percent of the population was 
                                                 
78
 Tension as used here means misunderstanding or disagreement. 
130 
 
 
 
made up those aged between 15 and 64 years, and the dependant population (children up to 
15 years and the aged who were above 65 years) constituted 45 percent. About 57 percent 
of the population was engaged in farming and other agricultural related activities. 
 
In terms of ethnicity and religion, the Techiman municipal area may be termed highly 
heterogeneous partly due to the high migrant population. The population is made up of 
several ethnic groups including Akans (64 percent), the Mole Dagbon (23 percent), and 
several other minority ethnic groups. Christians constitute 68 percent, Moslems constitute 
21 percent, with the rest practising traditional religion. 
 
The Techiman municipal area has been the stronghold of the opposition NDC (now the 
ruling party). During the 1992 general elections, the NDC won the Techiman South seat. In 
the 2000 elections, the party again won the Techiman South seat. The NDC won the 
parliamentary seats for both Techiman North and Techiman South constituencies in the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004. In the case of Techiman North, the NDC 
has won two out of the three presidential and parliamentary elections.  
 
The Techiman Traditional Council (TTC) also offers its durbars to various stakeholders in 
health care as platforms to promote their agenda in health. The TTC is one of the influential 
traditional authorities in Ghana.  
 
Techiman is the municipality with the largest number of NGOs and CBOs that mobilise 
around HIV and AIDS as compared with the other four cases. It has as much as twice the 
number of NGOs in Sunyani and Ho.  
 
4.6.1 Informal ties with Municipal Assembly 
Techiman is unique in the sense that it is the only case to be at the bottom of the scales for 
performance, informal ties and embeddedness. It has weak informal ties with executive 
officers of the Assembly; elected Assembly members; leaders of NGOs; traditional 
authority; and the church (see Figure 9 below and refer to Table 3 in Chapter 3 and Table 4 
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in this Chapter). It performed poorly in terms of access to the fund and consultation. In a 
later section when I compare Techiman with New Juaben in a discussion of access to the 
fund, and also when comparing Sunyani with Techiman in the discussion of norms and 
beliefs around HIV and AIDS, I show that one main explanation for the weak informal ties 
might be that the Health Director and Deputy Director of Nursing Services were new in 
Techiman (less than 2 years in office), whilst the Coordinating Director is also less than 
two years in Techiman. 
 
Figure 9: Informal ties and embeddedness in Techiman 
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Given that two of the three officers from the Health Directorate are new, it is not surprising 
to find weak informal ties with elected Assembly members as well (refer to Figure 9 and 
see data in Table 6 in Chapter 6). Only three out of the ten elected Assembly members have 
abusua ties with the Disease Control Officer, and each of the officers has ethnic ties with 
two each of the Assembly members. All the officers at the Health Directorate noted that 
they have weak ties with elected Assembly members. According to one of them;  
I only know about six elected Assembly members. In 2008, there were some issues about HIV 
and AIDS patients whose family wanted to throw them out when they realised that they had 
the disease. We had to do a lot of negotiations with those families to resolve the matter so it 
was through those negotiations that I got to know those Assembly members who brought out 
the issue. Since that time a kind of friendship bond has developed between us here in the 
Health Directorate and those Assembly members [Staff, Techiman Municipal Health 
Directorate, 22
nd
 September 2009]. 
 
The officer who said this added that since 2008 those elected Assembly members have 
started to contribute to creating awareness about the disease to minimise discrimination and 
stigmatisation of people who have HIV or AIDS.  
 
Only 3 of the elected Assembly members indicated that they have abusua relations with the 
Disease Control Officer. Those who indicated that they have developed friendship ties with 
the Health Directorate noted that the relationship was established since 2007 during the 
process of joint negotiations between them and the Health Directorate to stop those families 
from throwing out people with the disease. According to one elected Assembly member: 
I drew the attention of officers of the Health Directorate to the issue in 2007 when they came 
for Voluntary Counselling and Testing programme. Since the issue was delicate, we agreed 
that we meet the family together with the Health Director, and the other Assembly member 
who identified similar thing in his electoral area to resolve the issue. Since then we have been 
close to these officers at the Health Directorate [Elected Assembly member, Techiman 
Municipal Assembly, 18
th
 September, 2009].  
 
Techiman is the only case (out of the 5 cases) in which political party ties are weak between 
officers in the Health Directorate and executive officers at the Assembly. All three officers 
are affiliated to the opposition NDC. The only political party tie they have in the Assembly 
is with the Municipal Coordinating Director who is NDC. Given that the Municipal 
Coordinating Director is only 2 years in the Assembly (just like the Health Director and the 
DDNS), their influence is weak because the Chief Executive has 80 percent of Assembly 
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members who are NPP. The weak political party ties may also be due to the weak ethnic 
ties across the Assembly and the Health Directorate. I discuss these relationships and how 
the Assembly and the Health Directorate collaborate in Chapter 5. 
  
4.6.2 Embeddedness of the Health Directorate with CSOs working on HIV and AIDS 
With respect to ties with NGOs, all the staff in the Health Directorate indicated that these 
were very formal. According to them, they only meet leaders of a few NGOs in the course 
of their application process to access financial support from the Ghana AIDS Commission 
or the National HIV and AIDS Control Programme. This is how one of them perceived the 
work of the NGOs and his relationship with them,  
I hear there are several NGOs in Techiman working around HIV and AIDS. Those known to 
me are the five I mentioned but they only come here to endorse their proposals. I do it for 
them because I do not want them to think I want to frustrate them, but I hear there is rivalry 
and competition among them [A staff in Health Directorate, Techiman, 17
th
 November 2008]. 
 
Analysis of political party connections show that most of the leaders of NGOs do not share 
anything common with officers in the Health Directorate as about 60 percent of them 
belong to the NPP. This might be the reason why most of the NGOs are not consulted by 
the Health Directorate, and it also supports the Health Director‟s comments that the NGOs 
are several and difficult to consult with. It is interesting to note that the paramount chief and 
leaders of religious groups are all NDC. In this Techiman is similar to Ho where the 
paramount chief, religious leaders and Health Director belong to the NDC. 
 
4.6.3 Collaboration and coordination: access to the DACF 
Techiman is the second case in which the Health Director‟s access to the fund is low 
suggesting that coordination is low and therefore performance is low (refer to Table 4). The 
Health Director performed well between 2000 and 2004 even though he was not successful 
in 2001, he performed poorly between 2004 and 2008 receiving no allocations at all 
showing weak  performance overall (see Table 5 in Chapter 5). The Health Director‟s 
inability to access the fund in 2008 is interesting because this was one of the election years 
and, following the logic from the other four cases, the Chief Executive may have been 
expected to allocate funds as one way to win votes. However, as I show in Chapter 5 when 
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I compare New Juaben with Techiman, it appears that good informal networks might be 
required by Health Directors to access the fund even if Chief Executives want to push their 
party‟s agenda. 
 
4.6.4 Consultation with elected Assembly members and HIV and AIDS CSO leaders 
Consultation with elected Assembly members is low (refer to Table 4). According to my 
respondents in the Health Directorate, it is difficult to consult with Assembly members 
because most of them have just come to the district and need time to get to know them. 
They claimed that consulting with Assembly members about the disease would only be 
effective if the Assembly members also view HIV and AIDS as a top priority issue, 
something they have not yet observed. This was what one of them said about working with 
the Assembly members:  
None of the elected Assembly members has come to talk to us about the disease. I know it is 
an issue here in Techiman because of the location of the municipality but it looks like the 
Assembly members have a different priority. I have had the chance to meet some of them and 
the issue of the disease came up. This was about cases in two electoral areas where some 
people with the disease faced rejection, stigmatisation, and discrimination. So we visited these 
electoral areas and had discussions with the Assembly members and the families of those 
people to stop them from doing that [A staff at the Health Directorate, Techiman, 18
th
 
November 2008]. 
 
Another staff member in the Health Directorate also intimated that the template for the 
preparation of the High Impact Rapid Delivery (HIRD) plan also limited any efforts to do 
extensive consultation with citizens.
79
 According to him:  
The template comes from Accra and we are supposed to fill-in. Even though we are told that 
two representatives from the Assembly should be members of the health management 
committee, nobody comes from the Assembly. At least some of the elected Assembly 
members could be the representatives but they do not come for meetings [A staff at the Health 
Directorate, Techiman, 17
th
 November 2008]. 
 
Interview results from the Assembly members support the finding that consultation is low 
in the Techiman municipality.  Only 3 out of the 10 elected Assembly members indicated 
that they have meetings with staff in the Health Directorate (see Table 12 in Appendix J). 
One of them explained that:  
Each time I go to the Health Directorate to ask about when the CHPS compound in my 
electoral area would be completed and health staff sent to us, the issue of HIV and AIDS 
                                                 
79
 This is the health plan which all Health Directorates are supposed to prepare. The Ghana Health Service provides a 
template to guide in the preparation of the plan in line with donor funding arrangements. 
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comes up and we discuss ways to address the disease. I remember that the Health Director 
asked me about how best to deal with stigmatisation and discrimination against people with 
the disease. I suggested to him that NGOs needed to be given enough financial resources to do 
so. I said that because it is the NGOs that are close to the people in the communities. He 
promised to take this up but I have not heard anything yet [Elected Assembly member, 
Techiman, 19
th
 November 2008]. 
 
When I asked the Assembly members about why they are not consulted by the Health 
Director, one of them had this view: 
 
I do not know why. Sometimes I only find staff from the Health Directorate undertaking 
immunisation in my electoral area without my knowledge. Because they do not tell me to 
inform the people, they come to meet empty houses most of the time because this is a farming 
community and the people leave for their farms. I heard the old director had a motor accident 
and died and a new director has come but I have not seen him in my electoral area yet. I only 
saw him on one or two occasions at the Assembly [Elected Assembly member, Techiman, 29
th
 
November 2009]. 
 
All the 5 NGOs I interviewed claimed that the Techiman Municipal Health Directorate did 
not consult them about plans to manage HIV and AIDS. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the nature of informal ties that exist between the Health 
Directorate and the Assemblies. I also discussed the extent to which the Health Directorates 
are embedded with society. I have shown that the strength of informal ties and 
embeddedness vary considerably across all the cases. The chapter has also described how 
each of the Health Directorates performed in terms of the level of coordination through 
access to the fund; and consultation with Assembly members and leaders of civil society 
groups all geared towards coordination of programmes to make them more responsive to 
citizens. Findings from the in-depth interviews and analysis of documentary data suggest 
that (a) there is a relationship between the informal ties which the Health Directorate has 
with the Assembly and Health Directorate performance (in terms of access to the fund), and 
(b) the embeddedness of health staff with leaders of CSOs seems to explain the ability of 
health staff to overcome socio-cultural norms and beliefs that can undermine the 
implementation of HIV and AIDS policy. I hope to show these relationships in the three 
subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 5 
Collaboration and Coordination: the Role of Informal Ties 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this and the next two chapters I will explain the variation in ties and performance that 
were outlined in chapter 4. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which informal relations 
can explain variations in performance in terms of collaboration and coordination between 
the Municipal Health Directorates (MHDs) and Municipal Assemblies (MAs) in the 
implementation of HIV and AIDS policy in Ghana. 
 
The evidence presented here suggests that in order for mixed systems to work, informal 
relationships matter and where Health Directors do not have access to the DACF poor 
relations exist. Informal ties are necessary but not sufficient conditions to encourage good 
cooperation as they can lead to corruption, nepotism, and cronyism in service delivery. 
Evidently good relations may promote both good and bad outcomes.  
 
I will use the DACF as a tool in understanding the extent to which coordination occurs 
between departments as the fund is managed by the MA although the MHD has a right to a 
percentage of those funds for activities related to health. I will show that the 
implementation of formal directives from the Administrator of the DACF, which provide 
that the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) must release 1% of the Assemblies share of the 
DACF to the MHD for HIV and AIDS programmes, are constrained by a number of 
structural issues. These include the relative autonomy of the MHD; the widely held notion 
that the MHD is financially strong and lack of clarity regarding who has the capacity and 
mandate to perform which task. These structural challenges might be due to confusion 
between the Local Government Act, Act 462 of 1993 and the Ghana Health Service and 
Teaching Hospitals Act, Act 525 of 1996. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that these problems can be overcome: health directors who had and were able to 
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use informal relations with the executive officers of the Municipal Assemblies were able to 
access their share of the DACF. Where informal ties were weak, these problems could not 
be overcome. I focus the discussion on the Health Director and the MCE as they are the two 
senior officers in these two decentralised institutions who take most of the decisions 
relating to the DACF. 
 
This chapter sheds light on the politics of intra-governmental relations, which can increase 
our understanding of how the state actually functions at the local level to deliver services to 
the poor. The debate on informal networks in conjunction with intra-governmental relations 
has not received adequate attention among scholars, policy makers and other actors whose 
interests are geared towards improving the performance of government agencies at the local 
level. On the basis of the findings in this study, I make a contribution to the growing debate 
that seeks to promote understanding of how decentralisation works, in particular on how 
devolution and deconcentration can work simultaneously to improve service delivery.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the existing literature has focused more on vertical 
relationships between central government and devolved authority (in this case the District 
Assemblies in Ghana) in the form of intergovernmental transfers using theories of fiscal 
federalism; and much of the literature looks at weaknesses in the guidelines for the 
disbursement of the fund (Abbey et al. 2010).
80
 The literature does not adequately discuss 
how the fund is disbursed at the local level, particularly when there is evidence to suggest 
that a number of structural issues constrain disbursement of the fund at the Assembly level 
and that many Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) fail or refuse to 
comply with the guidelines and collaborate with their Health Directorates (Abbey et al. 
2010: 76; Ghana News Agency 2010f). I investigate why some MCEs comply with the 
directives whilst others fail to do so. 
                                                 
80
 During the fifth workshop organised by the Public Agenda as part of a series of workshops on fiscal 
decentralisation in Ghana, participants focused on issues around the constitutional provision of not less than 
5% of total national revenues, and indicated that what constitutes total revenue in each particular year before 
the 5% is applied has remained a controversial issue. One of the key arguments raised at the workshop was 
that since the revenues are collected and allocated on a quarterly basis, prior to such allocation of the quarterly 
releases into the fund, Ghanaians should be made aware of what is the quantum of the total revenue for that 
quarter (Decentralization Agenda 2007). 
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Here I use the cases of New Juaben and Techiman to illustrate the issues of collaboration 
and coordination.  These provide good contrasts as they are polar opposites; in New Juaben 
the Health Director was able to access the fund over the 8 year period examined, and there 
were strong informal ties between officers in the MHD and executive officers at the 
Assembly. In Techiman the Health Director did not enjoy the same level of access despite 
his efforts. 
 
This chapter comprises ten main sections. In two following the introductory section I 
discuss how collaboration and coordination between the two institutions can be constrained 
by reviewing some of the examples from Sub-Saharan Africa and then identifying three 
issues particular to Ghana. These are a) relative autonomy of the Health Directorate; b) the 
notion that the Health Directorate is financially strong; and c) capacity, qualification and 
tasks. I will take each of these issues in sections three, four, and five respectively and 
describe how and why New Juaben overcame them whilst Techiman failed to do so. In 
section six I discuss access to the DACF as evidence of the success in Sunyani and what 
appears to be failure in Techiman.
81
 In section seven, I will look at how the Health 
Directorates and the Assemblies collaborate on more routine or everyday matters around (i) 
meetings, and (ii) sanitation and malaria control activities targeted at pregnant mothers and 
children under 5 years of age. Possible explanatory factors to the findings in both Sunyani 
and Techiman are discussed in section eight. This will be followed by section nine where I 
describe informal relations between the Health Directorate and the Municipal Assembly in 
the two municipalities as a factor that suggests explaining the findings in the two 
municipalities. This section is followed by the conclusion section ten. 
 
 
                                                 
81
 The discussion of collaboration and coordination using the DACF would have been enhanced if I had 
obtained data on the utilisation of the fund for HIV and AIDS campaigns. It would have been possible for me 
to show whether the success of the HIV and AIDS campaigns have any relationship with health officers‟ 
access to the fund. As a result of this limitation, I only use the campaigns around the disease to determine the 
success of collaboration between health staff and the Assembly members (in Chapter 6), and with leaders of 
CSOs (Chapter 7). 
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5.2 Constraints to effective collaboration and coordination 
 
The vast literature on decentralisation gives numerous examples of structural problems that 
can undermine effective functioning of decentralised agencies (Crawford 2008). The 
situation across most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa looks similar. For example, in their work 
on local governance and decentralisation in Zimbabwe, Mellors et al. (2002) found that 
central government dominance over the affairs of decentralised authorities at the local level 
helps to explain the poor performance of local government bodies. In South Africa, Chikulo 
(2007) found that as a result of incomplete fiscal decentralisation, line departments did not 
incorporate their budgets into the mainstream budget process at the local level, and this 
undermined the harmonisation and coordination of policy between decentralised agencies at 
that level. Similarly, Mosha (2007) showed that weak horizontal linkages and coordination 
contributed to constrain effective development planning at the district level in Botswana, 
and went on to suggest continuous structural reforms to enhance the cooperation and 
coordination of efforts by government agencies responsible for development planning. 
Similarly, the examination of fiscal performance of countries in Francophone West Africa 
by Korsun and Meagher (2004), revealed that decentralisation failed to deliver the expected 
benefits mainly due to structural problems as a result of flaws in the design of the 
decentralisation programme. Korsun and Meagher argued that the design of the 
decentralisation programme perpetuated the dominance over and excessive control of 
public officers and elected political figures at the local level through budget and 
expenditure regulations by central government, politicians and national elites (Ibid). 
In the current study, a number of structural problems emerged in terms of incomplete fiscal 
decentralisation and central government controls over local government bodies, similar to 
those found by Mellors et al (2002); Korsun and Meagher (2004); Chikulo (2007); Mosha 
(2007); Awortwi (2010a; 2010b; 2010c) elsewhere across Sub-Saharan Africa. Three issues 
that emerged in this study which appeared to undermine effective collaboration and 
coordination between the MHDs and the MAs were, a) relative autonomy of the MHDs b) 
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the widely held notion that the MHDs are financially strong and c) conflicts over capacity, 
mandate and roles. I will discuss each of these structural issues in the next section. 
 
5.2.1 Relative autonomy of the Health Directorate  
In Ghana, under the current arrangements of Act 525, the Health Directors do not have 
absolute autonomy from the Ministry of Health, thus preventing their  absorption into the 
Municipal Assembly as one of the decentralised departments as envisaged by Act 462. Act 
525 provides that the Health Directorate has a strong allegiance to the Ministry of Health 
(through the Regional Directorate of Health Services) which has its own command 
structures and channels of reporting mechanisms). As a result, most Health Directors were 
not clear as to who was their boss, given that Act 462 also requires the Health Directors to 
report to the MCE. There is inadequate clarity in terms of how the Health Director is 
expected to relate to the Regional Director of Health Services (RDHS) and the District 
Chief Executive. Most Health Directors seem to be in a state of dilemma in terms of how 
they should manage the ambiguities in the laws as portrayed by Ibrahim et al. (2004) in 
Figure 10 below: 
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Figure 10: Dilemma of the Health Director in terms of who is his boss 
 
The study revealed that the lack of clarity contributed to constrain collaboration and 
coordination between the Health Directorates and the Municipal Assemblies. This is 
because the existence of strong bonds between the Health Directors and the Regional 
Director of Health Services do not give the MCE control over the budgets of the MHDs. 
The inability of the MAs to control the budget of the MHDs has created relationship 
problems between these two important public offices at the local level. The way in which 
many Health Directors manage these relationships may result in personality clashes 
between staff of the two institutions. Ibrahim et al. (2004) claim that the poor management 
of these relationships between the Health Directors and MCEs coupled with suspicion and 
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lack of transparency among them have contributed to eroding the trust that is required for 
effective collaboration and coordination. This lack of trust is amply demonstrated by 
Ibrahim et al. (2004) in Figure 11. Trust might be required particularly when the Health 
Director would have to depend on the MCE for capital investment in health such as the 
construction of clinics, health centres, CHPS centres, and accommodation for health staff. 
  
Figure 11: Indication of lack of trust between MHD and MCE 
 
As a consequence of this lack of trust, Health Directors and MCEs were unable to be honest 
with one another. Consequently the Health Directors may seek to hide their budgets whilst 
conversely the MCEs might also be suspicious about resources available to the Health 
Directors. This suspicion can influence how the MCE responds to requests made by the 
Health Directors for financial and other forms of support from the Assembly. The apparent 
suspicion and lack of trust between these two key officers seem to be heightened by the 
notion held by most public officials and politicians that the MHD is financially strong 
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although it is not clear if this notion can be empirically justified.
82
 This mistrust seems to 
affect the attitudes of many MCEs and may make them reluctant to release the fund to 
health; this is considered in the next section. 
 
5.2.2 The notion that the Health Directorate is financially strong 
The continuous operation of separate budgets and accounting systems by the MHDs 
combined with the Assemblies‟ lack of control over the budgets and other resources of the 
MHDs appears to have created suspicion which has heightened the notion among public 
officers in the municipalities that the MHD has access to a lot of financial resources. It is 
for this reason that the Ministry of Health would not allow those resources to be managed 
by the Assembly. Many Health Directors and MCEs were suspicious of each other, 
assuming they might lose „money power‟ when they were transparent about the amount of 
money they had, and fearing  others might want to share their funds with them (Ibrahim et 
al. 2004: 39). This kind of suspicion and mistrust appears to have affected how many 
MCEs reacted to other demands that were made by Health Directors apart from the fund. 
For example, Ibrahim et al. (2004: 56) have shown that under such circumstances, the Chief 
Executive might be reluctant to support programmes such as immunisation or even to 
release funds to provide accommodation for health staff (see Figure 12). 
 
This lack of collaboration and coordination has attracted a lot of interest from major foreign 
donors to the health sector. For example, the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) has funded a number of programmes to promote collaboration and coordination 
at the local level (Ibrahim et al. 2004). The rationale for DANIDA support suggests that the 
way in which the various actors collaborate and coordinate with each other can have 
tremendous impact on the delivery of health services to poor people in Ghana. 
 
 
                                                 
82
 Available data from budget statements of Government of Ghana (GoG) does not give a clear picture to 
suggest that allocations to the Ministry of Health are high and that MHDs are financially strong as compared 
with other Ministries and their departments at the local level. In fact, one of the budget statements rather 
shows that the Ministry of Education was allocated 70% of total allocations to all social services whilst health 
received 27% (Republic of Ghana 2000b; 2002d; 2005c). 
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Figure 12: Suspicion and mistrust between MHD and MCE 
 
Further evidence arose of eroded trust between the MHD and the Assembly due to doubts 
about capacity and inadequate mutual respect for roles and responsibilities to perform them; 
this is the subject of the next section.  
 
5.2.3 Capacity, qualification and tasks 
The behaviour of a number of public officers towards their counterparts appeared to be 
influenced by how they perceived those that they interacted and worked with on daily basis, 
and how they were perceived by those people. I observed a lack of mutual respect between 
many MCEs and Health Directors which centred on issues of doubts about qualifications, 
expertise, and even statutory mandates. There is the perception among many Ghanaians that 
the appointment of MCEs is not based on merit but rather on partisan considerations. 
Whilst there are Health Directors who have the perception that their MCEs are not highly 
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educated, I also found MCEs who thought that their Health Directors were not experts in 
health. An expression of this scenario is presented in Figure 13 below. 
  
This study has revealed that the mutual lack of respect also contributed significantly to 
weaken cooperation overall between the Assembly and the MHD. The importance which 
people (especially Africans) attach to respect shown to them is indicated by Mellors et al. 
(2002: 9) that:  
In most traditional African cultures, values such as respect for elders, discipline and 
obligations are customary and important for social cohesion. Even in the context of rapid 
social change, these values are still evident … leaders are [expected to be] accorded high 
levels of respect …   
 
Therefore leaders such as the MCE might refuse to cooperate with their Health Directors 
when they feel that they are not accorded the level of respect they deserve as political heads 
at the municipal level who represent the President of the country. 
 
Figure 13: Doubts about capability and commitment 
 
Having described the structural problems that contribute to making it difficult for 
collaboration and coordination of efforts at the local level, I now turn to describe how each 
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of these issues were addressed by New Juaben and Techiman. As each of the issues are 
considered, New Juaben will be presented first followed by Techiman. 
 
5.3 Relative autonomy of the Health Directorate 
 
In New Juaben there were two Directors of Health between 2000 and 2008; the one in 
office at the time of my research had taken over from his predecessor in 2005. Neither 
Health Directors had asserted their authority, as allowed by the budget controls, in their 
engagement with the Assembly. The analysis revealed that they relied more on informal 
networks in their day-to-day engagement with the Assembly than the relationship 
prescribed under the formal institutional arrangements. The results from the analysis in 
Table 4 (in Chapter 4) show that officers at the MHD had strong ties with executive officers 
in the Assembly (see also Table 2 in Chapter 3). One of the officers I interviewed at the 
MHD indicated that the former Health Director had very good ethnic, abusua, old-school, 
and political party ties with the MCE and that this relationship enhanced collaboration and 
coordination between them. The Health Director also indicated that he recognised that 
overdependence on provisions in the legal and institutional arrangements within the 
decentralisation programme would not be enough to facilitate collaboration and 
coordination between the MHD and the Assembly. This was how he explained it: 
You know that two bosses cannot drive the same boat. Even though I am the Director, I make 
the MCE feel that he is the boss. I am supposed to report to and take instructions from my 
Regional Director but I do not leave out the MCE even though it is difficult sometimes for me 
to be able to deal with two conflicting demands. For example, it is difficult to share my time 
between my regional boss and the MCE when both of them invite me for what they consider 
to be important programmes and my presence is needed. What I do is that I have taken it upon 
myself to brief the MCE on every little thing I do. I make sure that he is on top of issues and 
he feels very comfortable about that because he is able to answer all questions that come from 
the Castle about the health situation in the municipality.
83
 The second thing I do is that 
whenever I need funds or any support from the Assembly I first have informal discussions 
with the MCE and the Coordinating Director before I make a formal request in writing. So it 
is not the letter I write to request the fund but I do my homework well. You understand what I 
mean? It is all about how you play the game. I know some of my colleagues don‟t get it. 
Perhaps they behave as bosses [Health Director, New Juaben, 23
rd
 Oct., 2008]. 
 
                                                 
83
 The castle he refers to is the Christianborg Castle at Osu in Accra. It is one of the remnants of the colonial 
administration. It used to be the seat of the British colonial administration. It was turned to the seat of 
Government by the National Liberation Council after the coup in 1966, and it has remained so until now. 
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The techniques employed by the Health Director in New Juaben, which were confirmed by 
over 70 percent of my interviewees in the Assembly, suggest that as compared with the 
formal relations, ethnic or tribal, abusua, old-school, and political party connections were 
more effective in facilitating collaboration in terms of accessing what he referred to as the 
„politically sensitive fund.‟ His indication that he made the MCE feel like he was the boss 
is evidence of his belief that if he asserts his authority, he might have difficulty in obtaining 
the cooperation of the Chief Executive. This is because, the mandate of the Health Director 
under Act 525 makes him the autonomous head of the district (at least in theory) and the 
requirements stipulated by the Act further align him more strongly with the Ministry of 
Health than the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development as provided by Act 
462. So if the Health Director had chosen to assert his authority as provided by Act 525 
problems of cooperation and collaboration could have arisen. 
 
In comparison, the Health Director of Techiman did assert his authority and engaged in 
more formal terms with senior officers at the Assembly. My interviews with the Health 
Director revealed that he was more focused on the resources he received through the 
vertical relationship he maintained with central government. He did not show so much 
interest in his relationship with the MCE. The data in Table 2 (Chapter 3) gives evidence of 
the weak informal ties he had with the Assembly; compared with the score of New Juaben, 
Techiman‟s score was low. The Health Director indicated that he and the Deputy Director 
of Nursing Services had only been in the municipality since the middle of 2007 so the two 
key officers had been at post in Techiman for less than two years at the time of my 
research. As a result they only recently commenced establishing ties with the Assembly and 
other important actors in health care delivery for the municipality. One of the officers at the 
MHD explained how they related with the MCE as follows: 
The records we have found show that the MCE could not be relied upon for financial support. 
Because the Assembly has not shown adequate commitment to supporting our programmes, 
we rely more on the Ministry of Health for the resources we need down here. As I said to you 
earlier, we are convinced that the MCE does not cooperate with us so we only attend meetings 
at the Assembly when we are invited and we have the time. But why should we attend 
meetings when we know that our views will not make any difference? Maybe things will 
change after sometime; we are all new to each other so perhaps as we become more familiar 
with each other, we can understand one another and things might be different [Staff at the 
Health Directorate, Techiman, 26
th
 Nov., 2008]. 
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I corroborated these claims with officers at the Assembly who indicated that the MHD‟s 
heavy reliance on the Ministry of Health rather than its links with the Assembly might be 
because the Assembly had been reluctant to support HIV and AIDS programmes. This 
situation was similar to that found in Ho where the Health Director maintained a strong 
relationship with central government structures mainly because his ties with the Assembly 
were weak. The staff at the Health Directorate in Techiman indicated that they did not have 
anything to lose as a result of the weak relationship they had with the Assembly given that 
the Assembly had not been cooperative in terms of making funds available to health and 
supporting their programmes. 
 
5.4 The notion that the Health Directorate is financially strong 
 
The Health Director in New Juaben indicated that he was aware of the widely held 
perception that the MHD receives a lot of financial support from donor agencies. He also 
recognised this belief influenced the levels of cooperation extended by the MCEs when 
working with the MHD. He said he employed honesty and transparency to dispel this idea 
among officers at the Assembly. He explained that he was honest and transparent with the 
MCE in terms of the resources he had at his disposal at every point in time and this enabled 
trust to build among them. He said: 
Whenever I need funds from the MCE for my programmes, I do not just ask for the whole 
amount. This does not mean that if he gives me the entire amount for the programme I will 
not be happy. So for example I will say that Sir, we need so much to undertake a particular 
programme. Unfortunately we have just this little amount left from the malaria control funds 
from last year. If you could give us something from the DACF to top it up we would be able 
to do it well. This is what I did with the Polyclinic project [Health Director, New Juaben, 24
th
 
October 2008].  
 
The other people I interviewed in the Assembly corroborated the claims by the Health 
Director that he informed the MCE of the funds available to him when he presented 
requests to the Assembly. According to the Coordinating Director, even though one could 
not say whether the Health Director declared everything he had, his actions helped to 
increase trust between them.  
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Unlike New Juaben, and of the five cases, Techiman was the one for which the study 
revealed strong feelings within the Assembly that the MHD was financially strong and in 
receipt of a lot of funds from central government. They believed that donor agencies and 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) provided funds directly to Health 
Directorates, bypassing Ministry of Health controls. This belief may account for the 
Assembly‟s reluctance to allocate HIV and AIDS funds to the MHD. For example, one of 
the officers from the Assembly indicated that: 
My friend, we all know that health has money. The Ministry of Health is one of the ministries 
that receive a lot of donor funds. All these funds are channelled to the districts outside the 
control of the Assembly. Nobody knows the contents of the purse of the MHD but everybody 
is asking questions about the purse of the Assembly, why? [Senior officer, Techiman 
Municipal Assembly, 20
th
 Nov., 2008].  
 
It is likely that the other officers of the Assembly would have held similar views to this 
senior officer with regard to the MHD. Similarly, the officers of the New Juaben Municipal 
Assembly also held this perception, yet it did not influence the Assembly‟s actions towards 
health, possibly due to political party ties or because they interpreted and followed the strict 
meaning of the law. 
 
The belief that the Ministry of Health is one of the most financially strong government 
ministries in Ghana is widely held. However, there is evidence to suggest that District and 
Regional Health Directorates receive funding directly from donors and NGOs bypassing 
central government control (Mayhew 2003). As Awortwi (2010a) and Ayee (2004) noted, 
one characteristic of decentralised departments at the local level is that they continue to 
hold on to funds and control their programmes without the knowledge of the officials at the 
District Assembly. This belief that the Ministry of Health receives a lot of donor funds 
perpetuates the suspicion that exists between the Assembly and the Health Directorate as 
depicted by Ibrahim et al. (2004) in Figures 10, 11 and 12. This may be because “the 
expected integration of health into the District Assembly structure has not occurred partly 
due to the reluctance of the Ministry of Health to relinquish control over its decentralised 
units, and partly due to the contradiction in the legal framework for decentralisation” (Larbi 
1998: 223). This kind of relationship had an effect on collaboration between the Health 
Directorate and the Municipal Assembly.  
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5.5 Capacity, qualification and tasks 
 
In New Juaben I found no evidence of doubts from either the MHD or the Assembly, about 
capacity in terms of their roles in health care delivery; rather, I found mutual respect 
between the Health Director and the MCE. The Health Director informed me that he was a 
Pharmacist rather than a medical officer but I would not have known this from my 
interviews with the officers from the Assembly. This is significant because most Health 
Directors are medical officers so an office holder without this qualification could have 
difficulty in commanding the respect of senior officers of the Assembly (refer to Figure 
13).    
 
Moreover, unlike the case of Techiman where the Disease Control Officer at the MHD and 
the HIV and AIDS Focal person at the Assembly appeared to have difficulty working 
together, my impression was that there was no tension or misunderstanding between these 
two officers in New Juaben. My interviews with officers from the Assembly corroborated 
the existence of mutual respect between them and their counterparts at the MHD. The staff 
from the two institutions all indicated that each institution has the appropriate capacity and 
operates within the mandate provided by law. The staff at the MHD indicated that they did 
not hold the view that their jobs around HIV and AIDS programmes had been taken by the 
Assembly. The Assembly staff also held the same view. For example, this was how one of 
the officers at the Assembly explained it: 
Based on my experience from other districts, I will say that those of us in the Assembly know 
that it is the MHD that has the expertise and mandate charged with health service 
administration in the district. Under the Local Government Act 462, the MHD is part of the 
Assembly as one of the decentralised departments with specialised functions. The 
establishment of the HIV and AIDS Focal person‟s desk is to complement the efforts of the 
Health Directorate, and it is not to take away their duties or compete with them. I do not think 
they will say it is competition. This can arise when there is no understanding of the local 
government law. You can also have this misunderstanding of duties if there is no mutual 
respect between the Health Director and the MCE. Some of the Health Directors do not show 
respect to the MCEs because they think that the MCEs are not highly educated or something 
like that. When this happens it affects attitudes of the other staff towards the Assembly 
[Officer, New Juaben Municipal Assembly, 17
th
 Oct., 2008].  
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Showing respect to the MCE was one of the strategies the Health Director employed to 
promote collaboration and coordination. It also earned him respect from the MCE. In 
addition to this, the regular briefings to the MCE enhanced trust between them. This might 
be why the MCE would be willing to cooperate with the Health Director. 
  
In Techiman, the study revealed that officers in the MHD held the perception that staff in 
the Assembly had usurped the functions of the MHD even though they did not have the 
capacity and mandate to perform those roles. For example, one of my interviewees in the 
MHD had this view:  
Officers at the Municipal Assembly behave as if they are the experts in health. They do 
everything alone without thinking about us. Perhaps they fear that if they involve us then we 
will ask questions about the money for HIV and AIDS programmes. We are the experts as far 
as health service delivery in the municipality is concerned. The Assembly is supposed to 
support us instead of taking the job away from us and fail to do it well. Even though I am in 
charge of disease control, I have nothing to do with the Focal Person for HIV and AIDS at the 
Assembly because I do not want him to think that I want to know what is in his purse [a staff 
in the MHD, Techiman, 25
th
 Nov., 2008].  
 
When I interviewed the Focal Person for HIV and AIDS in the Assembly, his response 
confirmed my conclusion that the two sides were not clear about roles and the capacity of 
their counterparts with regard to HIV and AIDS programmes. This was how he put it: 
You do not have to go to a medical school to know how to do voluntary counselling and 
testing. So I do not understand why the staff in the MHD think that they are the only people 
who can do that job [staff member at the Municipal Assembly, 27
th
 Nov., 2008].  
 
When I compare this with the cases in New Juaben and Obuasi where the two institutions 
jointly conducted activities around awareness campaigns it seems that the MHD and MA 
officers could not undertake joint activities due to disagreements between them. This 
disagreement became evident in my presence during an interview I conducted with the 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services and the Disease Control Officer. A telephone call was 
received from the Assembly‟s Focal Person for HIV and AIDS who wanted the kits for 
testing for HIV and AIDS from the MHD as they were about to conduct voluntary 
counselling and testing. The Deputy Director of Nursing Services and the Disease Control 
Officer replied that they would not release the kits to him because he was not an expert and 
that it is the duty of experts at the MHD to conduct the voluntary counselling and testing. 
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The Disease Control Officer then put the phone down and asked me to continue with the 
interview. 
 
This incident adds to the evidence that there are staff in both institutions who do not 
adequately understand the provisions in current legal and institutional arrangements 
concerning the implementation of HIV and AIDS policy under decentralisation. According 
to those at the Assembly, they undertake voluntary counselling and testing exercises as part 
of their mandate under Act 462. Nevertheless, the health staff thought that the District 
Assembly staff had taken over their powers and, most importantly, they did not have the 
expertise to undertake voluntary counselling and testing activities which constitutes one of 
the major roles of the Health Directorate as provided for in Act 525. 
 
In the next section I will explore the ways in which these structural issues affect the MHD‟s 
access to the fund from the Assembly. The discussion will focus on the period between 
2000 and 2008.  
 
5.6 Access to the District Assemblies’ Common Fund 
 
The data on access to the DACF which is presented in Table 10 (Appendix H) shows that 
the Health Director in New Juaben received the fund between 2000 and 2004 and then for 
2007 and 2008, he received nothing for 2005 and 2006. In all, his success rate between 
2000 and 2008 was over 70 percent. This appears unprecedented as most MCEs did not 
comply with the policy to release the fund to their Health Directors (see Ghana News 
Agency 2010f). When I asked the Health Director whether his ties could have enhanced his 
chances of accessing the fund, he said:  
Look, the fact which people in government and people outside of government including the 
ordinary person in the street know, is that the DACF is a highly political issue and you have to 
know how to play the game to get it. I get it because I know how to play the game. Through 
my actions I make the Chief Executive feel that he is in control of affairs. I always treat him 
with respect. I have also tried to be very honest with him about resources we have and where 
they come from. As I do all of these things, I am able to win him over most times. Therefore I 
do not bother myself with the question of whether he will give it to me or not because I know 
I will get it. Because I know I will get it, I have relied on it to implement not only HIV and 
AIDS programmes but also other activities as well. I have always used the fund to undertake 
key activities whose funds are delayed in coming from the Ministry of Health. Even though it 
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is 1 %, it constitutes about 20% of our recurrent budget so you see it is always a relief when I 
receive it [Health Director, New Juaben, 21
st
 October, 2008].  
 
These views of the Health Director suggest that he had confidence that the Chief Executive 
would allocate his share of the fund to him. However, his confidence is unusual and poses a 
paradox as to why he was able to receive his funds when other Health Directors did not 
seem to be successful. 
 
Table 5: Access to the DACF by Health Directors
84
 
 
Years 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 (%) Accessibility 
level 
Ho  Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 33.33% low 
Obuasi Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 66.66% medium 
Sunyani Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 77.77% high 
Techiman Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No 33.33% low 
New 
Juaben 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
88.88% 
 
high 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Notes: Access is high if  ≥ 70%, medium (40%-69.5%), and low ( ≤ 39.5%) 
(a) Most of them received their allocations during period of elections (e.g. 2000, 2004, and 2008) 
(b) Former directors of Ho managed to receive some allocations before leaving in 2005. May be good relations with 
the MCE? Current director not being successful apart from in 2008 when he received support for NID and he 
was told it was coming from the DACF 
(c) Former director of health in Techiman also received some allocations. Also had some good relations. Current 
director not been successful even in election year. 
 
Meeting the demands of recurrent expenditure can be challenging when funds from the 
Ministry of Health are delayed but the health director was not disturbed because he could 
rely on one-fifth of his recurrent budget, which came from the Chief Executive. My 
interviews with key officers at the Municipal Assembly further corroborated claims by 
officers of the MHD that they had access to the fund. According to one of the senior 
officers at the Municipal Assembly, he would rate the Chief Executive‟s desire to allocate 
                                                 
84
 As I have already indicated, the Health Directors‟ success in receiving the DACF from the Chief 
Executives of the municipal assemblies for HIV and AIDS programmes is how I define accessibility to the 
Fund. The question I asked the Health Directors was whether the MCEs released the fund to them or not. I 
sought a „Yes‟ or „No‟ answer. The sum of all the ‘Yes’ responses is computed as a percentage of the number 
of years under investigation, and this is a 9 year period from 2000 to 2008. The percentages of all the „Yes‟ 
responses obtained in the 11
th
 column of Table 5 show how regular the funds were released to the Health 
Directors. 
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funds to the Health Directorate as excellent, compared with other municipalities where he 
had worked before being transferred to New Juaben. He explained this as follows: 
If I compare the other municipalities where I worked before coming here, I would say that we 
have done excellent work here. We have released the fund to the Health Director from 2000 to 
this date. I can remember that it was only on two occasions that we were not able to give them 
money. These were 2005 and 2006. We found that a lot of unexpected demands crept into our 
budgets during these years and we needed additional resources to be able to meet those 
demands, but we supported the Health Director in other numerous ways. I do not know if he 
has told you about all the support we gave him during those years. The fund was released to 
us very late in these two years you are referring to, and before its arrival the Assembly had 
already made a substantial financial allocation to the Health Directorate to support various 
programmes including HIV and AIDS related programmes. So even though you may find that 
there were no allocations, we supported the programmes of the Health Directorate in other 
ways [a senior officer, New Juaben, 21
st
 Oct., 2008]. 
 
On the basis of this officer‟s comparison of New Juaben with his experience in other 
locations, I could conclude that collaboration and coordination in New Juaben was better 
and performance was high. Although this senior officer did not directly refer to the role of 
informal ties affecting how the two institutions collaborate, his subsequent comments 
suggested that informal relations (especially political party affiliations and abusua 
networks) might have strongly influenced the Chief Executive‟s release of the fund to the 
Health Director. He said: 
We do it because the law requires us to do so. The Minister for Local Government and Rural 
Development gives us directives for the utilisation of the fund, and according to the directives, 
we are supposed to allocate 1 percent each for HIV and AIDS and malaria to the Health 
Directorate. We have been doing this for a long time including the period you are referring to. 
So we allocated the fund to the previous director because he was very hard working and 
reliable. He was very committed to fighting the disease, a cause we are also committed to. 
The present director is also a very committed and reliable person. He always comes to brief us 
on key issues in health so the Chief Executive likes him. All these might explain why the 
Assembly is supportive of his efforts. As the Chief Civil Servant in the municipality, I see it 
as big responsibility to reverse the trend of high prevalence of the disease in the municipality. 
Do not forget that the Eastern Region has recorded the highest rate of the disease in the 
country for more than three years continuously since 2005. There is pressure on me and the 
only person with whom I can work to correct this is the Health Director. We meet regularly 
and each time we meet, what occupies the greater part of our time is discussions on strategies 
to reduce the spread of the disease [senior officer, New Juaben Municipal Assembly, 18
th
 
Oct., 2008]. 
 
This officer claimed that the Assembly released the fund to the Health Directorate because 
of the law but his claims suggest that the Chief Executive‟s behaviour might have been 
influenced by the informal relations they had with the Health Director. If they acted solely 
because of the law then one would question why other Chief Executives do not follow suit. 
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This respondent also indicated that the Chief Executive liked the Health Director because 
his regular briefings enabled him to respond to the President of Ghana but as the Health 
Director indicated, those briefings went beyond a formal level of engagement with the 
Assembly. Most of these discussions took place during informal meetings which were held 
more than three times a week outside of office hours, and sometimes on weekends when 
they attended programmes such as funerals together. Meeting three times in a week outside 
of office hours indicates a very good relationship with the Chief Executive.  
 
The Planning Officer who was an old-school mate of the Health Director also compared 
New Juaben with other Assemblies to corroborate that the Assembly made the funds 
available to the Health Directorate. He said: 
In other Assemblies there is always the excuse that the Assembly‟s resources are inadequate 
and so the fund has to be used for other things. The Health Directorate would not therefore be 
given its share when the release arrives. In one of the districts, the Chief Executive kept 
saying that he did not understand why the Health Directorate should be asking for this fund 
when it receives so much from the Ministry of Health and other donors. For all this time that I 
have been in this Assembly, I have not heard the Chief Executive complain about releasing 
the fund to the Health Directorate. It would interest you to note that the Chief Executive at 
one of my former stations made us all believe that the Health Directorate is one of the 
wealthiest decentralised departments at the districts. He always said that the Health 
Directorates control so much money that the Ministry of Health is not willing to allow the 
implementation of the composite budget by the Assembly [Planning Officer, New Juaben, 18
th
 
Oct., 2008].  
 
I do not have any evidence to suggest that the Ministry of Health is unwilling to support the 
implementation of the composite budget because it does not want to lose control over its 
Health Directorates. However, this appears to be a widely held view among the public in 
Ghana and this perception appears to influence how many Chief Executives work with their 
Health Directors.  With the composite budget system, decentralised departments under the 
Assembly are supposed to harmonise their individual budgets into one main budget to be 
implemented by the Assembly. The composite budget is similar to a “mainstream budget” 
as described by Chikulo (2007: 16) when he showed that line departments did not 
incorporate their budgets into the mainstream budget at the local level in South Africa due 
to incomplete fiscal decentralisation. One implication of implementing a composite budget 
is that the various decentralised departments, such as health, would lose control over their 
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financial resources to the Assembly, which in turn would reduce the Ministry of Health‟s 
control over the Health Directorates. 
 
Although informal ties facilitated the release of the fund from the Municipal Assembly to 
the Health Directorate, which may have contributed to the implementation of HIV and 
AIDS programmes by the Health Directorate, there was evidence that informal relations 
undermined the achievement of beneficial outcomes to the poor. There were practices 
which suggest that the nature of some of the reciprocal exchanges within existing informal 
relations might be considered corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. First of all, two 
influential persons who used to be members of the HIV and AIDS Advisory Committee of 
the New Juaben Municipal Assembly left after about 8 years in the committee to set up 
their own NGOs to provide care and support for PLWAs. In addition to the ethnic ties the 
owners of these NGOs have with key officers in the Assembly their work at the Assembly 
enabled them to establish strong abusua ties in the Assembly and the Health Directorate. In 
fact, one of them has strong old-school ties in the Health Directorate. Furthermore, political 
party ties across leaders of these NGOs, officers in the Health Directorate and executive 
officers at the Assembly were very strong. As compared with other NGOs, these two NGOs 
received substantial support from the Assembly for their programmes. They also received 
tremendous support including training and the supply of resource persons for their 
programmes by the Health Directorate. Therefore even though informal ties enabled them 
to access the fund to undertake HIV and AIDS programmes, both the Assembly and the 
Health Directorate are selective in terms of the support they provide to NGOs mainly due to 
their ties with them. Other NGOs are excluded from these benefits. Secondly, officers in 
both the Assembly and the Health Directorate use public resources, such as official vehicles 
and fuel, to attend private programmes such as funerals, marriages and child naming 
ceremonies organised by people with whom they have ties. It is illegal for public officers to 
use official vehicles at weekends but the rules were ignored because these events that 
officers in New Juaben attend are held on the weekends; again, the uses of public resources 
only benefit a selected few. 
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Unlike New Juaben, there was poor collaboration and coordination between the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly in Techiman. During the eight years under investigation, the 
Health Directorate only received the fund in three 2000, 2001, and 2004 (refer to Table 5). 
The Health Director‟s success rate was only 38%.  Based on the response by the Health 
Directorate staff, I conclude that the Assembly only released the funds to health due to the 
elections in 2000 and 2004. The Chief Executive‟s desire to enhance the chances of his 
party in the elections might have been an incentive for him to commit resources to health. I 
was told by my key informants in the Assembly that the Techiman Municipal Assembly 
was particularly „generous‟ during these two election periods. This assertion supports the 
argument in the literature on neopatrimonialism in African elections that most politicians 
use public resources to advance their political interests (Leonard 2009). Even though access 
to the fund was low, there is evidence to suggest that HIV and AIDS was the top priority 
health issue in Techiman (TMHD 2007; 2006; 2002), and my interviews with officers at the 
Health Directorate and the Assembly also corroborated this fact. One would expect that on 
this basis, the Chief Executive would have collaborated with the Health Director by making 
funds available to him for that cause, or at least the share of the fund as mandated by law. It 
was therefore paradoxical that the Chief Executive did not release the fund to health. 
According to the Health Director:  
When I came here I realised that we needed additional resources to be able to fight this 
disease in Techiman and thought to use allocations from the DACF to supplement whatever 
resources that will come from the Ministry of Health. I also realised from our records that the 
Assembly only gave the money to the department during election periods. But I was not sure 
whether the former officers requested it or not on other occasions because the information I 
came to was scanty. I therefore took the initiative to request it. I made several attempts to get 
this money to work but I have not been successful. I have written a number of letters to the 
Chief Executive to remind him about the money but he would not respond. I know that the 
Assembly will say there is no money so as soon as I hear that the fund has been released to the 
Assemblies then I will send a letter to the Chief Executive. I also follow this up each time I 
attend meetings in the Assembly. In spite of all these efforts I have not been successful. I 
become so frustrated when I write all those letters and I do not receive any response from him. 
There has been a confrontation between us on two occasions. For example, in 2007 when I 
went to his office to ask about the money, he told me that he would not put money into areas 
that would not give him votes. I got angry and left his office and vowed that I would not to go 
to him or ask for any support from him again [Health Director, Techiman Municipal Health 
Directorate, 25
th
 Nov., 2008].  
 
According to another senior officer at the Health Directorate they had made a number of 
attempts to obtain the fund but failed. She explained that the Director informed them at 
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management meetings about the Chief Executive‟s attitude towards him. From the views of 
this senior officer, it was possible to sense frustration in the Health Directorate. She 
intimated that:  
We all know that the fund is a „no go area‟ for the Health Directorate. We do not even think 
about it when we discuss budgets and sources of funds for our programmes, even programmes 
to address HIV and AIDS.  My boss has written so many letters about this fund, and 
sometimes when I find him writing the letters I laugh and tell him that it is a waste of time, 
but he tells me that he would write for it to be on record that he has asked for it. He also tells 
me that he does it because the directives provide that a proportion of the fund is allocated to 
us to do HIV and AIDS related work [senior staff member, Techiman Municipal Health 
Directorate, 24
th
 Nov., 2008].  
 
In the views of another respondent in the Health Directorate, she thought it was of no use 
for the Director to continue to ask for the money from the Assembly when previous 
attempts had failed. According to her, the Chief Executive‟s comments during public 
gatherings about the use of the Assembly‟s financial resources show that he would not have 
welcomed attempts to share it with him. She also indicated that:  
I do not think about the fund when we discuss sources of financial resources for HIV and 
AIDS programmes in this municipality. The Chief Executive will not give it to us save 
election time, and there are no indications that he would give this money to us to work. When 
the director informed us that he had walked out of his office because he said he would only 
put money into projects that could give him votes, I was not surprised. You will not even find 
one letter from the Chief Executive explaining why he cannot give us our share. At least he 
should respond when we make the request. It is very disturbing [a staff member at the Health 
Directorate, Techiman, 24
th
 Nov., 2008].   
 
What is striking to me is that all the attempts made by officers in the Health Directorate to 
get the funds and other forms of support from the Assembly were made through formal 
means such as writing letters. The failure of this approach suggests that reliance on formal 
relations alone might not be adequate to promote collaboration between the Assembly and 
the Health Directorate. This contrasts sharply with the case in New Juaben, where the 
Health Director indicated that he only wrote letters to the Chief Executive as a formality 
and that whenever he needed additional funds, he would first discuss the issue during 
informal meetings with the Chief Executive.  
 
Due to the weak personal relationship between the Health Director and the Chief Executive, 
the existing inadequate formal level of engagement was the only option available for 
officers of the two institutions to engage with each other. An over reliance on formal 
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relations might have facilitated the Chief Executive‟s refusal to reply to the funding 
requests by the Health Director. For the Health Director to be upset and frustrated to the 
extent that he walked out of the office of the Chief Executive suggests that the relationship 
between the two officers was not good. Moreover, this strained relationship filtered down 
to the other officers in both institutions, which seems to have affected other areas of 
development in the municipality. For example, it might have contributed to the delay in the 
completion of a Community Health Planning Services centre at Nkwaeso.
85
 My key 
informants claimed that the project was started by the former National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) Member of Parliament, but he was not able to continue it when he lost the 
elections in 2004. Consequently the community leaders and the Assembly member for the 
Nkwaeso area contacted the Health Directorate to ask the Assembly to complete the project 
for them, but according to my interviewees at the Health Directorate, poor personal 
relationships between officers in the two institutions contributed to undermining any joint 
efforts to get the project completed.  
 
Once again, this case sharply contrasts with the situation in New Juaben where the Health 
Director persuaded the Chief Executive to commit additional resources for the construction 
of the Polyclinic building. What was common to New Juaben and Techiman was that 
informal ties could result in corruption as doubtful practices emerged in Techiman as well. 
The Techiman Municipal Assembly provided financial support to a few selected NGOs 
although that list of NGOs was not made public to elected Assembly members. In spite of 
several appeals made by Assembly members to the MCE for the list to be made available 
and for information of the proportion of the annual health expenditure allocated to these 
NGOs, the MCE would not comply. Most of the Assembly members raised serious 
concerns about this. At the time I conducted the interview a number of Assembly members 
had appealed to the Techiman traditional council to resolve the issue threatening legal 
action against the MCE if he did not cooperate with them within 3 months. The issue of the 
MCE‟s dealings with selected NGOs could also explain the lack of cooperation between 
officers at the Health Directorate and Focal Person for HIV and AIDS at the Assembly. 
                                                 
85
 This is a project that has been abandoned even though it is supposed to serve wide catchment area of 
several villages 
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Information from my key informants, which I corroborated with sources at the Health 
Directorate, the Techiman traditional council, and some Assembly members, suggests that 
the owners of those NGOs have strong party ties with the MCE and that about 60% of their 
time is invested in mobilising support for the MCE who had plans to contest the 
parliamentary election in 2008. In addition to these episodes of corruption, it is worth 
mentioning that the smooth cooperation between the MCE and the Health Directorate in 
New Juaben, and the unwillingness of the MCE to cooperate with the Health Director in 
Techiman appeared to be largely due to the nature of informal ties across these institutions. 
This therefore suggests that cronyism was pervasive in both the New Juaben and Techiman 
cases even though informal ties had a positive influence in New Juaben. 
 
Having analysed access to the DACF, which is a more formal means of collaboration and 
coordination between the two decentralised institutions, I attempt to explore routine 
administrative matters which require day-to-day collaboration between officers in the two 
institutions. 
 
5.7 Collaboration on day-to-day issues  
In all the five cases, collaboration on everyday matters appeared to be strong in the cases 
where there were dense informal networks across the Health Directorates and the 
Assemblies. For example, among the routine administrative activities in both New Juaben 
and Techiman are meetings. In New Juaben these meetings are held on Tuesdays of every 
week. According to the officials from both the Health Directorate and the Assembly, they 
refer to these meetings as „management meetings‟ because all the heads of the various 
decentralised departments and executive officers of the Assembly meet to discuss general 
development issues about the municipality.  
 
My interviews with officials from both institutions revealed that the health officers have 
always attended these meetings which are held on the premises of the Assembly. According 
to a high profile official from the Health Directorate, he attended the management meetings 
all the time because the Health Directorate is part of the Assembly. She added that such 
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meetings provide her with the platform to strengthen working relationship between the 
Health Directorate and the Assembly, and also with heads of the other decentralised 
departments. She indicated that: 
 
I do not like to be absent at such meetings. I ensure that someone from our office will 
attend if I have to be away from Koforidua for other reasons. Health affects every aspects 
of development so attending the meetings regularly enables us to understand what is going 
on in the other departments as far as health issues are concerned. This helps us to develop 
appropriate programmes together with the other departments. Overall, the meetings help to 
strengthen our working relationships (High profile officer, New Juaben Municipal Health 
Directorate, 2
nd
 May, 2012). 
 
Although I could not obtain all the files for the management meetings mainly due to poor 
record keeping by Assembly officials, the minutes available for the past three years show 
that officers at the Health Directorate attended the meetings.  
 
In Techiman, I did not find enough evidence to suggest that the health officers were regular 
at the management meetings which were held on Mondays. The minutes from the 
management meetings for the past three years that were available show that attendance rate 
by health officers was once in every month or two as compared with once in every week at 
New Juaben. 
 
The views of one of the health officers about the management meetings give a good picture 
about why health officers fail to attend the meetings on regular basis. She explained it as 
follows: 
 
Discussions at the meetings are taken over by issues that seek to advance the cause of the 
party in power rather than the development of the municipality. I see it as a waste of time 
because no matter what you say at the meeting, someone or a group of people have already 
made up their mind (Health officer, Techiman, 5
th
 May, 2012). 
 
These comments further confirm the poor working relationship between the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly in Techiman. They also contribute to explain what one of the 
health officers referred to as “tension” between him and the MCE which caused him to 
walk out of the MCE‟s office and vowed never to go to that office again. 
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Other activities such as sanitation and health campaigns and malaria control programmes 
(especially targeted at pregnant women and children) also bring health officers to 
collaborate with the officers at the Assemblies. According to the Assembly officials, these 
programmes require the request for the use of the Assembly‟s vehicles by health officers 
on daily basis. The process is that health officers would write to the Assembly to ask for a 
vehicle. The vehicle has to be signed for by the health officer in the morning and after the 
day‟s work, the officer will have to sign and return the vehicle. 
 
I found that these processes were not followed strictly in New Juaben yet the health 
officers had access to the vehicles without any difficulty. When I asked about files which 
should have letters showing how the vehicles were released to the health officers, I only 
found a couple of such letters. There was no information which shows that health officers 
signed for the vehicles in the morning and in the evening after work. 
 
In the case of Techiman, health officials indicated that there was no need to make such a 
request to the Assembly because the MCE would not cooperate to release the vehicle to 
them. This response agrees with earlier responses that they gave in an answer to how they 
collaborate with the Assembly around the DACF. It appears that collaboration was not 
only weak around the DACF but also on more routine everyday matters in Techiman as 
compared with New Juaben. 
 
In the forgoing discussions I explained the nature of collaboration and coordination 
between the two institutions and I gave evidence to support the case that in both New 
Juaben and Techiman, the kind of informal ties influence the relationship between the 
Assembly and the Health Directorate. However, the argument in this chapter, that informal 
relations may play an important role in how the two institutions worked together, and the 
explanations advanced, raises the question of alternative explanatory factors. These are 
addressed in the next section. 
 
163 
 
 
 
5.8 Competing explanatory factors 
 
Even though informal ties are important, a number of alternative explanatory factors 
emerge that cannot be overlooked. Among these factors, those that were employed by 
Grindle (2007a) in her work in Mexico seem relevant to the current study. The first is 
political competition at the local level. When Chief Executives are faced with competitive 
elections and opposition parties have the chance to unseat incumbent Chief Executives, 
there is an incentive for Chief Executives to perform well by being responsive to citizens‟ 
needs. Perhaps this is why most citizens push for electoral politics at the local level in 
Ghana so that they can elect their Chief Executives and have District Assemblies run on a 
party basis. This might not apply to my cases since Chief Executives are appointed so 
citizens struggle to influence who becomes the Chief Executive or to remove a non 
performing Chief Executive. However, there were instances when local people were able to 
influence the removal of a Chief Executive. An example is the case in Obuasi where elected 
Assembly members mobilised and put pressure on the president of Ghana to remove their 
Chief Executive in 2007; this is very unusual in the country. As a result I cannot conclude 
that Chief Executives in my cases are pressurised to release the fund to the Health Directors 
by elected officials. 
 
The second factor suggested by Grindle (2007a) is public sector modernisation in terms of 
capacity development and service delivery systems. According to Grindle (2007a), 
performance by local authorities can vary when there are differences in capacity of public 
officers. In the current study, capacity can play a significant role. I might explain capacity 
in terms of the knowledge of the Chief Executives and the Health Directors for whom the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Ministry of Health organise 
joint workshops. On the basis of this, I would conclude that they are aware of the 
regulations applying to the way in which the District Assembly system should function. 
However, it appears that the Municipal Health Director in New Juaben had an 
understanding of the weaknesses in the law so he employed informal relations to overcome 
them and work with the Municipal Chief Executive. Grindle (2007a) also suggested that 
when there are variations in how the service delivery system is restructured through 
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privatisation or contract arrangements, the service delivery itself can be affected although 
this might not be enough to explain my findings. According to the current arrangements, 
the Health Directorate is one of the decentralised departments of the Assembly so their 
mandate and function as deconcentrated agents of the Ministry of Health are the same. 
 
The third factor is state entrepreneurship. Grindle (2007a) further suggests that local 
governments can perform differently based on the behaviour of public officials in terms of 
their initiative, drive, ideas, and innovations around the promotion of policy from initiation 
through to implementation. This might explain the variations in performance in my cases. 
For example, in New Juaben the personal attitudes of officers in the two institutions played 
a significant role in how they work together. 
 
The fourth factor is civil society engagement.  According to Grindle (2007a) this is the 
ability of local people to mobilise and hold public officials accountable for how public 
resources are utilised. In situations where citizens demand better services from public 
officers, it can put pressure on public officers to be responsive. Again, the extent to which 
citizens play an active role in the policy process through to implementation and monitoring 
of policy can affect how local governments perform. In the current study this might be 
important. It is possible that citizens mobilise and influence how the Health Directorates 
and Assemblies collaborate; I will discuss this in Chapter 7. 
 
In addition to the factors outlined by Grindle (2007a), there are five other factors that might 
be worth considering as possible explanatory factors. The first is the relative importance of 
the hierarchical relationships between the Health Directorates and central government 
(Ministry of Health). Some scholars might argue that if a particular Health Directorate 
receives the bulk of its funds from the Ministry of Health then it might not need to maintain 
good informal relationships with the Assembly to enhance its chances of receiving funds 
and other support from the Assembly. The opposite might also be true. Nevertheless, my 
analysis of central government releases of funds to the Health Directors and in depth 
interviews with officers at the Health Directorates revealed that even though this can be 
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important, it might not be adequate to explain why New Juaben maintained good informal 
ties or why Techiman failed to do so.  The analysis of per capita central government 
transfers to the Health Directorates in Figure 14 reveals that between 2000 and 2005, 
Techiman received the lowest per capita transfer among all the cases (see Table 15 in 
Appendix O), whilst between 2001 and 2005, New Juaben and Obuasi were the highest 
recipients. Again, between 2007 and 2008, receipts by Techiman were comparatively lower 
than New Juaben and Obuasi even though its receipt was higher than Ho and Sunyani.  
 
 
Figure 14: Per capita central government transfers to cases (GH ¢) 
Source: Author’s construct, July 2010
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As Techiman‟s receipts were low on average when compared with the other cases, one 
would expect that Techiman should choose to maintain strong ties with the Assembly to 
obtain its support, whilst cases such as New Juaben may lose interest in maintaining strong 
ties with the Assembly but this was not the case. 
 
The second issue is the high prevalence of the disease, which could be a reason for Chief 
Executives to commit more resources to HIV and AIDS programmes. In this study all five 
cases had a high prevalence of HIV and AIDS. New Juaben and Obuasi both released funds 
to the Health Directorate which one might expect but the Chief Executive in Techiman did 
not follow suit, there was no evidence of the Chief Executive‟s commitment to fighting the 
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disease. Evidently the high prevalence of HIV and AIDS does not explain why DACF 
releases are made. 
 
The third factor that may have contributed to the variation in my cases, is the pressure 
brought to bear on the Chief Executive of New Juaben for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
Eastern Regional Minister initiated a programme to create awareness in the New Juaben 
Municipality which promoted voluntary counselling and testing for HIV over a period of 5 
years (from 2003 to 2008) among residents in Asokore (a suburb of the Municipality). This 
is credited with the rise in the number of residents going for voluntary counselling and 
testing services (Ghana News Agency 2010g). In the views of my respondents, the project 
was successful. Secondly, as the New Juaben municipality is also the Eastern Regional 
capital, it has been the venue for a chain of high profile sensitisation meetings and 
workshops to discuss the issue of the use of funds for HIV and AIDS at the district level. 
One such series of workshops was organised by the Eastern Regional HIV and AIDS 
Committee, which has shown strong interest in how funds for HIV and AIDS were utilised. 
This workshop was organised in response to a wave of complaints raised by HIV and AIDS 
Focal persons and NGOs across the country, and receiving extensive media coverage, 
which alleged the Chief Executives did not comply with directives to release the funds for 
the HIV and AIDS programmes. The workshops appealed to the Chief Executives to 
release funds for HIV and AIDS (Ghana News Agency 2010f; Ghana News Agency 
2010h).
86
 It is possible that these indirect forms of pressure encouraged the Chief Executive 
to act and the consequences included the release of the DACF to health and making 
additional funds available for HIV and AIDS programmes. This assumption might be 
plausible as there were similar findings in Obuasi and Sunyani. For example, in Obuasi, the 
activities of AngloGold Ashanti appeared to put pressure on the Chief Executive to commit 
funds to HIV and AIDS programmes (Ghana News Agency 2010o).
87
 Similarly, in the 
Sunyani Municipality, the sister-city relationship between the Assembly and Regional 
                                                 
86 A similar workshop was organised for the Parliamentary Press Corps by the Administrator of the Common 
Fund who noted that some Assemblies may have concealed figures or mixed them up deliberately to avoid 
being penalised in the event of wrongful utilisation of the fund. 
87
 AngloGold Ashanti is the largest gold mining company in Ghana and is located in Obuasi. 
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District of Nanaimo in Canada might equally have contributed to the Chief Executive‟s 
release of funds to the Health Directorate to show the Regional District in Nanaimo that the 
Sunyani Municipal Assembly is a credible institution with which to be in partnership. The 
Chief Executive might also have done that to promote the good image of the municipality.
88
 
 
The fourth possible factor would be party ties. Even though the Health Directors, as civil 
servants, are not supposed to publicly declare their party affiliation, my key informants 
suggested that one reason why Chief Executives would get on well with their Health 
Directors could be party networks. The possible influence of political party ties is 
evidenced from strong party connections between the Health Directors and the Municipal 
Chief Executives. 
 
The fifth issue consists of the priorities of the Municipal Assemblies. These can drive their 
development budget allocations, and the utilisation of the DACF which might explain why 
the Assemblies in Techiman and Ho would flout central government directives for the 
allocation of the DACF. It is common to hear MCEs complain that the directives 
undermine their authority and ability to utilise the DACF in line with their local priorities. 
This could explain why the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry 
of Local Government are unable to take action against MCEs who do not comply with the 
law. Their non-compliance with the law might not signify they are unwilling to collaborate 
and coordinate their efforts with the Health Directorate, it could simply be a sign that they 
wish to make efficient use of their meagre resources. 
 
Although these alternative explanations and a number of other factors cannot be 
disregarded, I would conclude that generally, good informal relations are likely to eliminate 
conditions of suspicion that may strain the formal relations between the Chief Executive 
and the Health Director such as we find in Figures 10, 11, and 12. Based on the views of 
both officers of the Health Directorate and Assembly I suggest that informal ties might play 
an important role in how the two institutions collaborate. To further increase our 
                                                 
88
 Sunyani municipality has the image of the cleanest city in Ghana. It won the Ghana tourism award for the 
cleanest city in 2006 and 2007. 
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understanding of how informal ties shape the formal relationships between the two 
institutions, I will explore the types of informal ties that existed between the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly. 
 
5.9 Informal ties in New Juaben and Techiman 
 
Unlike other forms of informal ties in over 80 percent of all the interviews across both 
institutions, the respondents were unwilling to disclose their political affiliations, or admit 
that political party ties influenced how they work. However, I had evidence to suggest that 
about 70 percent of my respondents in New Juaben have strong political party ties. With 
respect to other ties the former Health Director had ethnic and old-school ties with the 
Chief Executive; and he had ethnic and abusua ties with the Municipal Coordinating 
Director. He also had abusua ties with the Planning Officer. According to the Health 
Director at the time of my research, before he took over he had been the Municipal 
Pharmacist for over 8 years. During this period, he established abusua ties with the Chief 
Executive. He added that the Planning Officer was his friend at school and they have 
established abusua relations as a result of them being in Koforidua together. He said:  
As the Municipal Pharmacist, I worked closely with the then Health Director. As a result I 
know most of the key people who were his friends and in his networks. These persons include 
the Chief Executive and other key officers in the Assembly. All these officers have also 
become my personal friends. The Chief Executive and the Coordinating Director and I are 
Ashantis. I see these officers at least twice in a week. For the past five years, our programmes 
around HIV and AIDS have made my personal relations with the Coordinating Director very 
strong. It is an issue we talk about each time we meet. I also know the Planning Officer very 
well. If you ask him he would tell you. We have been friends for about 30 years. We were in 
graduate school in the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. We have maintained friendship ties 
till today. Even before he was transferred to Koforidua we were in touch and we met 
regularly. His coming to Koforidua has further strengthened our relationship [Health Director, 
New Juaben, 23
rd
 Oct., 2008]. 
 
The Coordinating Director also confirmed that he and the Health Director had ethnic 
relations and that in addition to this they supported each other socially as good neighbours 
would do. He explained that:  
We all come from here and my village is not far from that of the Health Director‟s. But the 
most important thing these days in Ghana is that the people you work with become your 
neighbours because you tend to seek for support from them and you in turn provide them with 
support when the need arises. So the Health Director and I have been doing this for a long 
time now. Talk about support during funerals, church programmes or weddings etc. Since 
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2004 or so, the senior officers at the Health Directorate are those I contacted when I needed 
any help that is not official [Coordinating Director, New Juaben, 18
th
 Oct., 2008]. 
 
The existence of ethnic ties, abusua relations, and old-school ties between the Health 
Director and the executive officers of the Assembly was further corroborated by the 
Municipal Planning Officer. He explained that:  
I have known Mr. Boateng for over 20 years. We were mates in school in the former Soviet 
Union so since we came back to Ghana, we have kept our friendship. We have always been in 
touch and we met regularly even when I was working in other districts. But our friendship has 
become stronger and our meetings have become more regular since I was transferred to 
Koforidua. I am also aware that he has good relations with the Chief Executive and the 
Coordinating Director. All these relations make it easy for us to work together. Sometimes 
things are done before the letters follow, you know what I mean. But other officers such as the 
Deputy Director of Nursing Services and the Disease Control Officer also come here 
regularly. We attend funerals and other social activities together. We see ourselves as a family 
or abusua here in Koforidua. We support one another in various ways [Planning Officer, New 
Juaben, 18
th
 Oct., 2008].  
 
The findings from the various discussions with officers in the Health Directorate and the 
Assembly suggest that the Health Directorate was well integrated into the Assembly and 
that informal channels were a comparatively important space for engagement by officers in 
the two institutions. The Health Director was more interested in emphasising the use of 
personal ties to get to the Assembly than the formal level of interaction and engagement. In 
the same way, the Coordinating Director and the Planning Officer were equally enthusiastic 
about how they related to the Health Director and his team on an informal level rather than 
on a formal level.  
 
In all their responses, with the exception of the Coordinating Director, none of them made 
any mention of the formal provisions such as Act 462 or Act 525 as the reason for their 
collaboration with the Health Directorate. From the views expressed by the Coordinating 
Director, one can see that his indication of him being on the same page as the Health 
Director with regard to HIV and AIDS was influenced by attitudes of respect and the 
behaviour of the Health Director. Under such circumstances it is most likely that trust can 
eliminate any suspicion that might arise.  
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If I compare the kinds of informal ties I observed in New Juaben with those in Techiman, I 
find that informal ties in Techiman were indeed weak (refer to Table 4 in Chapter 4). Out of 
the three informal ties that I considered, three officers at the Health Directorate had ethnic 
and abusua ties with only one officer at the Assembly, the Coordinating Director (see Table 
2 in Chapter 3). Similarly, political party connections between officers in the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly were weak. Conversely, the Municipal Chief Executive had 
strong party ties with over 60% of leaders of NGOs. This might explain why only a few 
selected NGOs received funding from the Assembly. Generally, the picture of informal ties 
between the two institutions might be summarised by the Health Director‟s description of 
his relationship with the Chief Executive: 
The relationship between me and the Chief Executive cannot be described as the best one. I 
thought the fact that HIV and AIDS is a big issue in Techiman could bring us to work together 
but it is not so. I told you I got angry and left his office because of his attitudes towards me 
about the Common Fund issue [Health Director, Techiman, 26
th
 Nov., 2008]. 
 
A manifestation of the weak informal ties was the confrontation in 2007 between the Health 
Director and the Chief Executive about the fund, and the refusal by officers in the Health 
Directorate to release the voluntary counselling and testing kits to the Focal Person for HIV 
and AIDS at the Assembly. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown that informal ties can contribute to explaining how different 
decentralised authorities collaborate and coordinate programmes implementing health 
policy in Ghana. I have demonstrated that structural problems which result from conflicts in 
the provisions in Act 462 and Act 525 can be overcome when good informal relations exist 
between officers of the Health Directorate who work under a deconcentrated mandate and 
their counterparts at the devolved Municipal Assembly. The role played by informal 
relations in facilitating the allocation of the DACF by the Assembly to the Health 
Directorate cannot be overemphasised.  
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These effects of informal ties, which are influenced strongly by political party affiliations, 
raise ambiguities about the significane of political party ties. On the one hand, political 
party ties help to channel public resources along partisan lines which implies that those who 
are outside of such networks might not have access to those resources. This way, we might 
conclude that patron-client relations and for that matter neo-patrimonialism undermines 
effective use of public resources. On the other hand, channelling funds along partisan 
networks help to make resources available to clients (Health Directors in this case) from 
patrons (MCEs), and such resources might enable the Health Directors to implement more 
programmes that can benefit the poor granting that the Health Directors would do so. If this 
is the case then we might conclude that it is a positive outcome of neo-patrimonialism. 
 
Even though informal ties can produce positive outcomes, they may result in corruption and 
nepotism, which can undermine the implementation of not only HIV and AIDS 
programmes but the delivery of other basic services. These findings are supported by other 
scholars who have shown that at the local level, the relationships between the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly are “quite often fluid” and are mainly informal. Given that 
other decentralised departments also compete for funds from the Municipal Assemblies, 
one‟s “success in receiving an allocation [of funds] depends on … individual lobbying 
ability” (Mayhew 2003: 79), which has the potential to both promote and undermine the 
delivery of services to the poor. 
 
So far I have focused the discussion of collaboration and coordination between the Health 
Directorate and the Assembly on senior officers so the conclusions I draw on the 
performance of the Health Directorate are based on ties between the highest ranking 
officers. The impression that one might gain from this chapter is that it is only ties between 
senior officers that matter, but the relationship between the Health Directorate and the 
Assembly goes beyond senior officers in health and executive officers of the Assembly. 
Depending on the issue in hand, the role of other members of the Assembly can also be 
important. Officers in the Health Directorate might also need good informal ties with 
Assembly members to be able to efficiently coordinate their programmes with the 
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Assembly in order to win public support. As we have seen in this chapter, the existence of 
informal ties can be counterproductive; they can bring cronyism, patronage and ethnicity to 
the workplace. One way to minimise these weaknesses might be to broaden networks to 
make decision making more transparent. This is when extending informal ties to cover 
Assembly members might help and this will be the focus of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Consultation with elected representatives: the realities 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The activities of Municipal Assemblies in Ghana are heavily politicised and characterised 
by collusion and corruption. Act 462 empowers the president of Ghana to appoint the 
Municipal Chief Executive and 30 percent of the members of the Assemblies. These 
appointees often seek to promote the interests of their party at the local level rather than 
providing for needs of local citizens (Crawford 2010). In this chapter I compare New 
Juaben and Sunyani Municipalities and argue that expansion of informal ties between 
officers of the Municipal Health Directorates (MHDs) and elected Assembly members can 
facilitate the consultation of Assembly members by health staff. This can increase 
transparency and minimise corrupt practices associated with informal relations in the 
coordination of HIV and AIDS programmes. It can also limit the weaknesses of heavy 
politicisation of Municipal Assembly programmes. 
 
Although coordination of programmes between decentralised departments and the 
Municipal Assemblies (MAs) may appear easy to achieve, empirical evidence from the 
current study suggests that in practice, it can be difficult. This is particularly so when such 
programmes do not directly promote the agenda of the party in power and the personal 
political ambitions of the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE). In addition, many Assembly 
members might not support the coordination of programmes unless those programmes 
bring development to their electoral areas and promote their political ambitions. One of the 
implications of weak coordination of programmes is that it can undermine efforts to 
achieve responsiveness even though the decentralisation programme is expected to lead to 
more responsive governance outcomes (Smith 1985). As far as the implementing of HIV 
and AIDS policy in Ghana is concerned, the coordination of programmes at sub-national 
level can be shaped by the politicisation of the Assembly. However, it appears that the 
ability of the MHD to expand its informal networks to include elected members of the 
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Assembly can help the Health Director to overcome the weaknesses attributable to the party 
politics in the Assembly, increase transparency, and achieve increased involvement of 
Assembly members in the design and implementation of HIV and AIDS activities.  
 
In Health Directorates, such as New Juaben, where health officers had good informal ties 
with both executive members and elected Assembly members, they were able to minimise 
the weaknesses of central government interference. They were also able to coordinate their 
HIV and AIDS programmes with their MAs by pushing their programmes into the 
Assemblies‟ priority list through increased consultation of Assembly members.  
 
When informal ties are strong with only executive officers but weak with elected Assembly 
members, they are unlikely to be effective tools that can be employed to overcome the 
negative impacts of party politics in health care decisions. In such cases the MCE may be 
able to push his personal and party agenda through the Assembly (especially when the party 
and MHD agendas conflict) rather than the Assembly responding to the needs of the wider 
population. Sunyani was one such case. Politicisation of the Assembly was also present in 
New Juaben, but the difference between New Juaben and Sunyani was that the staff at the 
New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate were able to establish good informal links with 
the Assembly through both the executive officers and elected Assembly members which 
appeared to neutralise, or at least minimise, the potential negative effects of how the 
Assembly was politicised. In the Sunyani case the Health Directorate‟s strong ties with 
only the elected Assembly members made it difficult for the officers to use the Assembly 
members to push health programmes through the Assembly. The inability of the elected 
Assembly members to influence policy in the Assembly suggests citizens‟ were unable to 
make the Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate and the Assembly adequately respond to 
their needs as far as HIV and AIDS issues are concerned. 
 
Advancing my argument in this chapter, I contribute to the debate surrounding citizens‟ 
participation and representative democracy in the governance process supporting the 
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argument in the literature that electing representatives to the Assembly might not be enough 
to guarantee that they can promote the needs of citizens. 
 
I organise the chapter into eight sections. Following this introduction, in section two, I 
explain the main criticisms of the District Assembly system in Ghana. In section three I 
describe the steps taken by officers in New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate and those 
in Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate to overcome the weaknesses of party politics in 
the Assembly. This will be followed by section four where I will show that the ability of 
health staff in New Juaben to overcome the influences of party politics enabled them to 
push HIV and AIDS programmes into the Assembly‟s budget. The example of Sunyani will 
be used to illustrate a case where coordination was more difficult to achieve. I then discuss 
competing explanatory factors to the differences in the findings between New Juaben and 
Sunyani. After this, I describe how officers in the Health Directorates and the Assemblies 
were informally connected in the two municipalities which may explain the achievement by 
the Health Directorate in New Juaben and the failure of the Health Directorate in Sunyani. 
In section seven I describe the challenges that might affect how elected Assembly members 
perform. The conclusion to the chapter is in section eight. 
  
6.2 Politicisation of Ghana’s District Assembly system 
 
Most advocates of devolution argue that elected representation can provide channels for 
citizens to influence decisions that affect their lives (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Conyers 2007; 
Ayee 2008a; Republic of Ghana 1993b; 1996a). The interference in the affairs of local 
authorities by central government through the appointment of key officers has been heavily 
criticised in the literature as one of the factors that explain the failure of decentralisation in 
many developing countries especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Crook 1994; Crook and 
Manor 1998; Conyers 2007; Robinson 2007a; 2007b; Ayee 1995; 2008b).  
 
In Ghana, the appointments of one-third of members of the District Assembly and the 
Municipal Chief Executive by the President have been criticised as undermining the 
democratic and non-partisan objectives of the local government and decentralisation 
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programme.
89
 Election of all the Assembly members and the MCE has been advocated as 
an alternative. For example, according to Agyeman-Duah (2005), in spite of approximately 
two decades of decentralising to local governments in Ghana, the process has been 
undermined as a result of the inadequate participation of citizens and the lack of 
accountability of local government officials. There appears to be an assumption in the 
literature that democracy can be effective when all the Assembly members, including the 
MCEs, are elected. Citizens will be able to hold public officers accountable by rewarding 
those who perform well with votes to retain them or voting out non-performing ones. 
Nevertheless, we do not know whether, in practice, current elected Assembly members are 
able to influence the governance process, to justify the election of all Assembly members.  
 
The criticisms of Ghana‟s decentralisation system seem justified. The decentralisation 
programme is expected to be non-partisan yet the President‟s appointments provide him 
with strong party influence and control over the Assemblies. There are also claims that 
various political parties sponsor the election of Assembly members.
90
 As noted by 
Agyeman-Duah (2005: 1):  
Under both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), 
Ghanaians have behaved like the ostrich, pretending not to see that political parties do sponsor 
members of the Assembly and DCEs/MCEs, and the 30 percent of the President‟s appointees 
to the Assembly are party members. 
  
The decentralisation programme was expected to enable citizens to participate in decisions 
affecting their lives but this does not appear to have happened. In the current study, the 
findings suggest that some Municipal Health Directorates (such as New Juaben) were able 
to overcome the negative effects of central government interferences in the business of the 
Assemblies whilst others such as Sunyani could not. This is the subject of the next section.  
 
                                                 
89
 The Chief Executive is nominated by the President and approved by two-thirds of members of the 
Assembly present and voting. In some cases, the Assemblies did reject the President‟s nomination. 
90
 It is interesting to note that senior politicians themselves acknowledge that the non-partisanship of the 
Assemblies is a charade and an exercise in self-deception. For example, the Former President John Kufuor 
and Former Attorney General (now Presidential candidate of the NPP) openly acknowledge this (Ayee 
2008b). 
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6.3 Overcoming the weaknesses of party politics in the Assembly 
  
The New Juaben Municipal Health Directorate managed to overcome party politics issues 
in the Assembly to coordinate and harmonise programmes with the Assembly. New Juaben 
is one of the cases in which the Health Director had access to the District Assemblies‟ 
Common Fund. It is interesting to ask why in the same municipality health staff were able 
to harmonise their programmes with the Assembly and get the Assembly to fund additional 
projects. According to the staff at the Health Directorate, each time they wanted to push 
programmes into the Assembly budget, they would have informal meetings with the 
Assembly members in their villages and electoral areas to discuss the issue and win their 
support prior to Assembly meetings. One of them explained how this was done: 
Sometimes when we discuss issues with senior officers at the Assembly, what they say is that 
once we get the support of the Assembly members then the job is half way done. Since we 
have established good friendship ties with them, we take the opportunity to discuss why we 
would like them to support our programmes by forwarding the projects to the Assembly as if 
it was their initiative. If you take the Polyclinic project for example, we just phoned and called 
them and told them about it. We agreed to meet and we all met one weekend to discuss the 
issue. It was during that meeting that we got their support. For the programmes to support 
condoms, setting up Voluntary Counselling and Testing, and training of health staff, we met 
them sometimes in a group and at other times we met them individually in their electoral areas 
to discuss and lobby them. Once we got some of the Assembly members to support us, we had 
separate discussions with the chairpersons of the Social Services Sub-Committee and Finance 
and Administration Sub-Committee as well. Having done all these then we know that our 
programmes would go through the sub-committee stage to the Executive Committee which 
we would have handled already so the programmes finally appear on the agenda for the 
General Assembly [A staff at the Health Directorate, 15
th
 October, 2009]. 
 
According to another staff member of the Health Directorate they used this approach to get 
funding for other programmes from the Assembly. Most elected Assembly members prefer 
physical projects that are visible which will help them in re-election so to get their support 
for non-physical projects usually requires more than formal working relationships with 
them. I got the impression that the ability of the staff at the Health Directorate to connect 
directly with elected Assembly members made a huge difference. One of the staff from the 
Health Directorate explained that:  
We invite the Assembly members who are our friends to our end of year parties and also to 
private parties we organise at home. We also attend their private parties during Christmas 
and New Year. We always praise them for the support they give us each time we have the 
opportunity to do so in public during durbars whether they are there or not. As we do all 
these, it makes it easier for us to receive their support when we need it [A staff at the Health 
Directorate, New Juaben, 15
th
 October, 2009].  
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This type of story did not emerge in the Health Directorate in Sunyani even 
though I asked them specifically about these.  
 
Senior officers of the Municipal Assembly and elected Assembly members supported the 
claims that were made by officers at the Health Directorate. According to most of the 
officers of the Assembly, the Assembly had a lot to do with limited resources. As a result 
lobbying by heads of decentralised departments to get Assembly members to push for their 
programmes in the Assembly was beneficial.  
 
The strategy that the Health Director and his officers employed to lobby Assembly 
members included inviting Assembly members to speak at public gatherings and parties. 
All the Assembly members I interviewed noted that the Health Director acknowledged and 
showed appreciation to Assembly members each time they did things to promote health in 
their electoral areas.
91
 Publicly applauding Assembly members for promoting the 
collective interest of their communities helped to achieve more. This echoes what Tsai 
(2007) described as moral standing which local communities in China extend to public 
officers who promote the interest of the larger community. 
 
This indicates that the existence of good informal ties can facilitate successful lobbying 
and explains why officers at the Health Directorate were more successful in obtaining the 
support of Assembly members. The support of Assembly members helped the Health 
Director to win the support of the Chief Executive during the period that he lobbied the 
Chief Executive prior to debates around those projects in the Assembly. The Chief 
Executive‟s reaction influenced how the Presiding Member steered the debates which 
subsequently led to those projects being approved for funding.
92
  
                                                 
91
 Alhaji Alhassan was presented with two citations for his role in encouraging the people in his electoral area 
to register for the National Health Insurance Scheme. According my key informants the Health Director was 
very instrumental in this award (see Appendix M). 
92
 The Presiding Member as the Speaker of the Assembly is elected from among the members of the District 
Assembly. In most cases a member of the ruling party wins such office. But I found instances in Obuasi and 
New Juaben where the party in government (NDC) and the main opposition party (NPP) negotiated. Members 
of the opposition party accepted to approve the President‟s nominee for the office of chief executive. In return 
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In contrast to the case in New Juaben where both the Health Director and the MCE belong 
to the same political party, the Health Director and MCE in Sunyani belong to different 
political parties (refer to Table 2 in Chapter 3). Their relationship was affected by the 
personal political ambitions of the Chief Executive, Presiding Member, and most Assembly 
members which resulted in instances of personality clashes among the Chief Executive, 
Presiding member, and Assembly members.  The Chief Executive sought to hinder the 
Assembly members he perceived as threats to his personal ambition to become member for 
parliament, and also push the agenda of his party in the municipality. All the elected 
Assembly members said they were unable to influence decisions at the Assembly due to the 
Municipal Chief Executive‟s manipulation of Assembly business. Consequently, citizens 
did not seem to adequately participate in health care decisions in the Sunyani Municipality. 
According to one of the Assembly members: 
The MCE has managed to get his people to be chairpersons of the important sub-committees. 
These Sub-committee chairpersons therefore work for the MCE such that issues that the MCE 
does not like would not pass through to the Executive Committee for consideration and then 
brought to the general Assembly for deliberation. Since these sub-committee chairpersons are 
in the Executive Committee, it makes it easier for the MCE to determine what happens. There 
are so many instances when we asked in the General Assembly about issues that came up at 
sub-committee level but never appeared in the agenda for Assembly meetings. Discussions in 
the Assembly follow the agenda for the day and the agenda is set by the Executive Committee 
which is chaired by the MCE. Once the agenda is exhausted the business of the day ends and 
nothing can be done about it. The main objective has been to push the party‟s agenda and to 
ensure that the party maintains its popularity at the grassroots. As a result issues which came 
to the general assembly for discussion ended up to be those that promote the party‟s agenda 
[Elected Assembly member, Sunyani, 5
th
 May, 2009].  
 
Over 80 percent of the Assembly members claimed that they were scared of the Chief 
Executive because he could cause them to lose their seats. As one of them explained:  
Since 2000, the MCE funded the campaigns of my opponent to contest the elections against 
me. Unfortunately for him, my people like me so each time they vote for me that is why I have 
been in the Assembly for all the three terms. On one occasion, my opponent came to inform me 
about it. A number of people also came to inform me that the MCE had brought money to be 
shared for people to vote for my opponent. They told me that they would take the money but 
they would not vote for him. About 5 Assembly members have been victims and they all lost 
their seats. Three of them are women [Assembly member, Sunyani, 5 May, 2009]. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
for this, members of the ruling party also voted for a member of the opposition party for the office of 
Presiding member. 
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The MCE had the power to push the party‟s agenda due to his party ties and the support of 
the one-third of members of the Assembly who are government appointees. He also 
sponsored about 10 party members to contest the District Assembly elections in 2006 and 6 
of them won giving him substantial support from the elected Assembly members. He also 
got his party member elected as the Presiding Member of the Assembly. All these steps 
made it easier for him to push his agenda through in the Assembly even when some 
members strongly opposed his decisions. 
 
Similar to the New Juaben case, the Presiding Member also played an important role in 
Sunyani where he supported the MCE on most issues. This effectively limited the 
opportunity for elected Assembly members to influence decisions if they might oppose the 
Chief Executive‟s agenda. As the Standing Orders provide, the Assembly members are 
supposed to „catch the eye‟ of the Speaker of the Assembly (the Presiding Member) and it 
appeared that he used this provision to the advantage of the Chief Executive.
93
 According 
to about 80 percent of the elected Assembly members, the Presiding Member decided not to 
„see‟ those members who opposed the agenda set by the Chief Executive.  Based on events 
during the Assembly meeting, it appears the way in which the Presiding Member (PM) 
steers the meeting shapes the outcome as the Assembly members who were known to be 
vocal and opposed the Chief Executive were not „seen‟ by the PM even though they raised 
their hands and sometimes called out the PM‟s name to draw his attention.94 It serves to 
explain why the Health Director in New Juaben lobbied Assembly members and the 
Presiding member. Two examples of projects where the PM used this strategy to support 
the Chief Executive‟s agenda are given below. The first case was narrated by one of the 
Assembly members: 
The MCE was able to cause the Municipal Assembly to commit an amount of 150,000 Ghana 
Cedis to supplement an electrification project (street lights) some three months before the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2008. He insisted that the 350,000 Ghana Cedis 
which the central government had brought for the electrification project was inadequate and 
that he needed the 150,000 Ghana Cedis to pay for labour cost. Most Assembly members 
opposed this. We suggested that the 150,000 Ghana Cedis should rather be used to complete 
an office for the National Health Insurance Scheme which was about 60 per cent complete 
and had been abandoned for lack of funds for the NHIS to move in. We argued that this would 
                                                 
93
 Catching the eye of the Speaker means you should be able to attract his attention. 
94
 They were Hon. Raphael Cubagee; Hon. Stephen Agyekum; Hon. Evelyn Kumi Richardson. 
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save the Assembly from paying the exorbitant rent for the office which had been rented for 
the NHIS. In spite of our opposition to this, the MCE was able to push this agenda through 
when it came to voting because the Presiding member refused to see the several of us who 
raised our hands to oppose the motion [Elected Assembly member, Sunyani, 5
th
 May, 2009]. 
 
In the second example, all the 5 government appointees informed me that between 2000 
and 2004 and between 2007 and 2008, the award of contracts for the construction of two 
clinics and one health centre met heavy opposition in the Assembly because there were 
procedural issues involved that the contract award process did not follow. The Presiding 
member refused „to see‟ those who opposed the motion which was eventually carried 
through.  
 
All the Assembly members indicated their frustration in the Assembly as their views did 
not reflect in the Assemblies‟ programmes. They noted that they saw themselves as „rubber 
stamps‟ in the Assembly to only vote to endorse agendas that were aimed at promoting the 
political aims of the party in power.  
 
The Chief Executive‟s control over the Assembly seemed to undermine the powers of 
Assembly members. Whilst it was comparatively easy for health staff in New Juaben to use 
Assembly members to get programmes into the Assembly‟s budgets, it was difficult for the 
Health Director and his staff in Sunyani to do the same.  
 
6.4 The success in New Juaben and the failure in Sunyani 
 
During the period under study, between 20 per cent and 25 per cent of the New Juaben 
Municipal Assembly‟s annual budget for HIV and AIDS went to programmes that 
originated from the Health Directorate. For example, according to the Second Medium 
Term Development Plan that was being implemented at the time of my research, out of the 
18 programmes that were being implemented by the Assembly, three of them had come 
from the Health Directorate attracting about 25 per cent of funds meant for HIV and AIDS 
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programmes (NJMA 2006).
95
 This appears unusual when compared with the case in the 
other municipalities who did not enjoy the same success.  
 
Although capital investment in health was part of the mandate of the Assembly it did not 
automatically commit resources to areas considered priorities for the Health Directorate. 
One of the staff at the New Juaben Health Directorate described their achievement as 
follows: 
Since 2002, we have found very clever ways to make sure that some of the very important 
things we want to do get into the Municipal Assembly‟s budget for the year. I will say that our 
success rate is between 50 and 60 per cent each year. We are very proud about this because if 
you understand how the decentralisation system works, you will realise that we have done 
well. Don‟t forget that others equally compete with us for the same resources. Apart from the 
support we need for programmes, most of the health projects require huge capital outlay. We 
do not build clinics and health centres, it is the Assembly that does those things but it does not 
mean that if we sit back the Assembly will build the clinics for us. Even if the funding is 
coming from donors, we need some lobbying to get projects [A staff at the Health Directorate, 
New Juaben, 15
th
 October, 2009].  
 
The Health Director used the Polyclinic project to illustrate his claim that they needed 
lobbying to get projects funded by the Assembly. He explained that: 
The issue of the Polyclinic came onto our drawing board just at the time my predecessor 
handed over to me around 2004. I remember the first time I mentioned it to the MCE his reply 
was that it was too early since there was not money in the system due to the election we just 
had. I kept pushing on and one day he agreed that we should meet at his office to look at the 
issue. As soon as I realised that the green light was coming I got some of the Assembly 
members whose names I would not like to mention here to support the idea. In that meeting, it 
was tough because some of them argued that if the Assembly approved that project it would 
mean that that electoral area would benefit from more projects than others because the market 
project had already been approved for the same electoral area. Some of them even said the 
regional hospital was too close to where the project was proposed to be located. In the end we 
managed to get the votes in favour of the project. If you were in the meeting you will think it 
was just the debate and the voting that day that made the difference. The truth is that I had 
done my homework and lobbied well before that meeting [Health Director, New Juaben, 15
th
 
October, 2009]. 
 
I observed from interviews with senior officers that Assembly members who voted for the 
Polyclinic project had strong informal ties with officers at the Health Directorate. This 
further explains the Health Director‟s claim that he did his „homework.‟ He was able to do 
                                                 
95
 These were (i) Training of community health volunteers in home based care practice; (ii) Establishment of 
2 Voluntary Counselling and Testing centres; and (iii) Promotion and sale of condoms in non-traditional 
outlets such as supermarkets, funeral grounds, internet cafes, drinking spots, markets, and chop bars (local 
restaurants) (see Table 11 in Appendix I). 
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his „homework‟ effectively due to his informal ties with executive officers at the Assembly 
and strong ties with elected Assembly members. The nature of ties between the two 
institutions suggests that the Health Directorate was well connected with the Assembly 
which made it fairly straightforward for him to get his project approved. Elected Assembly 
members also supported the Health Director‟s claims that lobbying was needed to get 
projects accepted. One who was very vocal in the Assembly (popularly called „MP-member 
of parliament‟) explained that although each of them would try to win projects for their 
electoral areas they also needed to lobby amongst themselves to vote. Those who had been 
persuaded by the Health Director also lobbied their colleagues in the Assembly which 
involved „reciprocal voting‟ when Assembly members negotiate for support with their 
colleagues and they in turn vote for them when their projects come up.  
 
Even though lobbying and „reciprocal voting‟ can be said to be helpful it could be viewed 
as collusion, corruption and nepotism since only a few officers could lobby and benefit 
from it. The advantages were limited to those belonging to the complex web of ethnic, 
abusua, and ruling political party linkages. Between 2000 and 2008, over 60 percent of the 
Assembly‟s annual budget was allocated to lobbyists with ties to the Chief Executive and 
Presiding Member rather than the official Medium Term Development Plan.    
 
One of the explanations as to why a proportion of the annual budget is spent sustaining 
patron-client relations is the role of the Presiding Member. Following investigations of how 
the Health Director‟s Polyclinic project was accepted, it emerged that the votes of the 
Assembly members alone could not have influenced the project; the support of the PM was 
crucial in this regard. It was highly unlikely that the PM would steer the debate against the 
Chief Executive so once the Health Director secured the support of the Chief Executive, it 
was probable that the PM would support such projects. 
 
From my observations at General Assembly meetings the PM was unlikely to oppose the 
Chief Executive. The Assembly members could debate the issues but the Chief Executive 
could push his agenda through so the Health Director needed the support of the Chief 
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Executive and the Presiding Member. For example, during the discussion of the sessional 
address presented by the Chief Executive, most of the Assembly members opposed two 
issues that came up in the address but they were carried and the Chief Executive won.
96
 The 
first was the fact that twenty-one Social Investments Fund (SIF) projects had been awarded 
on contract without the involvement of Assembly members in the process.
97
 The second 
issue was the Chief Executive‟s proposal that the eleven sanitation sites which had not been 
contracted out be contracted to Zoomlion (Gh.) Ltd because the company had performed 
well with the twenty-two sanitation sites previously awarded to it.
98
 Some of the members 
were of the view that the contracts could have been awarded to „other private companies‟.99 
However, those who opposed were heckled by both the government appointees and some of 
the elected members. Ultimately the Chief Executive was able to push this proposal through 
with over 65 per cent of the members when the motion was put to vote.
100
 These two 
examples imply that the Chief Executive could have found ways to reject the Health 
Director‟s Polyclinic project and other requests even if they had the support of most 
Assembly.  
 
Compared with New Juaben municipality, the coordination of programmes was more 
difficult to achieve in Sunyani. This may have occurred because, although both Health 
Directors had access to the DACF, the Health Director in New Juaben had additional 
resources whilst his counterpart in Sunyani did not. As I show later in this section although 
officers in both Health Directorates had medium informal ties with executive officers at the 
Assembly, officers in New Juaben also had strong informal ties with elected Assembly 
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 Sessional address delivered by the Municipal Chief Executive, Hon. Alex Kwaku Asamoah at the 1
st
 
Ordinary Meeting of the 3
rd
 Session of the 5
th
 New Juaben Municipal Assembly held on Wednesday, 8
th
 and 
9
th
 July, 2009 at the Municipal Assembly Hall. 
97
 At the time of the meeting, SIF projects had been awarded on contract and contractors had been working on 
the projects for about five months yet most Assembly members did not know about the names of the 
contractors involved, the contract sum, details of the NJMA‟s contribution in respect of each project as well 
as the beneficiary community contribution to the various projects 
98
 This was private company which had been contracted by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government to 
manage sanitation in most parts of the country. 
99
 Those who shared this view were Hon. George Boakye Yiadom, Hon. Fadilu, and Hon. Alhassan Kassi 
100
 The MCE had the support of the Sanitation Sub-Committee chairman, Hon. Ibrahim Amu, and Hon 
Kwaku Okyere even though Hon. George Boakye Yiadom called for an evaluation report on the performance 
of Zoomlion (Gh.) Ltd before contracting out the remaining sanitation sites. 
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members also whilst in Sunyani these ties were only at the medium level (refer to Table 4 
in Chapter 4). 
 
According to the officers of the Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate, their counterparts at 
the Municipal Assembly did not show adequate commitment to coordinate programmes 
with them to fight HIV and AIDS in the municipality. They indicated that this was evident 
from the Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) of the Assembly. Interviewees at the 
Health Directorate doubted the commitment by the Assembly to fight the disease. This was 
how one of them put it: 
We wanted the Assembly to commit more resources for programmes to reducing 
discrimination and stigmatisation against PLWAs. Especially we would like more support to be 
given to NGOs who are on the ground doing this job. We have achieved a lot in making people 
accept PLWAs and to empower PLWAs to live productive lives. But we cannot rest on our 
oars. This has to be consistent and intensified. In 2005 we wrote to the Assembly about this 
and we also raised it in the meetings when health issues appeared on the agenda. During the 
celebration of World HIV and AIDS Day in 2006 and 2007, the Regional Minister, the Chief of 
Sunyani and some prominent people were at the durbar and we emphasised that NGOs and 
Health Directorate need to be supported by the Assembly to continue to work to change 
peoples‟ attitudes towards PLWAs. The MCE also mentioned in his address that the Assembly 
was committed to this cause and that additional resources would be allocated for this. But the 
actions we expect to follow these promises have not been seen. So we only talk about it but 
nothing happens [Staff of Health Directorate, Sunyani, 4
th
 May, 2009].  
 
These claims of poor commitment by the Assembly and difficulty in obtaining additional 
support for HIV and AIDS programmes were supported by the Assembly members and the 
leaders of NGOs who claimed the provisions in the MTDP for 2006 and 2009 did not 
translate into actual programmes. The plan indicates that: 
To mitigate the increasing trend of HIV and AIDS in the Municipality, the Health Director 
worked in close collaboration with CSOs in the Municipality and the Municipal Assembly to 
educate the populace on the dangers of HIV and AIDS menace, and the need for civil society to 
team up with Health Director to control the menace [Sunyani Municipal Assembly 2006a]  
 
Even though all Assembly members noted the joint efforts of the Health Directorate and the 
NGOs in the fight against HIV and AIDS, many of them were unable to support the Health 
Director to push any of his programmes into the MTDPs for additional support. This poses 
the question of why other municipalities (such as New Juaben where HIV and AIDS is top 
priority health concern) were able to mobilise concerted efforts with their Assembly 
members when Sunyani could not. The answer to this question may lie in the differences 
between how officers at the Health Directorates related with elected members in their 
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Assemblies. However, there are other competing explanations to this that cannot be 
overlooked.  
 
6.5 Competing explanations: New Juaben and Sunyani 
 
In addition to the factors discussed in Chapter 5 which could account for findings of 
success in the New Juaben case, it seems the Assembly members themselves were keen to 
fight HIV and AIDS within the municipality which might explain why the Health 
Directorate obtained their support. The fact that New Juaben topped the prevalence rate for 
the country was not pleasant news to many people including the Assembly members. This 
explanation seems plausible because Obuasi was another case in which Assembly 
members showed strong interest and commitment to HIV and AIDS issues because of its 
high prevalence there. So it was possible that as the New Juaben Assembly members 
perceived the disease as a top priority health issue to which they were committed to 
reducing, their attitudes would be positive and so conducive to supporting related 
initiatives and programmes.  
 
In spite of suggestions that there is inadequate evidence to show that prioritisation of 
expenditures occurs at some of the Assemblies (see Crawford 2010: 115), the prioritisation 
of programmes could be another explanation to why Sunyani Municipal Assembly seemed 
uncooperative with the Health Directorate with regard to HIV and AIDS programmes. The 
Sunyani Municipal Assembly appeared focused on improving urban sanitation to keep the 
city clean and ultimately prevent diseases such as malaria, and the Assembly is under 
pressure to maintain the status of the cleanest city in the country. This would suggest that 
the MCE‟s focus on sanitation rather than HIV and AIDS might not indicate that he was 
unwilling to work with Assembly members and the Health Directorate to curb the disease. 
 
The higher proportion of women in the New Juaben Municipal Assembly compared with 
Sunyani could further explain why health staff in New Juaben were able to use Assembly 
members to pass HIV and AIDS programmes whilst their counterparts in Sunyani could not 
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do so. Women constituted about 15 percent of the membership of the New Juaben 
Assembly which had an active Women and Gender Sub-Committee to champion the cause 
of women in the municipality. Findings from studies in other Assemblies in Ghana by 
Crawford (2009: 68) shed light on the fact that weak Women and Gender sub-Committee 
with limited support of the Executive Committee could help explain why support for HIV 
and AIDS programmes in some Assemblies would be weak. There were less than 10% 
female Assembly members in Sunyani and the Women and Gender Sub-Committee was 
weak compared with that of New Juaben. 
 
Although these competing explanations cannot be discounted, evidence from the current 
study suggests that the differences in how Health Directorates in both New Juaben and 
Sunyani are informally connected to their respective Assemblies explain the success of the 
New Juaben Health Directorate and relative failure of the Sunyani Municipal Health 
Directorate to promote their programmes with their Assemblies.  
 
6.6 Informal ties with the Assembly: the contrast  
6.6.1 New Juaben 
In New Juaben, the Municipal Health Directorate effectively connected to the Assembly via 
two routes. The first route was via the executive officers and informal ties between the 
Health Directorate and executive officers of the Assembly have already been described in 
Chapter 5. The second route is via elected Assembly members. In this section I describe the 
nature of informal ties that existed between the health staff and elected Assembly members 
in more detail. 
 
Informal ties between Health Directorate and elected Assembly members 
Overall, there were medium informal ties between officers at the Health Directorate and 
elected Assembly members (see Tables 4 in Chapter 4 and Table 6). Just like the other four 
cases, the important forms of ties were abusua and ethnic relations. New Juaben was the 
only municipality with old-school ties between two officers at the Health Directorate and 
elected Assembly members. In fact 4 out of the 10 elected Assembly members and the 
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Deputy Director of Nursing Services were colleagues at secondary school, and 5 out of the 
10 elected Assembly members were also in secondary school with the Disease Control 
officer (see Table 6).  
 
In Table 6 the 10 elected Assembly members interviewed constitute 100 percent and out of 
this number, those who have each of the three informal ties being considered are 
represented by the figures in percentages under those ties. For each of the ties, the average 
score which shows the strength of that particular tie between health staff and Assembly 
members is taken. This average is from the sum of what each health officer has scored. For 
example, in the case of Ho, the strength of old-school tie between health staff and 
Assembly members is  0%, whilst it is 30% with neighbourhood ties and 50% for ethnic tie 
(these are the average scores for each of these ties). The average scores for each of the ties 
are then summed up and their averages taken (last colum of Table 6). This represents the 
overall strength of informal ties between health staff and elected Assembly members. 
Informal ties are considered to be strong when the score in the last column is 70% and 
above; medium (40%-69.5%); and weak (≤ 39.5%). The stronger the ties the stronger the 
relationship whilst weak ties imply weak relationship (see Appendix E for details of the 
process I used to construct Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Strength of informal ties between Health staff and elected Assembly members 
 
 
Case 
Elected Assembly members 
Old-school tie Neighbourhood 
relation  
Ethnic tie Municipal average 
 
Ho 
Health Director  0%  
 
0% 
30%  
 
30% 
60%  
 
50% 
 
 
(0%+30%+50%)/3  
= 26.66% 
Deputy Director of 
Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
0% 
 
40% 
 
50% 
Disease Control 
Officer 
0% 20% 40% 
 
Obuasi 
Health Director 0%  
 
0% 
60%  
 
50% 
60%  
 
30% 
 
(0%+50%+30%)/3  
= 26.66% 
Deputy Director of 
Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
10% 
 
50% 
 
0% 
Disease Control 
Officer 
 
0% 
 
40% 
 
40% 
 
Sunyani 
Health Director 0%  
 
50%  
 
0%  
 
 
(0%+60%+50%)/3  Deputy Director of    
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Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
0% 0% 70% 60% 80% 50% = 36.66% 
Disease Control 
Officer 
 
0% 
 
60% 
 
70% 
 
Techiman 
Health Director 0%  
 
0% 
0%  
 
10% 
20%  
 
20% 
 
(0%+10%+20%)/3  
= 10.00% 
Deputy Director of 
Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
20% 
Disease Control 
Officer 
 
0% 
 
30% 
 
20% 
 
New 
Juaben 
Health Director 0%  
 
30% 
100%  
 
90% 
80%  
 
80% 
 
(30%+90%+80%)/3  
=66.66% 
Deputy Director of 
Nursing Services or 
Public Health Nurse 
 
40% 
 
100% 
 
90% 
Disease Control 
Officer 
50% 80% 60% 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
 
Apart from the political party affiliations, old-school ties, and ethnic relations that existed 
between elected Assembly members and staff at the Health Directorate, when I asked the 
elected Assembly members to describe the kind of neighbourhood or abusua ties they had 
with officers at the Health Directorate, each of the 10 elected Assembly members gave 
similar description. Their responses centred on giving and receiving mutual support and 
assistance during social events such as funerals. For example, this was how one of them 
described it: 
Most of us in the Assembly organise and attend funerals when we are invited. Mr. Boateng and 
Sister Evelyn and others invite us to go to their villages with them when they had funerals. 
These are people most of us in the Assembly will turn to when we need support. Other 
Assembly members have also invited officers from the Health Directorate and they honoured 
the invitation. It is not like you attend every funeral but you are selective to go and support 
whoever that has supported you in the past or the people you can trust to obtain support from 
them when you need it. This is how life in Koforidua has become. You support your friends 
and they also support you. When we attend funerals, no matter how little your donation is it 
helps to reduce the cost to the family [Elected Assembly member, New Juaben, 14
th
 October, 
2009]. 
 
Organisation of funerals and burial rites are very important to most people in Ghana and 
funerals form the basis around which many people establish abusua ties. There are several 
reasons for this; first funerals are very expensive to organise so it has become a means of 
judging the social status of families in Ghana leading to competition and escalating costs.
101
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 Majority of the people in Ghana pride themselves on the class and status of people who honour their 
invitation to attend funerals or other social activities. In fact, the status of a family might also be judged 
according to the number of high ranking or influential personalities that attend their funerals. They are seen as 
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The second reason is that because it is expensive people rely on the support of their 
neighbours or the abusua who are mostly colleagues in the office or in the city where they 
live and work. The more neighbours who attend your funeral, the higher the chances that 
donations will defray the costs incurred. Therefore the people who offer support might also 
receive support in future when the need arises.
102
  
 
Reciprocal support during funerals, marriage, and child-naming ceremonies helps to sustain 
informal ties and promote good working relationships between health staff and their 
counterparts in the Assembly. However, the support system produces patronage and 
corruption when public resources such as official vehicles and fuel are used in the process, 
these negative qualities may also sustain the ties. 
 
According to my interviews with the one of the senior officers at the Health Directorate in 
New Juaben, his association with elected Assembly members was motivated by the new 
approach to healthcare delivery that focused on enabling citizens to influence healthcare 
decisions according to their needs. He noted that the Assembly members were one 
important group of public officials and local politicians who can play a very useful role in 
helping the Health Directorate to be responsive to local citizens. He explained that: 
Even though most of the Assembly members and I are from the same ethnic group, we have 
gone a step further to strengthen our relationship with good neighbourliness. They respond in a 
group to come to offer their support when any of our officers invites them. In the same way we 
also do the same to them. I am happy with this relationship because it is part of our strategy to 
get people in the various communities to make inputs into our programmes and we cannot do 
this effectively without the Assembly members. So I believe that good neighbourhood relations 
is the stepping stone for us in the Health Department to be able to deliver healthcare to the 
people according to their needs [Senior Health Officer, New Juaben, 16
th
 October, 2009].   
 
Due to the schedules of this senior officer at the Health Directorate we had to meet four 
times to enable me complete the interviews with him. Throughout these interviews he 
                                                                                                                                                    
important by their folks back in their villages when the Health Director or Deputy Director of Nursing 
Services goes to their village at their invitation. Apart from that, having good abusua ties with the Health 
Director means that you are likely to be in his company for a number of important public functions, and all 
these could contribute to improving one‟s social standing. 
 
102
 There is still a third factor which is that funerals can offer most people the opportunity to make money. 
The reason is that when the donations are higher than the expenditure one incurs then the excess money 
becomes what I call „profit,‟ and in fact there are people who look forward to this. 
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referred to his belief in maintaining informal ties with people he worked with as an 
important tool to employ when dealing with politically sensitive issues, or under conditions 
when legal and institutional provisions make formal working relations difficult. This is why 
he felt establishing and sustaining strong informal ties with Assembly members was 
important to help him to understand and incorporate the health needs of the people into 
their programmes. In addition, this „stepping stone‟ enabled health officers to reach deep 
into the Assembly and persuade the Assembly members to push health programmes 
through.  
 
6.6.2  Sunyani 
Informal ties between Health Directorate and executive officers 
Unlike New Juaben where ties between officers at the Health Directorate and executive 
officers were strong, in Sunyani they were medium (refer to Tables 2 and 3 in Chapter 3 
and see Table 4 in Chapter 4 and see also Table 10 in Appendix G). According to the data 
in Table 2 (Chapter 3), only the Deputy Director of Nursing Services and the Disease 
Control officer had both ethnic and abusua relations with two out of the four Executive 
Officers at the Assembly (the Chief Executive and Coordinating Director). Ethnic relations 
were found to be weak although abusua relations were strong but these could not facilitate 
interaction partly because of the negative influence of weak ethnic ties. If both ethnic 
relations and neighbourhood ties had been strong this may have enhanced trust and 
subsequently increased the chances of health staff to obtain the support of the executive 
officers. 
 
Trust that results from good informal ties is likely to promote mutual respect among the key 
actors in health policy implementation. When one party, especially the Chief Executive, felt 
the Health Director did not trust and respect him then he would be unlikely to reciprocate. 
A situation of this kind appears to have contributed to tensions between most Chief 
Executives and their Health Directors (refer to Figures 11 and 12 in Chapter 5). Comparing 
the case in New Juaben with Sunyani, trust and mutual respect were evident between the 
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Chief Executive and the Health Director in New Juaben but not in Sunyani; however, there 
was no evidence to suggest that the Health Director did not respect the Chief Executive.
103
   
 
Informal ties between Health Directorate and elected Assembly members 
With respect to ties with elected Assembly members, unlike New Juaben where such ties 
were medium, Sunyani maintained weak ties with Assembly members (refer to Table 3 in 
Chapter 3, Table 4 in Chapter 4 and Table 6 in this Chapter).
104
 The informal ties that 
officers of the Health Directorate had with elected Assembly members were similar to 
those of the Executive Officers as explained earlier; both ethnic and abusua ties were 
medium (refer to Table 6). Informal meetings during social activities were important to 
officers of both the Health Directorate and Assembly but they were not as frequent as those 
in New Juaben. This is evident from Table 6 which shows the score for neighbourhood ties 
was strong (90%) for New Juaben and medium (60%) for Sunyani. Additionally, whilst the 
score for ethnic relations for New Juaben was strong (80%), Sunyani‟s score was medium 
(50%) (refer to Table 6). These differences may have contributed to the inability of officers 
at the Health Directorate to connect with Assembly members and obtain their support. This 
was evident from the words of one of them: 
Because the Assembly members are always looking for votes, they are more interested in 
physical projects such as schools, clinics etc. As a result there are schools that are scattered all 
over without enough teachers. There are also some clinics without enough health staff. But 
HIV and AIDS is everywhere even though it is not tangible. So if they can support efforts to 
intensify education programmes it can go a long way to help improve the health conditions of 
the people here. We have raised the issue a number of times at the General Assembly but it 
looks like Assembly members do not show much interest because they cannot see how this can 
bring them votes [Staff, Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate, Sunyani, 5 May, 2009].  
 
 Assembly members prefer projects that are visible so provide evidence of their 
performance to help win votes in elections. It would take more than medium strength 
informal ties to gain their support for intangible programmes which may be useful but may 
not attract votes. Raising the issue of HIV and AIDS in general Assembly meetings and 
                                                 
103
 My perception of the Health Director is that he was an introvert, calm, and reserved person. He seemed to 
be the kind of person who would not like to lobby or a person who had poor lobbying skills. Since he was 
reserved, his attitude might be misinterpreted by the Chief Executive as a sign of disrespect. I would describe 
him as a direct opposite of the Health Director of the New Juaben municipality who appeared to be an 
extrovert, more lively and very sociable which made it easy for him to get along with most people and to 
lobby. 
104
 Overall pattern of informal ties and embeddedness are also presented in Table 10 in Appendix G 
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durbar grounds is not enough to get HIV and AIDS education and awareness programmes 
through the Assembly. Achieving success can be facilitated by the Health Directorate 
working through strong informal ties with both executive officers and the elected Assembly 
members as was the case in New Juaben. 
 
Unlike the case in New Juaben where the Health Director lobbied through the Social 
Services Sub-Committee, there was inadequate evidence to show that the Health Director in 
Sunyani worked through the sub-Committees. These channels were not utilised mainly 
because the informal ties between health staff and Assembly members were not strong 
enough. As the Chief Executive had strong influence on the chairpersons of the various 
sub-Committees, one way to achieve success would be to establish strong informal ties 
with the chairperson of the sub-Committees so programmes would have a chance of 
appearing at the Executive Committee to be discussed at the General Assembly meeting. 
 
Another factor that may explain why interviewees in the Sunyani Municipal Health 
Directorate were unable to connect well with the Assembly was the lack of ties with 
government appointed Assembly members. Lobbying government appointees was one of 
the advantages which the Health Director in New Juaben had over his counterpart in 
Sunyani. Most of the government appointees claimed that prior to any official meetings all 
the government appointees would meet to discuss how they would vote on the issues in the 
agenda for the meeting. The government appointees indicated that they were lobbied by 
heads of other departments but not the Health Director. 
 
In spite of the usefulness of links with Assembly members, there were challenges in using 
them to deliver health services in terms of promoting local people‟s participation in health 
care decisions. Most of them had poor capacity; and the process of getting elected into the 
Assembly appears to undermine their autonomy. Whilst many of the challenges I discuss in 
the next section were general to both New Juaben and Sunyani, some of them were specific 
to Sunyani. 
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6.7 Challenges of Assembly members in New Juaben and Sunyani 
 
The challenges faced by Assembly members in both New Juaben and Sunyani include (i) 
poor capacity of most Assembly members; and (ii) the processes of getting elected to the 
Assembly seemed to undermine their independence and effectiveness. In addition to these 
challenges, the MCEs in Sunyani took a number of steps that dampened the morale of 
Assembly members. 
 
The literature on decentralisation in Ghana has not given adequate attention to the capacity 
and calibre of Assembly members in terms of their literacy levels as essential factors which 
may affect the performance of Assembly members.
105
 When I attended the Assembly 
meeting in New Juaben, I gained the impression that over 50 percent of Assembly members 
were not conversant with proceedings in the general Assembly and had limited knowledge 
of the essential legal instruments which govern decentralisation and local governance in 
Ghana.
106
 This constrains their ability to influence discussions including those pertaining to 
health. For example, of the 46 elected members of the New Juaben Municipal Assembly 
only about 10 of them spoke during the two-day meetings. Out of the 10 the floor was 
dominated by three, namely Hon. George Boakye Yiadom, Hon. C. H. Asare, and Hon. 
Hussein Fadilu. As the total membership of the general assembly was 67, it suggests that 
majority of the members were there only to „rubber-stamp‟ policies.107  
 
For example, according to Part 5 Section 21 (sub-section 7) of the Model Standing Orders 
for District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies (MSODMMAs),  
The mover of an original motion shall always have the right of reply after all the other 
members have had the opportunity to address the Assembly before the motion is put to the vote 
(MLGRD n.d). 
 
This was however not the case in practice. Assembly members who proposed motions 
addressed the Assembly immediately and the motion was put to vote without other 
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 The Standing Orders allow for debates to be held in the local language. However this has been rarely used 
since some Assembly members do not want to expose their lack of fluency in the local language. 
106
 These are the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, the Local Government Act (Act 462 of 
1993), and the Model Standing Orders for District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies.  
107
 The members of the Assembly include 46 elected and 21 government appointees. 
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members debating the issue or the person who proposed the motion having an opportunity 
for a final word before the voting took place. Only one member questioned this practice 
although he was heckled by other members. Also the Presiding Member „did not see‟ 
several hands that were raised on a „Point of Order‟ to bring the proceedings within the law. 
Part 5 Section 21 (sub-section 10) of the Standing Orders states that:  
Where a member proposes a motion, the subject matter of which falls within the terms of 
reference of a Sub-Committee...be referred to the Sub-Committee...and shall not be debated 
until the Sub-Committee or Commission or Board has considered the matter (MLGRD n. d). 
 
Many of the Assembly members could not refer to this provision to question the Chief 
Executive when he presented his sessional address and informed the Assembly of his plans 
to re-award the public toilets on contract at the end of the expiration of the first contract 
arrangement. He stated in the address: 
I wish to inform you that, the two year public management contracts awarded to private 
contractors came to an end at the end of June 2009. The Procurement process of re-awarding 
the contracts has begun and the Hon. Members would be informed of the outcome on 
completion of the process [New Juaben Municipal Assembly, 2009]
108
 
 
This presentation by the Chief Executive generated a heated debate with the government 
appointees and most of the elected members supporting the Chief Executive. This brought 
the procedural issues in the Model Standing Orders and the understanding of Assembly 
members to the fore. Most of them could not contribute to the debate which suggests that 
they did not adequately understand the procedural issues on how decisions should be 
reached by the Assembly. Again, a few members argued that since the old contract had 
ended and a Sub-Committee had been mandated by the Assembly to present an assessment 
and evaluation of performance of the company, it was out of order to debate re-awarding of 
new contracts when the Sub-Committee had not yet submitted its report. They referred the 
Assembly to Part 5 Section 21 (sub-section 10) of the Model Standing Orders, arguing that 
since an earlier motion had referred the matter to a Sub-Committee, the matter of re-
awarding the contract could only be debated and carried when that Sub-committee has 
presented its report to the Assembly. Although the Presiding member eventually upheld a 
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 Sessional address delivered by the Chief Executive on 8
th
 of July 2009. 
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„Point of Order‟ raised by a few members, the reactions of most of the members implied the 
Chief Executive was uncomfortable with the ruling by the Presiding Member. 
 
The poor capacity of many Assembly members can weaken their morale and limit their 
motivation to contribute to debates in the Assembly. This became evident during the 
discussions of a supplementary budget statement by the New Juaben Municipal Assembly. 
The debate on the budget started at 4.00 pm when most members were already exhausted, 
many of them left the meeting hall to idle around till the end of the meeting so they could 
collect their sitting allowances and lunch packs. According to majority of them, pushing the 
budget to the time that most of them were tired was deliberate so that members would not 
be able to scrutinise the budget.
109
  
 
The next challenge is the prevalence of clientelism, nepotism, and cronyism involved in the 
Assembly election process. According to the law, the elections are supposed to be non-
partisan (see Appendix P for the provisions in the law) but in practice this is not the case 
and they are very expensive to contest. According to the Assembly members, it cost them 
about 700 Ghana Cedis (US$ 500) during the last elections in 2006. Potential candidates 
had to fund their elections yet Assembly members are unpaid volunteers. Most of them 
complained claiming the process allowed political parties and influential people to secretly 
fund candidates. This method was employed extensively by the Chief Executive of Sunyani 
to unseat incumbent members who opposed him. For example, one of the „victims‟ of the 
Chief Executive‟s influences explained her case as follows: 
I realised that some of the issues that we raised at Sub-committee level did not appear on the 
agenda for general Assembly meetings. They ended up at the Executive Committee level. I 
raised these issues on several occasions at the general Assembly meeting and demanded to 
know what happened to those issues.  I was perceived by the MCE as being anti-government. 
Most Assembly members believed this because I did not show my political affiliation as a 
result of my job as a caterer. I supply food and snacks for various functions held at the 
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 According to all the Assembly members I interviewed, another practice which de-motivated them was that 
minutes of previous meetings were not circulated to them early enough for them to study and prepare for the 
meetings. Minutes were distributed at short notice and sometimes during the meetings. This makes it very 
difficult for some of them who can read and are interested to contribute to discussions to do so. This was 
evident on the second day of the meeting (9
th
 July 2008) during correction of previous minutes for discussion. 
I realised that only a few of the Assembly members pointed out corrections indicating that they were the only 
persons who had read the minutes. For Hon. George Boakye Yiadom and others, it has been a deliberate 
practice by the MCEs to push their agendas without scrutiny. 
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Assembly. I also do same for other organisations or associations such as churches and 
political parties including the NDC. Hon. Ignatius Baffour Awuah (then MCE) and others 
propagated the idea that I was NDC. Hon. Baffour Awuah therefore sponsored Mr. Justice 
Obeng but he lost.  
 
During the second elections, the issue of my political affiliation came up again. Hon. Kwame 
Twumasi Awuah (then MCE) sponsored Mr. Afari Mintah against me and I lost. Somehow 
this was leaked to the media and I was interviewed by SKY FM about the fact that the MCE 
used money against me because I was troublesome in the assembly and that I was against him. 
I told the media that I did not see it that way. 
 
It even got to a point when attempts were made by Hon. Kwame Twumasi Awuah to 
demolish my restaurant and drinking spot because he said I had illegally acquired the land 
where I operate my restaurant in spite of the fact that I produced all documents covering the 
land to show that I had been given the land by the National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE). The matter went to the seat of government in Accra (Osu Castle) that I was NDC 
and I opposed the MCE. In order to make a strong case against me, Hon. Kwame Twumasi 
went on to influence the Social Club (Society of the Youth in Sunyani who were mostly NPP 
sympathisers) to threaten the Member for Parliament for the constituency, Hon. J. H. Mensah 
(then Senior Minister), that if I was not ejected they would vote against him in the 2004 
Parliamentary elections [Former Assembly member, Sunyani, 9
th
 June 2009]. 
 
Interviews with some of the „beneficiaries‟ of the MCE‟s support echoed these 
observations. According to one of them, the MCE and the NPP promised him continuous 
support if he agreed to contest the election and join the Assembly but they had not 
honoured those promises. Having realised that he was in the Assembly only to vote for the 
Chief Executive he decided to step down out of frustration. This was how he put it: 
I was sponsored by the MCE to contest. He promised that he would continue to support me 
financially in so many ways. I however regret this because I have been unable to be objective 
during discussions in the general Assembly. I was forced against my will on some of the issues 
in the Assembly. For example I was against the MCE‟s idea of taking 150,000 Ghana cedis 
from the Assembly‟s coffers to pay for labour cost for the street light project which central 
government had brought some few months to the general elections. I could however not vote 
against it since voting was by show of hands and the MCE and the Presiding member and other 
NPP members would know all who would vote against the MCE [Assembly member, Sunyani, 
21
st
 June 2009]. 
 
These activities undermine the independence of Assembly members who find themselves 
under the control of powerful interests. This is why Agyeman-Duah (2005) indicated that 
Ghanaians behave like the ostrich refusing to accept the reality of the partisan nature of the 
Assembly. It is also one of the reasons why some scholars have called for partisan electoral 
politics at the Assembly since it is already happening. 
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Even though these situations affected the performance of most elected Assembly members 
the poor performance of Sunyani compared with New Juaben was because the politicisation 
of activities in the Sunyani Assembly was strong in terms of the personal political 
ambitions of the Chief Executive, Presiding Members, and the elected Assembly members 
themselves.  
  
6.8 Conclusion 
 
My aim in this chapter was to show that for the successful implementation of HIV and 
AIDS programmes by devolved and deconcentrated state institutions at sub-national level, 
informal ties need a wide span across many actors of both two institutions. The wider the 
network of informal ties, the more likely the actors within the network will develop 
common interests around issues and coordinate their efforts to advance their shared 
interests. What this suggests is that neo-patrimonial relations are likely to shape the 
governance process in a positive way under the condition that the network covers large 
number of actors. This raises ambiguities about the positive outcomes of neo-patrimonial 
relations especially when political party affinity constitutes a key component of such 
relations. What it means is that it seems political party ties are capable of producing 
positive outcomes even when they shape how public resources are used along partisan 
networks. 
 
As we have seen, informal ties have weaknesses such as corruption, nepotism, and 
clientelistic tendencies thus supporting the claims in the neo-patrimonial literature. These 
might arise when very few powerful individuals control public resources and determine 
how such resources are disbursed. This is when we are likely to find political party 
affiliations undermining government performance as resources might be channelled along 
partisan networks further suggesting how ambiguous influences of informal relations such 
as political party ties can be.  
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Ghana‟s decentralisation system is a kind of recentralisation through the appointment of the 
Chief Executive and a third of the Assembly members by the President of the country.
110
 
Due to these appointments central government appear to retain substantial control over the 
affairs of local government authorities. One implication of this control is that the Assembly 
system is highly vulnerable to capture by a few people as the existing institutional 
arrangements do not seem to be effective to safeguard the interests of the poor who 
constitute the majority of the population. A way to minimise elite capture might be to 
increase the number of actors in the decision making process and informal ties have the 
potential to achieve this. 
 
This chapter has also shown the challenges to Assembly members as representatives of 
citizens. The voluntary nature of the work of Assembly members may undermine their 
autonomy and effectiveness. As Assembly members struggle to fund their election 
campaigns they become vulnerable to capture by powerful interests who may even resort to 
secret sponsorship of their campaigns in return for political party allegiance.  
 
The relationship between the Assemblies and the Health Directorates has been the central 
focus of this chapter and the previous chapter 5. In this chapter, the discussion has focused 
on the potential of informal ties to facilitate consultation of elected Assembly members in 
the coordination of health programmes. We know, however, that health care delivery at the 
local level in a country such as Ghana requires the input of more than these two institutions. 
A third and equally important group of actors is Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). These 
include religious groups, Non-governmental organisations, and traditional authorities. 
Norms, practices and belief systems that CSOs such as the church and traditional 
authorities hold can affect the implementation of HIV and AIDS policy. For the Health 
Directorate to effectively implement its policy health staff might require a good 
understanding of the needs of citizens and one important way to do this is for staff of the 
                                                 
110
 Crawford (2009: 58) has noted that in Ghana, “the rhetoric of decentralisation talks of making democracy a 
reality, the actual reality is about the maintenance of central government control.” Similarly, this has been 
termed by central government retaking from the Assemblies what it had given to them (Awortwi 2010a; 
2010b; 2010c). 
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Health Directorate to embed within society. An analysis of the relationship between staff at 
the Health Directorate and leaders of CSOs can contribute to our understanding of the 
performance of the Health Directorate in terms of efforts to achieve increased consultation 
of leaders of CSOs and win their support for HIV and AIDS programmes; this is the subject 
of Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Socio-cultural norms, religious beliefs, and HIV and AIDS: Does embeddedness 
matter? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I argue that embeddedness of the Health Directorate with Civil Society can 
facilitate health staff consultation with leaders of Civil Society organisations (CSOs) to 
implement HIV and AIDS policy and overcome cultural practices, social norms and 
religious beliefs that are considered to be barriers to addressing the spread of the disease. 
 
I compare Sunyani with Techiman to show that Health Directorates that were adequately 
embedded with Civil Society were able to overcome these barriers. Firstly, they obtained 
the support of the church to promote programmes around condoms. Secondly, they reduced 
stigmatisation and discrimination against people infected with HIV or AIDS, and thirdly, 
they minimised the dominance of the views of males in matters around sex and health.
111
 
The Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate is one of such cases. In municipalities where the 
Health Directorates are weakly embedded with Civil Society, they could not overcome 
these barriers. This is the case in Techiman. These findings are based on the analysis of in-
depth narratives by the relevant public officers and leaders of Civil Society groups who 
were involved at various stages in the design and implementation of HIV and AIDS 
programmes at the Municipal level.  
 
                                                 
111
 Stigmatisation in this study is taken to mean name calling of people living with HIV or AIDS (PLWAs). 
Thus seeing PLWAs as „scapegoats‟ (Gilmore and Somerville 1994: 134); significantly discrediting attributes 
of PLWAs (Holzemer et al. 2006: 52); a mark on someone or group of people that leads to that person or 
group being viewed negatively (Republic of Ghana 2005b). Discrimination is defined in this study as denying 
access to support systems available in the community due to one‟s HIV or AIDS status. This involves the 
establishment of socio-cultural, psychological, economic and political boundaries within society to separate 
PLWAs from other citizens thereby excluding them from accessing opportunities and resources needed to 
enhance comfortable living (Republic of Ghana 2005b; Castro and Farmer 2005; Duffy 2005; Gilmore and 
Somerville 1994; Walkey et al. 1990). 
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Based on the findings in this chapter, I make a contribution to the debate that seeks to 
deepen our understanding of how cultural practices, religious beliefs, and social norms can 
shape the process and outcome of the implementation of HIV and AIDS and reproductive 
health programmes. Overall, this chapter contributes to the main argument in this thesis that 
embeddedness facilitates institutions at sub-national level to achieve increased consultation 
of citizens in the implementation of national health policy. 
 
Following the introduction to the chapter, I discuss the areas of focus at the global level 
towards addressing the HIV and AIDS pandemic and explain how Ghana‟s HIV and AIDS 
policy is shaped by the global agenda. I then discuss how socio-cultural norms and belief 
systems can be challenges to HIV and AIDS policy at the global level and also at the 
national level in Ghana. These challenges are religious beliefs around condoms; 
stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs; and male dominance in sexual and 
reproductive health issues. As the evidence suggests that embeddedness of health staff with 
leaders of the selected CSOs and the nature of embeddedness seemed to have enabled 
health staff and leaders of CSOs to develop joint efforts to overcome the challenges, I 
describe how the health staff in Sunyani and Techiman were embedded with leaders of 
CSOs. After this I show that the nature of embeddedness of officers at the Health 
Directorate with leaders of Civil Society groups appear to have facilitated increased 
consultation with leaders of CSOs by health officers leading to the development of shared 
interest around the disease. I then consider each of these three issues and show that health 
officers and leaders of CSOs in Sunyani seem to have overcome them whilst their 
counterparts in Techiman did not appear to have been able to do so. This will be followed 
by a discussion of alternative explanations to the differences between the findings in 
Sunyani and Techiman. A summary of lessons learnt in the chapter are provided in the 
conclusion. 
 
7.2 Managing the HIV and AIDS pandemic: the global focus 
 
There are a number of areas of focus at the global level for the management of HIV and 
AIDS which have attracted the interest of governments, international donor organisations, 
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scholars who write about the disease, and human rights and advocacy groups that seek to 
champion the cause of PLWAs. Four areas in the global focus form Ghana‟s HIV and 
AIDS policy. 
  
The first is the accessibility to antiretroviral therapy (ART) for PLWAs. Promoting access 
to ART has gained a lot of support and mobilisation by Civil Society groups in most 
countries such as South Africa and the United States of America (Mboup et al. 2006). One 
important theme that recurs in the literature which is also the issue in Ghana is the poor 
accessibility to treatment opportunities for PLWAs as a result of the high cost of ART 
drugs (Abreu et al. 2003; Kist 2007). Ghana‟s HIV and AIDS policy is therefore aimed at 
making ART facilities available to people who acquire the disease (Republic of Ghana 
2004e; Ghana AIDS Commission 2006). 
 
Second is the promotion of the use of condoms. This has been widely accepted as a means 
to address HIV and AIDS and has informed policy in countries that have been hit hard by 
the disease (Chamratrithirong et. al 1999; Isarabhakdi 2000). For example, in Thailand, the 
Ministry of Public Health designed and implemented a programme to promote universal 
condom use by commercial sex workers (Chamratrithirong et. al 1999).  Similarly, the 
increase in condom use has been employed as the basis to judge Uganda‟s success story in 
reducing HIV and AIDS (Asingwire and Kyomuhendo 2006). The promotion of condoms 
has now become a regular component of Ghana‟s HIV and AIDS policy.  
 
The third relates to stigmatisation of, and discrimination against, PLWAs (World Bank 
2006; Ghana News Agency 2010e). Ghana is pursuing efforts to ensure HIV positive 
people are accepted, loved, and cared for. The policy has encouraged Ghanaians to show 
compassion to those who have the disease (Republic of Ghana 2004e; Ghana News Agency 
2003c; 2010d). 
 
The fourth is the call for Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) for HIV or AIDS. 
Expanded HIV testing and counselling is an increasingly urgent policy issue for HIV and 
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AIDS control in many developing countries. This is a method of alerting people and 
limiting infection. International agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the United Nations Agency in charge of HIV and AIDS also lend their support to calls 
for expansion of testing. VCT is therefore a major strategy being implemented in Ghana 
(Ghana News Agency 2010k).  
 
There are volumes of HIV and AIDS literature suggesting that the management of the 
disease is constrained by a complex mix of cultural practices, social norms, and beliefs that 
manifest in stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs (Esplen 2007; Crentsil 2007; 
Castro and Farmer 2005; Duffy 2005; Conyers 2003; Baffour 2003; Anarfi 2003; Evans et 
al. 2003; Mayhew 2000; Gilmore and Somerville 1994; and Walkey et al. 1990). For 
example in KwaZulu-Natal Province, Maharaj (2001) found that, culturally, most people 
had the perception that the use of condoms was a sign of infidelity. Such perceptions can 
encourage stigmatisation and discrimination against people who use condoms and PLWAs 
thus discouraging condom use and making PLWAs reluctant to declare their status and 
receive treatment even if ART facilities were made available at a cheaper cost. In Ghana 
most people are discouraged from taking the VCT services offered by the Health 
Directorates and from accepting condoms. Policy can be undermined as these perceptions 
are strongly held. This might explain why Anarfi (2006: 169) has indicated that: 
To be able to design and develop effective programmes to promote reproductive health and 
reproductive choices, therefore, it has become increasingly necessary to understand more 
about socio-cultural norms and practices which either promote or act as barriers to adoption 
of services or acceptance of advice. 
 
Exploring effective ways to address challenges posed by stigmatisation and discrimination 
appears to elude HIV and AIDS policy in most affected developing countries including 
Ghana
112
 (De Waal 2006; Anarfi 2003; Ghana News Agency 2010c). 
 
Current study findings point to a strategy to help decentralised agencies first identify the 
obstacles at local level and then identify and incorporate solutions into their programmes.  
                                                 
112
 It has been indicated that HIV and AIDS message is not effectively tailored to suit the various cultures and 
all segments of the population. Programmes have overlooked efforts to shape societal norms, expectations and 
perceptions which serve as obstacles to achieving success (see Addai 1999; Gyimah et al. 2006). 
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This may be facilitated by health staff embedding themselves within the community and 
building trust amongst the people.
113
 Before I discuss evidence supporting the role of 
embeddedness in overcoming these problems, I first describe how they can affect policy. 
  
To simplify the discussion I address the issues surrounding religious beliefs that discourage 
the use of condoms, stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs, and male 
dominance in sexual and reproductive health issues separately although there are areas 
where they overlap.
114
 
 
7.2.1 Religious beliefs and condoms 
One of the three strategies of fighting the disease is the „ABC‟ approach - Abstinence, 
Being faithful to one‟s partner, and Condom use at all times. Most religious leaders 
however oppose the policy to promote condoms (Adongo and Philips et al. 1997).
115
 In a 
study of HIV and AIDS-related beliefs and behaviour among adolescent and young adult 
rural-urban migrants in Nigeria, Smith (2004) found that most Christians did not accept the 
use of condoms mainly due to religious beliefs. Keele et al. (2005) also found that Islamic 
belief was a major factor in the low condom usage in Matemwe, Zanzibar. The belief is that 
the Quran teaches against the use of condoms because it means taking human life. In 
addition, a number of religious leaders argue that creating condom awareness can promote 
promiscuity among unmarried people. Most members of the Catholic Church in particular 
would not accept condom use amongst married people (Baffour 2000). This is considered 
sinful as one of the interviewees indicated: 
Some of the pastors say that when you use the condom it means you have taken life. They say 
that God‟s plan is to make the sperms produce children so when the sperms are collected in 
condoms and they die, it means you have killed human beings and so God will punish you. 
This is why they say it is a sin to use the condom. Another reason why they do not want to 
talk about condom is that it will mean that we are encouraging unmarried people to have sex 
before marriage which they also consider to be sin. They also say young people will also see it 
                                                 
113
 Community in this study is taken to mean the Municipality. 
114
 Sexual and reproductive health issues are defined in this study as all the decisions people would make 
about when they want to have sex, and with whom, whether to use condoms or not. 
115
 This is very common among the leaders of the Catholic and Charismatic or Pentecostal churches. 
206 
 
 
 
as our endorsement that they can have sex. They say this also is immoral [A member of 
Sunyani Traditional Council, Sunyani, 20
th
 May 2009].
116
 
 
This interpretation of the consequences of the use of condom can be frightening to most 
Christians especially when the pastors preach that this can attract the wrath of God who will 
punish people who commit sin by not allowing his plan of procreation to work by killing 
human beings at the very beginning of their lives.
117
  
 
Religion in Ghana is pervasive (Baffour et al. 2010; Addai 1999; Yirenkyi 2000; Gyimah et 
al. 2006; Sackey 2006), everything that is done is embedded in faith. A prayer is said at the 
beginning and end of all state functions such as Independence Day celebrations, arrival of 
foreign dignitaries in the country, and Parliamentary sessions.
118
 Government officials and 
politicians are more accepted when they appeal to religious sentiments of the electorates, 
and sometimes promotion in public and private offices and access to job opportunities are 
influenced by religious affiliation. There are a number of churches led by one person who is 
normally referred to as the „Founder and General Overseer.‟ These have persuaded many 
people in Ghana that the devil/demon and witchcraft are the cause of poverty and diseases 
including HIV and AIDS (for example see Meyer 1995; Agbenohevi 2006). They profess to 
provide solutions, through prayer, to all kinds of problems. Some even claim to be able to 
pray for HIV or AIDS patients to be healed and they have established prayer camps in the 
forest where some HIV and AIDS patients go with the hope to find a cure. Attempts to 
remain outside of religious circles in Ghana might expose people to stigmatisation and 
discrimination with labels such as „you are a devil‟, „he is a witch‟ and „an agent of the 
                                                 
116
 „Sin is explained in the Bible as any behaviour that is contrary to the teachings of the Bible‟ (A Pastor in 
Sunyani, 21
st
 May 2009). 
117
 They claim the consequences can possibly be either hardship while on earth or it might even lead one to go 
to hell. According to the teachings of most pastors of charismatic churches in Ghana, hell is a place of torment 
where sinful people are sent when they die. They claim that the place is made up of burning flames which 
continue forever so one will continue to burn forever. Most of them, including the pastor of the church I 
attend, draw from Luke 16:24; Mathew 13:42; Mathew 25:4 etc (Bible verses). 
118
 At the time of writing this thesis, the President made a public appeal for a more congenial collaboration 
between the church and national leadership; and on Friday 12
th
 November 2010, he expressed his appreciation 
to the church for making the 2010 National Week of Prayer and Fasting successful. On the same day, he had a 
„closed door session with the Ministers of the Gospel‟ and it is believed that the President sought counsel 
from them in that „secret‟ and private meeting (Citi FM 2010b). 
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devil‟ (Citi FM 2010a).119 As a typical developing country characterised by wide scale 
poverty, diseases, and misery, most of the people in Ghana resort to spiritual/divine 
(religious) intervention to find solutions to problems in daily life. One reason is that the 
Ghanaian state has failed to deliver basic services including health to the people. 
Consequently, religion plays a very significant role in the lives of most Ghanaians both 
literate and the illiterate. For example, a study of popular opinions on local government in 
Ghana found that 4 in every 10 Ghanaians would consult religious leaders rather than 
elected national representatives (Members of Parliament and Assembly members) when 
they have development problems (AFROBAROMETER 2008b). 
  
The strong influence of religion means the church in Ghana is embedded within 
government and leaders of the church get appointed to key positions in government.
120
 As 
most people, including politicians, fear the consequences of being labelled, the church‟s 
voice has become very strong. As noted by Yirenkyi (2000), the church in Ghana has 
become more involved in politics now than at any other time in the history of the country. 
Clearly the influence of church leaders on policy and strategy to manage HIV and AIDS 
can shape the mindset and sexual and reproductive health choices of most Ghanaians which 
in turn can affect how successful HIV and AIDS policy is implemented. 
 
The formal „ABC‟ approach assumes Ghanaians will accept the message and change their 
behaviour accordingly but this overlooks the real life situation. The interviewees at the 
Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate had the view that this approach might not be 
adequate. They focussed attention on shaping policy toward persuading pastors who 
                                                 
119
 An example is the concern raised by Ghana‟s Second Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Professor Mike 
Oquaye in support of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly‟s plans to clamp down on all „illegal‟ churches in the 
capital. He said that the churches have taken advantage of the fact that most people fear to criticise the church 
because they might be seen as anti-Christ. 
120
 For example Rev. Dr. Mensah Otabil got appointed to the Council of State during the time when the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) was in power between 2000 and 2008. Another person who was appointed to the 
Council of State was Mrs. Gifty Afenyi Dadzie, a strong member of AGLOW, a Women‟s Christian group. 
The Council of State is a body of eminent citizens whose responsibility is to counsel the President in the 
performance of his functions (Republic of Ghana 1992). Another example is that the president at the time of 
this research, Professor John Evans Attah Mills of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), also had one 
Reverend T. B. Joshua as his key advisor. It is widely claimed in Ghana that Rev. T. B. Joshua supported 
Professor Atta Mills in spiritual terms by praying for him to win the presidential elections in 2008. 
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opposed condom use to change their attitudes and lend their support towards spreading the 
message of condom use. This view was supported by all the respondents in the Health 
Directorates in the other municipalities.  
 
7.2.2 Stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs 
Closely related to beliefs around condoms are socio-cultural practices that cast stigma on 
PLWAs leading to them being discriminated against in many ways. PLWAs are given 
many derogatory labels and there are families and health workers who discriminate against 
them (Antwi and Oppong 2006).
121
 Stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs has 
therefore been a challenge to the implementation of programmes addressing HIV and AIDS 
in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Monjok et al. 2009; Dodor 2008; Oye-Adeniran et al. 
2006; Fawole et al. 2006). In Ghana, this is particularly important since when 
stigmatisation and discrimination are reduced citizens can be bold enough to accept VCT, 
one of the Government of Ghana‟s key policies to address HIV and AIDS. A study on the 
nexus between violence and HIV and AIDS in northern Ghana found that stigmatisation 
and discrimination were the factors undermining efforts to fight the disease. Most people 
with the disease became “victims of violence because of their HIV status.” The violence 
includes rejection from family homes, insults and name-calling (ActionAid Ghana 2007: 
35; Antwi and Oppong 2006). 
 
7.2.3 Male dominance in sexual and reproductive health issues 
In Africa, the views of men dominate those of women in matters of sex and reproductive 
health. This makes women more vulnerable to HIV infection than men. There is evidence 
to suggest that infection rates are higher among females than their male counterparts due to 
women‟s inability to make choices regarding sexual activities and health (Ekanem et al. 
2005; Ezumah 2003; Antwi and Oppong 2006;
122
 Burgoyne and Drummond 2008). Part of 
the reason is that in most countries such as Ghana, norms of society expect women to be 
passive when it comes to sexual issues (Anarfi 2006), but males are permitted to be active 
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 The common perception in Ghana is that PLWAs are immoral, unfaithful, prostitutes, and womanisers. 
122
 According to Antwi and Oppong (2006), up to about the 1990s HIV infections in females and males in 
terms of ratio was 6:1. 
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and some cultures even allow males to have extra marital relationships whilst in the same 
society it is considered taboo for women to do so (Frimpong-Nnuroh 2006). 
 
I have discussed the challenges to HIV and AIDS policy implementation. Ideally officers at 
the Health Directorates would involve citizens in the design and implementation of health 
programmes. In the case of HIV and AIDS campaigns, the health officials seek to change 
the behaviour of citizens, and they realised that establishing strong ties with leaders of 
CSOs would enable them to develop joint efforts and work closely together to facilitate 
this. In the next section I will compare Sunyani with Techiman. I will describe how the 
staff of these two Health Directorates embedded themselves with CSO leaders in order to 
develop joint efforts with them to work to change peoples‟ attitudes towards HIV and 
AIDS programmes. 
 
7.3 The nature of Health Directorates’ embeddedness with Civil Society 
 
In Sunyani, the strength of embeddedness was medium with leaders of NGOs, religious 
groups, and traditional authority (refer to Table 3 in Chapter 3 and see Tables 7 and 8 for 
details of ties with the selected NGOs and other CSOs respectively).
123
 The figures show 
that each of the officers at the Health Directorate had at least two out of the three ties with 
leaders of civil society groups. In addition, political party ties were strong even though the 
Health Director is an NDC sympathiser. This is because most of the other officers are NPP 
and the leader of the traditional council, religious leaders, and „owners‟ of NGOs are all 
NPP. 
 
In both Tables 7 and 8, the strength of embeddedness was obtained by computing the 
number of existing ties as a percentage of all the possible ties that each case could obtain 
(see Appendix F). The number of all the ties depends upon the number of NGOs (as in 
Table 7), or the number of religious groups and traditional authorities (in Table 8) that were 
selected for the interviews. As these were selected based on them being known to work on 
                                                 
123
 See also Table 10 in Appendix G for overall pattern of informal ties and embeddedness 
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HIV and AIDS programmes, their numbers vary in each of the cases, therefore they would 
not have the same denominator. The difference in the denominator was however not taken 
into account in the computation of the strength of embeddedness. Each case was 
determined based upon the number of NGOs, traditional authority leaders and religious 
leaders interviewed. The figures in the last bottom row of Table 7 and the last column in 
Table 8 show the strength of embeddedness using the following scale: ≤ 39.5% (weak), 40-
69.5% (medium), and ≥ 70% (strong). The strength of embeddedness also means the 
density of ties that exist between health officers and the selected CSO leaders. 
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Table 7: Embeddedness: Health Directorate and NGOs 
 
NGOs 
Ho Obuasi Sunyani Techiman New Juaben 
HD DDNS/PHN DCO HD DDNS/PHN DCO HD DDNS/PHN DCO HD DDNS/PHN DCO HD DDNS/PHNN DCO 
AFRIWEB E N -             
FUGI N, E E N             
CLF E N, E N             
LDF - E E             
SSF    E, N N E, N          
PACAI    E, N N E,N          
KWDA     - N          
BV       N E,N E,N       
CSD       N N N       
6th MWF       N E,N E,N       
MH       N N N       
WASA       - N,E E,N       
FO          E E E,N    
ACF          - - -    
IFFN          - - N    
LPA          - - N    
BCSF          - - N    
4-HG             E,N E,N N 
M25H             E,N E,N N 
FHF             E,N E,N,O O 
RW             E E N 
 (12/36) = 33.33% (11/27) = 40.74% (20/45) = 44.44% (7/45) = 15.55% (19/36) = 52.77% 
Notes: HD (health director), DDNS (deputy director of nursing services), PHN (public health nurse), DCO (disease control officer)  
*FUGI-Future Generation International *CLF-Cure Lepers Foundation  
*LDF-Life Development Foundation *SSF-Social Support Foundation 
*PACA-PACA International  *KWDA-Kaleo Women‟s Development Association 
*BV-Beauty in Virginity  *CSD-Centre for Sustainable Development 
*6
th
 MWF-6
th
 March Women‟s Foundation *MH-Mission of Hope 
*WASA-    *FO-Frankmay Orphanage 
*ACF-Ahenebronoso Care Foundation *IFFN-Inter-Faith Family Network 
*LPA-Lamp of Peace Association 
*BCSF-Bromkyempem Care and Support Foundation 
*4-HG-4-H Ghana; M25H-Mathew 25 House  
*FHF-Faith and Hope Foundation 
*RW-Rural Watch 
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Table 8: Embeddedness: Health Directorate and chiefs, and religious leaders 
 
Case 
Ho Obuasi Sunyani Techiman New Juaben  
(%) Chief1 Pastor1 Chief2 Pastor2 Pastor3 Chief3 Pastor4 Chief4 Pastor5 Chief5 Pastor6 Pastor7 
 
Ho 
HD E E,N            
(9/18)  
= 50.00% 
DDNS/ 
PHNS 
 
E 
 
E,N 
          
DCO E E,N           
 
Obuasi 
HD   E, N E, N E, N         
(12/27)  
= 44.44% 
DDNS/ 
PHNS 
  -  
N 
N        
DCO   E, N E E        
 
Sunyani 
HD      N N       
(9/18)  
= 50.00% 
DDNS/ 
PHNS 
      
E, N 
 
E, N 
     
DCO      E E, N      
 
Techiman 
HD        - -     
(2/18)  
=11.11% 
DDNS/ 
PHNS 
        
- 
 
- 
   
DCO        N N    
 
New 
Juaben 
HD          E, N E, N E,N  
(15/27)  
= 55.55% 
DDNS/ 
PHNS 
          
E,N 
 
E,N 
 
E,N 
DCO          N N N 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Notes: 
Pastor1: Pentecost Church 
Pastor2: End Time Ministries 
Pastor3: Living Praise Church 
Pastor4: Pentecost Church 
Pastor5: Roman Catholic Church 
Pastor6: New Faith Bible Church 
Pastor7: Powerhouse Miracle Worship Centre 
Chief1 
Chief2 
Chief3 
Chief4 
Chief5 
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Leaders of the selected civil society groups and officers at the Health Directorate confirmed 
the existence of these ties. For example, the leader of one NGO explained: 
The Disease Control Officer and the Public Health Nurse are Brongs and so we see ourselves 
as one people. We see each other almost every single day because several activities bring us 
together. We meet to discuss upcoming funerals, weddings, and religious programmes and 
plan to attend or not to attend. Because we are from the same ethnic group, it makes us feel 
comfortable in each other‟s company. Apart from the ethnic relations we have, our interest in 
helping to work around HIV and AIDS in the municipality has also contributed to 
strengthening the bond between us. We undertake joint programmes most of the time 
[Director of an NGO, Sunyani, 18
th
 May 2009].  
 
Similarly, the Disease Control Officer had ethnic relations with all the leaders of the NGOs. 
According to her: 
The Director of Beauty in Virginity has been a good neighbour for over 10 years. We have 
lived in the same vicinity all this while. We lend support to each other in times of needs such 
as bereavement, marriage, and religious support. I give here support when her church 
organises annual harvest. She does the same thing to me. I have also been involved in her 
NGO work because I have always been a resource person to talk to the girls in her virgin 
clubs. I do not take any payment from her for doing this and sometimes when our official 
vehicle is not available I pay for my own transport to go to the schools. During holidays I 
sometimes skip church service and meet her girls when they have programmes on Sundays 
[Disease Control Officer, Sunyani, 5
th
 May 2009].    
 
The Disease Control Officer‟s emphasis on the reciprocal support shows the importance of 
abusua ties between them. Most Ghanaians are likely to measure the strength of abusua ties 
based on how reliable and consistent their neighbours would be when they are bereaved or 
during weddings when they issue indirect invitations to request support in kind and cash.
124
 
It was the strength of this abusua tie that led the Disease Control Officer to pay for her own 
transport, to speak with the girls in the virgin clubs, and offer her services as a resource 
person for free. These are opportunities that NGOs might miss if they do not have good 
informal ties with resource people. This is one of the factors missing in Techiman, which 
might have contributed to its poor performance. 
 
                                                 
124
 From my own experience, when we plan funerals in my village and talk about numbers we would cater for 
in terms of food and drinks, there are members of our abusua who we can be sure will support in cash and in 
kind. 
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According to a high profile member of Sunyani‟s traditional council the ethnic ties he had 
with the Disease Control Officer and the Deputy Director of Nursing Services enabled them 
to develop concerted efforts towards fighting HIV and AIDS. He explained that: 
As the traditional custodian of the municipality, everything concerning the development of the 
people here comes to my palace. Therefore I have been very concerned about this issue of 
HIV and AIDS and its effects on my people. I have been in touch with Dr. Opare and his team 
and we have been able to work together to help increase the awareness level among my 
people. Dr. Opare can come to me anytime and I can also request him to come whenever I 
need him. In addition to our friendship ties, I was the Chairman of the Hospital Management 
Board for about 4 years. All these have further strengthened our friendship [Member of 
Sunynai Traditional council, 7
th
 May 2009].  
 
Through most of my interactions with people in Sunyani, I observed they were proud of 
their ethnic identities and they showed strong ethnic solidarity towards their people. This 
might explain their desire to mobilise efforts to help reduce the spread of the disease. There 
was also strong commitment from the Chief, officers at the Health Directorate, and the 
Civil Society actors to reduce HIV and AIDS in the municipality.  
 
For Techiman, ties were weak as compared with Sunyani. It was only the leader of 
Frankmay Orphanage (NGO) who had ethnic relations with all the three officers at the 
Health Directorate (they hailed from the northern part of Ghana), and abusua ties with the 
Disease Control Officer. In the same way it was only the Disease Control Officer who had 
abusua ties with leaders of three NGOs, Pastors, and the Chief of Techiman (refer to Table 
4 in Chaper 4 and see Tables 7 and 8). There were no old-school networks at all. The weak 
abusua ties might mainly be due to the fact that the officers of the Health Directorate were 
new in Techiman unlike in Sunyani where officers at the Health Directorate had been in 
office long enough to establish abusua ties within the municipality. The Director of Health 
explained that: 
I am yet to know these people you are talking about because as I said I am new. We only deal 
at the formal level especially with the NGOs who sometimes come for me to recommend 
them for funding from the Ghana AIDS Commission and the National HIV and AIDS Control 
Programme. But I hope that as time goes on we will all get to know each other. My initial 
impression is that there is so much rivalry and competition going on among the NGOs. This 
raises the issue about their genuine intentions about fighting the disease [Health Director, 
Techiman, 25
th
 November 2008].  
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The short period that health staff had been in post could explain why the strong political 
party ties between them and leaders of NGOs have not influenced the overall strength of all 
the ties. All the NGO leaders also stated that the Health Director and the Deputy Director of 
Nursing Services were less than two years in Techiman. These officers were therefore still 
learning about NGO activities. This might also explain why staff at the Health Directorate 
had doubts about claims of the NGOs concerning the number of PLWAs they provided care 
and support for. The views of health staff might be influenced by the fact that most of the 
NGOs were „owned‟ and directed by single people. The NGOs in Sunyani were also owned 
by individuals but they were managed by „Boards‟ having the Health Director as their 
Chairman.  NGOs that are owned by one person might not be peculiar to only Techiman 
and Sunyani as observed by Amoako (2008: 4) that “NGOs in Africa are often dominated 
by individuals, have few members and are prone to minimal transparency and 
accountability.” 
 
The rivalry and competition among the NGOs might explain why the health officers had 
questions about their claims because there is the perception that NGOs use HIV and AIDS 
to make money. A study conducted by ActionAid Ghana (2007) in Ghana, found that HIV 
and AIDS sufferers complained that NGOs used them to make money as indicated by one 
of the PLWAs, “because of us, people outside send money. We don‟t see the money. All 
we know is that the money has been used for us …” (ActionAid 2007: 79).125 
 
The analysis of interview transcripts and documentary materials suggest that the 
embeddedness of staff at the Health Directorates can play a significant role in 
implementing HIV and AIDS policy in addition to other factors. I discuss these below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 This PLWA might be referring to donors whose interest in HIV and AIDS has come with a lot of funding 
which NGOs can access. This can be the main incentive for mobilisation around the disease in Ghana and 
why NGOs might want to register more AIDs victims. 
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7.4 Effects of embeddedness of Health Directorates on beliefs and norms 
 
To be able to identify the extent to which informal relations between health staff and 
leaders of the selected groups within civil society may have contributed to the development 
of joint efforts between them to work together, I asked both leaders of the CSOs and the 
health officers how the District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) enabled them to 
work together. None of them indicated that the DHMTs were functional enough. According 
to one of the senior health officers, for the past 8 years, the DHMT has only existed in 
name on paper. This was how she described the activities of the DHMT in Sunyani: 
 
As far as the DHMT is concerned, I would say yes, we have it. At least it exists here at the 
Health Directorate. However it is only made up of health staff. We do not have any member 
or representatives from the Assembly and Civil Society Organisations even though they are 
supposed to send representatives to come. They know about this and we have written to 
them. It looks like they are just not interested in it. It is one of the reasons why finding other 
ways to work with the CSOs is important and this is what I mean by developing good 
friendship and working relationships with them [Health officer, Sunyani Municipal Health 
Directorate, ...] 
 
Findings from subsequent interviews I had with the leaders of the selected NGOs supported 
what I found from the Health Directorate that the DHMT did not have the required 
membership and that other representatives from the Assembly and CSOs did not actively 
participate in the DHMT. The claims by health officers that the weak nature of the DHMT 
partly explains the usefulness of embedding themselves within society appear to make 
sense following the findings from the analysis of the effects of their embeddedness with 
CSOs. 
 
The Sunyani Health Directorate‟s embeddedness within the selected aspect of civil society 
seem to facilitate the consultation with leaders of the selected civil society groups by health 
staff and about 57 percent of leaders of those CSOs were consulted in the design and 
implementation of HIV and AIDS programmes (see Table 13 in Appendix K and Table 14 
in Appendix L). The increase in consultation appeared to have contributed to the 
development of shared interests around the disease which seems to have helped overcome 
the challenges discussed in the previous section and influenced the behaviour of Health 
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Directorate staff. For example, one of the respondents at the Health Directorate indicated 
that based on experiences and lessons he had gained from working with people at the local 
level, and dealing with beliefs around health, he has adopted a strategy of embedding 
himself within the community as this makes it easy to involve the community and deliver 
more responsive services to citizens. He claimed that his approach has yielded good results. 
He said: 
Through my own Pastor, I became friends with other Pastors that I know to have opposed 
condoms so it was easy to talk about HIV and AIDS issues with them. We talked freely about 
condoms during the times we had together, and these meetings were very informal so they 
trusted me that our campaigns to promote condoms would not necessarily encourage people to 
engage in premarital sex. Sundays after church service, they give me their pulpits to explain 
our programmes to the congregation. In the same way my frequent attendance to NGO 
meetings as a Board member eroded all formalities between us. We all trusted each other so it 
was easy to coordinate our efforts in that respect. Again a high profile person in the Sunyani 
traditional council has become my friend and I can go to him anytime. So it made it easy for 
me to get him to attend all the public campaigns we organise [A staff at the Health 
Directorate, Sunyani, 14
th
 May 2009]. 
 
The Pastors‟ offer of their pulpits to the health staff and leaders of NGOs for health 
campaigns is a demonstration of trust and acceptance that their message would not conflict 
with the church‟s doctrine about morality. The embeddedness of health staff with leaders of 
the churches might have contributed to the establishment of trust between them but it will 
take time for trust to be established and maintained for it to yield such outcome. Similarly, 
for staff at the Health Directorate to be able to get a very influential member of the Sunyani 
traditional council to attend their programmes means that this high ranking member of the 
traditional council was accessible to them privately or they had good personal ties with him 
or her otherwise it is unlikely to get the support of such a person. 
 
Another popular elected Assembly member also supports the claims that the change in 
attitudes of residents in Sunyani could not have been possible without informal ties 
between officers at the Health Directorate and civil society actors. He explained using the 
example of the case of the Zongo community that: 
Leaders of NGOs and health officers were able to get the leaders of the Zongo areas to accept 
open discussions about condoms because I know they are good friends and they have become 
familiar with each other. I think the whole issue is about familiarising yourself with the people 
to eliminate any suspicion and win peoples‟ trust. That is what health officers have done with 
leaders of NGOs. I have seen senior health officers on a number of occasions with leaders of 
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influential NGOs outside office or formal working hours which make me believe that they are 
good friends [Elected Assembly member, Sunyani, 6
th
 May 2009]. 
  
Trust might explain why the Zongo community was easily accessible to the Health 
Directorate and NGOs as NGO leaders would not be able to hold private discussions about 
sexual and reproductive rights with women without the approval of their husbands. Gaining 
the approval of the men for open discussions about the right of women to make choices 
concerning sex and reproduction also appears to suggest that some men may be chaning 
their attitudes about how they dominate in matters surrounding sexually transmitted 
infections and ways to manage them. This suggestion is supported by one of the leaders of 
the Zongo community who said: 
For over four years now, we have all worked with the staff from the Health Directorate and 
leaders of NGOs who come here to help create awareness that women should be able to say 
how many children the family should have or how many wives their husbands should have. A 
woman should also be able to say when she wants to have sex. It is not that we were against 
such efforts in the past and that Muslim men would like to dominate women. It is the teaching 
of Islam that women must be submissive to their husbands. Islam also allows the man to 
marry more than one wife. Sometime ago it was not possible to raise this discussion in the 
Zongo community. But now most women are gradually being able to do so because the men 
are tolerating the views of their wives and women in general [Opinion leader in the Zongo 
area, Sunyani, 6
th
 May 2009].  
  
As the teachings of Islam allow a man to marry more than one wife, these comments 
suggest the attitudes of some Muslim men may be changing as they allow their wives to 
hold views concerning the number of women they should marry. If this is the case then it is 
a positive consequence of the collaboration between the Health Directorate and Muslim 
men. It also suggests the successful embedding of the Health Directorate within civil 
society which enabled staff at the Health Directorate to win the trust of the leaders of the 
Zongo areas and for them to allow a discussion of this kind. 
 
In Techiman, unlike Sunyani, there was low consultation with leaders of the selected CSOs, 
poor coordination of programmes between the Health Directorate and those Civil Society 
Organisations, and consequently a lack of concerted efforts towards the challenges that 
confront HIV and AIDS policies. All the leaders of the 5 NGOs claimed that the officers at 
the Techiman Municipal Health Directorate did not consult with them about plans to 
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manage AIDS (see Table 13 in Appendix K and Table 14 in Appendix L). According to the 
leader of one NGO:  
My NGO provides care and support for PLWAs. We do voluntary counselling and encourage 
people to go for testing, and I know that there are other NGOs that also do the same thing. 
Even the Health Directorate also undertakes voluntary counselling and testing. The Health 
Directorate has not made any effort to coordinate our activities so we can fight the disease 
together [Director of NGO, Techiman, 27
th
 November 2008]. 
 
This Director‟s view suggests that coordination of NGO activities, which is a key 
responsibility of the Health Directorate, is weak in Techiman. This may be due to weak ties 
between health staff and leaders of NGOs because the staff in the Health Directorate and 
leaders of NGOs had not known each other for long as most of the health officers have 
spent less than two years in Techiman. As these NGOs conducted their activities in 
isolation from each other and considering the reservations that staff at the Health 
Directorate had about NGO activities, it can be difficult for them to mobilise concerted 
efforts towards addressing the issues that constrain implementation of HIV and AIDS 
programmes in the municipality.  
 
The study also revealed that politicisation of NGO activities in the municipality might have 
contributed to weakening the consultation with and mobilisation of NGOs around the 
disease. A staff member of one of the private radio stations in Techiman revealed that 
leaders of NGOs known to be members of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) received funding 
from the Assembly between 2000 and 2008 when the NPP was in power. In fact Minutes of 
the General Assembly meetings show that Assembly members called for the list of NGOs 
receiving support from the Assembly to be made public but this was not carried out by the 
Chief Executive (TMA 2003a; 2003b).
126
 The Chief Executive‟s unwillingness to make the 
list public provided further grounds for Assembly members to call on opinion leaders, 
traditional authority and the clergy to monitor the use of HIV and AIDS funds (see TMA 
2003b), and this might have caused NGOs to lose the support of Assembly members. The 
                                                 
126
 See TMA (2003a) „Minutes of the First Ordinary Meeting of the Second Session of the Techiman District 
Assembly held on 7
th
 July 2003.‟ In addition, see TMA (2003b) „Minutes of the First Ordinary Meeting of the 
Second Session of the Techiman District Assembly held on 8
th
 July 2003.‟ This might be why the Focal 
Person for HIV and AIDS at the Assembly was reluctant in giving me the list of NGOs in the Municipality. 
When he later gave me the NGOs verbally, I realised that I could not trace some of the NGOs. Their 
telephone numbers did not work and some of them who accepted my call would not grant me interviews. 
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Assembly members have great influence within the community and without their support 
NGOs could lose the trust of community members in their programmes to promote condom 
acceptance, and empower women. This interviewee added that the politicisation of NGOs 
was extended to their radio station in 2006. He said: 
In 2006 we had a schedule with a high profile international NGO which paid for airtime to 
create awareness about HIV and AIDS in Techiman. Unfortunately some people started 
pointing accusing fingers at our radio station that we were anti NPP because we made the 
government unpopular since our programme created the impression that government was not 
doing enough in Techiman as far as prevention of HIV and AIDS was concerned. We 
therefore stopped the programme even though the NGO had paid for the airtime, so that we 
would not be seen as anti-government [Staff from a media house, Techiman, 17
th
 November 
2008]. 
 
The extension of politicisation of NGO activities to media houses provides further evidence 
of weak coordination and poor mobilisation of efforts between the Health Directorate and 
the NGOs towards addressing HIV and AIDS in Techiman. If municipality residents had 
seen NGOs conducting joint programmes with health staff playing a leading role, they 
would have been less likely to misunderstand their message. This did not happen as health 
staff were not strongly embedded with the leaders of NGOs who were supposedly on the 
ground and in touch with the people. 
 
In the previous sections, I have explained the nature of embeddedness between health 
officers and leaders of CSOs and shown that the nature of health staff embeddedness 
enabled them to develop joint efforts with leaders of CSOs to implement HIV and AIDS 
policy. In the next section, I show how this was achieved in Sunyani as compared with 
Techiman where weak embeddedness largely explain the inability of health staff and CSO 
leaders to work to achieve success.  
 
7.5 Overcoming religious beliefs against the acceptance of condoms 
 
The Health Director in Sunyani and leaders of CSOs succeeded in changing the attitude of 
the church to condom use. Considering the influence that religious belief can have on 
people‟s choices this is a huge achievement. This is how one of the respondents in the 
Sunyani Health Directorate explained it: 
221 
 
 
 
We have worked with the NGOs to break through myths about condoms. We have been able 
to get some of the pastors to openly talk about condoms in church. We are now able to even 
carry both male and female condoms to demonstrate how they are used when we are invited 
by Men and Women Ministries of the church for health talks and this has been going on for 
about 4 years now. If you knew the situation from the late 1990s to around 2004, you will 
appreciate that we have achieved a lot. So I can confidently say that the situation now is far 
different from what I came to meet in the early part of 2004. When I came to Sunyani in 2004, 
I realised that the municipality was high transit point and there was the danger that most 
people could be at risk of contracting the disease. However, most people would not openly 
talk about it. The worst culprit was the church. I realised that there were a number of NGOs 
who were committed to this cause. I also realised that the NGOs effectively coordinated their 
activities. I saw this because I am also a member of their Board. I also realised that leaders of 
some of the NGOs were Christians and members of churches whose pastors opposed 
condoms. I therefore took advantage of my position as a member of their Board to use these 
NGOs to break this religious barrier. As I speak to you now, HIV and AIDS is discussed more 
openly than in the past. A lot more people voluntarily go for counselling and testing [An 
interviewee at the Municipal Health Directorate, Sunyani, 22
nd
 May 2009]. 
 
Documentary evidence supports the claims made by this Health Directorate respondent that 
condoms are now more acceptable than in the past. The study revealed that the rate of 
condoms acceptance is high especially among men. Whilst 18 out of 20 men would accept 
condoms in 2007, it is only 1 out of 20 women would do so in Sunyani during the same 
period (Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate 2007). A shift from the difficulty to talk 
about condoms to the demonstration of the use of condoms in Christian congregation is 
remarkable. For the Health Directorate to be able to do this continuously for four years 
means that many residents in the Sunyani municipality are changing their attitudes in a 
positive way towards the use of condoms (Sunyani Municipal Assembly 2006a; 2008b).  
 
According to the Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate (2007), the proportion of the 
population that sought VCT increased by about 15 per cent each year between 2000 and 
2008. Additionally, people diagnosed as HIV positive became confident to declare their 
status and form associations for the purposes of receiving care and support from Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, the number of PLWAs registered by the 
NGOs increased from a total of 216 between 2000 and 2004 to about 437 between 2005 
and 2008 (Sunyani Municipal Health Directorate 2007). Many families now accepted 
family members who were HIV positive. 
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The evidence of a shift in the position of many churches in the Sunyani municipality was 
supported by a Pastor of one of the Charismatic churches whose views changed. Initially 
the church did not want to encourage discussions around condoms because that would 
mean the church was encouraging sin among the people. Following the NGO and the 
Health Director‟s HIV and AIDS awareness campaigns in the municipality from 2004 he 
changed his mind because he realised that unmarried and young persons in his church 
would engage in sexual activities irrespective of them being in the church. He added that 
between 2000 and 2008, there were over 75 pregnancies and illegal abortion related 
complications among young persons in Sunyani including his church. He indicated that in 
spite of the fact that the church punished those concerned, there was the possibility that 
such things could happen. He explained how the church had changed to now support the 
idea of campaigns for condoms this way: 
I have personally taken it upon myself that I will spread the message about condoms. Since 
2005, I have incorporated sex education into the programme of our youth ministry. We invite 
staff from the Health Directorate to come and have a talk with the youth. This was difficult to 
do in the past because I had the conviction that young and unmarried persons could fall prey 
to sexual temptations that can lead them to commit sin. But I also know that there is the 
likelihood that some of my members could fall to this temptation so if they use condoms then 
we can be sure that at least they will not get infected or even prevent unwanted pregnancy. 
But I always ensure that I emphasise that the adolescent must stay away from pre-marital sex 
each time I preach my sermon [A Pastor at Sunyani, 10
th
 June 2009]. 
 
This pastor‟s views are a departure from the conventional teaching of the church that 
advocates that young and unmarried Christians would keep away from engaging in sexual 
activities until marriage. This thinking is what informs the abstinence „A‟ component of the 
institutional strategy which appears to be difficult to achieve. Most religious leaders are 
gradually accepting that it can be difficult to get unmarried people to abstain from having 
sex so pastors are able to promote condom use. However, others might have the view that it 
is unreligious for leaders of the church to encourage the use of condoms. One such instance 
is given by Haynes (2007) that a Buddhist monk in Thailand who supported the idea of 
condoms was criticised because it was not right for a cleric to do that.  
 
The results from in-depth interviews with leaders of NGOs and extensive analysis of 
documentary material on HIV and AIDS management in Sunyani provide further evidence 
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that from around 2004 to 2008, the general attitudes of religious leaders and the Christian 
public towards campaigns for condoms have been positive when compared with public 
attitudes during the period between 2000 and 2004 (Sixth March Women‟s Foundation 
2007; Centre for Sustainable Development 2006). A director of one of the NGOs claimed 
that when she set up the NGO in 1996, she was faced with the challenge as to whether her 
strong Christian beliefs and principles would conflict with her programmes around HIV and 
AIDS and whether she should support campaigns for condom acceptance. She indicated 
that although she set up the NGO in 1996 by undertaking programmes to create HIV and 
AIDS awareness among women it took about 8 years before she could openly show her 
support for such campaigns. She said: 
I started supporting campaigns for condoms as a means to reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS 
since 2005. I am aware that some of the pastors have changed their position on this. I am a 
strong Christian myself and I am a leader of the women‟s ministry in my church. I have been 
brought up with strict Presbyterian principles and discipline. As a woman with adolescent 
children, I therefore thought it was ungodly to openly support campaigns and debates around 
the acceptance of condoms. My belief at the time was that if we did that then we had given 
our approval to young people to get into immoral activities.  But I was not the only person 
who held this view. Most women in our church also thought the same way. But due to what I 
have learnt from my engagement with health officers and other religious leaders, I now hold a 
different perception which is that supporting campaigns for condoms do not necessarily 
conflict with Christian teachings. I know that other women have also changed to accept that 
condoms must be discussed and endorsed by everybody. Through our collaborative work with 
other NGOs such as Beauty in Virginity, and Mission of Hope, we visit churches and speak 
openly about condoms. We even distribute condoms at durbars and it makes people laugh. I 
could not do this some 5 years back [Director of an NGO in Sunyani, 18
th
 May 2009]. 
 
To change from a fear of breaking strict discipline rooted in religious ethics to open 
distribution of condoms at durbar grounds suggests a fundamental change in attitude of 
such an influential person, a leader of the women‟s group in her church. These actions 5 
years earlier would be seen as breaking Christian principles which could have cost her 
reputation and the trust she had built over several years as women‟s leader and a mother. 
She could not therefore risk doing this if she was not convinced that she could do that and 
still retain the respect and trust of the other women, her own family and the public. Her 
belief that other women have also changed their perception and attitudes towards condoms 
suggests that programmes around condoms are increasingly receiving support of religious 
people. 
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The evidence of change in perception of religious people is further supported by attitudes of 
the church towards leaders of NGOs who started condom awareness campaigns between 
early 2000 to about 2005. The account of the experiences of NGOs at the beginning and the 
support they have received later from the church was described by one NGO director as 
follows: 
I had some bad experience in 2002. Some parents criticised me on religious grounds that I 
was encouraging adolescents to engage in premarital sex which was a sinful act because I was 
talking about condoms to young people. It was true that I did educate the young people in the 
virgin clubs about the use of condoms. Ideally, I encouraged them to remain virgins till they 
marry but the fact is that we could only control them to some extent when they are in the 
Senior Secondary School (SSS). When they leave the SSS it can be difficult to control them 
and since they might have sex without you knowing, I thought that it was right to expose them 
to this so that they would be safe. But some parents did not understand me initially. My 
philosophy was that if we are able to „catch-them-young‟ and instil responsive sexual 
behaviours into them, they would grow to become responsible adults.   
 
I also aimed to reduce teenage pregnancy among young girls aged between 8 and 25 years. 
The good thing however is that the situation is different today. I think that some of the parents 
have come to understand that we can be Christians and talk about condoms without going to 
hell. Can you believe that the fathers of two of the members of the club who are pharmacists 
now provide us with condoms for distribution in schools? You won‟t believe this but these are 
Christians also. Most parents also support us with funds to organise our meetings where we 
provide health education talks. We meet every two weeks on Sundays to keep them active and 
busy so they would not be idle and get into doing things that could expose them to bad 
company [Director of an NGO in Sunyani, 18
th
 May 2009].  
 
This respondent‟s indication that the same parents and churches who criticised her in the 
past now support her NGO, in cash and in kind, further supports the claim made by officers 
from the Health Directorate that by using open discussions of HIV and AIDS and condoms 
in the church NGOs and the Health Directorate had been able to change people‟s perception 
about condom use in the municipality. 
 
Comparing the case in Techiman with Sunyani reveals that the Health Directorate and civil 
society actors in Techiman did not perform well in overcoming religious beliefs that 
constrained efforts to promote condoms. The rate of condom acceptance was low when 
compared with Sunyani. For every 40 men that would accept condoms, there was only 1 
woman who would do so, and this has been the situation each year between 2003 and 2008 
(Techiman Municipal Health Directorate 2005; 2006; 2007).  
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The low rate of condom acceptance might be due to the poor organisation of programmes 
by NGOs and the Health Directorate. Activities of the numerous NGOs in the municipality 
were fragmented and poorly coordinated mainly due to rivalry and competition among 
them.  NGOs competed for PLWAs because the more PLWAs an NGO has the better its 
chances to obtain financial resources from donors. Officers at the Municipal Assembly and 
the Health Directorate had doubts about the intentions of NGOs due to the rivalry and 
competition amongst them. According to one of the officers at the Health Directorate: 
I have been here for about two years but I hear there are several NGOs doing virtually the 
same thing. They all claim to have associations of PLWAs to whom they provide care and 
support but you hardly find them coordinating programmes. I have also been informed about 
some NGOs fighting over HIV and AIDS patients because those patients have left one NGO 
or another to join a different association of PLWAs under a different NGO. If they aim at 
improving the lives of PLWAs why won‟t they share ideas and resources? [A staff, Municipal 
Health Directorate, Techiman, 21
st
 August 2009]. 
 
Most of the leaders of the NGOs agreed that there was rivalry among them. According to 
one director, this rivalry was due to the way the Municipal Assembly treated the NGOs, 
offering financial support to a few selected ones and leaving out others. This helps to 
explain why NGOs would perceive each other as rivals and compete for resources. This 
finding suggests that there are no collaborative efforts between the staff in the Health 
Directorate, the Assembly, and NGOs around HIV and AIDS in Techiman. It is difficult to 
understand why the staff from the Health Directorate had reservations about the claims of 
the NGOs and their activities in the municipality. I discuss these reservations later in this 
chapter but it is useful to understand that funding drives NGO leaders‟ concern at the loss 
of a PLWA to another NGO. The lack of combined efforts among the key actors might 
explain why there are practical difficulties with promoting the campaigns to promote 
condoms. A member of the Techiman Traditional Council (TTC) said: 
The Catholic Church in Techiman is strongly against discussions about promotion of 
condoms. Apart from the Catholic Church, we have over 100 new churches, what people call 
Pentecostal or Charismatic Churches, which I call „one-man churches,‟ which would not 
encourage such discussions. Most people also see these churches as „heaven bound‟ and they 
preach about sin and hell and all that. HIV and AIDS is a big health concern here but how can 
we manage this when some of these young pastors tell us that we will promote premarital sex 
when we talk about condoms. We will be deceiving ourselves if we think young people would 
not have sex and they will abstain. We hear of stories of teenage pregnancies in the church 
here and there. There are even stories of some of the church leaders having affairs in the 
church. Why don‟t we help everybody to leave a safe life? [A member of Techiman 
Traditional Council, 19
th
 November 2008]. 
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The views of this member of the TTC concerning promiscuity in the church may not be 
restricted toTechiman but can help us to understand the challenges of campaigns to 
promote condoms within Techiman.
127
 The views further support my assertion that the 
other two components of the „ABC‟ strategy to fight HIV and AIDS in Ghana may be 
ineffective since it might be difficult to get people to abstain from having sex, the first 
component. It is also unlikely that people will restrict their activity to one sexual partner the 
perception held by my respondents in Sunyani, which is anticipated by the second 
component of „ABC‟. What these views suggest is that the third component of the „ABC‟ 
strategy (condoms) might be more acceptable to most people in Ghana. This is why the 
TTC has called for sensitisation of citizens to change religious beliefs that can undermine 
efforts towards promoting the use of condoms (Techiman Traditional Council 2007).  
 
Involving the general public in the fight against the disease is particularly important to all 
the interviewees who have concerns about stigmatisation and discrimination against people 
with the disease. In addition to the success of promoting condoms in Sunyani, the study 
revealed that stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs has been minimised in 
Sunyani as compared with Techiman. I describe this next. 
  
7.6 Addressing stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs 
  
The level of stigmatisation and discrimination has been reduced in Sunyani. As I indicated 
in an earlier section of this chapter, the number of people who went for voluntary 
counselling and testing and the number of people who have HIV and AIDS registered by all 
the NGOs increased significantly between 2000 and 2008. According to my key 
informants, the increase in the registered number of PLWAs might not be due to new 
infections but rather because people have become confident to publicly declare their status 
due to a change in the attitudes of the public to accept them. The Executive Director of one 
                                                 
127
 A cursory survey of the media in Ghana reveals that there are several stories of premarital pregnancies 
among young persons in the church and also stories of pastors defiling church members (see Daily Guide 
2010; Ghanaian Journal 2010; Ghana News Agency 2010m). 
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of the NGOs indicated that stigmatisation and discrimination have been minimised mainly 
due to the collaborative activities undertaken by NGOs and Health Directorate. He claimed 
that they have achieved a lot especially in the Zongo areas.
128
 He explained that: 
Until 2004 onwards there was a kind of silence and myth about the HIV and AIDS disease 
among the people in the Zongo communities. Those who had the disease were hiding because 
they were seen as immoral people who had been punished by God. Family members would 
not want to be associated with PLWAs because it was demeaning to the whole family. 
PLWAs could not go to the market or buy things or come to public gatherings. Some people 
even would not shake hands with PLWAs for fear of being infected. Until around 2004, the 
Zongo areas were „no-go‟ zones for most NGOs because the Imams were strongly against 
activities that sought to expand Christianity in the Zongo community. Initially they did not 
understand the work of the NGOs around HIV and AIDS and some of the Islamic teachings 
that see sex as sacred made it difficult for open discussions around sex as the main cause of 
the disease. But we have been able to break this silence and most people in the Zongo areas 
now talk about the disease in public. Most people are also happy to go for VCT services. I can 
lead you to homes where PLWAs are living with their families because this is no longer secret 
and the PLWAs themselves are able to come out. But it was in the same communities that 
PLWAs were hiding and nobody would like to show you who and where they were [Director 
of an NGO, Sunyani, 18
th
 May 2009]. 
 
Breaking the taboos surrounding sexual activities and HIV and AIDS in the Zongo area is 
important to fighting the disease. All the respondents claim that PLWAs in the Zongo areas 
publicly declared their status, and families openly accepted them. This claim suggests that 
attitudes towards PLWAs in the Zongo in particular and Sunyani in general have changed 
from the earlier situation between 1990s and early parts of 2000.  The Zongo areas‟ 
acceptance of HIV and AIDS related programmes might have been influenced by the 
approach that one of the NGOs employed. This was how the leader of this NGO explained 
it: 
We identified 50 orphans due to HIV and AIDS in the Zongo for support in education. The 
support includes payment of their fees; provision of school uniform; footwear; meals; books; 
and pencils. In addition to these, we adopted one of the Islamic Schools in the area for 
support. For twice in every year since 2005 we provide books and teaching aids to them. All 
these have helped to allow us access to the Zongo areas [Director of NGO, Sunyani, 18
th
 May 
2009]. 
 
The strategy for accessing the Zongo communities through the provision of support to 
orphans showed the Imams and leaders of the Zongo areas that activities around the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic were in good faith and that the leaders of NGOs and health staff did 
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 Zongo communities were predominantly inhabited by people of Islamic faith. 
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not aim at religious indoctrination or efforts to convert Muslims to the Christian faith.  This 
explains why people‟s perception towards the disease and NGOs activities changed. 
 
An influential member of the Sunyani Traditional Council was particularly impressed by 
the positive change in attitudes of the general public in the municipality towards PLWAs. 
This is one area which my respondents from the Techiman Traditional Council believed has 
not changed in Techiman. According to the member of the Sunyani Traditional Council, 
continuous stigmatisation and discrimination against the people who have the disease 
would worsen their plight and expose others to risks of infection because those who have 
the disease might go into hiding. He explained that: 
I can say that for the past five years or so most people in Sunyani are able to openly declare 
their status when they are diagnosed to be HIV positive. This has come as a big relief because 
the more we call HIV positive people with funny names the more we expose all other persons 
to the risk of infection. You know that HIV positive persons can still look healthy therefore 
anybody can fall in love with them and because they fear to be rejected, they would not tell 
you their condition. In the past, it was like a taboo to talk about the disease due to several 
superstitions we all heard about. People even called it „Abidjan disease‟ because it was mostly 
those who came from the Ivory Coast who were found to have come home with the disease. 
Women who had it were called „prostitutes‟ and the men who had it were called „womanisers‟ 
and nobody would like to come near such people [A member of Sunyani Traditional Council, 
7
th
 May 2009]. 
 
The views of this respondent have mirrored a number of influential NGOs such as 
ActionAid-Ghana. The danger of stigmatisation is that it can compel PLWAs to migrate to 
reside in other cities in the country or even outside the country, and keep their status secret 
thereby exposing innocent people to risk of contracting it from them (ActionAid Ghana 
2007). A change in perception among residents of Sunyani also means that people‟s 
knowledge about the causes of HIV infection had improved and that most people had come 
to know that sexual transmission is not the only means of getting infected and that those 
people who acquire HIV might not necessarily be prostitutes in the case of women or 
womanisers as with men.  
 
As compared with Sunyani, stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs were high in 
Techiman. The Health Directorate and NGOs‟ performance in this respect was low as 
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compared with the achievements of NGOs in Sunyani. A number of stories attest to this 
and one of such experiences was given by an officer at the Health Directorate. She said: 
I think the public in Techiman is too judgemental especially the Christian community. People 
who know they have the disease are hiding because they are called by all kinds of derogatory 
names and their families will not want to have anything to do with them. The common 
perception among most people is that those who have the disease have slept with several men 
or women. So people feel shy to be seen at the VCT centres. The number of people who go 
for VCT services show that most people are not willing to patronise this service even though 
it is one of the important programmes the government is implementing to address HIV and 
AIDS [Interviewee at the Health Directorate, Techiman, 17
th
 November 2008].  
 
Rejection by extended family members can lead to serious consequences given the nature 
of the support system that extended families can offer to their members in an African 
context (Hanson 2004; Witte 2003; Clark 1999; Aldous 1962). Most people in Africa, and 
Techiman in particular which is a farming community, rely heavily on cheap labour from 
extended family members and acquaintances. Extended families can also provide emotional 
support so most people in Africa would not conduct themselves in a manner that can lead 
them to lose this bond. This might increase the likelihood of HIV positive persons keeping 
their status secret so as not to be rejected by their extended families. Two examples were 
given by another respondent from the Health Directorate about cases of AIDS patients who 
were rejected by their families where efforts to get the families to accept those people back 
failed: 
There were two instances in 2005 and 2007 I can remember. In 2005, a woman was forced to 
move into a village on the Nkoranza road when she realised she had the disease because her 
family would not accept her. She told me that she was a trader in textiles and so she went to 
Abidjan to bring the textiles to be retailed in Techiman. I met this woman in the village during 
our immunisation tours. She was in a very bad condition. I took the contacts of her family and 
I contacted her brother who informed me that the family had promised to be supporting her 
whilst she was in that village. But I realised during subsequent visits to the village that the 
families had not honoured this promise. I do not know what happened again to her but I never 
saw her again and the villagers did not know where she had left for. What happened in 2007 
was a similar case but this one was a truck driver. According to his wife, the husband had 
moved to Tamale and she had not seen him for a long time [Interviewee at the Health 
Directorate, Techiman, 21
st
 November 2008].   
 
There are many similar stories of families rejecting PLWAs in Techiman but space does not 
allow them to be presented here. What we see in these two instances are: firstly, both 
victims were abandoned by their families, and secondly, they relocated to live in places 
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where their status might be kept secret. The possibility of these people infecting others with 
the disease can be high but they were forced by the circumstances to take that option.  
 
In the next section I turn to the issue of male dominance in sexual and reproductive health 
matters. The Health Directorate and civil society actors in Sunyani have been able to 
influence many residents in the municipality to accommodate the views of women 
concerning issues about their sexual lives. In Techiman however, male dominance in sexual 
and reproductive health matters was more prevalent and there is inadequate evidence to 
suggest that the Health Directorate and CSOs have been able to reverse this. 
 
7.7 Overcoming the notion of male dominance in sexual matters 
 
The leaders of three NGOs and a member of the Sunyani Traditional Council informed me 
that there had been changes in the attitudes of commercial vehicle drivers towards 
programmes of NGOs that sought to empower women to take decisions about their sex life. 
This is an indication of acceptance of the debate that seeks to promote the voice of women 
in matters around sex and health. For example, the leader of one of the NGOs indicated that 
they have focused on bringing the men into the discussion because they realised that they 
could not be successful without involving the men. This attempt was initially frustrating 
because the men would not attend such programmes. He explained that: 
In 2002 when we mounted a public address system at the lorry station and hung banners 
during one of our public campaigns, some of the commercial vehicle drivers removed the 
banners.
129
 One particular driver I know very well said that our instruments had blocked the 
way of passengers who wanted to board his vehicle. We distributed condoms but only few of 
the drivers collected them. None of the drivers‟ mates collected the condoms because they 
feared that their masters would see them as bad boys.
130
 There was no woman who came 
forward to pick the condoms. We were not disturbed and continued with such programmes. 
These days when we do such programmes and distribute condoms, women are able to come 
forward to collect them even though you will think they are joking, we know they use them. 
Most people no longer feel shy about these things today [Leader of an NGO, Sunyani, 8
th
 May 
2009]. 
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 He said what they had written on the banners was „Women, say yes to condoms! Men respect views of 
women.‟ 
130
 Driver‟s mates in Ghana are driver-apprentices. They are responsible for getting passengers to board their 
vehicles and the collection of the fares from the passengers. They will do this job for three or four years whilst 
they learn the skill to drive. You will have to show a good character and respect to your master before he will 
teach you how to drive. Your master might not be happy to see you accepting condoms in public. It would 
mean that you are not respectful, and you are not prepared to learn the job to become responsible person. 
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That women may collect condoms in public places such as vehicle terminals is an 
indication of their gradual empowerment, and the consequent erosion of male voices in 
matters of sexual behaviour. As women develop an interest in condoms and possibly 
encourage their sexual partners to use them, it can reduce infection among the people. My 
interviews with female Assembly members supported the view that men in the municipality 
had changed their perception about women in matters concerning sex. For example one of 
the Assembly women, explained that the nature of campaigns organised by the Health 
Directorate and civil society groups were so intensive that most women have been 
enlightened about their sexual rights. She said until recently around 2003, it was not 
possible for women to discuss matters of sex and HIV and AIDS in public because of fears 
of being labelled. She described what she called the „new woman‟ in Sunyani as follows: 
I know that the new woman in Sunyani can now ask a man to use a condom during sex and 
she will not feel shy. These days even some married women ask their husbands to use 
condoms when they go out and fall into the temptation of sleeping with another woman. I 
know all these because I am a married woman and we know that it is possible for our 
husbands to sleep with other women. These days some pastors, even our pastor, tell us that we 
should put condoms in the bags of our husbands when they go on trek. So when my husband 
is travelling I put condoms in his bag. We laugh over it but I am serious about it. You cannot 
prevent it so you tell your husband to be sensible and behave in a safe way. Today, women do 
this and their marriages are working. If you did this in the past, your husband could be angry 
with you and the consequences could be a divorce [Elected Assembly member, Sunyani, 13th 
May 2009].  
  
The views of this Assembly woman give us an idea of the extent to which women in 
Sunyani could go to get their voices heard. Their ability to do this also shows that men had 
become more accommodating of the views of women but their views are premised on the 
misconception that it is only men who bring HIV and AIDS into the matrimonial home. 
The call by religious leaders for women to put condoms in the bags of their husbands when 
they travel is significant as it is a further indication of acceptance of the message about 
condoms by religious leaders. As I explain later in this chapter, the presence of other 
factors in Sunyani might have also contributed to the gradual empowerment of women. 
 
Although leaders of CSOs have contributed tremendously in working with health staff to 
overcome cultural practices and norms that undermine HIV and AIDS programme 
implementation, the organisation of many NGOs raises concerns about their primary 
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purpose. About 80 percent of the NGOs are „owned‟ by individuals and have no system of 
accountability. This was possible because leaders of these NGOs were connected to key 
people in the Sunyani Municipal Assembly mostly through political party and abusua lines. 
Consequently, they receive a lot of support from the Assembly without evidence of 
accountability or reporting to the Assembly. Some of the Assembly members are sceptical, 
questioning the dramatic increase in the number of NGOs that seek to provide care and 
support to PLWAs. Some Assembly members suggest that operating an NGO is a 
„business‟, this suggestion was  supported by a group of people I interviewed who  
purported to be HIV positive and benefitting from  NGO support. They claimed that they 
were asked to pose as PLWAs for a group photograph used to obtain funds. In return they 
would receive a percentage of the funds although these did not materialise.
131
   
 
In Techiman, Municipal Health Directorate and civil society actors had been unable to 
implement effectively coordinated programmes around condom acceptance or to reduce 
stigmatisation and discrimination against PLWAs. They had also failed to influence a 
reversal of the perception of male superiority over females in matters of sexual and 
reproductive health. This was revealed by all the leaders of the NGOs. Their views are 
represented by one of the NGOs leaders who said: 
Most females in Techiman do not have the confidence to make decisions and choices about 
when to have sex and with whom. This is particularly common with female unmarried adults 
and commercial sex workers. I have worked with commercial sex workers to encourage them 
to insist that their clients use condoms but they tell me that if they insist on it they will not get 
any customer. This is very disturbing and that is why I am being supported with funds by the 
West African Programme for Commercial Sex Workers (WAPCAS) to help commercial sex 
workers in Techiman. We also have an association of PLWAs with 156 members and some of 
them say that their partners beat them up when they insisted that they use condoms. Some of 
them also said if they insist their husbands can go and sleep with other women because they 
will allow them to do so without condoms [Director of an NGO, Techiman, 27
th
 November 
2008].  
 
These views were also held by three of the commercial sex workers at different locations of 
the municipality.
132
 They all said for the sake of keeping their clients, they would not insist 
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 I found similar incidence in New Juaben. This appears to be common and most poor people are likely to be 
victims.  
132
 I did not use any rigorous method to select them. I just walked into their apartments randomly for 
interviews. 
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on condoms but if any of their clients would like to use it they would welcome the idea. 
The commercial sex workers fear of losing customers confirms the strong influence of 
Techiman males who patronised the services of sex workers. The weak economic power of 
these women eroded their bargaining and negotiation powers (Mill and Anarfi 2002).  
 
This can be difficult to reverse using only the formal approaches of mounting public 
campaigns to push for empowerment of women or promote the rights of commercial sex 
workers. The dominant choices of males were significant because it affected commercial 
sex workers and married women in Techiman who feared losing their husbands to other 
women if they insist that their husbands use condoms. This is the opposite of the case in 
Sunyani where women were able to assert their influence without fear of damaging their 
marriages. Considering the dependence of most married women on their husbands for their 
livelihoods in a developing country such as Ghana, most women would not want to risk 
their marriages over the issue of condom use.  
 
My interviews with all four media houses in Techiman  gave me fair understanding of 
general public perception,  these results also support the notion of the dominant voice of 
males over females in matters concerning sex and reproductive health in Techiman. For 
example, a Programme Manager of one of the radio stations in Techiman explained that: 
When we run programmes about sex education, HIV and AIDS, and ways to reduce it, we 
have a segment of the programme when we make the listening public to phone in to either ask 
questions, contribute ideas, or say anything they have about the topic. For the past 6 years or 
so, I can say that 8 out of 10 of the callers for a day are men. Most of the men can call and say 
that they do not enjoy sex when they use condom that is why they do not like it. Others can 
even call and say it is not disgraceful if a man is found sleeping with other women apart from 
his wife but it is more disgraceful for a woman to be caught doing so. There have been times 
when men phoned in and said one way to know that your girlfriend or wife sleeps with other 
men is when she starts talking about condoms. You will not find a single woman who can 
phone in to say anything to support the views of women [Programme Manager of Radio 
station, Techiman, 17
th
 November 2008]. 
 
The other three media houses in the Techiman municipality that run similar programmes all 
alluded to these views that women would not have the courage to phone into such 
programmes to make a contribution in support of their views because of the social 
construction of the role of women. The views of men, as indicated by this respondent, show 
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that a woman who phones in to express views about condoms may be seen as immoral by 
the people around her including other women.  
 
This finding supports those of other scholars. For example in a study of social norms in 
Thailand, it was found that “condoms generally represented mistrust and promiscuity, while 
not using condoms symbolised trust and loyalty to one‟s partner” (Caouette et al. 2000:17). 
This finding also supports the evidence of low rate condom acceptance between males and 
females in Techiman (Techiman Municipal Health Directorate 2005; 2006; 2007).  
 
 Central to the discussion so far is the significant role played by the joint efforts of health 
officers and CSO leaders in combating the spread of the disease even though some NGOs 
might engage in corrupt practices. Embedding health staff with Civil Society leaders by 
employing good informal relations with CSOs can result in the development of shared 
goals between health staff and leaders of CSOs.
133
 
 
7.8 Overcoming socio-cultural norms: alternative explanations 
 
Several other contextual factors could have contributed to Sunyani‟s success and 
Techiman‟s   failure. One explanation is the presence of Nurses‟ Training College and a 
Polytechnic in Sunyani. Due to these training institutions there were more educated women 
who were trained and enlightened; most of them resided in private accommodation and 
hostel facilities scattered across the municipality. Their interaction with other women could 
have led to increased awareness where women begin to question issues around male 
dominance. Additionally, their awareness of HIV and AIDS might be high since they are 
more educated in current issues and this might have contributed to increasing awareness 
levels among them, changing their perception and the attitudes of people they mixed with 
towards AIDS victims as they interacted with them. 
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 It might be worth mentioning however that in some situations embeddedness was prior to the changes that 
have occurred around these cultural practices and religious beliefs. This was where ties were ethnic and old-
school based. There were also iterative processes of embeddedness around the changes in these factors. This 
was where ties were mainly of the abusua type. 
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The second is that, as compared with Techiman, the population of Sunayni appeared to be 
more stable so the same people were likely to be exposed to the variety of programmes 
organised by the Health Directorate and CSOs over a period of time increasing the 
opportunity for such programmes to influence them.
134
 In the case of Techiman, because of 
its characteristic as a high transit town, the population turn-over was high. Therefore at any 
point in time, there could be a new set of people to whom the HIV and AIDS programmes 
needs to be administered making it difficult for a good assessment of the impact of such 
brief programmes. 
 
The third is that the Sunyani Health Directorate‟s access to the fund might have enabled it 
to undertake more programmes than Techiman where access to the fund was comparatively 
low. As I discussed earlier in Chapter 5, Sunyani was one of the cases which had high 
access to the fund. Following the assertions of the Health Director in New Juaben that the 
fund increased financial resources at his disposal which enabled him to undertake more 
programmes, we could conclude that the same would be true for Sunyani which was also 
able to do more when compared with Techiman.  
 
The contribution of these alternative explanations to the differential performance in 
Sunyani and Techiman cannot be overlooked. However, it would require a systematic and 
extensive study into them to establish their direct relationship with norms and beliefs that 
shape HIV and AIDS related policies.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
I have endeavoured to show how the embeddedness of officers of the Health Directorate 
with leaders of the selected civil society groups can facilitate the development of joint 
efforts required to shape cultural practices, social norms, and religious beliefs that may 
serve as barriers to the fight against HIV and AIDS in Ghana. The Sunyani case suggests 
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 Example include educational campaigns by artists publicly declaring their HIV status and asking 
Ghanaians not to shun the company of PLWAs since the disease can be contracted accidentally. 
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that where the Health Department is strongly embedded within civil society, consultation 
with CSOs can be high which might enhance joint efforts to change attitudes of citizens 
towards HIV and AIDS programmes in a positive way. The Techiman case demonstrates 
the difficulty experienced in shaping cultural practices and belief systems towards the 
disease when health staff are weakly embedded with leaders of CSOs. Consultation with 
NGOs can be poor particularly when NGO work is fragmented and poorly coordinated. 
Strong embeddedness is likely to facilitate the development of shared interests and 
appropriate tools of intervention to address HIV and AIDS even though such strategies 
might not suit all segments of society. 
 
Findings in this chapter both challenge and support the claims in the neo-patrimonial 
literature. There can be both good and bad outcomes of informal relations as I show in the 
overall assessment of neo-patrimonialism in the concluding chapter (Chapter 8).  
 
In this chapter, we find that informal relations which may have been influenced by political 
party links seem to play significant role in making resources available to the selected NGOs 
from both the Health Directorate and the Municipal Assembly. If these resources are 
utilized as claimed by the NGOs then they are likely to implement quality campaigns to 
help fight the disease. In addition, increased consultation and subsequent development of 
joint efforts between health officers and NGO leaders appear to have been facilitated by 
their informal ties. It can be said that these are positive effects of neo-patrimonial relations 
and for that matter informal ties. 
 
The fact that it is only selected NGOs who received support from the Health Directorate 
and the Municipal Assembly support the claims in the neo-patrimonial literature that 
informal relations produce corruption. NGOs are unlikely to be accountable with the 
resources they receive partly due to the way they are organised. Most of them were 
operated by individuals making it highly possible that their use of those resources might be 
channelled to advance personal interests or even support personal political ambitions of the 
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patrons from whom the resources are obtained particularly if the resources were channelled 
along partisan considerations. 
 
We also learn from this chapter that in the implementation of healthcare policy at the local 
level under the decentralisation programme in Ghana, informal relationships among the 
various actors seem to play significant role, directly or indirectly, shaping both the process 
and outcomes. Decentralised authorities and local government bodies might have sufficient 
resources, well qualified staff, autonomy to use their resources; and many other factors 
identified in the decentralisation literature as necessary for decentralisation to work, but the 
politics of informal relations seem likely to have a tremendous effect on the outcomes and 
consequently affect how well decentralisation works. 
 
It is also clear that the approach to addressing HIV and AIDS in Ghana might have to go 
beyond the „ABC‟ approach. Exploring ways to identify, understand, and incorporate the 
complex socio-cultural factors that can influence peoples‟ sexual and reproductive 
behaviour needs to be given policy attention. This might require that health officers 
adequately embed themselves within the community in which they are located. I explain 
this further in Chapter 8 where I present the summary and conclusions of the findings from 
the study. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
My aim in this research has been to explore how decentralisation, in the form of a mixture 
of devolution and deconcentration, works in practice by examining the case of health 
services in Municipal Assemblies in Ghana.  Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa adopted 
decentralisation policies in the expectation of improved service provision. The benefits 
anticipated were two-fold; the first was that decentralisation would lead to better 
coordination and collaboration between different parts of the state at the local level. The 
second was that decentralisation would lead to increased consultation with citizens by local 
governments so that public officers can be more responsive to citizens. The predominant 
form of decentralisation adopted by these countries is a combination of devolution and 
deconcentration. However, as I show in this thesis, the combination of devolution and 
deconcentration in Ghana creates structural problems for the working of sectoral 
departments as well as Municipal Assemblies particularly in getting better coordination and 
collaboration among the various actors at the local level. This mixture of devolution and 
deconcentration also seems to constrain local governments‟ ability to increase consultation 
with local people. These effects are largely due to ambiguities in two major laws under 
which the Assemblies and their Health Directorates operate (Act 462 and Act 525). The 
reason for ambiguous laws is most likely political, to avoid privileging one group over the 
other, but to leave it to be sorted out through politics at the local level. It could also be a 
means to enable central government to control local government affairs. 
 
So how are these relationships sorted out through politics at the local level?  The hunch I 
had was that informal relationships are important in enabling the local state to work.  Thus, 
the main question this thesis asks is: what is the role of informal ties in promoting 
collaboration and coordination between devolved Municipal Assemblies and 
deconcentrated Health Directorates, and consultation with groups within civil society that 
239 
 
 
 
worked on HIV and AIDS campaigns by Health Directorates? Two sets of relationships 
were examined: between officers in different parts of the state, and between public officers 
and leaders of Civil Society groups.  
 
Overall, the study found that informal relations seem capable of promoting governance 
performance. Conflicts in the general legal framework that make it difficult for public 
officers to effectively work in concert, seem to be overcome by public officers when strong 
informal ties exist among them making it possible for them to work together. Although I 
did not focus on investigating the adverse impact of informal ties, I also found instances 
where informal relations between public officers undermined the performance of the local 
state.
135
  
 
These findings are supported through the documentation of four types of informal ties and 
their impact on coordination and collaboration; and consultation in the five municipal areas 
studied. The informal ties are ethnic links; family/neighbourhood/abusua relations; old-
school networks; and political party affiliations. These ties between officers at the 
Municipal Health Directorates and senior officers of the Municipal Assemblies were found 
to facilitate Municipal Health Directorates‟ access to the District Assemblies‟ Common 
Fund, which is controlled by the Assemblies. The existence of these ties between officers at 
the Municipal Health Directorates and elected Assembly members were found to enhance 
the quality of Municipal Health Directorates‟ policies and helped to gain public support for 
HIV and AIDS programmes. Additionally, these ties between officers at the Municipal 
Health Directorates and leaders of HIV and AIDS Civil Society Organisations were found 
to facilitate implementation of Municipal Health Directorates‟ HIV and AIDS programmes. 
 
                                                 
135 As well documented in the literature, ties and their effects in terms of the reciprocal support system and 
exchanges can sustain corrupt practices, patronage and clientelism. I present a summary of the various ways 
in which informal relations seem to positively influence the processes of collaboration and coordination in the 
answers to each of the three sub-questions in this chapter. I  also highlight a couple of examples in the 
answers to each of the various sub-questions to show that informal relations might undermine service delivery 
efforts by decentralised institutions at the local level. 
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The main argument of this thesis is that informal ties and embeddedness matter for mixed 
systems of devolution and deconcentration to work as it is in such systems that there are 
likely to be ambiguities in the legal arrangements with high potential for conflicts to occur 
between different parts of the state, and between the state and non-state actors. To explore 
this concept thoroughly scholars, policy makers, politicians, donors, and governments who 
are interested in ways to make decentralisation work might need to extend their focus 
beyond issues of centre-periphery relations.
136
 Much of the existing scholarly work on 
decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be rooted in the assumption that issues of 
centre-periphery relationships such as local government finance; human resource and 
technical capacity; and autonomy of local decentralised authorities from central 
government interferences need to be resolved for decentralisation to work. For this reason 
their attention has been focused on these issues.  
 
This study shows that resolving these issues might not be adequate for improving basic 
service delivery by decentralised authorities at sub-national level as issues of coordination 
and consultation that are assumed still remain in mixed systems of decentralisation. I 
demonstrate that ethnic links, family/neighbourhood or abusua relations, political party 
affiliations, and old-school networks can have tremendous impact on how these other 
factors (finance, human resources, autonomy of local government bodies) contribute to the 
performance of decentralised institutions. Many earlier studies were comparisons between 
countries which advocated for complete devolution as the ideal model of decentralisation 
appropriate to sub-Saharan Africa, but there is inadequate empirical evidence to support 
this assertion. Empirical evidence from this study shows that within a uniform decentralised 
system,  a combination of devolution and deconcentration can work together to produce the 
desired outcomes when informal ties within the state are strong and decentralised 
institutions are adequately embedded with the communities in which they are located. 
 
In this chapter I present summaries of the findings from which I draw key conclusions and 
highlight their theoretical significance. I have organised the chapter in five main sections. 
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 Relationship between central governments and local government authorities 
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After this introduction, I summarise the findings in the second section under the following 
headings: a) coordination and collaboration within the state at the local level; b) achieving 
increased consultation with elected representatives of citizens; and c) consultation with 
CSOs, socio-cultural norms and HIV and AIDS. For each of the findings, I draw out the 
implications for theory particularly to show how they fit with the literature on neo-
patrimonialism in Africa with reference to the claims in the neo-patrimonial literature.  In 
the third section I discuss the policy implications of the findings to include the following: a) 
ways of establishing and harnessing informal relations between different parts of the local 
state and between the state and civil society actors; b) resolution of conflicts in legal 
arrangements; c) restructuring of training curricular for public officers; d) adoption of 
eGovernance mechanisms; e) rethinking competitive elections of all Assembly members 
and Chief Executives; and f) payment of salaries to Assembly members. I list the areas 
requiring further research in the fourth section. The general concluding comments are 
presented in the last section. 
 
In order to enhance our understanding of the findings to each of the three sub-questions and 
their theoretical implications, some initial observations might be helpful. The conflicts in 
the legal and institutional arrangements of Ghana‟s decentralisation programme caused 
major issues with coordination and collaboration between the Assemblies and Health 
Directorates. Whilst conducting this study there were two main weaknesses in Ghana‟s 
decentralisation programme in general and healthcare decentralisation in particular. First, 
the President continued to appoint the Chief Executives of the Assemblies; this has been 
publicly supported by key political figures such as former President Kufuor, former 
President Rawlings, former Attorney general and now presidential candidate of the New 
Patriotic Party (Nana Akuffo Addo). Second, the provisions of Act 525 support the strong 
alignment of the Health Directorates to the Ministry of Health (MoH), whilst Act 462 seeks 
to give the MCEs authority and control over the Health Directorates. The ambiguity in the 
laws and the path which the decentralisation programme has taken appears to suit the 
president. This might be so since the president could not directly attack the powers of the 
Ministry of Health which appears to be powerful partly because the Minister of Health is a 
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member of cabinet and also due to claims that the MoH controls huge resources as 
compared with the other ministries. 
  
The existing arrangement with conflicts in the law is likely to continue for some time. One 
reason for maintaining this position might be that it allows central government politicians 
and bureaucrats substantial control over sub-national local government business which 
might enable them to project personal political ambitions and party agendas at the local 
level. As these arrangements benefit national level political figures and bureaucrats, the 
commitment to reform might be strong in theory and in policy (as evidenced in the on-
going constitutional review process covering initiatives to strengthen the decentralisation 
programme), but it may continue to be weak in practice. As noted by Crawford (2009: 58), 
“the Ghana case indicates that, while the rhetoric of decentralisation talks of making 
democracy a reality, the actual reality is about the maintenance of central government 
control.” The gap between policy and practice is unlikely to narrow in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
This assertion is supported by other scholars based on an analysis of the path, history and 
experiences of implementing decentralisation reforms in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Awortwi 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). As informal ties constitute the basic foundation and fabric 
of the structure of socio-cultural organisation in Ghana, they are likely to  continue to shape 
behaviour patterns of public officers and play an important part of the decentralisation 
architecture of the country as long as current weaknesses in the laws remain unresolved. 
 
8.2 General findings and conclusions 
 
8.2.1 Coordination and collaboration within the state at the local level 
The first question I investigated to explore the performance of the Health Directorates was: 
how have informal ties between officers at the Health Directorates and Executive Officers 
of the Municipal Assemblies enhanced or constrained these two decentralised authorities in 
collaborating and coordinating their programmes around healthcare delivery? I determined 
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performance in terms of coordination and collaboration between these two state institutions 
and used the release of the DACF by the Assemblies to the Health Directorates as an 
indication of coordination and collaboration between them. I based the discussion on the 
central government‟s directives for the utilisation of the DACF as these constitute some of 
the legal and institutional arrangements devised to achieve coordination and collaboration 
between the Assemblies and Health Directorates in health service provision. 
 
The study revealed that the institutional arrangements introduced to promote coordination 
and collaboration within the state at sub-national level did not seem to be effective. 
Interestingly informal connections such as political party ties, ethnic identities, 
family/neighbourhood/abusua relations, and old-school networks did appear to matter to 
the ways in which the MCEs related to the Health Directors with regard to the DACF.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 5, Health Directors who effectively exploited political party 
affiliations and abusua ties with the MCEs were comparatively successful in accessing the 
fund. This was reflected in cases such as New Juaben and Sunayni where coordination and 
collaboration between the Health Directorates and Assemblies was high. In this respect, we 
might conclude that this is a positive effect of informal relations as they seem to help 
overcome problems in the implementation of formal directives and facilitate the release of 
funds to the Health Director.  
 
In the other cases, such as Techiman and Ho where the ties were weak, the Chief 
Executives seemed to be unwilling to cooperate with their Health Directors to release the 
DACF to them. The low levels of coordination and collaboration between the two state 
institutions was reflected in poor performances in both Techiman and Ho. In these two 
cases, weak informal relations appeared to undermine collaboration and coordination which 
could be said to be a negative influence of informal relations.  
 
Although weak informal relations seem to make it difficult for the MCEs to comply with 
central government directives, as in Techiman and Ho, the non-compliance with the law 
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might not mean it is informal relations that explain it. Perhaps the MCEs did not view HIV 
and AIDS as priorities. Development priorities of the Assemblies shape the design and 
implementation of their budgets and therefore the use of their financial resources. Therefore 
the non-compliance with the law could mean that the MCEs like to utilise the HIV and 
AIDS component of the DACF for what they consider to be priorities at the local level, and 
these priorities may sometimes conflict with priorities of central government. Therefore 
weak informal relations between the Assembly and the Health Directorate might imply 
better formal relations between the Assembly and some other agency such as the directorate 
of education or agriculture. This suggests that there are limits to the extent to which 
informal relations provide explanations to our understanding of how devolution and 
deconcentration work in practice. 
 
In addition, the release of the DACF to the Health Directors does not guarantee that Health 
Directors would use such resources for HIV and AIDS programmes. Given the concerns 
which most people in Ghana have about the inefficient use of funds in many of the central 
government ministries, especially health, the non-compliance with the directives may well 
be in the good interest of the majority of people in the districts who are poor particularly if 
the Assemblies would use such funds effectively. 
 
The ways in which informal relations could promote coordination and collaboration 
between different parts of the local state point to two issues which are significant to the 
debate around decentralisation reforms in Africa and the notion that neo-patrimonialism 
normally undermines government performance. First, this study has shown that the debate 
around decentralisation reforms may have to be extended beyond issues of centre-periphery 
relations (relations between central government and decentralised authorities at the local 
level in terms of autonomy of local governments), the availability of financial resources to 
local governments, and adequate human capacity. Although these factors are important, 
informal relations seem capable of heavily influencing how they impact on service delivery 
by the local state.   
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Second, the positive outcomes of informal relations as we have seen in chapter 7 are quite 
interesting as they suggest that informal relations that could be considered neo-patrimonial 
in nature (such as that which exist between Health Directors and leaders of HIV and AIDS 
CSOs) seem capable of contributing to positive developmental outcomes under certain 
conditions. This raises questions about the central claims in the literature on neo-
patrimonialism as to whether informal relations are usually detrimental to government 
performance. In fact, this finding supports the central arguments by scholars in the APPP 
that neo-patrimonialism in Africa needs a rethinking as it can be employed to promote 
development. An example is what Cammack and Kelsall describe to have occurred between 
the mid 1960s and the late 1970s in Malawi when neo-patrimonial relations between 
president Kamuzu Banda and state bureaucrats, members of parliament, and party 
functionaries were employed by the president to mobilise economic rent that were in turn 
channelled into more productive growth of the country‟s economy (Cammack and Kelsall 
2011: 89-90).  
 
Although Cammack and Kelsall‟s findings are based on national level analysis where 
president Banda‟s control of state power and his commitment to discourage corruption 
made significant difference, their findings help us to understand that more productive 
outcomes could result from neo-patrimonial relations.  
 
At sub-national level, as in this study, apart from the evidence in chapter 7, in chapter 5, 
informal relations between the MCE and the Health Director (which might be termed as 
neo-patrimonial in nature due to the MCEs‟ ability to use his control over Assembly‟s 
resources to influence the Health Directors) seemed to have facilitated the release of funds 
to the Health Director making him/her have access to additional resources that could be 
used to implement more programmes. 
 
Undoubtedly, some of my findings support neo-patrimonial interpretations of informal 
relations: corruption, patronage, and clientelism that can undermine basic service delivery. 
The nature of collaboration in the release of the DACF was also characterised by corrupt 
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practices that were sustained by political party ties and abusua relations in both high and 
low performing cases. In New Juaben, the Health Director‟s access to the DACF was 
facilitated by reciprocal exchanges maintaining abusua ties. However, these were largely 
financed from public resources including the use of official vehicles and fuel to attend 
private programmes such as funerals of members of one‟s abusua. Similarly, in Techiman, 
discrimination at the workplace on the basis of ethnicity, nepotism, and cronyism 
culminated in the MCE refusing to comply with the law. 
 
In spite of these findings, the neo-patrimonial view of the weaknesses of informal ties 
should not dominate our thinking of how the state works in many countries in Africa. As 
scholars such as Booth (2011); Cammack and Kelsall (2011); and Crook and Booth (2011) 
have shown, and as this study demonstrates, dense informal relations encompassing a wider 
section of society could promote the development of shared interest around which the local 
state would deliver basic services more effectively.   
 
8.2.2 Achieving increased consultation with elected representatives of citizens 
The second question I investigated was: in which ways have informal ties between health 
officers and elected Assembly members facilitated the consultation with Assembly 
members by health staff in order to win public support for health programmes? The study 
found that there seemed to be increased consultation with elected Assembly members in the 
municipalities where strong informal ties existed between health staff and elected 
Assembly members. Conversely, in those municipalities where informal ties between the 
health staff and elected Assembly members were weak, consultation appeared to be low. 
 
Officers at the Health Directorates in New Juaben and Obuasi who consulted with 
Assembly members appeared to have achieved three things. First, they obtained the support 
of elected Assembly members for their programmes; second, they were able to harmonise 
their programmes with the Assemblies; and third, they obtained additional funding from the 
Assembly (Chapter 6). The harmonised programmes seemed more appropriate to the shared 
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interests of health staff and elected members of the Assembly in terms of managing the 
HIV and AIDS pandemic.  
 
As Health Directors actively involved the Assembly members in the design and 
implementation of programmes, the Assembly members experienced a sense of recognition 
and respect. They also had a feeling of appreciation for their role as representatives of their 
electoral areas. This seems to have motivated most Assembly members to develop sincere 
intentions and commitment to support programmes that would promote the interest of the 
public. Officers of Sunyani, Techiman and Ho Health Directorates did not appear to 
adequately involve elected Assembly members and did not realise any of the three New 
Juaben and Obuasi achievements. In these municipalities HIV and AIDS programmes were 
poorly coordinated, highly fragmented, and extensively duplicated. These findings suggest 
that the wider the network of informal ties across public institutions, the higher the 
potential for such networks to develop shared interests in public policy formulation and 
implementation. 
 
In chapter 6, we have seen that informal relations appeared to have facilitated the 
development of shared interests between health staff and elected Assembly members to 
change sexual and reproductive health choices of local people. In areas such as New Juaben 
where consultation with Assembly members was high, the Assembly members helped to 
get the HIV and AIDS campaigns across to the people in their electoral areas. The same 
cannot be said about Techiman.  
 
On the one hand, the development of concerted efforts which appears to have led to 
Assembly members supporting HIV and AIDS programmes may be said to be a positive 
outcome of informal relations. On the other hand however, changing sexual behaviours 
may not necessarily be what the majority of local people would like. The programmes 
around HIV and AIDS campaigns essentially sought to change peoples‟ sexual behaviour 
and reproductive health choices which are shaped by norms and cultural practices such as 
polygamy particularly in Moslem communities. Even in Christian dominated communities 
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where polygamy is discouraged, there are claims among many people in Ghana that the 
behaviour of some Christians directly or indirectly promotes sexual activity with multiple 
sexual partners.  There are also Christian leaders who do not support campaigns to promote 
condoms. If public policy and public service delivery are to benefit poor people, the design 
and implementation of such policies need to accommodate and work with all these 
diversities rather than seeking to change them as Assembly members and health officials 
have done.  
 
Again, the elected Assembly members with whom health staff developed HIV and AIDS 
programmes may not represent the needs of their electorates in practice as electing them 
does not mean that they would behave in ways that their electorates would like. Many 
electorates at the local level have criticised their elected Assembly members on the grounds 
that Assembly members often champion the agendas of political parties and influential 
individuals rather than pursuing the interests of poor people who elected them. Majority of 
elected Assembly members have suffered the consequences by being voted out of office. 
Therefore there are limits to the positive influences of informal relations between elected 
Assembly members and health officers. In spite of this, the New Juaben case seems to 
challenge the claims that informal relations normally constrain the performance of 
governments. Here we find that they rather seem to facilitate collaboration between health 
officers and local government elected members. 
 
What we find in Sunyani points to the extent to which informal relations can be damaging 
to the performance of governments. Health officers and Assembly members in Sunyani 
appeared to be unable to develop concerted efforts and shared interests to work together 
partly because of the lack of strong informal relations between them. This lack of unified 
efforts as I showed in chapter 6 could undermine the design and implementation of health 
programmes especially if the elected Assembly members genuinely seek to champion the 
interests of their electorates and when the interest of their electorates support changing 
sexual and reproductive health choices in line with the HIV and AIDS programmes. 
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A number of issues hampered the effectiveness of elected Assembly members as 
representatives of citizens. The first is the position is voluntary so there is no payment of 
salaries or benefits such as housing and transportation allowances due to other public 
officers such as Members of Parliament. They only receive a sitting allowance of between 
GH¢20 (US$13) and GH¢30 (US$20) on average, and there are a maximum of three 
sittings per year.  Nonetheless the demands on Assembly members are huge; as part of their 
official duties they are expected to organise communal labour, and meet their electorates 
before and after general Assembly meetings. Outside their official duties, the social and 
cultural organisation in Ghana also place huge demands on Assembly members. They are 
expected to attend a host of social functions such as marriage; child-naming; religious 
functions; and funeral programmes all of which require the Assembly member to pay a 
token or make a donation in support of the programmes. This of course is one reason why 
they are invited. In addition, Assembly members are called upon to pay school fees, 
provide school uniforms and sometimes provide money for food to families. The cost of 
meeting all of these demands for a volunteer can produce a strong disincentive to many 
Assembly members to play an active part in advancing the interests of their people. 
 
The second issue is the non partisan nature of the District Assembly system and the ways of 
seeking election into the Assembly. The current system provides that the District Assembly 
system is non-political and non-partisan. In practice however, the process is highly partisan 
and politicised. Political parties and national political figures overtly and covertly sponsor 
candidates but the process itself is expensive as the role provides no salary so it is difficult 
for candidates to turn down offers of support from political parties and powerful elites. 
There is little incentive for people to invest their own personal resources to join the 
Assembly. However, notions of „non-political‟ and „non-partisan‟ themselves are 
impractical as people are likely to belong to a political party. Some of the political parties 
are rooted in long held traditions and ideologies; for example the NPP is rooted in 
Danquah-Busia tradition whilst the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) is built on the 
socialist-cum-communist ideologies of Kwame Nkrumah. Drawing a line between such 
strong traditions and neutrality in the Assembly can be difficult. In this context, the non-
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partisan and non-political characteristics required for the decentralisation process may not 
survive for long.  
 
Third, the weak capacity of Assembly members appeared to undermine their ability to 
effectively participate in debates in the Assembly. Many Assembly members did not 
understand the provisions of the Model Standing Orders, Act 462, and other provisions in 
the 1992 Constitution regarding how the District Assembly works; this was evident during 
the general Assembly meetings. Most of the Assembly members could not draw on 
provisions in these legal instruments to back their arguments which appeared to affect their 
ability to influence discussions and shape the outcomes.  
 
Fourth, political ambitions of many Chief Executives caused them to take a number of steps 
that undermined the role of Assembly members. Some Chief Executives sponsored 
candidates to contest seats of incumbent Assembly members who were perceived to be 
vocal or opponents to them. In most cases, as the Chief Executives had resources and 
influence, their candidates won. This was a predominant practice in Sunyani and Techiman. 
Chief Executives also influenced the election of chairpersons of the various sub-committees 
particularly the strategic ones such as Finance and Administration; Social Services; and 
Justice and Security. As the chairpersons of the sub-committees constitute the Executive 
Committee, the Chief Executive could ensure members were likely to be sympathetic or 
supportive. The one-third government appointed Assembly members were also likely to 
support the Chief Executive providing him with significant control over policy outcomes 
and Assembly commitments and leaving many Assembly members frustrated and 
demoralised as a result. This assertion conforms to the findings of other scholars regarding 
Ghana‟s decentralisation programme which is excessive dominance of national politicians 
in local government business and most Assembly members are demoralised because of 
their inability to influence policy and meet the expectations of their electorates (Abdulai 
and Crawford 2010; Crawford 2009; Crook 1994).  
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These findings of issues that hamper the effectiveness of elected Assembly members point 
to two things. First, they further show that the voluntary and non-partisan nature of the role 
might deepen the frustration of Assembly members which would threaten the sustainability 
of this arrangement. Most elected Assembly members can publicly express their 
frustrations via the platforms created by the increasing number of private radio stations and 
private newspapers across the country. These frustrations can dampen the morale and 
enthusiasm of potential Assembly persons. As people lose interest it may be difficult for the 
District Assemblies to attract high calibre of people. Second, the quality of debates in the 
general Assembly will be poor as they are captured and controlled by the few Assembly 
members who understand the legal instruments and are able to express themselves fluently 
in English and local languages. If the MCE is able to capture those few Assembly members 
who control debates in the Assembly, then he or she can easily steer the Assembly to 
advance his or her personal political ambitions and party agenda instead of advancing the 
interests of ordinary people. 
 
8.2.3 Consultation with CSOs, socio-cultural norms, and HIV and AIDS 
The third question I investigated was: how has the embeddedness of health officers with 
leaders of groups within civil society who were known to work on HIV and AIDS 
programmes promoted increased consultation with leaders of these civil society actors by 
health staff in order to implement health programmes? As we saw in chapter 7, in Sunyani 
where the Health Directorate was adequately embedded with HIV and AIDS CSOs, it 
facilitated the consultation with leaders of these civil society groups by health staff. 
Consequently, they seem to have achieved three things: a) they obtained the support of 
some churches to promote debates about condom use; b) they appeared to be successful in 
reducing stigmatisation and discrimination against people infected with HIV or AIDS; and 
c) they were able to minimise the dominance of the views of males in matters of sex and 
health. None of these achievements are true of cases such as Techiman where the Health 
Directorate‟s embeddedness with HIV and AIDS CSOs was weak. 
 
252 
 
 
 
The role of informal relations in producing what might be termed as good outcomes in 
Sunyani may be further appreciated given how such ties enabled health staff and leaders of 
the HIV and AIDS CSOs to work. Leaders of these CSOs were already part of the 
communities therefore establishing ties with such leaders meant that health workers could 
reach the ordinary citizens with less difficulty. The dense ties seemed to have enabled them 
to develop trust that appears to be critical in dealing with the churches and ordinary people, 
particularly men in Muslim dominated communities in the municipality.  The trust and 
confidence that church leaders had in health officers contributed to minimise concerns that 
allowing campaigns to promote condoms in the church does not imply that HIV and AIDS 
policy would encourage sexual immorality among young persons and unmarried people 
according to the churches‟ standards. Similarly, many men in Muslim communities seemed 
to have developed trust in health workers and the CSO leaders that their campaigns to help 
women to make informed reproductive health choices were not in conflict with Islamic 
teachings concerning the superior role of men in marriage to women. 
 
Despite what might be termed as positive roles by CSOs, there are important issues related 
to representation and accountability of many CSO leaders. Concerns about how HIV and 
AIDS NGOs are organised and the likelihood that NGO leaders will become corrupt and 
less accountable to citizens were common in all the five cases. Most of the NGOs that 
worked on HIV and AIDS were „owned‟ by individuals and lacked formal organisational 
structures to oversee their activities. The „owners‟ of these NGOs have strong ethnic ties, 
political party affiliations, and abusua networks with key officers in both the Assemblies 
and the Health Directorates so received much of the funding and support from both 
institutions.    
 
The concerns about NGOs notwithstanding, the case of Sunyani draws our attention to a 
number of issues. First, it points to the need for state institutions to create strong ties with 
civil society actors as they are critical for the success of public policy implementation 
(Abdulai and Crawford 2010; Widner and Mundt 1998). Second, the current HIV and 
AIDS policy‟s emphasis on the „ABC‟ approach might not be enough to address the 
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complex and fundamental social and cultural issues that mould the behaviour and life-style 
of people. Societal norms and beliefs can be difficult to reverse so it would be wrong to 
assume that citizens would see issues in the same way as governments and donor agencies 
whose ideologies might be in conflict with those of local people. For example, the idea of 
male superiority over women in sexual matters is accepted in most societies and often 
supported by the women themselves; also in most areas of Ghana, mentioning sexual 
organs and sexual intercourse is considered taboo and unacceptable (Frimpong-Nnuroh 
2006). Third, it is worth noting that religion will continue to matter to most people as long 
as governments fail to provide the basic needs for people to lead decent lives. Increased 
numbers of people in Ghana are likely to be influenced by religious leaders as evidenced by 
daily religious advertisements in the Ghanaian media. Religious leaders will therefore have 
a strong voice in the governance and decentralisation process and with issues of healthcare 
provision in particular. 
 
8.3 Policy implications of the findings 
 
a) Harnessing informal relations 
This study has demonstrated that informal relations and embeddedness seem to be 
important for devolution and deconcentration to work better. The policy implication here is 
that ways need to be found to establish and harness informal relations within the state. The 
focus for policy could be fostering of neighbourhood ties as these are non-ascriptive and 
can be constructed between officials. One of the ways to achieve this may be to locate the 
Municipal Assembly and all the decentralised departments that are supposed to be part of 
the Assembly in one building as many of the Assemblies have started to do at the time of 
conducting this research. The practice where other decentralised departments are located 
some distance away seems to exacerbate the problems of weakening ties between these key 
actors in development in the districts.
137
 Housing public officials together can also 
encourage the attendance to meetings as I found that sometimes the distance and 
                                                 
137
 For example Ho Municipal Health Directorate is located over 1 kilometer away from the Municipal 
Assembly, and in Techiman, the Techiman Municipal Health Directorate is  located over 2 kilometers away 
from the Municipal Assembly. 
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transportation issues made it difficult for the health staff to attend meetings regularly at the 
Assembly. 
  
Another policy focus may be to encourage interaction among public officers at the work 
place. The common way to do this could be through the creation of coffee points and the 
establishment of canteen in the office building to serve different food options. In addition, 
the provision of common room with comfortable seating to either read newspapers or just 
to relax when workers take intermittent breaks might be useful.  All these may encourage 
workers to interact and build dense friendship ties that are claimed to be essential for team 
work in organisations (Balkund and Harrison 2006; Kratzer et al. 2005; Brass et al. 2004).  
 
Municipal Assemblies could also institutionalise quarterly get-togethers in their Medium 
Term Development Plans. Such get-togethers will enable staff to share drinks and food. 
This might help to promote familiarity and friendship among workers. 
 
In terms of fostering the building of informal ties between public officers and citizens, local 
governments could organise social functions for public officers and citizens to interact on 
an informal basis. For example, Municipal Assemblies and the Health Directorates should 
institutionalise quarterly organisation of sporting activities targeting the sports that local 
people would like. Municipal Assemblies and the Health Directorates should also 
institutionalise annual get-togethers to meet citizens and share food and drinks. This idea 
may appear trivial but it can be an effective policy tool to lay the groundwork to build wide 
friendship ties which can promote mutual trust and cooperation between public officers and 
citizens (Tsai 2007; Wade 1988). As trust is established and people get to know one another 
and become familiar with behaviour patterns of others, it may gradually contribute to erase 
fears, suspicions, and reservations that may be harboured against others. This view is 
supported by other scholars who find personal relationships a critical factor in explaining 
how public officers work together. Jeppsson et al. (2003) make similar recommendation in 
regard to promoting harmony and collaboration between public officials in Uganda‟s 
Ministry of Health and its agents in the districts. 
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b) Resolution of conflicts in legal arrangements 
Many of the problems with healthcare delivery under current decentralisation provisions 
can be explained by ambiguity and conflicts in the existing legal framework and the on-
going initiatives to remove these problems in the existing institutional and legal 
mechanisms are laudable. The policy implication is that genuine political commitment is 
necessary for enabling decentralisation to work in practice.  This means that ambiguities in 
the various legal arrangements need to be resolved. For example, the challenges that 
confront the implementation of the composite budget initiative require increased attention 
by policy matters and in the debate around fiscal decentralisation. Successful 
implementation of the composite budget might help to address some of the structural 
problems affecting coordination and collaboration between different parts of the state 
apparatus at the local level. 
 
c) Restructuring of training curricular for public officers 
Trust between public officers from different parts of the state seems critical to the smooth 
functioning of the local state.  What this implies is that institutional reforms such as 
restructuring curricular of training need attention. The curricular of existing training and 
capacity building programmes for politicians and technical staff may need to be revised and 
restructured to incorporate ideas of social capital, embeddedness, and informal ties. The 
benefits of social capital, embeddedness, and informal ties; their potential to facilitate 
coordination and collaboration between different parts of the state; and the ways in which 
these concepts can promote state-society engagement and make the state to be more 
responsive to citizens need to be highlighted. Nevertheless, the dangers or weaknesses of 
informal relations and ways to minimise them need to be incorporated in restructured 
training curricular for senior level public officers. The top level technical and 
administrative personnel are most critical to successful reforms due to their proximity and 
access to the political machinery at the central government level. Programmes should be 
intensified to help build new skills for politicians and bureaucrats to adjust to the new ethos 
and expand the space for increased engagement across different parts of the state; and 
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between the state and non-state actors. In line with the New Public Management (NPM) 
concept and recent interest in the participation of citizens in the governance process senior 
managers will no longer be the sole actors in public service delivery. There is evidence to 
suggest that these changes have contributed to improved management and leadership skills 
of public managers in Mozambique as part of NPM reforms within the decentralisation 
system (Awortwi 2010a). Above all, officers must be trained to uphold high levels of 
professionalism and integrity and be fair to all citizens, a strategy that has been observed to 
have contributed to the improvement of public officers‟ work in Mozambique (Awortwi 
2010b). 
 
d) Adopting eGovernance mechanisms  
Whilst we seek to encourage the establishment of dense informal networks within the state 
and across the state and society, we need to acknowledge also that informal relations have 
limitations as some of the findings in this study suggest. Therefore, in general terms, ways 
to make decentralised authorities at the local level more transparent and efficient might 
need policy attention. Adopting eGovernance mechanisms appear to be helpful in this 
regard. These may need to be explored and promoted at sub-national level. Information 
about public resources, budgets, projects (health, education, agriculture, water, roads etc), 
and all expenditures could be organised and shared on Information Communication and 
Technology (ICT) platforms such as Assembly and Health Directorate websites, radio 
stations and newspapers to be easily accessible and available to citizens. This implies that 
public officers would need training to improve their ICT skills and equip themselves with 
mass communication and public relations skills. These skills can facilitate their engagement 
and interaction with citizens. Similarly, ICT skills of local people need improvement so 
they would be able to access such public information. These initiatives can help to 
minimise misinformation and suspicion, and they can increase citizen trust and confidence 
in public officers (Awortwi 2010b). Overall, e-governance can help reduce corruption, 
nepotism, and cronyism which characterise service delivery to the poor. 
 
 
257 
 
 
 
 
e) Rethinking competitive elections of all Assembly members and MCEs 
The issues about competitive election of all Assembly members and Municipal Chief 
Executives by citizens on political party tickets raise questions about effectiveness of the 
debates and preparations that went into the design and formulation of the Local 
Government Act 462 of 1993. A further debate of the issue seems necessary. As this thesis 
has shown, political parties and powerful elites fund candidates although the process is 
supposed to be non-partisan and scholars such as Crawford (2010); Awortwi (2010a); and 
Agyeman-Duah (2005) appear to suggest that competitive election of local government 
officers can be helpful. Experiences in other countries such as Uganda suggest that vibrant 
local council elections open avenues for fresh ideas and experience to be introduced into 
the local governance system at sub-national level. If the pressure of competitive elections 
and the possibility of losing one‟s job can motivate local government officials to be 
responsive and accountable to their electorates, what can be the limits to such policy? 
 
f) Payment of salaries to Assembly members 
Finally, the notion of voluntary Assembly work needs to be reconsidered by governments 
and donor agencies that support decentralisation programme within the country. Again, this 
issue needs extensive debate among scholars, donor organisations, politicians and 
governments. How can the payment of full-time salary with benefits such as transportation 
allowances to Assembly members guarantee their independence and efficiency? Countries 
such as Uganda pay full-time salary to local government officials, and findings by scholars 
such as Awortwi (2010b) suggest that the payment of salary to local government 
councillors contributes to better performances of local government institutions.  Whilst the 
academic community and governments reflect over this issue, it seems to be one of the 
ways to make Assembly members to be effective as they are likely to be accountable to the 
tax payers rather than the interest of powerful elites. 
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8.4 Areas of further research 
This study has focused on in-depth analysis of the horizontal relations between 
decentralised bodies, and between those and a small section of civil society in Ghana.  I 
have looked at only one aspect of this relationship investigating the processes of healthcare 
delivery focusing on HIV and AIDS policy implementation. There are a number of areas 
that need further exploration for a fuller understanding of what happens at the local level in 
terms of how devolution and deconcentration work in practice, and how neo-patrimonial 
interpretations of informal relations help us to understand how the state works in other parts 
of Africa and in different service delivery areas. Given the fact that informal relations 
constitute important part of the state in Africa, and with empirical evidence that these 
informal relations do not always undermine the performance of the state, a key question 
then would be what conditions lead to informal ties being positive and under what 
conditions do they undermine the process of service delivery or lead to negative outcomes? 
Which aspects of the local state and at which level of the decentralisation system do we 
have informal relations undermining or promoting service delivery and why? Does the 
influence of informal ties vary in terms of the nature of service and the kind of institutional 
mechanism and legal framework regarding the delivery of that service? 
 
In the Ghanaian case for example, ambiguities in the legal framework for health service 
delivery largely accounts for why informal relations seem very important. For example, the 
new draft decentralisation policy framework that had been produced at the time of 
conducting this study in an attempt to address the weaknesses in the Act 462 does not 
appear to solve the problems. Issues about appointment of MCEs and the lack of clarity of 
the relationship between MCEs and heads of decentralised departments such as health still 
remain. In addition, the appointment of one-third of Assembly members has not been 
resolved and there still remain ambiguities about how the Assemblies and decentralised 
departments work with civil society groups such as NGOs, CBOs and traditional 
authorities. There are also no clear indications that these issues have been adequately 
addressed in the draft report by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) that was set 
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up by the NDC government to review the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution (see 
Republic of Ghana 2010).
138
 
 
As both the new draft decentralisation policy framework and the report of the CRC had not 
yet been approved by parliament, and given that there were ongoing debates for Act 525 to 
be revised, the prospects are therefore good that further reforms may result in the future. 
However, based on the findings, the following areas might be of interest for further 
research. 
 
First, I based my findings on Act 462 before it was revised. Since Act 462 has been revised 
but not yet approved by parliament, and CRC has also completed its work and the report is 
pending the approval of the government, the report of the CRC, the new draft 
decentralisation policy framework, and the debate for the review of Act 525 present a good 
opportunity for analysis into how the general decentralisation policy framework and the 
constitution can be updated to effectively address coordination and collaboration problems 
within the local state that the earlier versions could not address. 
 
Second, this research only looked at coordination and collaboration between the Health 
Directorates and the Assemblies around the utilisation of the DACF. I focused on whether 
or not funds were transferred without exploring details of the amount transferred. The next 
step in the broader research project would be to examine the actual disbursement of the 
DACF at the Assembly. Studies into conditions under which informal relationships can 
                                                 
138
 Although the CRC has recommended direct and popular election of Metropolitan, Municipal, and District 
Chief Executives, this is yet to be considered by both cabinet and parliament and there are no indications that 
this might be implemented anytime soon. There also seems to be a number of ambiguities in various 
provisions in the new Draft Decentralisation Policy Framework. For example, under administrative 
decentralisation, one of the policy measures is to ensure an effective integration of sectoral programmes and 
assets into the District Assemblies to facilitate coordinated programmes through the establishment of district 
departments. The policy re-emphasises that the District Assembly is the overall state authority at the local 
level responsible for general development of the district. Issues of relationships between heads of district 
departments and the MCEs are not clarified. In addition, under political decentralisation and legal issues, one 
of the policy actions is to review the process leading to the selection of DCEs for further transparency, more 
citizens‟ participation and accountability. The nature of transparency, and citizens participation do not seem 
to be clear from the document leaving it for possible control by central government as before (Republic of 
Ghana 2010: 16-18; Fiadjoe 2009: 11). 
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lead to perverse outcomes and corruption can help increase our understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of informal ties as additional factors that can make mixed 
systems work.  Such studies could follow the processes through to the outcomes, thus 
exploring how the DACF allocation is actually used.  As we have seen in this thesis, 
informal relations are necessary but not sufficient.  What additional things need to be in 
place for improved service outcomes to be achieved whilst employing the strengths of 
informal relations? 
 
Third, research into how complex socio-cultural factors can promote healthcare provision 
can be useful. The impact of social norms, practices, and behaviours on implementing HIV 
and AIDS policy, as shown in the current study, point to the fact that the design and 
implementation of HIV and AIDS programmes can be hampered by socio-cultural factors. 
This does not necessarily mean that social norms, belief systems and faith-based practices 
only undermine health provision rather than promoting them; this could be an area for 
future research. 
 
Fourth, apart from managing HIV and AIDS, the Health Directorates collaborate with the 
Assembly on the development of basic infrastructure; services such as water, sanitation and 
waste management, and issues pertaining to the health impact of mining and other 
industrial activities. The ways in which the two institutions work in these areas might also 
help to increase our understanding of how devolution and deconcentration work. The 
picture created by this study appears to show that Techiman and Ho have not performed 
well as New Juaben, Sunyani and Obuasi. However we might find different results 
altogether if other areas of engagement between the Health Directorates and the Assemblies 
were investigated.  
 
Fifth, the way in which the adoption of a partisan local government system would 
contribute to making District Assemblies more responsive is another area that might benefit 
from further research. Such studies could draw on lessons and experiences from countries 
such as Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria that operate partisan electoral politics at the local 
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government level. Here there are two issues: a) the election of the Chief Executive, and b) 
the election of all Assembly members. With respect to the question of whether Chief 
Executives should be elected by citizens, a former Minister of Local Government recently 
noted that this would breed incompetence and jeopardise the decentralisation and local 
government system (Ghana News Agency 2011; Daily Graphic 2010). The concerns of the 
former Local Government Minister and others who share his views is that democratic 
elections at the local level could heighten differences and undermine unity in the 
Assemblies. These need to be empirically explored to unearth the possible options that can 
be adopted so that the unity in the Assemblies can be achieved even when all Assembly 
members and MCEs are democratically elected. Perhaps experiences of countries that have 
adopted partisan electoral politics at the local government level would provide useful 
lessons on which informed policy could be implemented.  
 
Finally, this study focuses on health so exploring informal networks between the Assembly 
and other decentralised departments such as education or agriculture may provide rich 
insights into how devolution and deconcentration work in mixed systems of 
decentralisation.  Do strong informal relations in one area mean other areas are neglected?  
Or is there a pattern of dense relationships across sectors which build synergy in some 
municipalities and not others?  In other words, do all good things go together? 
  
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Through the exploration of informal relationships in the implementation of health policy in 
the Municipal Assemblies, with a focus on HIV and AIDS, this study makes a contribution 
to the debate surrounding decentralisation reforms and performance of local government 
bodies in Ghana. First, the findings provide useful insights into how different state bodies 
can coordinate and collaborate at the local level. This is relevant to the implementation of 
policy in other areas of development such as education, water and sanitation, and 
agriculture which may equally be shaped by informal networks between the key actors 
involved in the design and implementation of those programmes. Most importantly the 
findings give us indications of possible outcomes of governance reforms and policy 
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implementation in countries such as those in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where informal 
networks form the core of social organisation. 
 
Second, we learn that making decentralisation work might mean more than simply getting 
the laws right, providing appropriate human capacity and making adequate financial 
resources available to decentralised authorities at the local level. This study has shown that 
the hidden and often subtle but potent forces of informal networks and embeddedness can 
have a significant impact on how resources are used, even by highly qualified public 
officers, given the socio-cultural context of Ghana. This is particularly insightful when a 
group of public officers with a deconcentrated mandate collaborate with others working 
with devolved authority. Yet the legal and institutional framework that requires the two to 
collaborate and coordinate efforts remains ambiguous about roles and mandate; and the 
formal structures of enforcement of state directives remain weak.  
 
Third, the study also contributes to the debate around neo-patrimonialism and corruption 
within the state in Africa. The various ways in which informal ties seem to facilitate 
collaboration and coordination at the local level support findings from other scholars that 
informal relations are capable of promoting the performance of governments in Africa 
under certain conditions, and in this study, far reaching informal ties seem to be good 
condition for informal relations to produce positive outcomes. Whilst acknowledging the 
limitations of informal relations, the study showed that informal relations that may be neo-
patrimonial in nature might not always undermine development. 
 
Informal ties and embeddedness can help explain why the provision of services requiring 
coordination and collaboration between decentralised departments seems to be better in 
some municipalities than others. They may also explain why some municipalities have 
higher levels of citizen consultation than others. Even though informal networks and 
embeddedness have the potential to breed corruption and undermine governance reforms, 
empirical evidence from this study suggest that informal ties and embeddedness may not 
always undermine governance performance, and that given the context such as Ghana, they 
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can contribute to achieving good governance outcomes.  In other words, the role of 
informal ties and embeddedness in enabling devolution and deconcentration to operate in 
parallel should not be underestimated. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire for the Municipal Directorate of Health to be answered by the Municipal 
Director of Health Services 
 
Devolution and Deconcentration in Action: A Comparative study of Five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana 
 
DPhil research by Ronald Adamtey 
Institute of Development Studies 
University of Sussex, UK 
October 2008 
 
This is an academic research. It has no direct benefit to participants. Participation in the form of interviews is therefore 
voluntary. Nothing will be published without the consent of participants. 
 
A1. HISTORY OF DIRECTORS (between 2000 and 2008) 
A2. How long have you been the Municipal Director of Health Services in this 
municipality? 
A3. How many Directors have been at the Municipality between 2000 and 2008 and how 
long has each served? 
B1. HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS AND NETWORKS WITH OTHERS 
AROUND ISSUES OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE MUNCIPALITY 
(previous directors) (Focus discussion on HIV and AIDS) 
B2. Which of these groups/organisations/institutions/individuals did the past Directors have 
any kinds of relationship with? (tick) 
B2.1. NGOs in health care delivery (list specific NGOs)   
B2.2. Municipal Assembly (the MCE, MCD or any other key staff) 
B2.3. Assembly Members 
B2.4. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
B2.5. Religious groups (churches and mosques etc.) 
C1. If there was any kind of relationship with any of these 
groups/organisations/institutions/individuals ask the following for each: 
C2. What kind of relationship? (tick) 
C2.1. ethnic  
C2.2. neighbourhood-abusua 
289 
 
 
 
C2.3. old-school 
C2.4. political party (NDC or NPP) 
C3. When was it established? 
C4. Who established it? 
C5. Why was it established? (probe for content – purpose) 
C6. Why did they need this relationship? 
D1. HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS AND NETWORKS WITH OTHERS 
AROUND ISSUES OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE MUNCIPALITY 
(current director) (Focus discussion on HIV and AIDS) 
D2. Which of these groups/organisations/institutions/individuals do you have any kinds of 
relationship with? (tick) 
D2.1. NGOs in health care delivery (list specific NGOs)   
D2.2. Municipal Assembly (the MCE, MCD or any other key staff) 
D2.3. Assembly Members 
D2.4. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
D2.5. Religious groups (churches and mosques etc.) 
E1. If there is any kind of relationship with any of these 
groups/organisations/institutions/individuals ask the following for each: 
E2. What kind of relationship? (tick) 
E2.1. ethnic  
E2.2. neighbourhood-abusua 
E2.3. old-school 
E2.4. political party (NDC or NPP) 
E3. When was it established? 
E4. Who established it? 
E5. Why was it established? (probe for content – purpose) 
E6. Why do you need these relationships? 
F1. RESOURCES FOR HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
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F1.1. What is the total amount of money you require each year to deliver health care? 
F1.2. What percentage are you able to get? 
F1.3. How much financial resources have you received for health care delivery in the 
municipality? (please complete the table) 
TABLE A: SOURCES OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Year Central Government transfers 
00  
01  
02  
03  
04  
05  
06  
07  
08  
 
F1.4. What legal backing do you have for the mobilisation of internally generated funds? 
G1. ACCESS TO THE DACF 
G1.1 Do you have access to the DACF? Or Does the MCE release the 1% for HIV/AIDS 
for you to do health programmes? (please complete table with Yes or No) 
Access to the DACF between 2000 and 2008 
Year Releases of DACF for HIV/AIDS (Yes/No) 
00  
01  
02  
03  
04  
05  
06  
07  
08  
 
G1.2. Why Yes or No (Do detail discussion of answers for each year) 
H1. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHPS 
H1.1. To what extent has the CHPS been implemented? 
H1.2. How have the following groups/institutions/organisations/individuals contributed to 
the implementation of the CHPS? 
H1.3. The Municipal Assembly 
H1.4. Assembly members 
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H1.5. NGOs 
H1.6. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
H1.7. Religious groups (and mission hospitals/clinics) 
I1. ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES 
I1.1. Which civil society group mobilise to demand improvement in health care in the 
municipality? (NGOs, churches, mosques, Youth Groups etc) 
I1.2. What health issues/grievances/demands around health care delivery have been raised 
by civil society groups in the municipality? 
I1.3. How did you address these issues/grievances/demands? 
I1.4. What formal procedures/channels are there for civil society groups to present their 
grievances/demands around health care in the municipality to you? 
I1.5. What formal channels are there for stakeholders in health care delivery to access 
information about health care in the municipality? 
I1.6. What informal channels are there for civil society groups to present 
grievances/demands around health care in the Municipality? 
J1. AWARENESS ABOUT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OTHER 
GROUPS/ORGANISATION/INSTITUTIONS 
J1.1. What kind of relationship exist between the following? 
J1.2. Municipal Assembly and Traditional Authority 
J1.3. Municipal Assembly and NGOs that mobilise around health care 
J1.4. Municipal Assembly and Religious groups 
J1.5. Municipal Assembly and Donor Agencies 
J1.6. NGOs and Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
J1.7. NGOs and Religious groups (churches and mosques) 
J1.8. NGOs and Donor Agencies 
J1.9. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) and Religious groups (churches and 
mosques) 
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K1. PREPARATION OF HEALTH PLANS (Focus on HIV and AIDS) 
K1.1. How are plans made? Or what is the process involved in preparing health plans? 
(Look for a stage-by-stage process of activities. Look for any inputs from MA, traditional 
authorities, civil society groups, donor agencies etc). 
 
 
L1. HISTORY OF HEALTH PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS 
(please complete table) 
 
Year Programme/project Funding Agency Programme/project history 
-who pushed for it, who initiated it etc 
00    
01    
02    
03    
04    
05    
06    
07    
08    
 
M1. DHMT 
M1.1.  How does the DHMT operate? 
M1.2.  How many representatives are from the Assembly and CSOs? 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Questionnaire for the Municipal Assembly 
 
Devolution and Deconcentration in Action: A Comparative study of Five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana 
 
PART A to be answered by the Municipal Coordinating Director 
 
A1. RELATIONSHIPS AND NETWORKS WITH OTHERS AROUND ISSUES OF 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE MUNICIPALITY (Focus on HIV and AIDS) 
A discussion around the relationship between the MA and the groups/organisations/institutions/individuals listed below 
around health care delivery. 
A1.1. Health issue(s) 
A1.2. History and the nature of relationship 
A1.2.1. ethnic relations 
A1.2.2. neighbourhood ties 
A1.2.3. old-school networks 
A1.2.4. political party (NDC or NPP) 
A2. Architects of the relationship 
A3. Relevance of the relationship 
A4. How the relationship is maintained 
B1. PERSON WITH WHOM CONNECTED 
B1.1. Municipal Directorate of Health Services 
B1.2. NGOs in health care delivery (list specific NGOs) 
B1.3. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
B1.4. Religious groups (churches and mosques etc.) 
C1. ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES 
C1.1. Civil society groups that mobilise around health care in the municipality. The health 
issues of importance to them and why 
C1.2. Methods used to make the claims and why 
C1.3. The response of the MA to the demands and why the MA respond the way it does 
Thank you for your time 
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PART B to be answered by Municipal Planning Officer 
 
D1. HEALTH PROGRAMMES/PROJECTS 
(Complete Table B below) – Focus on HIV and AIDS if possible 
 
Year Programme/project Funding Agency Programme/project history 
-who pushed for it, who initiated it etc 
00    
01    
02    
03    
04    
05    
06    
07    
08    
 
For each of the programmes/projects listed, discuss the roles played by any 
groups/organisations/individuals. 
Thank you for your time 
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Questionnaire for Traditional Authorities to be answered by the Paramount Chief 
 
Devolution and Deconcentration in Action: A Comparative study of Five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana 
 
A1. RELATIONSHIPS AND NETWORKS WITH OTHERS AROUND HEALTH 
CARE DELIVERY IN THE MUNICIPALITY 
 
A1.1. Which of these groups/organisations/institutions/individuals does the traditional 
authority have any kind or relationship with? (Focus on the Chief) 
 
A1.1.1 Municipal Director of Health Service 
A1.1.2. NGOs in health care delivery (list specific NGO) 
A1.1.3. Municipal Assembly (the MCE, MCD or any other key staff) 
A1.1.4. Assembly Members 
A1.1.5. Religious groups (churches and mosques etc.) 
 
A1.1.6. ethnic relations 
A1.1.7. neighbourhood ties 
A1.1.8. old-school networks 
A1.1.9. political party (NDC or NPP) 
A2. If there was any kind of relationship with any of these 
groups/organisations/institutions/individuals ask the following: 
 
A2.1. When was it established? 
A2.2. Who established it? 
A2.3. Why was it established? (probe for content – purpose) 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Questionnaire for Civil Society Groups (NGOs, religious groups) to be answered by the 
leaders/heads 
 
Devolution and Deconcentration in Action: A Comparative study of Five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana 
 
A1. ABOUT RESPONDENT 
 
A1.1. Name: 
A1.2. Position: 
A1.3. How long have you been the leader/head of this organisation? 
 
B1. BASIC DATA ABOUT ORGANISATION 
 
B1.1. Name of organization 
B1.2. Date of establishment 
B1.3. How long has this organisation operated in this municipality? 
B1.4. Mission statement/Goals and Objectives 
 
C1. MEMBERSHIP AND INCENTIVES FOR BEING A MEMBER 
 
C1.1. Who are the members of the organisation? 
C1.2. How do people become members? 
C1.3. What incentives do people get to be members? Or why would anybody want to be a 
member of this organisation? 
C1.4. What do members lose if they lose their membership? 
 
D1. FUNDING 
 
D1.1. What are your sources of funding? 
D1.2. How did you get access to the source(s) listed? 
D1.3. Why do/does these/this source(s) continue to support your activities? 
 
E1. HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS AND NETWORKS WITH OTHERS 
AROUND ISSUES OF HEALTH CARE 
E1.1. Which of these groups/organisations/institutions/individuals did the past leader/head 
have any kinds of relationship with? (tick) 
E1.1.1. Municipal Health Directorate (Municipal Director of Health Services) 
E1.1.2. Municipal Assembly (the MCE, MCD or any other key staff) 
E1.1.3. Assembly Members 
E1.1.4. Traditional Authority (the chief/queenmother) 
E1.1.5. ethnic relations 
E1.1.6. neighbourhood ties 
E1.1.7. old-school networks 
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E1.1.8. political party (NDC or NPP) 
E1.2. When was it established? 
E1.3. Who established it? 
E1.4. Why was it established? (probe for content – purpose) 
 
F1. ACTIVITIES AROUND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY (HIV and AIDS) 
F1.1. What activities do you engage in as far as health care delivery in the municipality is 
concerned? 
F1.2. Who are your beneficiaries? 
F1.3. Who are your targets/claimants? 
F1.4. How do you go about making your claims? 
F1.5. If you have any success of influencing health care delivery in the municipality what 
are they? 
F1.6. If there are failures or difficulties as far as your mission statement and goals are 
concerned what are they? 
 
G1. ACTIVITIES OF THE DHMT 
G1.1. Have you been part of the DHMT? 
G1.2. Please describe its activities in terms of what you do 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Questionnaire for elected Assembly members 
 
Devolution and Deconcentration in Action: A Comparative study of Five Municipal 
Health Directorates in Ghana 
 
A1. BASIC DATA ABOUT RESPONDENT 
 
A1.1. Name: 
A1.2. Electoral area: 
A1.3. Political party affiliation (optional): 
 
B1. HISTORY OF OFFICE 
 
B1.1. How long have you been in office? (Number of terms: 3 maximum): 
B1.2. Why did you decide to be Assembly member? 
B1.3. How did you get elected? (look for detailed stories around campaigns and funding): 
 
C1. LIFE IN THE ASSEMBLY 
 
C1.1. Which sub-Committees have you been a member of? (list all): 
C1.2. Do you have any experiences to share as far as your job is concerned? 
 
D1. NETWORKS WITH HEALTH DIRECTORATE 
 
D1.1. Which of the following relationships do you have with the officers in health listed? 
D1.1.1. Ethnic 
D1.1.2. Neighbourhood 
D1.1.3. Old-school 
D1.1.4. Political party (NDC or NPP) 
 
E1. Health Directorate Staff 
 
E1.1. Health Director 
E1.2. Deputy Director of Nursing Service 
E1.3. Disease Control Officer 
 
F1. HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS 
F1.1. Number of years 
F1.2. How did it start? 
F1.3. How beneficial are these relationships? 
Thank you for your time 
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Appendix C: Suggested actors to be focus for HIV and AIDS in Ghana 
 
Table 9: Suggested actors to be focus for HIV and AIDS in Ghana 
Issue: role of state agencies, NGOs, traditional leaders and religious bodies supporting victims of violence and HIV 
Strategic Response 
Upper West Upper East Northern 
Chiefs/Traditional Authorities:  
 
 Identify negative traditional and 
cultural practices and replace, 
eradicate or modify them as the 
case may be 
 Enact bye-laws through District 
Assembly Committees and see 
to the implementation of such 
laws 
 
Religious Bodies: 
 
 Include the effects of violence 
and HIV in their sermons 
 
NGOs: 
 
 Strengthen collaboration among 
service providers 
 Support state agencies to 
embark on effective 
sensitisation on the effects of 
violence and HIV 
 Support victims‟ groups with 
financial assistance 
Chiefs/Traditional Authority: 
 
 Advocacy and 
sensitisation of community 
members 
 Make bye-laws to enforce 
acceptance of victims 
 Accept changes to 
negative cultural practices 
 
Religious Bodies: 
 
 Counsel victims 
 Provide Food 
 Sensitise communities on 
stigmatisation and 
discrimination 
 
NGOs: 
 
 Educate and counsel 
victims 
 Empower victims 
economically through 
training and provision of 
credit facilities 
 Open shelters for battered 
women 
Chiefs/Traditional Authority: 
 
 Create awareness 
 Modify negative cultural 
practices 
 Enforce bye-laws  
 
Religious Bodies: 
 
 Preach against violence 
and stigmatisation 
 Support victims of 
violence and HIV/AIDS 
e.g. Counselling, supply of 
food and basic needs 
 
NGOs: 
 
 Create awareness on e.g. 
stigmatisation, violence, 
HIV and AIDS 
 Support victims of HIV 
and violence with income 
generation activities and 
skills training 
 Support orphans 
Issue: What kind of policies, laws etc need to be put in place at national, district and community levels to address violence 
and HIV? 
Source: ActionAid Ghana (2007: 93). Note: table has been edited by author.  
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Appendix D: Author in Assembly meetings 
 
Plate 1: New Juaben 
Author in General Assembly meeting at Koforidua on the ….
New Juaben M. Assembly
 
 
 
Plate 2: Ho 
Author in General Assembly meeting at Ho on …
Ho Municipal Assembly
 
 
 
Plate 3: Obuasi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obuasi Municipal Assembly
Author in General Assembly meeting at Obuasi on …
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Appendix E: : Strength of informal ties between health staff and elected Assembly 
members 
 
The process 
 
Number of Assembly members = 10 
Therefore each health officer could score = 100 percent for each of the ties 
For each of the tie, total score for the MHD = sum of scores for all 3 health staff 
represented by X 
For each of the ties, average score for the MHD = X/3 = K 
 
This implies that there will be: 
 
K1 (Old-school tie)  
K2 (Neighourhood relations) 
K3 (Ethnic bonds) 
 
Overall MHD average = (K1+K2+K3)/3 (see last column of Table 6) 
 
The strength of informal ties is interpreted using the same scale:  
strong ( ≥ 70%); medium (40%-69.5%); and weak (≤ 39.5%) (Table 6 in Chapter 6)  
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Appendix F: Health Directorate‟s embeddedness with CSOs 
 
(a) Embeddedness with NGOs 
The procedure 
Maximum score each Health Directorate will obtain depends on the number of NGOs. This 
is represented by Q  
Ethnic ties are represented by E  
Neigbhourhood relations represented by N 
Old-school relations represented by O 
 
Sum of all „E’ obtained by each MHD is represented by X1 
Sum of all „N‟ obtained by each MHD is represented by X2 
Sum of all „O‟ obtained by each MHD is represented by X3 
The percentage for each of the cases: (X1+X2+X3)/Q * (100%). 
 
The strength of embeddedness is determined by the scale: strong (≥70%); medium (40%-
69.5%); and weak (≤ 39.5%). 
 
(b) Embeddedness with religious groups and traditional authority 
Maximum score that each of the Health Directorates could obtain would depend on the 
number of chiefs and pastors with whom the health Directorate had ties. This is represented 
by Z 
  
Sum of all „E‟ obtaine is represented by T1 
Sum of all „N‟ is represented by T2 
Sum of all „O‟ is represented by T3 
The percentage for each case: (T1+T2+T3)/Z * (100%) 
   
The strength of embeddedness is determined using the same scale. 
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Appendix G: Overall pattern of informal ties and embeddedness 
 
Table 10: Overall pattern of informal ties and embeddedness 
Hypotheses Informal ties Embeddedness 
Case Executive 
members of 
Assembly 
Elected 
Assembly 
members 
Civil Society OrganiSations 
Ho 31.25% 26.66% (33.33%+50.00%)/2=41.66% 
Obuasi 50.00% 26.66% (40.74%+44.44%)/2=42.59% 
Sunyani 47.91% 36.66% (44.44%+50.00%)/2=47.22% 
Techiman 18.75% 10.00% (15.55%+11.11%)/2=13.33% 
New 
Juaben 
 
72.91% 
 
66.66% 
 
(52.77%+55.55%)/2=54.16% 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Note: strength of informal ties and embeddedness: strong (≥ 70%); medium (40%-69.5%); and weak 
(≤ 39.5%) 
 
Table 10 presents a summary of the pattern of informal ties and embeddedness only. 
Figures in the cells are brought from Table 3 in Chapter 3 (under informal relations 
and embeddedness). At a glance, they provide a quick picture of how the cases 
perform in comparison with all others. Health officers have strong ties between 
them and Executive officers of the Assembly when the number of existing ties as a 
percentage of all ties is 70 percent or more. Strong ties will be the ideal as they are 
likely to facilitate how health officers work with Executive officers of the 
Assembly. Weak ties exist when the score is up to 39.5 percent. In the argument of 
this study, weak ties are unlikely to promote collaboration and coordination between 
different parts of the local state. 
 
Similarly, the density of ties between health staff and leaders of the selected groups 
within civil society show the extent to which health staff are embedded within 
society. As with ties with Executive officers or elected Assembly members, strong 
embeddedness is when the score is 70 percentage and beyond. 
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Appendix H: Determining performance: assessment of HIV/AIDS plans 
 
(i) Compilation of key AIDS management measures 
(ii) Determining consultation with elected Assembly members 
Based on the contents in table 9, I asked each of the Assembly members whether they were 
consulted by the Health Directorate or not. I then converted the number consulted into 
percentages. Having obtained the percentages, I used the same scale to determine the level 
of consultation is high if (≥70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and low (≤ 39.5%) (see table 10). 
 
(iii) Determining consultation with leaders of civil society groups 
The leaders of civil society groups I used are (i) leaders of NGOs, (ii) traditional rulers or 
chiefs, and (iii) religious leaders. Based on the contents in table 9, I asked them whether 
health staff consulted them. I sought a „Yes‟ or „No‟ answer. 
 
The maximum score that could be obtained by each case would depend on the number of 
NGOs, chiefs, and religious leaders consulted is represented by „B’  
 
When the answer is Yes, it is represented by „+‟ 
When it is No, it is represented by „–„ 
  
For each of the cases, the level of consultation is (sum of all „+‟)/B * (100%)  
 
Using the same scale, consultation is high (≥70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and low (≤ 
39.5%) (see Table 12 in Appendix J and Table 13 in Appendix K) 
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Appendix I: Key measures for managing HIV/AIDS  
Table 11: Summary of key measures for managing HIV/AIDS across cases 
 
Cases 
 
AIDS management measures 
Role of elected Assembly members Role of known NGOs 
Ho -Train counsellors for Voluntary Counselling and Testing for sub-
municipalities 
-Institute Home-Based Management of PLWA in the municipalities 
-Identify all NGOs in health since most of them are not known to the 
health department 
-Collaborate with NGOs 
-Ensure collaboration among NGOs 
-elected Assembly members did not have 
any knowledge about health department‟s 
plans to address AIDS 
-they also did not know about NGOs in 
AIDS operating in their electoral areas 
-elected Assembly members show no 
interest in AIDS programmes 
-NGOs provide care and support for 
PLWAs 
-NGOs provide education campaigns 
-out of the 3 NGOs, one was not consulted 
by the health department about AIDS 
programme preparation or implementation 
Obuasi -Strengthen already Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Treatment centres 
-Collaborate with all MDAs working in the area of HIV/AIDS 
-Intensify Heath Promotional activities on HIV/AIDS in churches, 
mosques, and Faith-Based healing centres 
-Implement workplace HIV/AIDS policies 
-Undertake Voluntary Counselling and Testing of the HIV (communities, 
schools, offices). Know Your Status campaign 
-Support hospitals to undertake PMCT 
-Set up committee on HIV/AIDS to oversee the activities of the Ministries, 
Departments, and Agencies (maiden meeting held in conjunction with the 
Municipal Response Initiative (MRI) and MDAs to reflect on the 
achievements and the way forward) 
-Radio discussions and Advocacy Communication and Social mobilisation 
activities 
-Train community-based Surveillance Workers in home-based care and 
support of clients 
 
-only few of the Assembly members were 
consulted during field visits by health 
department in connection with preparing 
health plan 
 
-out of the 3 NGOs, one was not consulted 
by health department about AIDS 
programme preparation or implementation 
-NGOs responsible for providing care and 
support for PLWAs 
-NGOs provide education campaigns 
Sunyani -Change peoples‟ attitude towards AIDS (stigmatisation and 
discrimination)  
-Collaborate with NGOs to educate people about the disease 
-Intensify Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission services 
-Identify and care for PLWAs 
-Provide Voluntary Counselling and Testing 
 
-some elected Assembly members did not 
play any role in AIDS programmes of the 
health department 
 
-3 out of 5 NGOs were consulted by 
health department 
-NGOs provide care and support for 
PLWAs 
-NGOs provide education campaigns 
-most of the NGOs are involved in 
implementation of AIDS programme by 
health department 
Techiman -Undertake awareness campaign for behaviour change in schools 
-Reduce stigmatisation, Cultural and belief systems that undermine AIDS 
-elected Assembly members did not know 
about AIDS programme by the health 
-only few of the NGOs are known by 
elected Assembly members  
306 
 
 
programme 
-Provide Care and Support to PLWA orphans (nutrition and livelihood 
support) 
-Encourage the use of ART services  
-Distribute condoms to commercial sex workers 
-Coordinate implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes 
-Train community volunteers for home-based care 
-Provide Counselling and Testing and PMCT services (use local FM 
stations) 
-Organise workshop for Police and Fire Service officers 
-Collaborate with the Municipal Assembly on District Response Initiative 
(MRI) 
-Collaborate with NGOs to facilitate support from global fund to assist 
PLWAs 
department 
 
-most NGOs did not have any idea about 
AIDS programme in the health 
department 
-NGOs provide education campaigns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New 
Juaben 
-Promote the use of female condom by Commercial-Sex-Workers and 
female hawkers 
-Promote sale of condoms in supermarkets, funeral grounds, internet cafes, 
drinking bars, markets, restaurants, hotels 
-Establish abstinence clubs in schools 
-Promote HIV/AIDS awareness in mass media 
-Train community volunteers for Home-Based Care 
-Support PLWAs to access Anti-Retroviral Treatment 
-Promote Counselling and Voluntary Testing and intensify Mother-to-
Child Transmission services 
-Provide care and support to Orphans and Vulnerable Children (AIDS 
affected and infected children)  
-most elected Assembly members were 
consulted to make inputs into AIDS 
programmes 
-most elected Assembly members were 
made to play leading role during outreach 
visits to their electoral areas  
 
-all 4 known NGOs, were consulted about 
the health department‟s AIDS 
programmes 
-NGOs provide care and support for 
PLWAs 
-NGOs provide education campaigns 
 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Note: Compiled from (i) Health plans, High Impact Rapid Delivery (HIRD) plans (ii) In-depth interviews with Health Directors, Disease Control Officers, Public Health Nurses, 
Deputy Directors of Nursing Services, HIV/AIDS Focal persons at the health departments, and elected Assembly members 
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Appendix J: Consultation with elected Assembly members 
 
Table 12: Consultation with elected Assembly members 
Case Proportion of assembly members consulted 
Ho 30% 
Obuasi 60% 
Sunyani 30% 
Techiman 30% 
New Juaben 60% 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Note: The value in percentage is the proportion consulted out of 10 
 
 
Table 12 presents the number of electe Assembly members who were consulted with by the 
Health Directorates. The number is expressed as a percentage of the number interviewed 
which is 10 in each of the cases. 
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Appendix K: Consultation with civil society organisations 
 
Table 13: Consultation with civil society actors 
 
Ho 
 
Obuasi 
 
Sunyani 
 
Techiman 
 
New Juaben 
1 2 3 4 C1 P1 1 2 3 C2 P2 P3 1 2 3 4 5 C3 P4 1 2 3 4 5 C4 P5 1 2 3 4 C5 P6 P7 
- - + - + + + + + - - + + - - + - + + - - - - - + + + + + - + + + 
50.00% 66.66% 57.14% 28.57% 85.71% 
 
Key: 
Ho Obuasi Sunyani Techiman New Juaben 
1-AFRIWEB 
2-FUGI 
3-CLF 
4-LDF 
C1-Chief1 
P1-Pastor1 
 
1-SSF 
2-PACAI 
3-KWADA 
C2-Chief2 
P2-Pastor2 
P3-Pastor3 
1-BV 
2-CSD 
3-6th MWF 
4-MH 
5-WASA 
C3-Chief3 
P4-Pastor4 
1-FO 
2-ACF 
3-IFFN 
4-LPA 
5-BCSF 
C4-Chief4 
P5-Pastor5 
1-4-H Ghana 
2-M25H 
3-FHF 
4-RW 
C5-Chief5 
P6-Pastor6 
P7-Pastor7 
Notes:  
I maintain the pastors and chiefs with their identification numbers from Table 4. 
 
Table 13 shows the number of leaders of the selected CSOs that were consulted by health staff. Consultation is represented by “+” 
whilst non-consultation is represented by “-“ For each case, all the sum of all “+” were expressed as a percentage of total number of 
CSOs. The results are interpreted using the same scale: high (if ≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and low (≤ 39.5%). In the analysis of 
causal relations, high level of consultation (scores of 70 percent or more) were expected to lead to development of shared interest 
around management of HIV and AIDS between health staff and leaders of the CSOs. Low level of consultation (scores of up to 39.5 
percent) are unlikely to facilitate the development of shared interests between health officers and CSO leaders. 
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Appendix L: Overall performance: consultation with elected Assembly members and 
CSOs 
 
Table 14: Overall performance: consultation with elected Assembly members and CSOs 
Case Performance Indicators 
Consultation with elected assembly 
member 
Consultation with Civil Society 
actors 
Ho 30% 50.00% 
Obuasi 60% 66.66% 
Sunyani 30% 57.14% 
Techiman 30% 29.28% 
New 
Juaben 
 
60% 
 
85.71% 
Note: Performance is high if (≥ 70%), medium (40%-69.5%), and low (39.5%) 
 
 
Table 14 only presents a summary of the overall performance in terms of consultation with 
elected Assembly members and leaders of the selected groups within civil society that were 
interviewed. The figures in the second column show the number of elected Assembly 
members that were consulted as a percentage of the total number interviewed (10 in each 
case). The figures in the third column are the averages taken from Tables 7 and 8 in 
Chapter 7. They are also the same figures in the 14
th
 row in Table 3 in Chapter 3 which 
show the number of selected CSO leaders interviewed expressed as a percentage. 
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Appendix M: Hon. Alhaji Alhassan with his citations 
 
 
 
 
Appendix N: Fighting HIV/AIDS by Obuasi Municipal Assembly 
 
 
Plate 1: Obuasi Municipal Assembly’s campaigns to stop AIDS
There were several of this kind of message/sign board scattered across the municipality
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Appendix O: Per capita amount received from central government 
 
Table 15: Per capita amount received from central government by each Health Department (2000 – 2008) 
 
 
Year  
Ho Obuasi Sunyani Techiman New Juaben 
Amt. 
(GH¢) 
Pop. Per 
capita 
Amt. 
(GH¢) 
Pop. Per 
capita 
Amt. 
(GH¢) 
Pop. Per 
capita 
Amt. 
(GH¢) 
Pop. Per 
capita 
Amt. 
 
(GH¢) 
Pop. Per 
capita 
2000 15,294 200,000 0.08 18,823 115,564 0.16 16,302 179,165 0.09 13,659 174,600 0.07 9,727 136,768 0.07 
2001 23,100 202,000 0.11 16,491 120,187 0.14 19,561 186,332 1.10 18,760 179,838 0.10 18,727 139,503 0.13 
2002 6,087 204,020 0.03 19,284 124,994 0.15 14,867 193,785 0.07 3,074 185,233 0.01 17,933 142,293 0.12 
2003 16,976 206,060 0.08 25,936 129,994 0.20 24,198 201,536 0.12 17,017 190,789 0.08 26,740 145,138 0.18 
2004 28,248 208,121 0.14 30,739 135,194 0.23 18,372 209,597 0.08 11,552 196,512 0.05 52,176 148,040 0.35 
2005 40,375 210,202 0.19 37,295 140,601 0.27 41,479 217,981 0.19 23,596 202,407 0.11 46,824 151,000 0.31 
2006 37,283 212,304 0.18 51,739 146,225 0.35 22,375 226,700 0.09 46,635 208,479 0.22 17,220 154,020 0.11 
2007 26,510 214,427 0.12 24,582 152,074 0.16 31,810 235,768 0.13 35,445 214,733 0.16 20,534 157,100 0.13 
2008 64,296 216,571 0.30 73,176 190,907 0.38 69,863 245,199 0.28 71,399 221,174 0.32 86,312 160,242 0.53 
Source: Author‟s construct, July 2010 
Notes:  
(i) Sources of figures for the construction of the table include: HMA (2007), TMA (2006); NJMA (2006), OMA (2006a), OMHD (2008), SMA (2006a), and various 
interviews 
(ii) These are central government transfers under ITEM 3 (e.g. HIV/AIDS, malaria, immunisation). Even though Ghana‟s currency was changed in 2004, I have converted all 
amounts to the new Ghana Cedi (GH ¢). 
(iii) Population figures are based on 2000 Population and Housing Census which estimates that from 2000, the growth rate for the municipalities are: Techiman (3.0%), 
NJMA (2.6%),  
(iv) Population for Ho: http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?r=7&_=116&sa=4260 (accessed on 18th July 2010) 
(v) Population of Obuasi: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obuasi (accessed on 18th July 2010). Obuasi‟s population growth rate was 4 percent (OMA 2006a; OMHD 2008). 
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Appendix P: Mode of seeking election to the Assembly 
 
Section 7 of Local Government Act, Act 462 of 1993 
 
(1) A candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or to any lower local government 
unit shall present himself to the electorate as an individual, and shall not use any symbol 
associated with a political party. 
(2) A political party shall not endorse, sponsor, and offer a platform to or in any way 
campaign for or against a candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or any lower 
local government unit. 
(3) A candidate who contravenes subsection (1) of this section commits an offence and on 
conviction shall have his nomination cancelled by the Electoral Commission. 
(4) A political party which contravenes subsection (2) of this section commits an offence 
and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five million cedis 
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Appendix Q: Main interviewees and date of interviews 
 
Ho Municipal Area Obuasi Municipal Area Sunyani Municipal Area Techiman Municipal Area New Juaben Municipal Area 
Municipal Health Directorate Municipal Health Directorate Municipal Health Directorate Municipal Health Directorate Municipal Health Directorate 
 
Position 
 
Date of interview 
 
Position 
 
Date of interview 
 
Position 
 
Date of interview 
 
Position 
 
Date of interview 
 
Position 
 
Date of interview 
 
 
MHD 
 
 
09/10/2009 
 
 
MHD 
 
 
14/08/2009 
 
 
 
MHD 
 
 
 
 
14/05/2009 
 
 
MHD 
25/11/2008 
26/11/2008 
21/08/2009 
 
 
MHD 
21/10/2008 
23/10/2008 
24/10/2008 
 
DDNS/PHN 
 
06/10/2009 
 
DDNS/PHN 
 
17/08/2009 
 
DDNS 
24/11/2008 
21/08/2009 
 
DDNS 
22/10/2008 
27/10/2008 
 
DCO 
 
09/10/2009 
 
DCO 
 
17/08/2009 
 
DCO 
17/11/2008 
21/08/2009 
 
DCO 
 
24/10/2008 
Municipal Assembly Municipal Assembly Municipal Assembly Municipal Assembly Municipal Assembly 
 
MCD 
 
30/10/2009 
 
MCD 
 
24/08/2009 
 
MCD 
 
20/06/2009 
 
MCD 
 
20/11/2008 
 
MCD 
18/10/2008 
20/10/2008 
 
MPO 
 
30/10/2009 
 
 
MPO 
 
25/08/2009 
 
MPO 
 
13/05/2009 
 
MPO 
 
18/11/2008 
 
MPO 
17/10/2008 
18/10/2008 
 
HIV/AIDS F/P 
 
30/10/2009 
 
HIV/AIDS F/P 
 
25/08/2009 
 
HIV/AIDS F/P 
 
14/05/2009 
 
HIV/AIDS F/P 
 
27/11/2008 
 
HIV/AIDS F/P 
 
21/10/2008 
Elected Assembly Members Elected Assembly Members Elected Assembly Members Elected Assembly Members Elected Assembly Members 
HAS1 07/10/2009 OAS1 14/08/2009 SAS1 06/05/2009 TAS1 26/10/2009 NAS1 14/10/2009 
 
HAS2 
 
07/10/2009 
 
OAS2 
 
14/08/2009 
 
SAS2 
19/05/2009 
09/06/2009 
TAS2 26/10/2009 NAS2 16/10/2009 
HAS3 07/10/2009 OAS3 14/08/2009 SAS3 21/06/2009 TAS3 26/10/2009 NAS3 16/10/2009 
 
HAS4 
 
07/10/2009 
 
OAS4 
 
21/08/2009 
 
SAS4 
13/05/2009 
19/05/2009 
TAS4 27/10/2009 NAS4 16/10/2009 
HAS5 09/10/2009 OAS5 21/08/2008 SAS5 06/05/2009 TAS5 27/10/2009 NAS5 16/10/2009 
 
HAS6 
 
09/10/2009 
 
OAS6 
  
SAS6 
05/05/2009 
06/05/2009 
TAS6 27/10/2009 NAS6 17/10/2009 
HAS7 12/10/2009 OAS7  SAS7 08/05/2009 TAS7 28/10/2009 NAS7 17/10/2009 
HAS8 12/10/2009 OAS8  SAS8 08/05/2009 TAS8 28/10/2009 NAS8 17/10/2009 
HAS9 10/10/2009 OAS9  SAS9 13/05/2009 TAS9 28/10/2009 NAS9 17/10/2009 
HAS10 10/10/2009 OAS10  SAS10 13/05/2009 TAS10 28/10/2009 NAS10 18/10/2009 
NGOs NGOs NGOs NGOs NGOs 
 
AFRIWEB 
 
08/10/2009 
 
SSF 
 
17/06/2009 
 
BV 
 
27/11/2008 
06/05/2009 
 
FO 
 
26/11/08 
 
4-H Ghana 
 
22/10/08 
 
 
FUGI 
 
 
08/10/2009 
 
 
PACA 
 
 
18/06/2009 
 
 
CSD 
 
 
06/05/2009 
 
 
ACF 
 
27/11/08 
 
 
 
Mathew 25 
 
6/11/08 
 
CLF 
 
08/10/2009 
 
KWADA 
 
20/08/2009 
 
6th MWF 
 
18/05/2009 
 
IFFN 
 
27/11/08 
 
FHF 
 
24/10/08 
314 
 
 
 
 
LDF 
 
 
07/10/2009 
  
MH 
 
18/05/2009 
 
LPA 
 
 
 
 
RW 
 
 
  
WASA 
 
08/05/2009 
 
BCSF 
 
26/11/08 
Religious Groups Religious Groups Religious Groups Religious Groups Religious Groups 
 
HRG1 
 
09/10/2009 
ORG1   
SRG1 
 
10/06/2009 
 
TRG1 
 
12/11/08 
NRG1 24/11/08 
 
ORG2 
  
NRG2 
 
24/11/08 
Traditional Authority Traditional Authority Traditional Authority Traditional Authority Traditional Authority 
 
HTA 
 
10/10/2009 
 
OTA 
  
STA 
07/05/2009 
20/05/2009 
 
TTA 
11/11/08  
NTA 
22/10/08 
Radio Stations Radio Stations Radio Stations Radio Stations Radio Stations 
- - - - SRS1 17/11/2008 TRS1 17/11/2008 NRS1 24/10/2008 
- - - - - - TRS2 17/11/2008 - - 
- - - - - - TRS3 17/11/2008 - - 
- - - - - -     
- - - - - - Health officer 05/05/2012 Health officer 02/05/2012 
Source: Compiled by Author, October 2009 
 
